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This study in political theory explores the challenges and potentialities of modern politics as
envisaged within the work of Jurgen Habermas, Hannah Arendt, and Alasdair Maclntyre. It
begins by confronting Max Weber's seminal diagnosis of the crisis era of late modernity.
According to this diagnosis the world-historic process of rationalization is deeply
paradoxical in promising freedom and yet threatening servitude under an "iron cage" of
deadening specialism and senseless hedonism. Weber responds to this paradox by conceding
that all endeavour will henceforth take the form of a specialism but that it can be rendered
meaningful by a fundamentally inscrutable decision to devote oneself to a cause or vocation.
For those called to politics this means accepting three ineluctable facts: that politics is a
contest over the means of violence in which the "ethics of brotherhood" has no place; that
freedom endures only when organizational machines are dominated by charismatic leaders;
and that there are no criteria to determine political legitimacy except the subjective decision
to act responsibly and not otherwise.
With Weber as both foil and problem, this study then explores the profound impact his
pessimistic diagnosis of modernity, elitist account of politics, and subjectivist theory of
ethics have had on Habermas, Arendt, and Maclntyre. Although very different in terms of
philosophic background and commitment, these three are united by a critical urge to think
beyond his dark prescriptions. Each begins with and largely accepts Weber's narrative of
modernity, seeing in his account of rationalization and disenchantment an apposite
description of the age. Each nonetheless rejects his understanding of the grounds and
possibilities of politics, accusing him of complicity in the very realities he sought to resist.
The central argument of this study, however, is that these thinkers simultaneously aid and
hinder the attempt to think beyond the "iron cage," their thought both a critique of and yet an
abutment to Weber's.
They aid in providing an alternative to subjectivism, Weber's neglect of the
intersubjective constitution of political life. This alternative not only shows the untenability
of his reduction of politics to dominative struggle and his normatively foreclosed
understanding of legitimacy, but also helps recover suppressed political possibilities.
Drawing from each thinker selectively, the conclusion is that a robust politics ensures the
conditions of human flourishing and advances citizens' active capacities. However, these
theorists hinder reappraisals of politics' potentialities in two decisive ways. In reaction to
Weber's analysis of the "iron cage" they bifurcate political reality into free and fallen realms,
with the result that pivotal arenas of human activity, administration, the economic, and even
v
the state, are depoliticized and thus distanced from critique. Similarly, in reaction to
Weber's identification of politics with dominative struggle, they go to the opposite extreme
of identifying the genuinely political with communication, "being-with," or dialectical
conversation. A robust politics, instead, must avoid bifurcation and refuse to reduce the
political to a singular logic.
Abbreviations
Max Weber
ES - Economy and Society
GEH - General Economic History
PE - The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit ofCapitalism
PV- "Politics as a Vocation"
PW - Weber: Political Writings
RRW - "Religious Rejections of the World"
SPWR - "The Social Psychology of World Religions"
SV - "Science as a Vocation"
Jiirgen Habermas
BFN - Between Facts andNorms
BR - A Berlin Republic
CES - Communication and the Evolution ofSociety
IO - The Inclusion ofthe Other
JA - Justification andApplication
MCCA - Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action
NC - The New Conservatism
PDM - The Philosophical Discourse ofModernity
PNC - The Postnational Constellation
STPS - The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere
TCA, I - The Theory ofCommunicative Action, Volume I
TCA, II - The Theory ofCommunicative Action, Volume II
Hannah Arendt
BPF - Between Past and Future
CR - Crises of the Republic
EJ - Eichmann in Jerusalem
EU - Essays in Understanding
HC - The Human Condition
vii
LKPP - Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy
LM, I- Life ofthe Mind, Volume I
LM, II - Life ofthe Mind, Volume II
MDT - Men in Dark Times
OR - On Revolution
OT - The Origins ofTotalitarianism
Alasdair Maclntyre
ASIA - Against the SelfImages ofthe Age
A V - After Virtue
DRA - Dependent Rational Animals
PP - "Politics, Philosophy, and the Common Good"
SS - "Social Science Methodology as the Ideology ofBureaucratic Authority"
TRV - Three Rival Versions ofMoral Enquiry
WJ - Whose Justice? Which Rationality?
viii
Acknowledgements
My work on Max Weber's legacy and the crisis of modern politics began in the University of
Edinburgh in 1999 and concluded in Queen's University, Belfast in 2004. Over the course
of that time I incurred many debts for which I am both extremely grateful and at a sincere
loss to repay. 1 would like to thank Dr Kimberley Hutchings and Professor Russell Keat for
their devoted and conscientious supervision ofmy work and for their critical insights into the
thought of Arendt, Habermas, and Maclntyre. Not only have Kim and Russell shaped my
understanding of modernity and politics in profound ways, but their example and support
have encouraged me to pursue an academic career.
Heartfelt thanks must also go to colleagues and friends for their steadfast
encouragement, inspiration and company, in particular Leigh Ahearn, Jane Astbury, Kate
Bilton, Allyn Fives, Richard Freeman, Paul Graham, David Halliday, Tim Hayward, Iseult
Honohan, Vasso Karageorgiou, George Karyotis, Thomas Moore, Takeshi Nakano, Laura
Reagan, Andy Schaap, Andrea Schellenberg, Markus Worner, and Naoki Yajima. Especial
thanks are due to Andy, whose deep understanding of Hannah Arendt and thought-provoking
observations and advice on virtually every aspect of this study were indispensable to the
development ofmy arguments.
I gratefully acknowledge the support of the National University of Ireland and the
Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Edinburgh, which in providing me with
studentships made this study possible. My thanks as well to the School of Social and
Political Studies at the University of Edinburgh, where I had the opportunity to broaden my
teaching skills, and to the School of Politics and International Studies, Queen's University,
Belfast, where I secured a post enabling me to bring my work to a conclusion. I am
particularly indebted to Chris Armstrong, John Garry, Vincent Geoghegan, Susan McManus,
Ciaran O'Kelly, and Shane O'Neill for their warm welcome and for a congenial atmosphere
in which to theorize contemporary politics.
I would also like to acknowledge the great debt owed to Nico and Ruth Flavin and to
Eddie and Philomena Touhy. The generosity and friendship they showed me and my family
were unparalleled and made a sometimes very difficult period easier to bear than it otherwise
would have been. Finally, I would like to thank my family. My parents, Teresa and Philip
Breen, for all their help, my sons, William and Richard, for the happiness they have brought,
and my wife, Diana, for her understanding, companionship, and supreme patience.
ix
Introduction
It is often assumed by Anglo-American analytical thinkers that the discipline of political
theory, the sustained enquiry into the challenges and possibilities of political life, lay
moribund from the late 19th century until the publication of John Rawls' A Theory ofJustice
in 1971. This study rejects that simplistic and parochial view. Instead, it insists on a
perceptible thread of reflection and theory stretching from the late 19th to the late 20th
century, a thread, however, having its starting point not in Anglo-American thought but in
the work of Max Weber. A figure straddling both centuries, Weber's impact on subsequent
generations is undeniable. Having a formative influence on thinkers as diverse as Simmel,
Parsons, and Schumpeter, he also inspired those schools of political science confidently
professing the 1950s "end of ideology" thesis, the belief that in modern politics substantial
change or reform is impossible and undesirable. However, his greatest impact was on those
who rejected this and equivalent complacent theses. On the right were his pupils Roberto
Michels and Carl Schmitt, who extrapolated from his reflections on modernity to vindicate
Italian Fascism and Fiihrerdemokratie. On the left stood his friend Georg Lukacs and the
Frankfurt School, a generation of critical thinkers who sought to uphold Marx's
emancipatory project in the extreme circumstances of 20th century society. All were united
by the Weberian insight that modernity represents a uniquely problematic moment, a trial of
the West's conception of itself and of humanity as a whole.
The focus of this study is not Weber's social-scientific appropriators or his role in 1930s
and 1940s Continental political thought, which is well documented, but his impact on three
seminal political thinkers whose work has come to prominence in the last four decades:
Hannah Arendt, Jiirgen Habermas, and Alasdair Maclntyre. Although not strictly
contemporaries, Arendt belonging to an earlier generation than Habermas and Maclntyre,
their thought is defined by a fundamental preoccupation with problems first articulated by
Weber. Underlying Weber's sociological and political reflections is an elementary concern,
the "ordeal of personality" faced by the mature individual in the modern age (Turner, 1992:
166-170). This ordeal issues from two closely interrelated developments. The first is the
process of "rationalization," of humanity reaching ever greater knowledge and technical
mastery, which in late modernity culminates in the "iron cage" of bureaucratic routine and
"mechanized petrification." The second is the process of "disenchantment," of divesting
oneself of illusions, which concludes in the abandonment of individuals to a radical
"polytheism" of warring values, none of which can claim rational superiority. These
movements are paradoxical insofar as they began with an urge towards freedom and meaning
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and yet conclude in bondage and meaninglessness. From this Weber urged a fundamental
revaluation of traditional conceptions of the individual subject, ethics, and politics in the
hope of preserving freedom and individuality from annihilation in a temporal context
wherein these values appeared exhausted. The modern individual is abandoned to a world
increasingly dominated by instrumental modes of thought and "machine-like" organizations
and in which the only available values or ends are consciously chosen and willed values or
ends. What prevents the threatened stultification of human life, its homogenization within
the now ineluctable "iron cage," is solely the individual's faith-full decision to endorse a
"cause," whether scientific, political, artistic or religious. The tragedy of such choice is the
impossibility of living a whole or integrated life and the truth that only those belonging to
intellectual or political "aristocracies" can now shoulder the serious tasks of culture, the
modern world being what it is. In politics the existential urgency of this choice is further
compounded by the truth that in choosing to act politically one endangers one's "soul," since
politics is fundamentally and desirably a matter of conflict and thus at odds with the "ethic
of brotherliness."
The core argument of this study is that Habermas, Arendt, and Maclntyre see in
Weber's vision an insightful diagnosis of the modern age, its inherent crisis character. But
while Weber commended resignation to the "iron cage," to the reduction of meaning or value
to the inner will, and to politics as a realm of domination, these thinkers insist that there is
still room for critique, for contesting and altering this state of affairs. Believing his thought
both a diagnosis and a perpetuation of modernity's ills, they defend alternative conceptions
of the subject, ethics, and politics. These alternative conceptions, it is argued, show in
combination a path beyond Weber's "iron cage" and extreme subjectivism, hence their
importance to the theorization of future political possibilities. However, it is a further key
argument of this study that in thinking beyond the "iron cage," Habermas, Arendt, and
Maclntyre also close off important possibilities and in doing so blind us to some of politics'
principal challenges. In short, it is claimed that in reorienting theory towards an
intersubjective account of the subject, reason, and action these thinkers arrive at a non-
dominative vision of politics and a non-subjective account of ethics, but that this admirable
achievement is undermined by a false dualist division of socio-political reality into "free"
and "fallen" realms and a tendency to reduce politics to a foundational non-conflictual
"logic." This political Manichaeism and reductive turn are not unique to these thinkers but
underlie much contemporary political theory.
In Chapter One we set the parameters of this argument by exploring Weber's narrative
of modernity. There we explain "rationalization," "disenchantment" and his monist vision
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of the "iron cage," the belief that systematization and regimentation of life-conduct cuts
across all spheres of human life, from the economic to the familial. We also pay attention to
his uncompromisingly realist description ofmodern politics, legitimation and the antinomies
governing political life, that is, the fated conflict between social order and individual action,
instrumental political machines and individual value-commitment, bureaucratic-legal
authority and charismatic domination. Deploring the "soft eudaemonistic outlook" which
mistakes "political for 'ethical' ideals," domination and conflict for equality and happiness,
Weber insists that under the conditions of the modern state and capitalist economy a minimal
space of freedom is preserved only by the rule of gifted leaders over bureaucratic machines
and passive masses (PW: 27). To lend credence to our overall argument, we then provide a
brief overview of Habermas, Arendt, and Maclntyre's agreements with Weber, their
rejection of his political prescriptions, and the shared aims and goals evinced in that
rejection.
In Chapters Two, Three, and Four (Part I) we move to explore Jurgen Habermas'
response and alternative to Weber. Chapters Two and Three set out Habermas'
reconstruction of Weber's rationalization thesis in terms of communicative reason and his
consequent argument that modernity is not doomed to self-enslavement but defined by real
emancipatory potentials, as was made clear by the 18th century bourgeois public sphere.
Failing to take this into account, Weber inevitably concluded in a subjectivization of
morality and an instrumentalized politics. This error, Habermas argues, is compounded by a
failure to distinguish "lifeworld integration" from "systemic integration," which led Weber
to the dominative antinomy of leader and machine. A politics drawing on the
communicative realms of civil society and the public sphere has the resources to resist the
systemically defined administrative state and economy, thus upholding the ideals of
solidarity and equal citizenship.
Chapter Four critically evaluates Habermas' project. Here we argue that the move to an
intersubjective conception of human identity undercuts Weber's subjectivist account of
ethics and politics and therefore provides a way of understanding the challenges of modern
life without dismissing modernity as a whole. The important political consequence of
Habermas' intersubjective turn is the retrieval of "legitimacy" as a critical concept and of
citizenship as potentially open to all. Yet Habermas cannot be endorsed in full. His
separation of "ethics" (the good) from "morality" (the right) and insistence that only a
minimal procedural morality can avoid Weber's "polytheism of values" contradicts the
squarely "ethical" grounds of his theory and indeed threatens a recrudescence of
subjectivism. There is also the problem of his overly abstract understanding of critique and
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emancipation, which mistakenly denies the constitutive role of experience. These
philosophical difficulties are exacerbated by serious political shortcomings. Habermas'
lifeworld-system dualism, his bifurcation or ontological spatialization of reality into
communicative and strategic realms, ensnares him in the paradox of advocating radical
democracy and yet consigning huge swathes of human activity, in particular governmental
decision-making procedures and the economic, to a "norm-free sociality" largely impervious
to democratic rule. Questioning this dualism and his enthusiasm for civil society, we are
also led to question his opposition between communicative and strategic politics.
Responding to Weber's one-sided stress on domination with an equally one-sided stress on
mutual understanding and consensus, Habermas underestimates the possibility of
argumentative stalemate and thereby neglects the temporal urgency or risk under which
political life stands, the fact that decisions often have to be made under conditions of staunch
dissensus, even hostility.
Hannah Arendt is the focus of Chapters Five, Six, and Seven (Part II). Emphasizing
Arendf s distance from Habermas in Chapter Five, we move in Chapter Six to explicate her
relation to Weber, her belief that modernity is characterized by "world alienation" or a loss
of shared culture, the result, as Weber saw, of the modern turn in upon the self and the
processes of capitalist expropriation. Yet Arendt accuses Weber of perpetuating this
situation. His subjectivization of meaning and value further enfeebles the shared "common
world," a failing buttressed by his reduction of political action to an instrumental means-end
category. Fearing the consequences of this, in particular hubristic violence and
totalitarianism, Arendt argues for a separation of "the social" and "the political" realms, the
former encompassing the "necessities" of material reproduction and technical administration,
the latter concerned with indeterminate tasks open to ceaseless reflection and "free" debate.
Upheld by a complex of relationship where none is sovereign, the political realm is a fragile,
contingent achievement brought into being by citizens constituting their polity through a
fundamental act of promising and held together by friendship, a love of human plurality.
Chapter Seven clarifies the ways in which Arendt carries our argument forward. She is
significant, we maintain, not only for augmenting Habermas' arguments regarding
intersubjectivity and legitimation, but also for defending a robust ideal of citizenship that in
demanding a transformation of the state itself challenges Weber's notion of government and
avoids privileging civil society. Furthermore, her keen awareness of contingency and risk,
the boundlessness and irreversibility of political deeds, provides an important correction to
Habermas' thought without succumbing to Weberian political realism. There are substantial
difficulties, however. In overreaction to instrumental conceptualizations of politics, Arendt
4
Introduction
masks the purposive elements of all action and thus renders her account of political activity
implausible. A similar problem dogs her theory of political judgement, whose dependence
on the fiction of a disinterested "world spectator" unwittingly ends in a re-subjectivization of
political reflection. These philosophical difficulties contribute to political weaknesses
remarkably similar to those observable in Habermas. Although advocating a radical
transformation of government and state, Arendt's sharp separation of "social" and "political"
concerns, "necessity" and "freedom," leads to a relegation of administration and the
economic to technocratic domination and therefore to a politics that reinforces, rather than
contests, Weber's "iron cage." With Habermas, as well, Arendt tries to exclude the strategic,
enmity, from the authentically "political" and consequently overlooks the problem of
remainder, the truth that every polity is founded on particular promises which are inevitably
contested. The result is that her conception of citizenship and understanding of political risk
are far less compelling than they might have been.
Chapters Eight, Nine, and Ten (Part III) examine the ways in which Alasdair Maclntyre
represents an advance upon Habermas and Arendt. Defending Maclntyre against liberal
caricatures in Chapter Eight, in Chapter Nine we document his agreement with Weber that
formal rationalization and capitalism end in an abjuration of uniquely human powers that
belies any cheerful faith in "progress." But while Weber deplores the fragmentary character
of modern life, his antinomical dynamic between charismatic leaders and managerial
machines in fact reinforces this fragmentation. Hence Maclntyre's turn to the idea of
"practice," a conception of action and reasoning that in combining purposes and values into
an integrated whole and stressing the ethical-normative dimensions of all human activity,
avoids Weber's binary of subjective value-commitment and instrumental calculation.
Guided by notions of the "good" or human flourishing, practical reasoning is a historically
rooted learning process in which human beings attain reflective independence, an
independence premised, nonetheless, on embeddedness within vulnerable "networks of
giving and receiving." Sidelined in modernity, a politics of practice endures only in those
communities which resist the manipulative intrusions of oligarchic markets and states.
The success of Maclntyre's attempt to transcend the "iron cage" is assessed in Chapter
Ten. Rejecting moral proceduralism and "disinterested" accounts of judgement, he is
significant for recognizing the political priority of the "good" and for providing a conception
of ethical reasoning that offers a concrete, experience-centred understanding of emancipation
without yielding to Weberian subjectivism. His most important contribution, however, is a
non-dualist theorization of political practice that intimates a recovery of "system" and "the
social" as realms constitutive of human identity and therefore the proper focus of ethical
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critique. However, Maclntyre relinquishes many of these gains. Thinking modernity wholly
degenerate, he holds to a nostalgic vision of pre-modern societies that sits ill with his
reliance on modern modes of thought and undermines his account of ethical learning. A
further effect of this nostalgia is that his laudable non-dichotomous theorization of practice
succumbs to a dichotomous division of local community and state reminiscent of Habermas
and Arendt's bifurcations, thus lending support to their view of large-scale organization as
"fallen." Moreover, in reaction to Weber's radically agonistic conception of the cosmos, the
incessant war of "gods and demons," Maclntyre defends a metaphysic where all human
endeavour appears as endeavour towards a singular good or summum bonum. Not only does
this metaphysic deny the objective heterogeneity of human goods and the possibility of
ethical dilemmas, but it encourages a vision of politics where the ineradicable role of
compromise, opposition, and struggle suffers occlusion.
This study concludes, in Chapter Eleven, with an assessment of the challenges and
possibilities of political life in a post-Weberian era. Drawing from our critique of Habermas,
Arendt, and Maclntyre's attempt to break beyond the "iron cage," we offer three arguments.
The first relates to conceptualizations of the modern subject and the goal of political
endeavour. Stressing intersubjectivity, we maintain that politics is fundamentally concerned
with questions of human flourishing, with the nurturing, facilitation, and encouragement of
individual maturity, and that this perfectionist orientation does not entail a denial of value
pluralism or a surreptitious embrace of tyranny. Our second argument concerns the
prevalent and yet pernicious tendency towards dualist accounts of socio-political reality.
Spurning contemporary celebrations of civil society, we argue that dualist theories lead to
large areas of life being arbitrarily excluded from critical reflection and to the privileging of
politically peripheral over politically pre-eminent realms. By contrast, a truly critical politics
takes the view that all spheres of life impact upon human identity and are therefore open to
change, but it rejects Weber's metaphor of "mechanized petrification" in demanding an
internal transformation of large-scale organization, the state and economy. In our final
argument we reflect upon the problem of political ethics. Because an emphasis on mutual
understanding or friendship is no less a distortion than an emphasis on domination or
conflict, we defend a mediating position that acknowledges the entwinement of
communication with coercion, friendship with hostility. Awareness of the need to engage in
strategy and sometimes even to coerce does not lead to Weber's embrace of "diabolical
powers" or a blunt amoralism, but to an ethical conception of strategy which stresses the
necessity of moderation and care. It is this moderation and care alone that prevent human
deeds from degenerating into atrocity, thereby preserving hope.
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Chapter 1
Modernity, 20th Century Political Crisis, and Max Weber
"He who seeks the salvation of the soul, of his own and of others, should not seek it along
the avenue of polities, for the quite different tasks of politics can only be solved by violence"
CPV: 126).
To understand the crisis character of modern politics is to understand Max Weber. On the
basis of this claim, this study advances a threefold argument as regards the political theories
propounded by Jiirgen Habermas, Hannah Arendt, and Alasdair Maclntyre. The first stage
in this argument is to show that Habermas, Arendt, and Maclntyre, three very different
thinkers, are bound together by Weber's thought, each beginning and largely concurring
with his diagnosis of modernity. In his account of society as increasingly regimented and
meaningless, of politics as a struggle over the means of domination, and of ethics as a
question of the inner will, they recognize, we will argue, the challenges faced by modern
men and women. This leads to the second stage in our argument, the attempt to explain why,
despite their indebtedness, they reject his conclusions. For various reasons and to different
ends, but united by a critical urge to think beyond the present, Habermas, Arendt and
Maclntyre dispute Weber's depiction of the grounds and possibilities of political life,
thinking him complicit in the realities he sought to resist. The third stage in our argument,
however, is to show how in moving beyond Weber these thinkers both aid and hinder our
understanding of these possibilities. Advancing an intersubjective vision of political and
ethical life, they rightly contest Weber's equation of politics with domination and of ethics
with an unfathomable inner will, but at the unfortunate and unnecessary cost of dividing
reality into "free" and "fallen" realms and of ridding politics of contestation, struggle.
Here we lay the foundations of this threefold argument by exploring Weber's
understanding of modernity and of modern politics. We begin by explaining why modernity
emerges in his thought as a predicament that nonetheless has to be affirmed (Ch I.I.).
Weber's radical ambivalence towards the modern age hinges on two momentous themes, the
world-historical process of rationalization and the fate of the free individual in an era of
disenchantment. As themes they encapsulate the crisis nature of modern politics, insofar as
rationalization tragically concludes in an "iron cage" of bureaucratic routine and
specialization which negates human freedom and cultured achievement, themselves
paradoxically the products of the same rationalization process.
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Chapter 1 Modernity and Max Weber
Having set out his theory of rationalization and disenchantment, we then explore
Weber's account of politics and his vision of mature or responsible personhood (Ch 1 .II).
Resigned to the truth that all activity now takes the form of a specialism, Weber argues that a
minimally meaningful way of life can be achieved by a fundamental act of choice between
the antagonistic realms of art, science, religion, and politics. For the responsible politician,
the Verantwortungsethiker, this choice demands acceptance of three fundamental facts: that
politics is an elitist sphere of violence utterly inimical to the religious "ethics of
brotherliness"; that modern politics is inevitably machine-like, dependent on a bureaucratic
apparatus; and that political life cannot be justified or legitimated by reference to shared
values, since politics is an instrumental means which admits of a radical plurality of
conflicting values. Arguing from these facts and his belief that ethics and normative
justification reduce to a question of individual decision, Weber insists that meaning and
freedom endure only if exceptional individuals assume control over political machines so as
to dominate and steer the passive mass of modern citizens. We then conclude with a brief
outline of the responses offered by Habermas, Arendt, and Maclntyre to Weber's "anti-
prophetic prophecy," their belief that his thought is both a diagnosis and yet a perpetuation
of the "iron cage" (Ch 1 .III.). This outline provides a necessary background to the claims
and arguments subsequently defended in Parts I, II, and III.
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Chapter 1 Modernity and Max Weber
1.1.) Occidental Rationalization and Polytheistic Disenchantment
Weber approached the problem of modernity in his role as a social scientist. A central
presupposition of his "interpretive sociology" is the individual rationalizing subject as the
fundamental unit of analysis. All action, that is, behaviour distinguished by conscious or
semi-conscious intention, has meaning only if it arises from individuals or individuals acting
in groups; all else is the product of non-rational habituation or biological impulse. That key
opposition between meaning and animal-like habituation leads not to idealism, for Weber
fully recognized the full importance of "material interests," but rather to an understanding of
social action attuned to the normally slight, but sometimes world-altering role of ideas, as
can be seen, for instance, in the charismatic genesis of salvation religions (SPWR: 280). In
Weber's view it is imperative to free sociology from the romantic "nonsense" of "collective
concepts," which are frequently disingenuous slogans for partisan political ends (Weber,
quoted in Stammer, 1971: 115). Spurning the politicization of scholarly research by
conservatives and radicals in Wilhemine Germany, their transformation of "nation" into
"Nation" and "class" into "Class," a central impulse to Weber's methodological
individualism is, consequently, a desire to ground a value-free (werturteilsfrei) science.
Weber affirmed the methodological stricture to render facts unto the scientist and values
unto the preacher because he deemed all scientific attempts to ground political orders a
species of gross self-deception. Truth and value are equally important, yet perfectly
separable. His understanding of scientific practice stresses personal integrity as coming-to-
clarity, and in this sense draws from the Kantian project of epistemic critique, which is
premised on the claim that human knowledge is constructed and limited knowledge. But
Weber explicitly disavows the emancipatory sense of Kantian critique and thus sets himself
apart from the majority of Kant's appropriators, both liberal and radical.' The goal of
science and of interpretive sociology in particular is not to provide a guide to emancipatory
endeavour or to change the world, but to investigate that world in all its chaos and to submit
one's investigations to empirical falsification (SV: 145). Weber believed that as regards facts
one could know them. Yet the attempt to come to an intersubjective rational appreciation or
justification of ideals or values is conceptually impossible, since values reside primarily
within the heart of the individual and issue from norm-originating prophecy or, which has
often been overlooked, are the products of quasi-biological determination (Turner & Factor,
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1994: 86-90). Values can be rationalized, that is, rendered ever more coherent and
principled (Wertsteigerung), and such has been absolutely crucial to the development of the
West, but this rationalization rests on an epistemologically ungraspable and inscrutable
commitment (SV: 152; 1949: 55). Every significant human accomplishment originates from
a fundamentally irrational yea-saying, even science, for science requires a commitment to
truth, a love of honesty.2 But although the scientist must feel the mysterious attraction of
truth and must, as well, interpret each object of study in light of the relevance it has for his
own culture, its contingent values and epistemological interests, truth is achievable by those
with the integrity and responsibility to see reality unadorned.3
This methodologically and ethically ordained separation of fact and value explains why
Weber understands his historical and general-sociological studies as providing a diagnosis
of, rather than a philosophical mediation upon, the modern age. By "modernity" Weber
means the unique contemporary constellation of the Western world, and to comprehend the
origins of this constellation he introduces the interrelated concepts of "rationalization" and
"disenchantment." Rationalization denotes the multifaceted and contingent processes that
human thought and action have undergone through time and are still undergoing. It means
both humankind's conscious attempt to make the cosmos and life ever more intelligible,
involving increasing knowledge and value-coherence, and the desire to increase mastery,
control, over every aspect of the world. So understood, there are three interwoven and yet in
many ways antagonistic strands to Occidental rationalization: it means an advance in
substantive rationality, in terms of ultimate and often "otherworldly" values being rendered
ever more coherent in thought and in life-conduct; an advance in terms of theoretical
rationality or intellectual conceptualizations of the world, that is, metaphysics and science;
and, finally, an advance in terms of formal rationality, that is, increasing codification or
routinization of behaviour and ever more efficient techniques or methods of control. These
varied strands highlight the perspectivism at the heart of Weber's theory. Something is
"rational" only from a specific perspective, religious asceticism being incomprehensible to
the hedonist, and "value," in general, being "irrational" from a formal-rational viewpoint
(SPWR: 293-294; PE: 37-38, 140).
1 As Weber saw it, "far from a true social science revealing the potential for liberation ... it began by
imposing even greater order on the world than the confused aspiration of individuals could manage,
and ended by showing just how chaotic life really was" (Albrow, 1990: 157).
2
(SV: 143). On the "rationalization" of value and the inscrutability of commitment, see Albrow
(1990: 60-62, 124-125), Kalberg (1980), and Turner (1992: 163).
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Underlying these rationalization strands and their accompanying forms of rationality is
Weber's (ES\ 24-26) ideal-typical categorization of the forms of social action. Weber speaks
of purposive-rational {zweckrational) action as a form of action orientated to calculating the
most efficient deployment of objects and human beings as means to an actor's given ends.
Value-rational (wertrational) action, conversely, consists in the adherence to an ultimate
value, such as beauty, goodness, or duty, for its own sake and regardless of success. These
two forms of action underpin formal and substantive rationality respectively, and are in their
pure form "limiting cases," the one devoid of moral reference, the other a fanatic moralism
(.ES\ 26). Because theoretical rationality, however, connotes cognitive processes, it has only
an indirect link to action (Kalberg, 1980: 1149). The remaining action-types are the
"affectual" (affektuell) and traditional, both of which are defined as non-rational because of
being largely unconscious. Affectual or emotionally charged action is action determined by
the feelings of the actor. Although distinct, affectual action can transform into value-rational
action once actors reflect upon their emotions, a point key, for Weber, to grasping how
revolutionary impulses and charismatic prophecies undergo substantive rationalization.
Traditional action concerns actions done on the basis of unconscious habituation and custom.
Everyday life generally takes this form; it is a mix of purposive-rational or value-rational
action that has become unreflective. Once reflected upon, however, traditional action can
transform into "value-rational" or "purposive-rational" action. Weber (ES: 26) insists that
these modes of action are simply ideal-types, which in reality are quite mixed and whose
classificatory "usefulness" can "only be judged in terms of its results."
Although Weber explores rationalization in its various forms, his main concern is with
formal rationalization, which he thinks has come to dominate the modern West. Thus the
task of his sociology is to explore how a purposive mode of action guided by formal and
calculating modes of thought gained contingent ascendancy over other modes of human
action and thought, in particular the substantive or value-rational, and why, consequently,
"culture" appeared to face extirpation (Kalberg, 1980: 1176). In this context a central theme
in Weber's work is religious prophecy's effect on forms of "economic rationalism," by
which he means the modes of everyday, practical life (PE: xxxix; GEH: 354; SPWR: 293).
In everyday life material interests and purposive-rational means-end calculations
predominate, yet these interests and calculations are shaped by the remnants of once visible
ethical-religious values. Not actual theological doctrines, but their psychological and social
3 "Reality" is infinitely complex and allows only partial views of the "whole," but these partial
insights depend on separating fact from value, how things are and how we want them to be (Weber,
1949).
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consequences, how they have been applied to everyday activity, have been of momentous
significance in the West's transformation (PE: 137-138). In Weber's view religion, now
deemed irrational by a hegemonic science to which it gave birth, was the prime engine of
rationalization in driving humanity from nature to culture, by which he means the living of a
mature, reflective, or free way of life (RRW: 357). The origins of rationalization lie in the
magical and "natural" pre-history of man. Culture arose in the turn against magical
polytheism, the primal adherence to nature deities, towards an intellectualized and ever more
consistent monotheism, as embodied in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, that sought to
render suffering comprehensible, "rational," by showing that the world "in its totality is,
could, and should somehow be a meaningful 'cosmos'"(SPWR: 273, 281).
It is Weber's fundamental claim that a tragic irony permeates this turn. Religion's
theodicies, the metaphysical well-spring of reflective appraisals of the world and of the
"ethics of brotherliness" underpinning the Abrahamic faiths, provoke a historical movement
of which religion itself, in the end, falls victim (SPWR: 281; RRW: 351). This is evinced
most clearly in the fate of the early modern Puritan. Puritanism plays a pivotal role in
Weber's thought insofar as the Puritan's "systematic rational ordering of the moral life as
whole" represents the culmination of Western rationalization, the affirmation of self-
discipline and responsibility as the defining attributes of mature individuality (PE: 47, 73,
79). However, assured of salvation in his calling to a God-glorifying labour, the Puritan
could not have known that his austere and world-altering values would, in industrial
capitalism, finally give way to a "nullity" that imagines "it has attained a level of civilization
never before achieved" (PE: 124). A nullity because the religious urge to render the
mysterious intelligible suffers extinction at the hands of an unthinking discipline which
religion itself helped bring about by forcing all activity to conform to an ascetic ideal of
methodical life-conduct that subsequently divested itself of any value-rational orientation.
And a false civilization insofar as the urge to move beyond animal nature to culture, to a
state of conscious and deliberate mastery of the world and a reflective understanding of it,
ends in "mechanized petrification" and unreflective hedonism (PE: 124).
Weber also explains this paradoxical process in terms of a historically unfolding
conflict between individual action and social order, this conflict taking the form of an
antinomical dynamic between value-originating charisma, which in the form of prophecies
gave rise to substantive rationalizations of religious-ethical worldviews, and the necessary
routinization of charisma and worldviews into institutional forms. Drawing from Protestant
theology, he defines charisma as "a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of
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which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman,
or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities"(£5: 241). For Weber charisma in
whatever form captures the vital element of human existence, that which is novel and
uniquely individual.4 The origin of every belief system and every institutional form, no
matter how regimented it may now appear, is generally some charismatic figure or moment.5
Prophecy is revolutionary in demanding a break with the past, for the prophet "like the
genuine military leader and every true leader in this sense, precedes, creates, or demands
new obligations" (ES: 243; SPWR: 285, 296). In order to endure over time, however, these
extraordinary and socially precarious obligations require both conscious substantive
rationalization and "routinization" (Veralltaglichung) into durable and therefore ordinary
institutional forms (ES: 246-254, 1121-1123). Routinization can be of a traditional or
bureaucratic-legal kind, largely depending on whether hierarchical positions are decided by
custom or by calculable tests and qualifications. In the modern West the latter form
increasingly wins out, because the traditional represents a profoundly non-rational uncreative
force, whereas formal rationality facilitates the growth and expansion of novel modes of
organization. The problem, however, with modern bureaucratic-legal routinization is that its
rigid instrumental formalism now threatens to evaporate the substantive well-springs of its
own development, the originary charisma of the great individual and the substantive
rationalization he inspired suffering dissipation.
Although Weber places strict qualifications on his rationalization thesis, the implication
is that it outlines a contingent world-historical movement having a retrospectively
discernible path. The end-point of that movement finds trenchant portrayal in The Protestant
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904-1905), where he argues that the movement of
modernity consists in a ruthless, progressively secular systematization of thought and activity
(PE: xxviii-xxxiii). Apart from the idea of increasing coherence, systematization entails the
elimination of uncertainties and a progressive increase in clear and replicable patterns of
behaviour. Here is it important to recognize that Weber holds to a monist understanding of
the fate of the West, a vision of ineluctable systematization across all spatial boundaries and
spheres of life, the totality of human activities (Barnes, 1995: 208). Thus, intellectual
enquiry has become wedded to the rational method of experimentation and subordinated to
the criteria of rational proof, as has historical scholarship (SV: 134). Music and architecture
4 Charisma also refers to the magnetism of the "inner demon" guiding one's vocation and the "allure"
ofmetaphysical and aesthetic worldviews (RRW: 354).
5
"Prophecies have released the world from magic and in doing so have created the basis for our
modern science and technology, and for capitalism" (GEH: 362). See Mommsen (1989: 150-151).
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are organized according to the ever greater calculation of sounds through notation and
orchestral divisions and a repeatable, principled utilization of line and spatial perspective.
The university, the state and the political party as phenomena unique to the West are now
dependent upon a division of labour that facilitates subject- and task-specialization and
necessitates highly developed bureaucratic hierarchies with sophisticated techniques of
control. These bureaucratic hierarchies are "machine-like" insofar as their division into
higher and lower offices, dependence on abstract rules and trained officials, use of files, and
specialization of functions enable a "monocratic" organizational structure ideally suited to
the instrumental and predictable achievement of policy goals (ES: 220-221, 956-958). Life
in the modern West would be unthinkable without these organizations and their specially
trained officials, for it is their expert and formally superior knowledge that underpins and
facilitates modern mass democracy and the mass economy (ES\ 223).
Lastly, the modern West is the age of the "expectation of profit by the utilization of
opportunities for exchange, that is on (formally) peaceful chances for profit," in other words,
capitalism (PE: xxxii). Radically impersonal, dependent on exact calculations of profit and
loss, requiring a formally free pool of labour and calculable modes of production, modern or
"rational" capitalism is the apotheosis ofWestern systematization. Pivotal here is the growth
of formal-rational procedures in the organization of an expropriated labour and of an
expropriated officialdom. By "expropriation" Weber (PW: 279-281) means, with Marx, the
separation of the worker from the means of production and of the official from ownership of
office accomplished respectively by corporations and the state. Warfare became the first
mode of human activity to be expropriated when Cromwell's Army of Saints substituted
unwavering discipline for Cavalier dilettantism (PE: 247). Other spheres followed
analogous paths. With the partial exception of the family and the erotic, politics, economics,
law, and science (the university) all became increasingly depersonalized and efficient (PV:
81-82; SV: 131). As regards capitalist expropriation and the formally free market, Weber is
quite clear that they bring an enormous and desirable increase in material productivity, but
they do so at the cost of smothering "spontaneous human relations" and of unleashing an
uncontrolled consumerism (ES: 636; GEH: 357). The substantive values that defined the
high cultural watermark ofWestern civilization, in particular the urge towards reflection and
a universal "ethic of brotherliness," therefore suffer extirpation. No longer a locus of
creative and self-creative energies, the individual appears now as a quantitative unit to be
administered according to precise regulations and contented with material goods. Formal
rationality, the obsession with categorization and regularity, combines with a blind purposive
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rationality, a closed relation of means to ends, to sideline values that might otherwise lend
these ends sense. In 1932 Karl Lowith (1982: 47-48) provided a classic summary of this
process, foreshadowing Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic ofEnlightenment (1947):
That which was originally a mere means ... becomes itself an end or an end in itself....
This reversal marks the whole of modern civilization, whose arrangements, institutions
and activities are so "rationalized" that whereas humanity once established itself within
them, now it is they which enclose and determine humanity like an "iron cage." Human
conduct, from which these institutions originally arose, must now in turn adapt to its
own creation which has escaped the control of its creator.
For Weber, then, the "iron cage" of bureaucracy and capitalism is the endpoint of a millennia
long movement from humanity's natural uncultured infancy to civilized maturity (PE: 123;
ES: 1402). The sad truth is that maturity, the freedom to consciously will one's ends,
becomes subordinated to the very means by which it came into being. Rationalization
liberates and enslaves. What is left, in Goethe's words, is merely "'specialists without spirit,
sensualists without heart'" (PE: 124).
Yet Weber is concerned not just with the loss of freedom in modernity, but also with the
meaninglessness of a rationalized world, its having become thoroughly disenchanted. As
with "rationalization," "disenchantment" (Entzaubergung) has several cognate referents. On
the simplest level it denotes the process of de-magification effected in the primeval turn from
magical symbolism to religion (SV: 139). As a religious development, this culminated in the
radical Puritan rejection of Catholicism's priestly powers; of all religions, Puritanism is the
most "disenchanted" in its extreme hostility to magical sacraments and strict conception of
an unknowable, otherworldly deity (SPWR: 290). More generally, because of
intellectualization and science, modern human beings, if they wished, could fully know the
workings of their environment and world. No longer do "mysterious incalculable forces ...
come into play" and no longer do we need recourse to magical charms to master reality, for
technical means and calculation have usurped the sorcerer (SV: 139). Significantly,
however, disenchantment also refers to the disappearance of moral certainty, the loss of
"objectivities" around which one could mould one's life. Whereas "mechanized
petrification" refers to the formalized social structures in which people find themselves,
disenchantment concerns the effect of a polyvocal rationalization on their personalities. The
one designates the triumph of a single rationalization strand, the other the differentiation or
splitting up of reason itself.
Though born of the religious, metaphysical impulse to render suffering and the universe
meaningful, science paradoxically concludes by asserting the "chaos" of that universe, its
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true lack of meaning (RRW: 352, 355). Indeed, the modern world is one where none can
become "satiated" or content with life, since all possibilities for a sense-conferring "unity"
have been irreparably closed off by the gradual rupture and subsequent advance of the
internal logics of the life-spheres (Lebenssphare) of art, politics, economics, religion (ethics),
science, and erotic intimacy. These realms assume meanings of their own and, as cultural
values, are tied to an inexorable process of advancement or "progress" that impels them
along mutually antagonistic paths. Art is beautiful, as Nietzsche saw, precisely to the extent
that it is not good; science true to the extent it is unbeautiful and ungood; and ethics good on
account of being blind to beauty and deaf to truth (SV: 147-148). Scarred by fundamental
antagonisms, the West has lost the unifying ethical core previously bestowed by Christianity
and has, instead, embraced a plurality of values whose nature it is to forever conflict. The
irony here is not to be neglected: from polytheism rationalization sprang and to it it returns,
albeit this time a disenchanted polytheism.6 Humanity being thrown back upon itself,
suffering and death become meaningless, which entails in turn the meaninglessness of
culture:
... for civilized man death has no meaning. It has none because the individual life of
civilized man, placed into an infinite "progress," according to its own imminent
meaning should never come to an end; for there is always a further step ahead of one
who stands in the march of progress. And no man who comes to die stands upon the
peak which lies in infinity. ... He catches only the most minute part of what the life of
spirit brings forth ever anew, and what seizes is always something provisional and not
definitive, and therefore death for him is a meaningless occurrence. And because death
is meaningless, civilized life as such is meaningless; by its very "progressiveness" it
gives death the imprint of meaninglessness (SV: 139-140; RRW: 357).
Gone then is a trust in salvation which underpinned the universal "ethic of brotherliness." In
its place are "unbrotherly aristocracies" of particularist cultural commitment demanding the
worship of one deity to the exclusion of others (RRW: 354-355; PE: 74-76). Combined with
the unbrotherly Puritan turning in upon the self and belief in predestination, this new
polytheism cut the individual irrevocably off from his fellow human beings and from a sense
of being at home in the world (PE: 63-64, 101). Forced to endure the homogenizing effects
of external organizational forms, the individual paradoxically experiences her inner life as a
mad battle of "gods and demons."
6 We live as the "ancients did when their world was not yet disenchanted of its gods and demons, only
... the bearing of man has been disenchanted and denuded of its mystical but inward genuine
plasticity" (SV: 148).
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l.II.) Maturity, Politics, and Beruf
The ordeal faced by modern human beings is having to live the lonely "inner-worldliness,"
insecurity of values, and alienating impersonality defining the modern age.7 Where Marx
believed "the abolition of religion as the illusory happiness ofmen, is a demand for their real
happiness," Weber sees a very different development, the opening up and then closing off of
human potentialities (Giddens, 1971: 215, quoting Marx, 1964: 44). The great scientific and
economic successes of the age rely on systematization, and Weber makes clear that he values
these in and for themselves, as well as for their indispensability to mass society. At no other
time have organizations been so efficient, at no other time has the productivity of managerial
knowledge been so great. Disenchantment, too, is embraced, for it means escape from
illusions, explaining why Weber admired the Puritan's "rigorous asceticism" and
determination to view the world unadorned. But these are at best ambiguous successes. The
humane dilettantism of the cultivated man, the Chinese Mandarin or the English gentleman,
is no longer possible. "Fate" has dictated that all work and cultural activity be performed as
a "useful" specialism (PE: 19-20, 123; 1948: 243). Specialization certainly contributes to
the real advancement of cultural logics, but it also means the impossibility of living a
meaningfully whole or integrated life.
Yet Weber saw a minimal chance for individuals to assert a subjectively felt sense of
meaning. A fundamental article of his faith, this chance acquires substance in the notion of
"vocation" {Beruf), of being inexplicably called to a "cause" or way of life. That
specialization is unavoidable means, in Weber's view, that only through self-conscious
devotion to a cause "strangely intoxicating" one's soul is authentic personhood achievable
(SV: 135-136). Aware of the loss involved in this devotion, he stubbornly insists nothing
else can conscionably be done, pouring scorn on those romantics and religious who yield to
irrational sensualism or worn Church dogmas {SV: 155). Praying futilely for prophets in a
prophetless time, their "intellectual sacrifice" guiltily refuses to affirm the cold reality that
mature personalities embrace (RRW: 352-355).
This honest existentialist pathos informs Weber's attempt to envisage a liberal politics
attuned to the strictures of sociology. Here a despairing disbelief in long-cherished liberal
dogmas joins with a tenacious insistence on liberal ideals, the individual as the ultimate
7 On the Puritan's lonely "inner-worldliness," his being in yet not of the world, which stands for
Weber as a metaphor for modernity in general, see {PE: 60, 101, 259; SPWR: 291; RRW: 349).
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source of value.8 He breaks with the tradition of Western political thought in rejecting all
talk of natural law, participatory democracy, or freedom as the destiny of humanity,
scientific rigour impelling him toward an unrelenting political realism. Political realism in
Weber's sense has nothing to do with "metaphysical" or "moral" realism, the claim that the
universe is directly knowable or that our moral beliefs have an objective status; rather, it
refers to the assumption that politics is a realm of warring interests where truth or morality
play a minor role.9 This realism forces Weber to the conclusion that under modern
conditions the attempt to realize "true" democracy would lead to rule by wealthy dilettantes,
wasteful incompetence, and general instability (ES\ 948-952; Held, 1987: 148-150).
Admirable in intent, time-honoured normative ideals are crushed upon the rocks of the
present. The problem, then, is how to fuse a disenchanting acceptance of the present with a
sense of responsible personhood watchful of individual prerogatives and freedoms. Weber's
answer relies upon a value judgement which takes the "facts" of political life into account.
What are these "facts"? An essentially coercive means to any number of good and evil
ends, politics is defined not by justice or virtue but by a timeless dominion ofman over man:
It is not possible to define a political association — not even a "state" — through an
account of the purposes of its action ... there has been no purpose which political
associations have not on some occasion pursued. Thus one can define the "political"
character of an association only through the means — which, though not peculiar to it,
is at all events indispensable for its nature: violence (Gewaltsamkeit) (ES: 55).
Governed by a means-end rationality where success stands paramount, politics is an
"ethically irrational" sphere in which cherished values ceaselessly clash with and wither
before the necessity to coerce. Political life increasingly demands the discipline necessitated
by the appearance of mass society yet, just as in the case of capitalism, this discipline
threatens individual liberty. Thus, caught between the realities of mass society and a
commitment to individuality as an ultimate value, Weber's political thought abounds with
antinomies of which he is acutely aware. Democracy, supposedly premised on popular
sovereignty and equality, is now a matter of party and therefore machine-like organization.
Yet, although opposed, democracy and bureaucracy stand interlinked. The impetus towards
democracy, that is, the removal of patrimonial privilege, demands the levelling effects of
8 Weber rejected old liberal dogmas, because he felt "how profoundly liberal thought and liberal ways
of life were under threat in this modern world" (Mommsen, 1989: 23; Lassman & Speirs: 1994:
xix).
9
See McMahan (1991: 384) and Smith (1991). It is important to stress the gulf between these
meanings of "realism," since a modest moral realism is defended below (Ch 4.II .ii, lO.I.i, 11 .II.).
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bureaucratic organization, even though this "impartial administration" threatens to engulf
democratic ends (PV: 95).
"The central question," for Weber (1924: 412), was therefore to find a way to limit the
scope of this necessary bureaucratic "machinery in order to preserve a remnant of humanity
from [a] fragmentation of the soul." What preserves an optimum of freedom is not the nai've
illusion of equal participation, but a "plebiscitary democracy" headed by strong and
authoritative leaders who, though kept in check by constitutional parliamentarism, rule
according to their own judgements alone.10 Hence Weber's (PW: 308) claim that the elected
president, the Reichsprasident who uses mass demagogy, is the "palladium of genuine
democracy, which does not mean impotent self-abandonment to cliques but subordination to
leaders one has chosen for oneself." Behind this antinomy between machine and leader lies
the opposition between Zweckrationalitdt and Wertrationalitat, as well as the antinomical
dynamic between formal routinization and charisma, order and initiative. For democracy to
be effective there must be clear procedures and party officials, but these in turn have to be
bound by charismatic rule, that is, the charged personality of the gifted individual and his
commands. Wedded to the ideal of liberal individuality, Weber nonetheless accepts as
inevitable the division of modern humanity into a politically active few, a caste of trained yet
subordinate technocrats, and an "intellectually proletarianized" passive mass (PV: 99, 113).
On the level of states, moreover, there exists the further antinomy between adhering to
liberal values and a nationalist, at times imperialist, foreign policy. Early commentators,
such as Lowith (1932), ignored this dimension, but it is beyond doubt that in Weber's world-
view the nation and the individual have equal significance." His liberalism and nationalism
are responses to the same phenomenon, a homogenization of culture that can be slowed only
by the cultivation of competition on intranational and international levels. National
preservation and individual freedom were, to his mind, inextricably linked; without powerful
leaders Germany would fall victim to the dominance of either Anglo-American or Russian
culture, the one already mechanistically petrified, the other tyrannous (PW: 75-79). The idea
of competition informs, as well, his reluctant but firm endorsement of capitalism. Capitalism
is the "iron cage," an immense cosmos in which modern man is destined to toil. Yet in
capitalist societies it remains at least possible for the entrepreneur to act in a conscious and,
10 Weber's (PW: 304-308, 351) disillusionment with post-war German politics underlies this
"solution." However, the idea of exceptional leaders arising from party and parliamentary struggle
defines the whole of his work, "Caesarism" being an inevitable feature of democracy (PW: 222).
1
See, for instance, Raymond Aron (in Stammer, 1971) and Wolfgang Mommsen (1959, 1989), who
stress the imperialist currents of Weber's politics. For a stark expression of these currents, see
Weber's Freiberg Antrittsrede (PW: 1-28).
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therefore, minimally free manner. Under socialism, especially an international socialism,
even this minimal liberty would fall away before the transformation of state officialdom into
an impregnable "shell of bondage" (ES: 1402, 1453).
The dynamic between entrepreneurs and monocratic corporations, as well as the
dynamic between leaders and their machines, issues directly from the deeper dynamic
between two interdependent yet mutually antagonistic forms of authority, that of charismatic
and bureaucratic-legal authority. Weber's theory of authority or "legitimate domination"
(Herrschaft), "the probability that a command with a specific content will be obeyed by a
given group of persons," again shows his distance from traditional political thought (ES: 53).
He accepts the traditional view of authority as the legitimate power (Macht) of a person or
group to command obedience from others who accept this command as valid, and yet
minimizes the traditional philosophical concern with normative justification, since sociology
is concerned with fact, not value. But despite this narrowed use of the term, legitimate
domination is pivotal to Weber's political sociology, providing a solution to a major
theoretical quandary. Although a sociologist, "society" as such did not exist for Weber;
what did exist were individual motivations for action and regularities of action. In rejecting
collective concepts such as "national spirit" or "class consciousness," however, Weber is left
with a peculiar difficulty: if he cannot have recourse to collective concepts or the idea of a
general will, if these are but illusions, how then can he account for the continuance of groups
and group organization?
For Weber the necessary link between individual motivations and continuous social
orders is achieved though the idea of "belief in legitimacy."12 When individuals attribute
legitimacy to an order they express their belief that it is in some way right, proper. To this
extent the "legitimate" is connected with an "ought," but this "ought" can take a plurality of
forms, most of which are irrational. Weber divides these largely heteronomous obligating
beliefs into four sub-categories. These are a belief in "that which has always been," that is,
tradition', belief by virtue of emotional "'faith ... [in the] revealed or exemplary," charisma;
belief in "that which has been deduced as an absolute," value-rational belief; and, finally,
belief by virtue of an order's legality (ES: 36). From the third sub-division it might be
inferred that normative belief is central to Herrschaft, and Weber does in fact say that natural
law reasoning played an important role within Western social orders (ES: 37, 865-880).
12
(ES: 31, 213). As Albrow (1990: 174) argues, it is through "legitimacy" that Weber secured "a
loop back between motives and beliefs, providing the conceptual possibility for a common order to
arise out of the various and conflicting individual motivations, without ever postulating a common
will."
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However, it is not necessary for ethical norms per se to underpin authority structures.
Unconscious habituation is equally effective here, and the sorts of ethical belief that might
fulfil this role are so diverse that the authority-relations upheld admit of infinity. One might
adhere value-rationally to an order either because it embodies the principle of divine
kingship or is premised on Caucasian superiority. Thus, when Weber comes to expound his
typology of legitimate domination he refers simply to traditional, charismatic, and legal
Herrschaft, since value-rational orientation, in the strict sense of rationally chosen norms of
action, is both rare and unlike '"revealed [charismatic], enacted, and traditional law' ... can
[only] support or fail to support particular positive orders, but cannot serve as a positive
order by itself."13 Compounding this is the fact that for Weber, authority means command
and obedience, which entails in turn that the ruled surrender their capacity for moral agency,
whether coerced or not (ES: 215).
To endure a political system needs to continually justify itself by appealing to the
"principles of its legitimation" (ES: 954), be it the charisma of a prophet or legal correctness.
In modern social orders bureaucratic-legal authority, the "belief in the legality of enacted
rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands," has
gained an unassailable pre-eminence (ES: 215). Understood by Weber as a positively
prescribed system of rules and procedures whose validation rests on the form of the legal
system itself and not on extraneous normative values, modern law sets the conditions by
which states and enterprises can govern society and exchange in the market. But here Weber
solves the puzzle of group maintenance in modernity only to face another problem, although
one he rarely voiced. In short, his sociology of domination and law, in being premised on
the positivist view that legitimacy is to be conceived "as the probability that to a relevant
degree the appropriate attitudes will exist and the corresponding conduct ensue," has no
means by which to distinguish well-founded justification from dissembling, rule from
wanton oppression, his key idea being de facto belief in legitimacy and not the substance of
such belief, whether it is in truth warranted.14 As a consequence, when Weber comes to
delineate his ideal of political vocation, this necessarily takes the form of a subjective
entreaty or cry.
That entreaty appears all the more impassioned given the centrality of the political
sphere and its clash with ethics, as Weber perceived it. Violence is politics, "the reasons of
13 Turner & Factor (1994: 102, quoting ES: 37). My reading of Weber here also relies on Beetham
(1985: 264-267; 1991: 6-34), Habermas (TCA, I: 243-271), and Mommsen (1989: 19-22).
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state," its "power pragma," following their own inexorable laws bound by no notion of moral
right (RRW: 334). A cold impersonality and lack of love are virtuous prerequisites in this
realm, especially under conditions of the modern bureaucratic state. That is not to claim
Weber thought politics a mere instrument, as a realm having no significance of its own. In
fact the opposite is true. He defined it as a means, the use of legitimate violence, but that
definition does not capture its cultural importance. Politics assumes a sui generis
significance in two interrelated ways. First, as an autonomous cultural sphere whose dignity
inheres in the conscious embrace of force (RRW: 335). Whereas the ancient polls managed
to reconcile religion and politics in the figure of the city-deity (Athena), modern politics
concerns solely the "internal and external distribution of power" and thus sets itself up as a
rival to the religious-ethical salvation (RRW: 333-334). It is in the extreme moment of war
that political life assumes a self-contained meaning destructive of compassionate
brotherliness. To freely embrace death on the battlefield represents the supreme political
event because in that embrace the warrior places a conscious imprint on what would have
otherwise been a senseless biological process.15
But politics is more than this partisan dignity, the affirmation of life in death. The
second dimension has to do with politics' relation to the other cultural spheres
(Lebenssphare) and, specifically, the ordeal of personality suffered by modern human beings
in that relation. Because employed in the struggle of any number of diverse ends —
religious, economic, and aesthetic — politics has significance commensurate to, indeed
greater than, the other spheres (Albrow, 1990: 166; Turner, 1992: 147-150). Thus, where
previous thinkers privileged religion, Weber privileges the political, insofar as the political
furnishes a fraught, mediating point for cultural value-conflict and the initiation of new
social orders. He does not privilege the political as essence, some enduring conception of
the nature of action, which is ruled out by his four-fold ideal-typical typology of social
action, but rather as a prime formative mode of his personality ideal, human beings as beings
defined by consciously affirmed vocations.
Politics yields the prime formative mode of mature personalities because it is in this
realm that the existential need to make character generating choices assumes greatest
significance. Other cultural value spheres, the spheres of science and of religion, for
example, entail basic presuppositional commitments necessary for activity within those
14
(ES: 214). Mommsen (1989: 21) gives this clear articulation: "for Max Weber 'illegitimate
domination' could not exist at all as a type, but there could only ever be a greater or lesser degree of
empirically extent consent to legitimacy." See also Stammer (1971: 114).
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spheres. These core values are non-disputable, must be accepted or rejected for participation
within each activity. As a means, however, politics rests on no such presupposition: the
actor may act on the basis of any value commitment, even none at all. In politics, then, the
individual must decide which god or demon will govern his soul and in this decision he has
no compass or guide but himself. In so choosing he also has to accept that the tragedy of
politics, that it is doomed to conflict with the ethical injunction to love one's neighbour, is
further exacerbated by the truth that "the final result of political action ... regularly stands in
completely inadequate and often even paradoxical relation to its original meaning" (PV:
117). It is only by affirming this paradox that actors can become true individuals and
impress upon political life a conscious substantive form, thus rendering their deeds genuinely
"legitimate," albeit only from the perspective of their inner cause. To explicate this
possibility, Weber arrives at a worldly ethic antagonistic in equal intensity to salvationary
brotherliness and nihilistic power for power's sake.
Although politics ever confounds traditional ethical dictates and conscience, the actor
can respond to political tragedy in three distinctive ways, of which only one is an
authentically political ethic. The first is hardly ethical at all, the response of the
Machtpolitiker who acts for the sake of power only and whose posing is as vulgar as it is
dangerous (PV: 116). If this "worthless creature" bothers with it, ethics becomes in his
hands merely a cynical tool for self-aggrandizement. The second, however, that of the
"ethics of conviction" or "absolute ends," is capable of a certain nobility. Here actors, and
Weber means specifically those pacifists and socialists whom he opposed before and during
World War I, act strictly according to the inner flame of their beloved cause. Consequences
are immaterial here, for if intentions be frustrated it is not the actor or his cause that is at
fault, rather the world (PV: 121). Thus the Gesinnungsethiker adheres to Christ's Sermon of
the Mount to the endangerment of himself and of others in repudiating a care for the
outcome of his deeds. A "cosmic ethical rationalist" blind to the conflict of ethics and
politics and obsessed with inner purity, he dooms himself and others to ineffectual
fanaticism (PV: 122; RRW: 339; PW: 298).
The authentic politician or Verantwortungsethiker, however, adheres to an "ethics of
responsibility" in recognizing the ethical paradoxes of political action, that to act
successfully he must contract with "diabolical powers," must align himself to a following of
unthinking "spoilsmen" kept in line by the strictest of impersonal discipline, and must, when
15 "Death on the field of battle differs from ... merely unavoidable dying in that war, and in this
massiveness only in war, the individual can believe he is dying 'for' something" (RRW: 335).
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the needs of the day demand, employ dangerous means to uncertain ends (PV: 123). Three
qualities distinguish the responsible politician, who to a remarkable degree resembles
Weber's Puritan. First, passionate devotion to a cause imbues his every action, yet that
passion is no "sterile excitation" but rather matter-of-factness, the transformation of oneself
into an instrument whose use will secure the ends desired. Matter-of-factness requires a
feeling of responsibility, a care for the success of his action and a personal willingness to
stand by it when challenged. He therefore combines value-rational and purposive-rational
action in every deed and is aware that knowing when the end justifies the means relies on the
intricacies of each situation (PV: 122). Last, responsibility means having a sense of
proportion, of being able to distance himself from "things and men" so as "to let realities
work upon him with inner concentration and calmness" (PV: 115). Like the scientist, the
Verantwortungsethiker strives to rid himself of illusions by rendering his cause conceptually
coherent and by evaluating it in terms of its probable practical consequences (SV: 151-152).
Knowing that politics is a "strong and slow boring of hard boards," the responsible politician
devoted to a "'cause,' to the god or demon who is its overlord," accepts the "power-pragma"
with which he has contracted and yet holds out for the "impossible" (PV: 128, 117). By
"impossible" Weber means not the fantasies of the Gesinnungsethiker, rather, he means
goals whose realization is unlikely, but whose pursuit is dictated by the heart and decided by
the head in such a way as to turn aspiration into possibility (PV: 128). To decide what is
"impossible" in this sense of a worthy, yet fragile goal and what is "fantasy" demands the
insight of "a leader, and not only a leader but a hero as well, in a very sober sense of the
word" (PV: 128). It was the absence of any social stratum equal to this task in post-war
Germany and the willingness of the bourgeoisie to give themselves over either to
complacency or to socialist "illusions" which made Weber despair of securing a stable
political future for his homeland, a despair, however, to which he never fully succumbed.
Ascetic and yet passionate. Weber's chosen ethic fuses the Puritan ideal of an iron
inner and outer adherence to revered "ultimate values" with a Nietzschean celebration of
self-realizing personalities, a fusion which incorporates the dictates of science, that the actor
be willing to subject her cause to critical reflection and allow reality to work upon it.16 Only
the Verantwortungsethiker can heal the gap in Weber's theory of legitimate domination and
instil an ethic that is not mere dissembling. In this role he imagines a leader fully cognizant
of modernity's polytheism, but nonetheless fully dedicated to preserving the minimal space
16 On the conflicting Nietzschean and Puritan-Kantian dimensions of Weber's personality ideal, see
Albrow (1990: 42-54), Aron (1971: 90-100), and Turner (1996: ix).
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for individual movement and self-determination. This is the meaning of the existential
choice between responsibility and the "ethics of conviction," a choice, however, which is
radically unstable. Indeed, as Weber admitted, the responsible politician stands precariously
close to the Gesinnungsethiker in that he, too, must adhere to a cause and must, when
circumstances dictate, exclaim with Luther: "Here I stand, I can no other." Having declared
socialism irredeemably and contemptibly absolutist, Weber in the end concedes that
responsibility and conviction are not "absolute contrasts but rather supplements, which only
in unison constitute a genuine man — a man who can have the 'calling for polities'" (PV:
127). The dynamic, irresolvable antinomies underlying his work repeat themselves once
more with vivid intensity. The charismatic heroism of the leader presumes the workings of
the machine; dreams of freedom and justice are declared illusory even though heroes are
called for; the intense commitment of a value-rationally oriented action requires and yet
conflicts with a cold purposively directed action; responsibility clashes with absolute
conviction, but absolute conviction turns out to be the basis of all responsibility.
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l.III.) Anti-Prophetic Prophecy, Pessimism, and Hope
A supreme irony pervades Weber's ideal of political vocation and solution to "mechanized
petrification." He derided the dogmatists and romantics for their "intellectual sacrifice,"
their refusal to accept disenchantment and "measure up to a workaday existence" of "a
godless and prophetless time" (SV: 147, 153). And yet his understanding of political life and
of the limits of political action, responsibility, depends in like manner on "intellectual
sacrifice." In a disenchanted age no one can know whether responsible action is the right
course. One can only feel this as a commitment within one's soul, and this commitment,
since premised on a faith in human effort which no science can uphold, itself entails a certain
re-enchanting of reality, something already implied by Weber's use of the Lutheran term
Beruf, where the individual submits his entire being to the allure of his chosen cause.
Authentic politics, one able to endure darkness and defeat, in the end derives its strength,
legitimacy, and contour from the individual's willed choice, his free, anxiety ridden, and
fateful decision to believe it capable of decency and freedom and not otherwise.
This irony is not lost on Habermas, Arendt, or Maclntyre. They see in Weber an anti-
prophetic prophet of a powerful sort, one whose words have indelibly marked 20th century
life. His negative avowal that in modernity all hope of "imitating Buddha, Jesus, or Francis"
is vain hope, portends the usurpation of attempts to institute freedom or emancipatory ideals
by a pervasive bureaucratic-legal rationality (RRW: 357). It joins with the positive, yet
unsure prophecy as to the enduring possibility of maintaining an unfragmented self through
engagement in vocations. But to prophesy is to go beyond the "bounds" of science and
therefore, perhaps, to err. Weber is to Arendt, Habermas, and Maclntyre, then, as Marx was
to Weber, profoundly perceptive and yet fundamentally wrong in certain key perceptions.
Weber was fascinated by The Communist Manifesto's melding of prophecy and scholarship,
insightful in its appreciation of capitalism and yet erroneously inspired in its faith that
capitalism would one day give way to communism and justice. However, the "inspired
error" he (PW: 288) ascribes to Marx can just as easily be ascribed to his vision of the "end
of prophecy," to the triumph of bureaucratic-legal rationality and the "iron cage." Thus,
where Weber (PW: 15) urges a heroic pessimism, "lasciate ogni speranza" (abandon all
hope), these three thinkers urge hope.
In the following chapters it will become clear that the dissatisfactions and hopes
expressed by Habermas cannot be equated with those articulated by Arendt or Maclntyre, the
discrete vocabularies and multiple implications of their work being subsumable under no
single category. Yet in their dependence upon Weber's theory of modernity and modern
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politics, a substantial unity of orientation does come into view. For Habermas (1994a: 60)
Weber is crucial "to a philosophically and scientifically informed diagnosis of our time"; for
Arendt (HC\ 277) the "only historian who raised the question" of modernity "with the depth
and relevance corresponding to its importance"; and for Maclntyre (AV: 86) "the key to
much of the modern age." He is important, they argue, because of his perception that
responsible personhood stands threatened by systematization and meaninglessness, the
products of "colonization" in Habermas' view, of "world alienation" in Arendt's, or of what
Maclntyre calls "bureaucratic individualism." Each likewise concurs with Weber (PW: 15)
when he declares that the "question which stirs us as we think beyond the grave of our
generation is not the [material] well-being human beings will enjoy in the future but what
kind of people they will be." But while they agree on the ethical centrality of mature
personhood and the dangers of closed specialism and unfettered hedonism, they nonetheless
spurn his response to the "iron cage." Insightful, certainly, yet his vision of the modern
world stands guilty of either presenting a pessimistically one-sided description of modernity
(Habermas), of being complicit in the perpetuation of the problems of modern society
(Arendt), or of ignoring aspects of human life and social-political organization which might
counter or at least resist those problems (Maclntyre).
In critiquing Weber these three have different and frequently contradictory ends in
mind, drawing as they do from the diverse philosophical traditions of neo-Kantianism, 20th
century Continental phenomenology, and neo-Aristotelianism. However, underlying is a
shared dismissal of Weber's radical decisionism, that the only value is willed value. This
decisionism issues from his understanding of action and his subjectivization of meaning.
Unable to imagine a mode of action unbound to the inner will and a site of value other than
that of the individual subject, Weber's thought was foredoomed to fall into an arbitrary
affirmation of exceptional leaders and their mode of rule, violence. The fate of which he
spoke admiringly and yet which he railed against in his preference for a "politics of
responsibility," is the fate of the modern isolated subject. Rejecting that subject, Habermas,
Arendt, and Maclntyre also reject Weber's personality ideal and political ethic. Simply put,
responsibility is not just chosen; it inheres in the very process of engaging with others in
political life, a process misunderstood and indeed undermined by Weberian Herrschaft. The
resuscitation of an ascetic and unbrotherly Puritanism in the form of the
Verantwortungsethiker ironically reinforces the dangers which responsible action should in
fact contain. A political virtuoso dependent on the subordination of others, the
Verantwortungsethiker sustains a politics where citizens are matter to be dominated and
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moulded according to aristocratically decreed designs. Nostalgia for the "heroic age of
capitalism," that is, the Puritan era, therefore leads Weber to repeat Calvin's myth of the
reprobate and the elect, a myth which he nevertheless condemned for its "extreme
inhumanity" (PE\ 111, 60).
Striking commonalities also inform their alternatives to Weber's political vision. We
will see that in each case Weber's isolated subject is rejected in favour of an intersubjective
subject defined either in terms of communicative action, a plural world-building praxis, or
the idea of shared, historically rooted practices. This intersubjective subject provides the
basis for a conception of reason or political deliberation oriented not to instrumental mastery
over the world and fellow human beings, but to a non-manipulative politics premised on the
realization of elementary human potentialities. Habermas, Arendt, and Maclntyre
understand political deliberation and human potentiality differently, and these different
understandings conflict, yet underlying is a wish to recover "legitimacy" as a critical and
intrinsically normative concept. Repudiating value-scepticism, their goal is to break beyond
the antinomical dynamic of charismatic and bureaucratic-legal authority impelling Weber's
division of humanity into active leaders, instrumental machines, and the passive mass. Their
success here varies significantly, but in endeavouring to circumvent this antinomy each
substitutes a dualist account of political reality for his spatially monist understanding of the
fate of the West. Where Weber sees "mechanized petrification" as occurring across all
boundaries or spheres of life, they argue that there are realms of existence where
systematization has not yet taken hold or which offer successful resistance to its processes.
Habermas' "bourgeois public sphere," Arendt's "political realm," and Maclntyre's "local
community of practice" stand in direct opposition to "system," "the social," and the capitalist
market and state as sites for an authentic politics in which speech, debate, and practical
reasoning displace violence and coercion.
Our goal now is to explore the diverse reflections of Habermas, Arendt, and Maclntyre
and to develop the core argument of this study. One element of this argument, it will be
recalled, is that these thinkers are indispensable to the attempt to think beyond the "iron
cage." Thus, it is only by combining their various insights into the generation of human
identities and values, citizenship, and the modes of political action that Weber's decisionism
and austere political realism can be overcome. However, the other element of this argument
is that they also hinder a reflective appreciation of the possibilities and challenges of political
life. Some failings are unique, yet the more fundamental are shared, suggesting that the
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Of our three thinkers Jurgen Habermas stands closest to Weber and thus it is appropriate to
commence with his understanding of modernity and the possibilities of modern politics.
Habermas' thought has assuredly taken dramatic turns over the course of five decades but
Weber has remained an inspiration and problem throughout, on the one hand providing
Habermas with key resources by which to theorize the present, on the other proving an
obstacle in the path of emancipatory politics. Chapters Three and Four therefore explore
Habermas' complex relation to Weberian theory and politics in line with the threefold
interpretive scheme and argument underpinning this study. The aim throughout is to come to
an appreciation of his significance for contemporary politics and also to establish a
framework for our subsequent discussions ofArendt and Maclntyre.
Our first task, then, is to illuminate Habermas' indebtedness to Weber's diagnosis of
modernity, in particular his account of rationalization, disenchantment, and the movement
towards individual maturity entailed by these processes. This indebtedness shows forth in
his reworking of Weber's rationalization thesis in terms of an evolutionary division between
pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional forms of consciousness and society.
It is also evident in his agreement that this process has been contradictory, promising
enlightenment and freedom and yet apparently condemning actors to an "iron cage" of
unfreedom and meaninglessness.
The theme of contradictory rationalization brings us to the second stage in our
argument. As already claimed, Habermas places significant qualifications on Weber's
diagnosis of modernity and indeed thinks him complicit in the very realities he sought to
resist. Weber's political realism, elitism, and pessimism are due to his preoccupation with
instrumental or technical rationalization and scepticism towards non-decisionist theories of
normative evaluation, both consequences of an adherence to the Cartesian "philosophy of
consciousness" paradigm. He is thus inevitably led to the view that in politics questions of
value are entirely subjective and that ordinary citizens are and must be subordinate to self-
assertive leaders whose domination of bureaucratic machines renders them fit to rule. For
Habermas this view is both false and replete with dangers. Because Weber's interpretation
of norms and ideals under the image of an assertive self-will renders such norms and ideals
rationally incomprehensible, the instrumental calculation of means and ends, which is a
matter of non-subjective fact, assumes the mantle of "reason" and with it success becomes
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the overriding goal. This elevation of success means, in turn, that there exist no internal
normative limits to the violence with which rulers might pursue their ends. Violence is
simply contained by external reasons: whether it will effectively contribute to willed ends,
whether it would produce self-destructive resistance.
To avoid the severe consequences of an unbound instrumentalism and to redeem
modernity as enduring ideal, Habermas turns to everyday speech as a repository of a non-
instrumental rationality, communicative reason. Embracing Kantian critique in both its
emancipatory and epistemic senses, Habermas' goal in analysing the structures of natural
languages and of universal interactive competences is to transcend the self-destructive
"dialectic of enlightenment," that the will to freedom ends in bondage, and to ground the
possibility of what he calls generalizable interests, those which all share equally. If, contra
Weber, it can be shown that such interests exist and if, too, they can be known, then he will
have provided the theoretical resources for defending a non-arbitrary critical politics that
eludes the scepticism underpinning moral subjectivism and the instrumentalist equation of
rationality with efficiency or success. These resources are to be found within "morality," the
activity of free subjects conjointly giving themselves the basic rules of their continued shared
existence, which rests in turn on that strand of rationalization neglected by Weber, the
structural differentiation ofthe lifeworld.
Rationalization consists in two world-historic movements, the growth in instrumental-
functional and productive complexity, which Habermas associates with economic and
administrative sub-systems under the label "modernization," and the increasing growth in
reflexivity and reciprocity in interpersonal relations within the lifeworld spheres of the
family and civil society. Both these rationalization strands represent evolutionary advances.
The ambiguity of modernity, however, consists in the simple yet momentous fact that these
strands have found themselves subject to imbalanced development (TCA, I: 140-145; 1986:
107). In short, complexity has overwhelmed the emancipatory potential underlying
rationalized lifeworlds, a potential inhering in the very structures of communication. The
task of critical theory, as Habermas understands it, is to illuminate the sources of that
potential and to sensitize modern subjects to the opportunities for carrying it forward as a
living project.
As will be seen, this project is understood in terms of a heavily reformulated, liberalized
socialism. Rejecting the earlier socialist concern with material reproduction and deference to
"revolutionary consciousness," Habermas' "radical reformist" or social democratic
perspective focuses instead on the "possibility" of overcoming the one-sided instrumental or
"capitalistic simplification of the process of rationalization" so that "humanity can
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emancipate itself from self-imposed tutelage" (Horster, van Reigen, 1979: 43). A synergetic
combination of Marx and Weber, wherein Marx's critique of capitalism is read in terms of
Weber's rationalization thesis, is needed to resuscitate post-communist Utopian energies in a
way that neither repeats the excesses of communist fantasy nor falls victim to the neo-liberal
status quo. Weber perceived quite clearly the advance brought by rationalization; his error
was to concentrate on its instrumental aspect, which led him to surrender to the capitalist
present. Marx was truly alive to the inequities of capitalism and its forms of domination; his
error, however, was to fail to see that this was but one aspect of rationalization. Obsessed
with production and still sentimentally tied to pre-modern labour forms, Marx misperceived
the rationality potential of rationalized lifeworlds marked by reflexivity and reciprocity in
human interrelations. Weber, for his part, let this insight succumb to the image of the "iron
cage." Together, however, they show that enlightened solidarity is the end towards which
societies should progress if not frustrated by a regressive return to pre-modern metaphysical
worldviews or crushed by "colonization," that is, the subordination of communicative
lifeworld logics to the instrumental-functional imperatives of the economy and bureaucratic
state.
We are thereafter led to the third and most important stage of our argument, the
contention that Habermas aids and hinders the attempt to theorize contemporary political
possibilities. Habermas advances our understanding in highly significant ways. In his
exploration of linguistic interaction he arrives at a conception of human identity formation
stressing the intersubjectivity of this process, the fact that becoming an individual is
simultaneously a matter of becoming a social being. This positive, intersubjective vision of
healthy identity formation or "sociation" undercuts the grounds of Weberian subjectivism,
the belief that normative evaluation is fundamentally the preserve of the individual alone. In
doing so it also provides a positive non-arbitrary standard by which to critique instances of
damaged intersubjectivity, socio-pathologies. With this standard Habermas can rearticulate
Weber's concern with the loss of freedom and meaning in modernity without succumbing to
Weber' totalising pessimism and thereby surrendering the modern ideals of "self-
consciousness, self-determination, and self-realization" (PDM: 338). Habermas' shifting of
horizons onto the paradigm of intersubjectivity has a concomitant salutary effect on our
conceptualization of politics. With politics now recognized as an intersubjective mode of
life held together by interpersonal expectations and justifications, the untenability of
Weber's reduction of "the political" to domination becomes plain. The same, too, with his
fateful equation of legitimacy with belief in legitimacy, an equation, which in distorting the
character of political life, lends unwarranted force to political realism and legal positivism.
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In these respects Habermas' challenge to Weber is of the utmost importance. When we
come to discuss Arendt and Maclntyre, both of whom fundamentally concur with his re¬
orientation towards intersubjectivity, we will be building upon contributions already made
by Habermasian critical theory. Yet these contributions are limited. As will be seen, certain
failings specific to Habermas' theory lessen its attractiveness as a critical resource. The first
concerns a key aspect of his attempted circumvention of subjectivism. In his discourse
theory Habermas hopes to side-step Weber by separating "ethics" from "morality." Ethics
concerns the substantive ends, values, or visions of the good human beings deem worthy of
fulfilment, but which vary from individual to individual, culture to culture, and are therefore
non-generalizable, a matter of subjective desires and conventional understandings. Morality,
instead, concerns universal questions of "right" or the "self-determination" by individuals of
the terms of their mutual co-existence, terms constrained by the procedural presuppositions
or norms of communication. Conflating ethics with morality, Weber was led to discount the
possibility of universal norms. The problem, however, is that Habermas' division between
ethical values and moral norms does not hold, since the basis of his discourse theory of
morality is in the last instance an understanding of healthy identity formation, that is, a
substantive ethical vision. Far from circumventing subjectivism, then, his characterization
of ethics as largely subjective or conventional ironically threatens to return us to it. This
failing is further problematized, we will argue, by an abstract and reductive understanding of
critique that disregards the historical specificity of moral-ethical reasoning and neglects the
constitutive role of experience in the movement towards universality and emancipation.
In different ways Maclntyre and Arendt offer solutions to these and related problems.
Nonetheless, there is a further complex of problems encountered in Habermas that is also
present within Arendt and Maclntyre. In response to Weber's monist antinomy of the leader
and machine, Habermas adopts a dualist framework in which the economy and the state are
understood as "sub-systems" conforming to functionalist-strategic logics, in contrast to the
communicative logic of the lifeworld, the realms of the family, civil society, and the public
sphere. This dichotomy or "ontological spatialization" leads Habermas to privilege civil
society and the public sphere as the sites of emancipatory politics. However, the resulting
division between opinion-forming and decision-making competencies has the effect of
weakening popular sovereignty and thus reinforcing Weberian elitism. More worryingly
still, his contention that administration and the economy operate according to a "norm-free
sociality" stifles possibilities for change in these arenas and arbitrarily denies labour's role in
identity formation. The result, consequently, is a paradoxical politics extolling radical
critique and yet retreating from it in resignation.
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While Arendt and Maclntyre's bifurcations of reality into "free" and "fallen" realms
differ from Habermas' in noteworthy ways, the effect is nevertheless the same: a
perpetuation ofWeber's vision of "mechanized petrification." A related shared weakness is
the manner in which they respond to Weber's one-sided reduction of "the political." Where
Weber reduces the essentially "political" to struggle, strategy, and domination, Habermas
offers a conception of the political as a movement towards consensus and mutual
understanding. This conception challenges Weber's equation of politics with domination but
at the cost of inversing his error and excluding coercion, struggle, and antipathy from the
horizon of authentically political activity. In seeking to theoretically neutralize the risks of
struggle and strategy within a hierarchical complex of communicative interactions, ranging
from moral discourse to fair bargaining, Habermas downplays the realities of discursive
stalemate and entrenched disagreement in which communicative engagement frequently
concludes. These realities and the problem of temporal urgency, the fact that actors must act
whether or not agreement has been achieved, show the implausibility and, in some crucial
respects, the undesirability of such attempts at theoretical neutralization, especially when
they occlude the real moral-ethical challenges and decisions faced by citizens in times of
crisis. Thus, while Habermas illuminates a path beyond Weber, that path cannot and should
not be travelled in full.
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One-Sided Rationalization: Habermas on Modernity, Discourse, and
Emancipation
"In complex societies, the scarcest resources are neither the productivity of a market
economy nor the regulatory capacity of public administration. It is above all the resources of
an exhausted economy of nature and of a disintegrating social solidarity that require a
nurturing approach" (BFN: 445).
For Jiirgen Habermas it is not poverty or powerlessness before nature that threatens the
inhabitants of late modernity but the corrosion of social bonds and the diminution of
individual freedom. Although consequences of the "project of modernity," these threats can
be answered only by augmenting that project's emancipatory potential. Thus, we begin with
Habermas' celebration of the 18th century bourgeois public sphere (Ch 3.1.). Utilizing
Weber's theory of rationalization, but rejecting his pessimistic conclusions, Habermas argues
that the bourgeois public sphere signified the first flowering of an evolutionary learning-
process in human consciousness and interaction. On the basis of this rationalization process
he develops his intersubjective model of "lifeworld" or "symbolic" reproduction and
differentiates communicative from strategic interaction, thus contesting Weber's equation of
reason with the instrumental calculations of an isolated subject. Rejecting Weber's
"philosophy of consciousness" paradigm, Habermas is also led to his theory of discourse and
division between morality ("right") and ethics ("good"), which together promise a path
beyond decisionism and the polytheism of warring values (Ch 3.II.).
However, that path is jeopardized by contrary currents in late modernity. Weber's
image of the "iron cage" points towards a second strand of rationalization, the processes of
"systemic integration" in the realms of "material reproduction" and bureaucratic
organization, the market and the administrative state (Ch 3.III). These sub-systems provide
unprecedented levels of security and material wealth, but, having burgeoned out of control,
now threaten to "colonize" the fragile lifeworld structures of the family and civil society,
resulting in increasing citizen dependency and consumerization. To counter this one-sided
rationalization and to avoid Weber's antinomy of the leader and machine, Habermas argues
for a form of deliberative democracy rooted in civil society and the public sphere (Ch 3.IV).
In conjunction with a liberal constitutional state, this rejuvenated democracy has the capacity
to stem the tide of colonization and to redeem the modern ideals of autonomy and solidarity.
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3.1.) Modernity, the Bourgeois Public Sphere, and the Intersubjective Paradigm
Weber considered sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe the high point of modern
civilization. Although profoundly ambiguous in his assessment of early modern capitalism
and its central figure, the Puritan, he (PE: 5, 67) nonetheless believed that "the bourgeois
classes ... have seldom before and never since displayed [such] heroism." Puritanism was
the "last of our heroisms" because "the Puritan's serious attention to this world, his
acceptance of his life in the world as a task," entailed the maturation of Western humanity,
the endorsement of self-discipline and iron resolve as the marks of true individuality (PE:
47). Burdened with "a feeling of unprecedented inner loneliness," the Puritan imposed on
himself "a systematic rational ordering of the moral life as a whole" and thus brought to
fruition a process of rationalization having begun in the transformation of mythic into
religious worldviews (PE: 60, 79). The tragedy of this figure is that he freely embraced as a
calling, the ascetic pursuit of wealth in the service of God, what would for later generations
become an irresistible and unalterable economic order devoid of meaning. In the Puritan
Weber sees the paradoxical fate of the West writ large, the movement towards maturity
ending inevitably in "mechanized petrification."
Habermas agrees that modernity is the age of humanity's maturation. However, he
disagrees fundamentally with Weber's portrayal of the Puritan "Protestant ethic" as the high
point of the modern age. The cold unbrotherliness of the Puritan, his disregard for others in
the pursuit of material success, represents a perversion of the moral core ofmodernity.1 That
moral core first revealed itself not in Calvinism but in the Anabaptist sects, which rejected
the "ascetic ethic of vocation — with its egocentric foreshortening, particularism of grace,
and conformity to the unbrotherliness of the capitalist economy" (TCA, I: 228, 232). In the
eighteenth century the brotherly ethic of the Anabaptists was transformed into a secular
universalism by the English, French and German bourgeoisie, who had by then emancipated
themselves from Church dogmas and the unreflective piety of the peasantry (TCA, I: 230).
For Habermas, then, it is the Enlightenment and its defining institution, the "bourgeois
public sphere ... of private people come together as a public," which constitute the defining
moment ofmodernity (STPS: 27).
"Peculiar and without historical precedent," the bourgeois public sphere was
distinguished by its operative principle, "publicity" or the "people's use of their reason
(offentliches Rasonnement')" (STPS: 27-28; 1992c: 465). In this it differed dramatically from
37
Chapter 3 One-Sided Rationalization
the pseudo-public of the late medieval and early modern period, in which the monarch
presented himself to his passive subjects "as an embodiment of some sort of 'higher' power"
(STPS: 7). Replacing the court as the site of public attention, the salons, the coffee houses,
the Tischgesellschaften, and the wider public of letters all became "centres of criticism"
subjecting the power of the sovereign to sustained scrutiny and critique (STPS: 31-56). Born
of the new capitalist market economy and of a reorientation of the conjugal family towards
the ideals of "voluntariness," "community of love," and "cultivation," these centres had three
"institutional criteria" in common. Social intercourse was, in principle, devoid of status
restrictions, the claims of title, wealth and distinction being bracketed out in favour of a
"common humanity" guided by the principle that '"the public use of one's reason must
always be free, [since] it alone can bring enlightenment among men'" (STPS: 36, 106,
quoting Kant). This meant that only "the authority of the better argument could assert
itself." Second, this critical argument knew no restrictions on its content; with the
dissemination of philosophy, literature and periodicals such as the Tatler and Spectator, old
boundaries on what could be said were overcome and the Church and court lost their
interpretive monopoly over what constituted culture or morality. Third, and most important,
the new public sphere was in principle inclusive} All men of property and education,
whether aristocrats, merchants, or well-to-do professionals, were able to converse on matters
of common interest. This common interest was "civil society," the sphere lying between the
state and family, and it was to be served by subordinating the law, Parliament and the
coercive apparatus of state, so long a realm of secret manipulation (arcana imperii), to
"public opinion as the expression of reason" (STPS: 52, 54).
Lasting until the mid-nineteenth century, the "only blissful moment in the long history
of capitalist development," the bourgeois public sphere gave classic expression to the
modern ideals of autonomy, the individual as free from the sovereign, and solidarity, the
individual as free to associate with his equals, ideals which were to "become a future
society's norms of political equality" (STPS: 79; 1992b: 424). Weber's claim that
Puritanism represented the modern moment is therefore doubly wrong: in mistakenly
privileging a form of life that placed individual salvation above the norms of personal
freedom and responsive sociability; and in equating humanity's maturation with a process of
internal disciplining and of instrumental dominance over nature and other men. Although
1 The Protestant ethic is not "the exemplary embodiment of the moral consciousness expressed to
begin with in the religious ethic of brotherliness, but a distorted, highly irrational one" (TCA, I: 231).
2 The illiterate, impoverished "masses" could not participate, but Habermas insists that the principle of
inclusivity was not simply ideological, that "with the emergence of the diffuse public formed in the
course of the commercialization of cultural production, a new social category arose" (STPS: 38).
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subject to serious contradictions, not least the fact that it claimed to be universal and yet
excluded women and the poor (STPS: 88; 1992b: 428), the bourgeois public sphere revealed
that it is the ability to communicate with other human beings and to subject one's opinion to
their judgement that defines mature, critical personhood.
Yet Habermas concurs with Weber on two counts. First, Weber was right to see the
modern age as both a story of triumph and a story of decline. Just as Puritan asceticism gave
way to utilitarian hedonism, so, too, did the critical public sphere give way to a realm of
"manipulated opinion." This degeneration did not destroy the public sphere or the principle
of "publicity," but it did seriously impair it, as will be seen (Ch 3.III.). Second, he was right
to understand modernity as the culmination of a world-historic rationalization process (TCA,
I: 143, 339). Thus, to support his contention that the bourgeois public sphere intimated a
new principle of social integration, discursive solidarity, and to show that this principle is not
confined to one period but rooted in the structures of human interaction itself, Habermas
offers a reconstruction of Weber's narrative of Occidental rationalization. In this, however,
his goal is also to develop an intersubjective conception of the human subject that rejects the
monological, instrumental-rational subject underpinning Weber's thought and thereby
disputes the pessimistic claim that rationalization is doomed to a tragic instrumentalization
of social relations.
Habermas interprets Weber's "rationalization of worldviews" thesis as a general
hypothesis to be approached in developmental-logical terms. By developmental-logical
terms is meant that the social scientist retrospectively reconstructs the course of human
evolution as a rationally comprehensible learning process in which the reflective powers of
human beings increasingly win out over the unreflective.3 This reconstruction attends to the
"internal validity conditions" that pattern and guide the growth in knowledge so as to
uncover "anthropologically deep-seated structures" within the everyday know-how of
ordinary subjects {TCA, I: 66-67; TCA, II: 383). Habermas' strategy here is to offer an
affirmative reading of "disenchantment" understood in terms analogous to Jean Piaget's
characterization of the movement in child cognition from a closed "egocentric" to a
"decentred" reflective consciousness of the world. Disenchantment or "decentration" is not
in itself destructive, indeed quite the opposite. Its negative aspects are attributable not to
rationalization as such, but to a pathological one-sided rationalization where cognitive-
instrumental or technical reason assumes inordinate proportions.
3 "We can speak of a developmental logic ... if the structures of historical frameworks vary within the
scope defined by the structural constraints of communicative action not accidentally but directionally,
that is, in dependence on learning processes" {TCA, II: 145).
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Non-pathological disenchantment unfolds according to sequential stages both on
ontogenetic (individual subject) and phylogentic (society) levels, as is suggested by George
Herbert Mead's account of self-other relations, Lawrence Kohlberg's reconstruction of moral
consciousness, and Durkheim's phylogenetic account of the movement from sacred to
secular societies.4 What these theorists show is that the formation of individual identities is,
first, dependent on "socialization," on the individual's becoming an individual by becoming
a member of society, and that, second, the structure of such socialization takes a progressive
form, such that at the highest stage a principled, autonomous individuality is secured. The
movement from mythic, through religious-metaphysical, to modern secular societies — the
"linguistification of the sacred" — is paralleled by a movement from preconventional,
through conventional, to postconventional individual consciousness (CES: 97-100). With
each transition there is an increase both in reflexivity, the level of self-reflection, and
reciprocity, the ability to take on an increasing number of interactive roles, for instance, that
of the speaker, addressee and observing listener in a debate (MCCA: 163). This increase
means, as well, a greater ability to integrate encountered problems and conflicts within
practical frameworks and an ever greater differentiation between forms of knowledge,
together the distinguishing marks of modernity.
The learning processes generating modern cognitive and moral competences are
interpreted by Habermas (2001b: 26) as universal and invariant across cultures. He is
careful, nonetheless, to distinguish this reconstruction from developmental dynamics, the
actual historical unfolding of societies or their "constellation of causality" (TCA, I: 194-195).
Reflexivity and reciprocity embody the "naturalistic core" of mature personhood insofar as
the logic of human interaction both stems from and points towards their realization (MCCA:
170). As conditions of knowledge, they are what we presume when we interact as
autonomous yet socialized beings. However, the achievement of this interactive competence
occurred over a long period of time and according to a particular historical narrative. When
talking of developmental dynamics, Habermas (1991a: 239) speaks in the role of a
sociologist oriented to the actual course of events that through a contingent succession of
catastrophes, crises, and advancements concluded in the as yet uncertain victory of
modernity. This role is methodologically distinguishable from that of the moral or
psychological theorist who as a reconstructive scientist retraces in a rational manner the
advance from lower to higher stages of learning. This theorist illuminates the context-
4 On Mead, see (TCA, II: 3-43; 1992a: 149-204); on Kohlberg, (CES: 69-94; MCCA: 116-194; JA:
113-132); and on Durkheim, (TCA, II: 43-111). See, as well, (TCA, II: 378), White (1988: 48-66,
90-123), Honneth & Joas (1988: 160-162), and Outhwaite (1994: 68-108).
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exploding significance of a reason differentiated according to its distinct moments; his
research program is guided by this key idea, which must, nevertheless, subsequently find
empirical confirmation {MCCA\ 39-40). Habermas' "weak evolutionism" finds empirical
confirmation ultimately, he contends, in the actual division of cultural value spheres, new
forms of social interaction and family life, and an ascendant democratic constitutionalism,
developments which show that modernity, as a mode of social interaction and consciousness,
is on the whole superior to pre-modernity despite the calamities that have accompanied the
modern era {TCA, I: 68, 341; PDM: 344; 1988: 263-265).
This idea of an empirically grounded evolutionary logic underlies what Habermas calls
the "structural differentiation of the lifeworld" {TCA, II: 119). By "lifeworld" Habermas
intends the intersubjective horizon of pre-given space and pre-theoretical knowledge and
assumptions in which people exist, act, and interact {TCA, II: 131-139). This space forms
the background to all we are, do, or can be and consequently has a "taken-for-granted"
quality prior to agreement or disagreement. Although this "taken-for-granted" quality can
never be fully transcended, when faced sudden problematic occurrences lifeworld inhabitants
are forced to embark upon transformative learning processes. A "rationalized lifeworld" is
therefore one that has undergone the formal differentiation and re-integration intimated by
Weber and explained by Piaget, Mead, Kohlberg, and Durkheim {TCA, I 340). The core idea
is that with rationalization the cohesion of social orders increasingly issues more from
"rationally motivated" agreement than from customary beliefs and pre-reflective mores
{TCA, I: 70; PDM: 321).
Habermas' understanding of lifeworld rationalization defies easy summary. In brief, he
argues for an interconnected process of differentiation which begins with the dissolution of
the naive everyday world into the objective, intersubjective, and subjective worlds, each
world encapsulating a realm of human experience, of nature, of culture and society, of the
self and inner feeling {TCA, I: 75-79; TCA, II: 120-126). Arising from this division of reality
into three worlds or realms is the structural differentiation of the lifeworld into the
components of culture, society, and personality {TCA, II: 140-141). Culture refers to a stock
of knowledge, memories and myths that endure through time; society to the norms, values,
laws, and customs interrelating diverse subjects; and personality to the cognitive, linguistic
and emotional capacities of individual subjects. As structural components, they are
reproduced, in turn, by the specific lifeworld reproductive processes of cultural knowledge
transmission, the social integration of children into established activities, and their
socialization, that is, the simultaneous internalization of external authority and development
of unique identities. To each of the reproductive processes corresponds, as well, specific
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reproductive mechanisms or functions. Cultural knowledge requires understanding; social
integration forms of co-ordination-, and socialisation the development of responsible
individuals {TCA, II: 137). These intersubjective functions together ensure the endurance of
lifeworlds and communities though time.
When the "culture" component sub-divides into science, morality-law, and art, each
"rationality complex" directs itself to a particular form of knowledge guided by a specific
validity claim expressible in language: the cognitive-instrumental sphere of science and
technology to truth-, the moral-practical sphere of morality and law to rightness\ and the
aesthetic-practical or ethical-existential sphere of art, eroticism, and subjective existence to
truthfulness or authenticity {TCA, I: 329). Here Habermas relies explicitly on Weber's
arguments regarding the separation of cultural "value spheres" (Ch I.I.), the three domains
of his architectonic presuming a simultaneous differentiation and accumulation of
knowledge {TCA, I: 237-242). This differentiated accumulation is accompanied by a gradual
separation of form from content, a growing reflexivity as regards the renewal and
transmission of knowledge, and an increasing critical perspective on social institutions.
With the turn towards post-conventional society, the individual's ego-identity also becomes
more and more abstract, less rooted in the traditional or customary. Following Weber,
Habermas argues that differentiation needs no philosophical justification, it being an
incontrovertible fact that "the sons and daughters of modernity have progressively learned to
differentiate their cultural tradition ... such that they deal with issues of truth, justice, and
taste discretely rather than simultaneously" {MCCA\ 17). However, what it does need, and
what Weber failed to provide, is some integrating device, some primary conception of
rationality, to explain this multifaceted appropriation of knowledge potentials.
Habermas finds it in the idea of communicative action and reason, which yields the
lynchpin holding the different strands of his theory into a coherent whole. Given the
disintegration of religious and metaphysical worldviews, reason now must be understood
post-metaphysically not as residing within some noumenal realm or "Absolute" of world
history, but rather as within the presuppositions of speech (PDM: 322; 1992a: 51, 142).
Hence Habermas' view that communication constitutes nothing less than the principle of
lifeworld sociation or reproduction {TCA, I: 337). What this means is that the reflective
symbolic achievements of cultural knowledge, of social integration, and of identity
formation, the paths along which a distinctly human life is formed, issue from the attempt to
reach understanding through speech, the "cooperative interpretation process" of ordinary
subjects {TCA, II: 146).
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Here Habermas distinguishes "communicative action" from "purposive action."
Purposive action underlies Weber's action-theory, which in starting from the consciousness
and intentions of the individual subject pictures all activity as the attainment of subjective
ends.5 As an action type, it sub-divides into both "instrumental" and "strategic action."
When actors reason instrumentally, they reason according to technical criteria as to the best
means to possible ends on the basis of empirical facts; when they reason strategically, they
reason from the basis of preferred ends where things and people are seen as mere resources
to those ends (TCA, I: 284; 1996b: 53-54). Governing instrumental and strategic action are
the criteria of efficiency and success. Governing communicative reason, by contrast, is the
internal telos of "mutual understanding."
By "mutual understanding" Habermas means something very specific. Minimally,
understanding utterances depends on their grammatical well-formedness and an awareness of
the basic conditions under which hearers could be motivated by speakers to accept the truth
or related validity-claim of an utterance.6 However, Habermas intends a stronger sense than
this. Understanding is not just the understanding of "mere" meaning, that is, the
intelligibility of utterances ("this is X") and the conditions requisite for the possibility of
redeeming their validity claims. Rather, understanding in an emphatic or maximal sense
means reaching agreement or consensus. In other words, for genuine communication to
continue, actors must "take a reasoned position" on the claims made by speakers, adopt an
affirmative, negative, or reserved stance that is directed towards "rationally motivated
assent" (TCA, I: 287; 1991a: 237).
Communicative action has certainly a goal, the mutual definition of action situations in
the world, but this goal is not achieved through perlocutionary effects, that is, getting others
to believe something indirectly through threats, cajoling or deception, but rather through
illocutionary acts, that is, by acting through openly saying something to the other that can be
understood as valid, as either true, right, or truthful/authentic (TCA, I: 288-295). Whereas
"meaning," "validity" and "intention" coincide in communicative action, in strategic or
perlocutionary speech acts what matters is simply the "intention" of the actor, the
consequences or ends he or she wishes to achieve. In other words, the illocutionary element
5 For Weber "what counts as fundamental is not the interpersonal relation between at least two
speaking and acting subjects — a relation that refers back to reaching understanding in language —
but the purposive activity of the solitary acting subject" (TCA, I 279). Because solitary, the activity
of this subject is necessarily instrumental, even when motivated by wertrational considerations.
6 See (TCA, I: 298-300), White (1988: 25-66), Rasmussen (1990: 37-55), Outhwaite (1994: 38-57),
Apel (1995: 276), and Warnke (1995: 120-124).
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of meaning-transference ("I sincerely believe X to be true") is turned into a tool of desire
satisfaction by the strategic actor.
This leads Habermas to an important claim. It is not just that perlocutionary speech acts
separate meaning, validity, and intention. It is that in performing this separation, they
surreptitiously subvert illocutionary meaning in a manner that nonetheless remains parasitic
upon it (TCA, I: 288). Perlocutionary acts conceal their true, manipulative design in the
enabling sheep's clothing of communicative action:
If the hearer failed to understand what the speaker was saying, a strategically acting speaker
would not be able to bring the hearer ... to behave in the desired way. To this extent ... "the
use of language with an orientation to consequences" is not an original use of language (TCA,
I: 293).
The claim that strategic action is non-primary or parasitic is important because it lends
credence to Habermas' fundamental argument that communicative action not just ought to be
but in fact is the primary form of social interaction and integration and that, consequently,
reason is itself communicative.7 Thus, the "real," what empirically exists, points by its very
constitution towards the "ideal," the emancipatory norms of reflexivity and reciprocity.8 But
if reason is primarily communicative and interwoven with inescapable norms, then Weber's
action-theory is flawed in having placed a secondary relation, the subject's instrumental
relation to the world and other subjects, before a primary relation, the subject's dependence
upon interpersonal speech for both its understanding of the world and its own identity (TCA,
I: 340-41, 391-399). This entails, in turn, that Weber's, and subsequently Adorno and
Horkeimer's, focus on a world-mastering reason that led inexorably to the bondage of the
"iron cage," sprang from a fundamentally skewed comprehension of modernity, one blind to
its integral communicative-rational dimensions (TCA, I: 377-386; PDM\ 106-130). And if
Weber's pessimistic understanding of modernity has to be questioned, then there is the
possibility that the communicative or intersubjective paradigm might, in isolating and
deferring to the intuitive presuppositions made by participants in communicative interaction,
grant a general structure to the consensual and non-dominative pursuit of universal interests.
7 See (TCA, I: 94-101, 341; TCA, II: 153-197), McCarthy (1984: XXVIII), and White (1988: 45, 97).
8 "The Utopian perspective of reconciliation and freedom is ingrained in the conditions for
communicative sociation of individuals; it is built into the linguistic mechanism of the reproduction
of the species" (TCA, I: 398). See also Honneth & Joas (1988: 156) and Schnadelbach (1991: 12).
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3.II.) Discourse, Morality, and the Just Society
Habermas' concern with "universal interests" is a response to Weber's politically realist
excision of the claims of justice (Ch 1 .II.). Together with his belief that the differentiation of
cultural "value spheres" entails a new polytheism of warring "gods and demons," Weber's
monological conception of the subject forces the conclusion that normative matters are
essentially subjective, questions of individual decision alone. "Reason" now being the
determination ofmeans to chosen ends and not the defensibility of these ends, the distinction
between de facto belief and justified belief in the legitimacy of political orders disappears.
The result is a positivist understanding of law and a strategic vision of politics where what
counts is success, the ability to enforce one's will and interests "despite resistance" (ES: 52).
Politics transforming into the enforcement of one's will, there is nothing to prevent the
imperatives of power erasing the obligations of solidarity and justice, since these obligations
are now themselves merely instances of the will to power (MCCA: 72-73).
But this conclusion holds only if the primacy of communication is denied. As a
"medium for permanent criticism," the bourgeois public sphere challenged that denial and, in
altering the "conditions for the legitimation of political domination," opened the possibility
of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate power (TCA, I: 341). Under these altered
conditions, it is speech, not violence, which defines "the political." Opposing the strategic to
the communicative, Habermas argues that communication is pivotal not only to the
formation of identities and social collectivities, but also to those moments when identities
and collectivities conflict, where a highly specific form of interaction is called for, moral
discourse. In "morality" (Moralitat) Habermas sees the prime integrative force of modern
societies, one having replaced the archaic bonding force of religion.9 Although his
subjectivism reduced conflict resolution to arbitrary willing, Weber's "own arguments for
the superiority of ethics of responsibility over ethics of conviction" in fact presumes an
intersubjectively justifiable account of moral life {TCA, I: 231). This account can be
provided and the universal claims of justice defended against the egocentric demands of
power, Habermas argues, by explicating the notions of "morality" and "discourse."
Habermas speaks of "discourse" when contested claims and arguments impel
participants in a dialogue to suppose "that a rationally motivated agreement could in
principle be achieved" if "argumentation could be conducted openly enough and continued
9 See {TCA, II: 92-93; 10: 80). Habermas' later work ascribes this integrative force to positive law,
but positive law is seen as complementary to morality, and morality is still, in the final instance, the
filter through which all legal discourse must pass (BFN: 155-168).
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long enough (TCA, I: 42). A central feature of discourse is the achievement of a hypothetical
attitude relieved "of the pressures of action and experience," so that validity claims can be
divorced from their affective tie to partial commitments and treated as hypotheses, rather
than givens {TCA, I: 25). In line with the three "institutional criteria" of the bourgeois public
sphere, discourse also presumes that conditions of openness and equality operate, what
Habermas calls the "ideal speech situation" (1973: 255-257; MCCA: 163; JA: 53; IO: 41).
While never fully realizable, this ideal is both constitutive and regulative of all attempts to
reach understanding in the sense that the redemption of validity claims — this is true, that
false, this is right, that wrong — constitutes the bedrock of communication and that their
perfect, non-coercive fulfilment is the standard guiding understanding.
Concerned with justice alone, "morality" equates with Kantian self-determination
{Selbstbestimmung), by which Habermas means the autonomous feat of subjects collectively
setting down the general rules of their co-existence. Such feats are in principle
transcontextual in reaching beyond the bounds of the particular to encompass humanity as a
whole {MCCA: 197). Filtering out the particular, this abstractive reach rests upon a
reciprocal apportioning of responsibility between speakers on the assumption that all are
equally rational and committed to achieving understanding. Moral disputes concern the
satisfaction of needs, or, more precisely, subjects coming to a consensus (Einverstandnis)
during moments of crisis on their "need interpretations." Only those need interpretations
coinciding with the interest of all are morally valid. Directed towards "generalizable
interests," morality therefore provides a shield to human vulnerability, "the constitutional
susceptibility of a personality structure that is at the mercy of interpersonal relations."10 In a
time of increasing pluralism, susceptibility calls for an "ascetic construal of morality" to
provide a basis for linking everyday intuitions to the general structures of moral
consciousness {JA: 176). Morality is ascetic insofar as the practical questions falling under
its universalizing gaze are rigorously and abstractly narrowed to those general prohibitions
and obligations of the form: "you ought not to kill," "you ought to keep your promises."
Along with abstract universality, morality has two further characteristics. It is
cognitivist insofar as moral norms can be demonstrably vindicated by way of non-subjective
reasons based on the notion of "right" in a mode analogous to the vindication of truth
claims. It is deontological in privileging unconditional, non-conflicting norms, or generally
binding behavioural expectations, over conflicting, optimizable and context-dependent
values, by which Habermas understands personally chosen or culturally rooted ideals or
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ends. Morality is therefore non-teleological in securing the conditions for the mutual co¬
existence of diverse subjects, rather than any particular vision of the good life. So
understood, moral norms differ from values in four ways (BFN: 254-261; IO: 54-56). First,
they presume a rule-governed sort of action irreducible to purposive action. Thus norms
constrain utility calculations, which rely on preferential and contingent orderings of values.
Second, they are either right or wrong, whereas values are more or less "preferable." Norms
rely on an abstract ought, values on intensity of desire. Third, norms are absolutely binding
whereas values are relatively binding, conditional upon cultural conventions and subjective
aspirations. Last, where values can and do conflict, norms cannot; they must constitute a
coherent system, as in the case of statutes and constitutions.
Given the fact of modern pluralism, a post-conventional deontological morality must be
neutral between and compatible with a variety of world-views (IO: 77, 93). In line with
"non-comprehensiveness," Habermas' theory of morality — "discourse ethics" — adheres
to a rigorously proceduralist approach in relying solely on the presuppositions of
argumentative speech and not presuming any substantive content, which would prejudice his
theory towards culturally biased or subjective conclusions. It is also proceduralist in the
sense that it imagines the actual functioning of morality as the following of procedures. A
central error of thinkers such as John Rawls is that they predetermine the outcome of moral
deliberations by including lists of "primary goods" in their theoretical constructions.
Precisely because content is always culturally specific, these lists cannot be a reliable basis
for a general theory {IO: 51-56). Moreover, in determining these lists and in setting down
substantive moral principles to govern actual relationships or social distributions, Rawls and
thinkers like him assume the role of philosopher-kings and illegitimately usurp the
autonomy of ordinary citizens (MCCA: 66-67). The principle that Habermas wishes to
locate, the principle of universalizability (U), functions merely as a rule of argumentation
drawn from the necessary performative presuppositions of discourse. Thoroughly dialogic
in its actual execution, "discourse ethics" is a thoroughly "minimal ethic" that leaves the
decision to endorse specific substantive principles, such as Rawls' "difference principle," to
actual participants in real discourses." Hence Habermas' denial that he is offering a
blueprint or model to which society must conform. His task is simply to locate the
procedures that citizens must follow in their quest for a just and rational society.
10
{JA: 67; BR: 73). On generalizable interests, see also McCarthy (1992: 51-72), White (1988: 69-74,
85-89), and Outhwaite (1994: 110-111).
" (CES: 90; JA: 16; IO: 72-73). See also Pettit (1982), Moon (1995), and Campbell (2000: 244).
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Habermas' justification of these procedures is complex, but his central argument is that
the core principle of discourse ethics (D) — "only those norms can claim to be valid that
meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a
practical discourse" — stands justified if it can be demonstrated that this principle implies
universalizability (U), which, in turn, is premised on the structure of discursive
argumentation in general (MCCA: 66). (U) states that a norm is valid if and only if "a//
affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be
anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests" (MCCA: 65). Thus, only
those desires, goods, and principles that "survive" this generalization test merit the status of
morality. The principle of universalization (U) can be defended against Weber's
metaethical scepticism by explicating the presuppositions or minimal "informal logic"
underlying all argumentation (MCCA: 57-63). Against the sceptic's contention that this
minimal logic must either fall into an infinite regress or circularity, Habermas argues that
the presuppositions of an activity required to make that activity meaningful are not a
question of semantic relation or formal logic but of the informal-logical performative
prerequisites of that activity's coming into being, its meaning.12 Consequently, Habermas'
task is not to show that coming to an understanding actually entails such presuppositions,
but instead that there is no alternative to them, that as far as we can tell we must presume
them in order to be able to argue or come to an understanding at all.
To show the lack of alternatives, Habermas (MCCA: 86-90) claims there are three main
levels of argumentative presupposition corresponding roughly to what Aristotle meant by
"logic," the products of speech, "dialectic," the procedures of speaking, and "rhetoric," the
processes engaged in by speakers. While the second category of presupposition, dialectic,
does in fact have normative import, it is in the third category of process rules that Habermas
sees the key to grounding (U) and (D.) These rules embody the "ideal speech situation" in
excluding all forms of internal or external coercion and demanding a general symmetry of
condition hostile to pre-given claims to authority. Thus:
3.1 Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a
discourse.
3.2 a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.
b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse.
c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs.
12 If a presupposition cannot be challenged without performative self-contradiction "then it belongs to
those transcendental-pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation that one must always (already)
have accepted, if the language game of argumentation is to be meaningful" (MCCA: 81-82).
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3.3 No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his
rights as laid down in 3.1 and 3.2 (MCCA: 89).
The first rule defines the set of potential participants, the second guarantees participants
equal opportunity to contribute to ongoing arguments, and the third prohibits all forms of
coercion other than the "unforced force of the better argument."
To show, however, that we are dealing here with inescapable presuppositions and not
mere social conventions, Habermas must rely, finally, on the idea of performative
contradictions. When a subject engages in an activity but denies the central presuppositions
of that activity — that dialogue requires speech, for instance — he contradicts himself
performatively and thus invalidates his position as a serious or sane participant. Habermas
(MCCA: 89-91) illuminates the idea of performative contradiction by analyzing the verbs to
convince and to talk into. By definition, "to convince" is internally connected with the
reaching of a reasoned agreement, whereas "talking somebody into something" implies
subterfuge, manipulation, threats or the offering of rewards. To say, then, that by
threatening a person one managed to convince him of the strength of one's argument is to
speak in non-sensical terms, that is, to commit a performative contradiction. If we cannot
commit such errors and still claim to be seriously engaged in argumentation, then we must
assume rules 3.1 to 3.3. But if this is so, then all serious participants who seek mutual
understanding and who realise that strategic action is in the end parasitic upon
communicative relations must therefore presume (U) and its assertion that only norms which
can claim the free consent of all participants in a discursive search for general interests are
ultimately valid. With (U) justified in this manner, Habermas assumes the cogency of (D)
and his project as a whole, that the "moral point of view" is not something we can either
adopt or reject "at will," but a perspective which "forces itself intuitively on anyone who is
at all open to ... reflective communicative action" (JA: 1).
Weberian subjectivism therefore hinges upon a failure to take the intuitive pre¬
conditions of argumentation seriously. There are two further reasons for this failure,
however. The first is Weber's assumption that the cultural "value spheres" or "rationality
complexes" of science, morality-law, and art are bound to conflict, condemning actors to an
arbitrary choice between irreconcilable demands. Habermas rejects this as unfounded
hyperbole, arguing instead that in its role as a "mediating interpreter" philosophy can
interrelate the discrete claims of scientific truth, moral Tightness, and aesthetic authenticity
so that a balanced, rather than one-sided, everyday life can be lived (TCA, I: 249; TCA, II:
397-398; MCCA: 19). The second, more fundamental, reason for Weber's decisionism is
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his conflation of moral norms with ethical values.*3 Thus, in developing his discourse
ethics, or, more appropriately, "discourse morality," Habermas also has a contrasting,
subordinate mode of linguistic interaction in mind.14 Directing itself "negatively to the
damaged life instead of pointing affirmatively to the good life," morality concerns questions
of "right" which encompass the interests of all, whereas ethics {das Ethische) points to what
is good for me or for us given our context and the uniqueness of our historical identity-
formation (MCCA: 205). The ethical therefore refers to the spectrum of evaluative
questions having to do with the meaningfulness of human life, the ends chosen or virtues
deemed admirable by individuals and groups, their ethoi, and the historically-effected nature
of personal and communal existence. Pertaining to questions of the "good," it is a massive
category that includes all the things implied by Hegel's idea of "ethical life" {Sittlichkeit)
and Aristotle's notion of eudaimonia, "well being" or "flourishing."
To show why subjectivism results from the confusion of moral norms with ethical
values, Habermas (TCA, I: 20-21) contrasts discursive argumentation with "aesthetic
criticism" and "therapeutic critique," both aspects of the "ethical-existential" rationality
complex. At stake in ethics is the idea of self-realization (Selbstverwirklichung) or the
self s capacity to work out for itself conceptions of the good and to combine these goods
into a relatively coherent narrative or whole. Of prime significance here is the notion of
"identity," of personal and communal historical teleologies and the understandings attaching
to them. Harnessing the disclosive power of art to convey exemplary experiences, aesthetic
criticism evaluates the adequacy or authenticity of values as they relate to individual and
communal ways of life. The object is the self-understanding or "hermeneutic evaluation" of
specific lives grounded in the preunderstandings of an everyday lifeworld that can never
attain the decontextualised, depersonalised transparency associated with theoretical or
moral-practical argument.15 Although reflective, aesthetic criticism is nonetheless limited.
Privileging concrete value systems, neo-Hegelian and neo-Aristotelian communitarianisms
therefore run up against the ineluctable fact that there is just no way of singling out the good
life from the multiplicity of contextual goods demanding allegiance. Similar limitations
constrain therapeutic critique. Therapy explores self-deception in the claims to sincerity and
truthfulness actors make in reflecting upon who they are or want to be. Self-deceptions
13 Weber "did not distinguish the preferences for values which, within the limits of specific life forms
and traditions, commend themselves, so to speak, as superior to other values, ... from the moral
oughtness of norms that obligate equally all whom they address" (Habermas, 1988a: 227).
14 Habermas (JA: vii) writes that it is more accurate to speak of "discourse morality," but continues to
use "discourse ethics" on account of its established usage
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cannot be demonstrated by argument; they can simply be shown "by the lack of consistency
between an utterance and the past or future actions internally connected with it" (TCA, 1:
41). Directed to historical conventions and inner subjectivity respectively, criticism and
therapeutic critique are more matters of historical chance and inner will than impartial
practical reason and are thus rationally subordinate to morality.
Weber, then, correctly saw in ethics an ineliminable conventional and subjective
element, but unwittingly concluded with subjectivism in mistaking the ethical for the moral.
Habermas stands by this contention in later writings, even though his understanding of
morality and ethics has undergone considerable revision.16 In place of a simple moral-
ethical dualism, he now differentiates practical reason into three distinct moments or
discourses, the pragmatic-purposive, the ethical, and the moral (JA: 1-17; BFN: 104-111).
Political discourse has a variety of contents ranging from pragmatic questions regarding the
most efficient means to predetermined ends, to ethical questions of ecology, immigration
policy, the protection of ethnic-cultural minorities, political culture, and the strictly moral
questions of wealth distribution, taxation, educational and health care provisions, equal
opportunities, and the system of private and public rights (BFN: 165, 513-514). This
expansion of the notion of discourse explains why Habermas (BFN: 155) also proceeds to
draw a distinction between the moral principle (U), which concerns Tightness alone, and the
discourse principle (D), which is no longer equated with morality but includes the whole
gamut of forms of argumentation, types of reason, and which centres around the
institutional, rather than interpersonal, procedures of interaction. Moral discourse is
therefore one moment in a much larger network of arguments and reasons that has to cohere
with self-legislated moral norms but not necessarily stem from them.
Now bearing the title "discourse," ethical-political discussion assumes a legitimate role
in legislative processes. Indeed, Habermas (BFN: 130-131, 359-359) increasingly stresses
the interlocking co-originality of self-determination and self-realization and, far more
significantly, the dependence of moral-political consciousness on an ethical-political culture
that "meets it halfway," that is, a historically embedded, culturally specific understanding of
ourselves that stresses the role of universal rights in the generation of our particular group
identities. Where in his earlier writings the ethical suffered trivialization so as to counter
15 No one can "agree to the form of life in which he has been socialized in the same way as he can to a
norm ofwhose validity he has convinced himself' (TCA, II: 109). See Cooke (1999a: 196).
16
Developed in Communication and the Evolution ofSociety (1979), The Theory of Communicative
Action (1984, 1987), and Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990), Habermas'
"discourse ethics" underwent revision in Justification and Application (1993) and Between Facts
and Norms (1996). See Cooke (1999a; 1999b) and Ferrara (1999).
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Weberian value-scepticism and the presumed conservatism of neo-Hegelian and neo-
Aristotelian theories, his current goal is to offer a sort of rapprochement that, nonetheless,
refuses to surrender the strict universalism of moral normativity (JA\ 91-92). This explains
why, as we will see (Ch 4.II.ii), he also begins to speak of two moral principles, of
decontextualized justification and of interpretive application, the principle of
"appropriateness." This turn is accompanied, as well, by an attempt to stipulate processes of
"fair bargaining" for conflicts that do not entail generalizable interests or that arise in
situations where such interests cannot be agreed on. For Habermas (BFN: 166) strategic
bargaining aims not at consensus but rather at compromise, the acceptance of a course of
action by actors for "different" as opposed to "identical" or shared reasons. Attempting to
accommodate aspects of liberal pluralism, he now declares that compromise-formation has a
legitimate place within political orders, but with the stern proviso that it be bound to
elementary rules secured indirectly by moral discourses attuned to the inequities of social
power.'7
Yet despite increasing sophistication, Habermas steadfastly holds to the primacy of
morality over ethics, of right over good. Even if the ethical-existential now bears the label
"discourse," his position has not fundamentally changed: ethics has to do with self-
understanding, self-clarification, and the meanings and ends around which individuals and
groups mould themselves, not unconditional, universally binding obligations. Thus, it plays
second fiddle to discourse proper, being non-demonstrable, lacking procedural transparency,
and tied to the heteronomous "egoistic" perspectives of me or us (JA: 6; BFN: 97; IO: 216).
Where the "good" relies on an opaque plurality of substantive rationalities and pregiven
forms of life, justice draws from the certain, indubitable form of a moral validity stripped of
metaphysical trappings. Philosophers who wish to elucidate general theories of human
flourishing suffer unrelenting admonishment for promoting comprehensive visions of the
good life that in a postmetaphysical age ought to be left to the judgement of ordinary
citizens. A deontological, minimal moral theory is all that philosophy can provide and it
alone yields an impartial route beyond utilitarian value-optimization, communitarian
conventionalism, and Weber's subjective "gods and demons."
17
Morality dictates that a compromise be "(a) more advantageous to all than no arrangement
whatever, (b) exclude free riders who withdraw from cooperation, and (c) exclude exploited parties
who contribute more to the cooperative effort than they gain from it" (BFN: 166).
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3.III.) Systemic Integration and the Loss of Freedom and Meaning
The turn to intersubjectivity and the discourse theory of morality are sufficient to rebuff
Weber's subjectivism and pessimistic narrative of Western rationalization, but they do not
simply invalidate his diagnosis of the modern age. In Habermas' view Weber's diagnosis
still commands respect insofar as "mechanized petrification" and "disenchantment" refer to
real losses in freedom and meaning in advanced modernity. These losses are the result not of
rationalization per se, but a pathologically imbalanced rationalization in which the principle
of lifeworld or symbolic reproduction, communication, is suppressed by a competing
principle governing the "material reproduction" of societies, systemic integration. Although
the social integrative mechanism of communicative solidarity defines the lifeworld horizons
of the family, civil society, and the public sphere, accompanying it are the mechanisms of
money and power, which impel the "subsystems" of the market and state (TCA, II: 310).
Hence Habermas' turn towards the systems theories or macro-sociological functionalism of
Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann. Despite his longstanding criticisms of systems
theories, he sees in them an important parallel to Marx's excavation of the economic "base"
wherein processes of commodification were said to work "behind the backs" of actors.18
Because Weber failed to develop anything like Marx's "base-superstructure" model, he
rashly identified lifeworld rationalization with the processes of material or systemic
modernization, which had the disastrous effect of conceptually emasculating the normative
content ofmodernity (TCA, II: 333). To avoid this, Habermas (PDM: 365) develops a "two-
level" theory of society which locates the crises of modernity in a "border conflict"
(Grenzkonflikt) between lifeworld and system that has become increasingly desperate with
the arrival of advanced capitalism.
Habermas grounds his "two-level" theory in an initially analytic distinction between
two methodological perspectives or standpoints. As "systematically stabilized complexes of
action of socially integrated groups," societies can be looked upon either from the internal
lifeworld perspective of actors — action-theoretically in terms of conscious communicative
and purposive acts — or from the external perspective of observers — systems-theoretical ly
in terms of latent processes and functional consequences (TCA, II: 152; 1991a: 253).
Because every social phenomenon exhibits a dual aspect, action-theoretic approaches and
systems-theoretic approaches are insufficient in themselves. It is only by combining them
18
(TCA, II: 186; PDM\ 349). For his criticisms of macro-sociological functionalism, see Habermas
(1988b [1970]: 74-88), Luhmann & Habermas (1971: 142-290), and McCarthy (1978: 213-232).
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into an overall theory, Habermas argues, that the social theorist can come to a full grasp of
social reality and thereby open up the possibility of emancipatory critique.
Habermas thinks action-theoretic approaches insufficient insofar as they rely on "three
fictions": the belief that actors are fully autonomous; that culture is independent from
external material constraints; and that communication is always transparent, devoid of
"systematic distortion" (TCA, II: 148-152). This concentration on unproblematized action
orientations ignores the processes by which unintended action consequences — the purchase
of a commodity in one context buttressing economic exploitation elsewhere, for example—
are coordinated and stabilized by steering mechanisms such as money in a mode inaccessible
to ordinary perception.19 From the observer perspective of action consequences what is
significant is not mutual understanding or conscious perlocutionary acts, but a latent
"functionalist rationality." By "functionalist rationality" Habermas understands an
underlying structural logic that compels subjects to unconsciously adopt an objectivating,
purposive attitude.20 Systems theory reinterprets "reason" as the ability of macro-
sociological systems, such as the market, to successfully adapt to and "maintain themselves
vis-a-vis an unstable and hypercomplex environment" {TCA, II: 151). Its criterion, therefore,
is not communication but the intensifying complexity of a radically depersonalized strategic
rationality "accessible only to the counterintuitive knowledge of the social sciences
developing since the eighteenth century" {TCA, II: 173, 180). Yet Habermas also make clear
that systemic approaches are in themselves blind, unable to ascertain the phenomena or
realities requiring explanation. Because the lifeworld experiences of labour, commodity
exchange, and officialdom initially determine the subject matter of the observer perspective,
a viable "two-level" theory has to commence with the everyday perceptions of ordinary
subjects {TCA, II: 151-154). Subsequent moves to an observer perspective are justified,
Habermas contends, by actors' experiences of "objectification" or alienation from their
social reality.
Concerned with objectification and alienation, Habermas clearly does not conceive of
the lifeworld-system distinction in methodological or analytic terms alone. Indeed, the point
of his incorporation of systems theory is to illuminate how realms of "norm-free sociality"
actually broke free form lifeworld contexts {TCA, II: 172, 258; PDM: 349). The distinction
is therefore intended in an "essentialist sense" as referring to how the lifeworld suffered
19 Actions are "coordinated not only through processes of reaching understanding, but also through
functional interconnections that are not intended by them and are usually not even perceived within
the horizon of everyday practice" {TCA, II: 150).
20 "Insofar as actions are coordinated through a delinguistified medium such as money, normatively
embedded interactions are turned into success-oriented transactions" {TCA, II: 178; 1991a: 254).
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reduction to the status of a mere environment or appendage to the economy and state (1991a:
256). As Habermas puts it, "the social":
split up into spheres of action constituted as the lifeworld and spheres neutralized against the
lifeworld. The former are communicatively structured, the latter formally organized ...
[standing] opposite one another as socially and systemically integrated spheres of action
(TCA, II: 309).
Under this view, the modern world is the result of a world-historical "uncoupling" in which
lifeworld and systemic imperatives have become progressively estranged. In tribal societies
the kinship structure meant that power and exchange relations stood under the normative
aegis of religion and family, lifeworld and system being virtually one (TCA, II: 154). This
unity of the symbolic and systemic disintegrated with the movement of economic production
from the household, into the guilds, and then into functionally autonomous markets, and the
transformation of organizational power structures from tribal descent hierarchies, into the
feudal estate system, and then into a state-centred power structure mediated by a codified
system of law and offices. The end-result is an economy and administrative state that adhere
to unique logics wherein moral-normative dispositions and identity-supportive social
relations have become largely irrelevant.21 But while the impetus to growing complexity
came from changes in the environmental, material, demographic, and class composition of
society, Habermas insists that system rationalization depended on a prior rationalization of
the lifeworld. Only if the lifeworld had previously attained a degree of structural
differentiation, in the sense of a decentring of the symbolic processes of cultural
reproduction, social integration, and identity formation, could advances also be made in the
sphere of material reproduction, since these advances required an enhancement of
knowledge and a release from traditionalism (TCA, II: 148, 173). The irony, however, is that
the enabling increase in lifeworld learning capacities facilitated a secondary strand of
rationalization which would later become independent of and enter into competition with the
rationalized lifeworld (TCA, II: 342-343).
The threshold for the decisive break between lifeworld and system was, as Marx and
Weber saw, early modern capitalism. With capitalism's intensified division of labour, there
arose the need to coordinate the actions of spatially and temporally distanced individuals
(TCA, II: 160). The "delinguistified" steering media of money and administrative power
therefore assumed the function of self-programming codes circulating within and between
discrete "subsystems of purposive rational action" (TCA, II: 180-181). Here law played a
21 "Norm-conformative attitudes and identity-forming social memberships are neither necessary nor
possible in these spheres; they are made peripheral instead" (TCA, II: 154.)
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paramount and highly ambivalent role. Habermas understands modern formal law
dualistically as both a lifeworld institution in which post-conventional moral consciousness
finds embodiment in a system of private and public rights, and as a systemic medium which
grounds, codifies and thereby stabilizes the circuit of money and administrative power.
Channelling lifeworld and systemic imperatives into one another, law enabled the
appearance of subsystems by "anchoring" them in lifeworld contexts in the form of
corporations, bureaucratic organizations, welfare agencies, and so forth (TCA, II: 173, 364-
366). These autonomous "formally organized realms" then perpetuated themselves
internally by legally determining the conditions of organizational membership so that
engagement in consensual, communicative forms of action coordination was displaced in
favour of normalizing routines. Communication and "informal" association still endure
within such organizations, but they are "disempowered" in the sense that presuppositional
validity claims have been decisively bracketed out. Hence the pertinence of Weber's "model
of bureaucracy," despite its reductive portrayal of managerial authority {TCA, II: 310).
Marx erred, asserts Habermas {TCA, II: 339; 1991b: 34, 40-41), in thinking this
evolutionary uncoupling detrimental. System is not in itself destructive. Because lifeworld
rationalization increases the demand on communicative energies, "subsystemic relief
mechanisms" helps ease the swelling risk of cognitive and motivational dissensus.22 This
ameliorating function is paralleled, as well, by an enormous expansion in productivity and
material well-being. Thus, far from alleviating the maladies of the present, a de¬
differentiating rejection of systemic complexity, a return to the enchanted and simple, would
mean both a repressive embrace of metaphysical totalities and social chaos (Habermas, 1986:
107). Against romantic idealizations of the past, Habermas argues that systemic imperatives
only become destructive when they reach in and transform the irreplaceable reproductive
mechanisms of the lifeworld. This occurs when systemic crises or "disequilibria," such as
class conflict or recession, are "successfully intercepted by having recourse to lifeworld
resources," that is, by re-defining lifeworld structures so as to reduce the likelihood of
material or organizational instability {TCA, II: 385-386). This "colonization" or
"mediatization" has drastic effect because cultural and intersubjective meaning can "neither
be bought nor coerced" (1991a: 259; 1992c: 473). By analogy to Marx's theory of value,
Habermas {TCA, II: 334-338) argues that when symbolic needs and lifeworld roles are
translated into systemic imperatives, communal and individual life suffer "abstraction" and
22 "To satisfy this growing need for coordination, there is either explicit communication or relief
mechanisms that reduce the expenditure of communication and the risk of disagreement" {TCA, II:
181; TCA, I: 340-342).
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cease to be the result of communication or intersubjective will. Increasing their areas of
competency and control, the market and state therefore loom over the lifeworld as a "quasi-
natural force" beyond the power of subjects to change or resist (TCA, II: 375).
Drawing from Weber' metaphor of the "iron cage," Habermas understands this
colonizing force as a "systemically induced reification" or "loss of freedom" impelled by
"commodification" and "juridification" {TCA, II: 306-331). Private life becomes
commodified when the market transforms individuals with unique personalities into
consumers with standardized material, leisure, and erotic preferences tailored to the pre-
structured dimensions of capitalist production and consumption. Individual have choices,
yet far from being autonomous these choices are made "under system conditions that are not
under his control" (1992a: 195-196). The end-result is a "life-style" geared not to personal
maturity, familial intimacy or cooperative solidarity but to a "possessive individualism ...
freed from the pressures of [communicative] rationality" {TCA, II: 325). Commodification is
paralleled by processes of "juridification" when previously extraneous lifeworld domains are
legally incorporated into the administrative state. With the expansion of formal positive law
there is a "bureaucratic disempowering and desiccation of spontaneous process of opinion-
and will-formation," resulting in the transformation of citizens into clients {TCA, II: 325,
357). Habermas has in mind here the workings of contemporary mass "welfare-states."
Dilemmatically caught between the imperatives of the market economy and normative
egalitarian ideals, the welfare-state attempts to defuse class-struggle by providing newly
redefined clients material and service compensations {CES: 194-198). This leads to a vast
increase in therapeutic social services and judicial interventions into private life. The goal of
these services and interventions is to relieve disadvantage and suffering, but they do so at the
cost of client dependency and surveillance.23 Thus, although an incontrovertible advance on
previous state forms, the "welfare-state compromise" has the effect of easing systemic
disequilibria by intensifying lifeworld crises.
These crises take the form of pathologies that affect the lifeworld components of
cultural reproduction, social integration, and identity-formation in different ways {TCA, II:
143, 305). In a complex argument, Habermas contends that by lessening the likelihood of
anomie, "delegitimation" and "withdrawal of motivation," that is, pathologies associated
with social integration and most likely to topple political systems, welfare compensations
increase the likelihood of pathologies in cultural reproduction and personality formation
23 "The more the welfare state ... spreads a net of client relationships over private spheres of life, the
stronger are the anticipated pathological side effects of a juridification that entails both a
bureaucratization and a monetarization of core areas of the lifeworld" {TCA, II: 364).
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(TCA, II: 385-386). As the impetus to political change or revolution becomes increasingly
enervated, personal identities and communal inheritances become increasingly threatened by
the intrusions of courts and therapeutic agencies into the lifeworld realms of the school and
family. The result is a disruption of familial bonds, inhibited ambition, growing
irresponsibility, and a weakening of individual self-esteem and communal self-reliance
(TCA, II: 362-369).
Lifeworld pathologies are also a consequence of what Habermas, following Weber's
vision of arid specialists and idle sensualists, terms the "loss ofmeaning.'''' This loss has two
sources. One is the enforced specialization or division of labour generated by the market and
state's accentuation of the cognitive-instrumental rationality complex. This accentuation
elicits as its reverse image an aestheticizing or sensualist counter-movement in the form of
New Age and equivalent groups, which, because they adhere to metaphysical and mystical
modes of thought, cannot cope with modern realities and instead urge a futile return to the
past (PDM: 340). However, the more fundamental cause of modern meaninglessness is a
"cultural impoverishment" induced not by systemic colonization but by the rise of expert
cultures that monopolize the various spheres of science, morality-law, and art that were
differentiated out in the process of lifeworld rationalization.24 Everyday practice becomes
desiccated as the validity claims of truth, right and good are appropriated by elites who
thereby contribute to the destruction of "vital traditions" already weakened by systemic
reification. Instead of "false consciousness," of a totalizing ideology cloaking the injustices
of the present, the danger ordinary subjects now face is "fragmented consciousness," an
inability to reflectively "synthesize" current predicaments and to interrelate the various roles
and aspects of their lives (TCA, II: 353-356). Lacking the ability to articulate dissatisfaction,
citizens are both intellectually and politically disempowered.
For Habermas commodification, juridification, and cultural impoverishment together
explain the "structural transformation" of the bourgeois public sphere and the consequent
suppression of modernity's emancipatory potential. As the bourgeois public sphere opened
up to the "unpropertied masses" it became interwoven with the administrative state and
economy and thereby lost "its political function ... of subjecting the affairs that it had made
public to the control of a critical public" (STPS: 140, 177). This critical "culture-debating"
function gave way to an ethos of culture consumption directed not towards universality, truth
and rational agreement but an engineered consensus congruent with the imperatives of
money and administrative power (STPS: 159). The result is a "refeudalization" of civil
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society where, in the manner of the old monarchs, special interest groups and political parties
seek "to manipulate public opinion without themselves being controlled by it" (STPS: 200).
The ideals of autonomy and solidarity are still touted, but they are less reflections of a
shared, general interest than ideological catchwords for the staged legitimation of corporate
and governmental programs.
The targets of Habermas' "refeudalization" thesis are clear. On the one hand, he fears
the triumph of "systematically distorted communication" wherein the potentialities of mutual
understanding suffocate under the weight of creeping formalization. This gives rise to forms
of "structural violence" that without becoming manifest preprogramme modes of thought,
inducing subjects to think of themselves and their lifeworld in terms amenable to the
maintenance of markets and administrative control.25 On the other hand, he isolates the
phenomenon of "cultural impoverishment" as a key reason why the emancipatory "contents
of cultural modernity have been defused" (TCA, II: 328). Structural violence and
consciousness fragmentation are mutually supportive in the sense that the latter renders the
former invisible to everyday perception. When structural violence, the numbing bonds of
systemic logics, does appear it assumes the image of a "causality of fate," of an "external" or
"second nature" impervious to human agency {TCA, II: 155, 311; PDM: 353). This fate
appears paradoxical inasmuch as it was lifeworld rationalization that made possible the very
systemic complexity and expert cultures now sapping its Utopian energies.
24 "What accrues to a culture by virtue of specialized work and reflection does not come as a matter of
course into the possession of everyday practice" {TCA, II: 326; STPS: 174-175).
25 Such violence "does not manifest itself as force," but, unnoticed, blocks "those communications in
which convictions effective for legitimation are formed" (1977: 21; TCA, II: 187).
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3.IV.) Civil Society, Radical Reformism, and Deliberative Democracy
Weber's response to this apparent paradox is a "heroic nihilism" resigned to "mechanized
petrification" (TCA, II: 324; PNC: 140). Bureaucratization being irreversible, the final
chance for "individually differentiated conduct" lies in the domination of purpose-rational
administrative machines by charismatic personalities (ES: 1156). The only agents capable
of bearing a principled and yet political wertrational "cause," Reichsprasidenten and party
bosses have no alternative but to engage in a plebiscitary democracy where what counts is
the manipulation of mass emotions, the binding of passive electorates to the image of the
leader {TCA, I: 352, 447; STPS: 203). Politics is necessarily dominative, the achievement of
goals through direct and indirect violence.
Habermas spurns Weber's "heroic nihilism," thinking it less a check on than a
perpetuation of reification and refeudalization. Because "enlightenment can only make
good its deficits by radicalized enlightenment," he (PDM: 84) doggedly insists that a
rejuvenating, albeit circumscribed and modest, realignment of society towards a genuine
politics of communication and consensus might still yet be achieved though the associations
of civil society and a critical public sphere. The public sphere suffered an internal
transformation, but as an ideal and reality it retains the resources to counter that deformation
and to hold back system.26 One prime manifestation of civil society's emancipatory
potential, for Habermas, is the grassroots, informally constituted "new social movements"
that took hold from the 1960s onward. These movements stand below the threshold of
formal organization and are therefore intimately linked to the "capacity for reflection"
exhibited by individual members {TCA, II: 390-395; NC: 64-67). Because formal
organization means surrender to systemic imperatives and self-obliteration, these informal
associations resist transforming into parties or lobby groups.27 As feminism, green politics,
and the various peace movements attest, their potential inheres in a form of protest that
simultaneously reflects and effects the changing order of political priorities defining the
advanced capitalist era. Where previously, in the age of class struggle, issues of material
reproduction and wealth distribution formed the main lines of conflict, now protest revolves
around "defending and restoring endangered ways of life," that is, questions of identity and
of freedom {TCA, II: 392; PDM: 357-362; 1991b: 41). This turn from a material to a
26 Habermas (1992b: 429-430, 437-438) has gradually toned down his "refeudalization" thesis,
arguing that "colonization" is less pervasive than he once thought and that because the public sphere
is based on "universalistic ... self-referential premises" it possesses the means to resist reification.
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symbolic politics, from a politics of workers and employers to a politics of equal rights, self-
determination, and quality of life, has two significant implications.
First, and pivotally, the old Utopian vision inhering in the ideal of a "labouring society"
no longer has force. This Marxist and pre-Marxist vision no longer applies insofar as
labour, as a self-creative activity, has irretrievably succumbed to system, the one attempt at
reversing this trend having ended in the disaster of state socialism.28 Communication,
instead, replaces labour as the Utopian rallying cry to protect the universal structures and
"aspects of an undamaged intersubjectivity" (NC: 69). Second, an emancipatory politics
must be both critical and self-limiting. Consequent upon "uncoupling," a politics trying to
render systemic imperatives less destructive of lifeworld infrastructures must nevertheless
respect the logics of state administration and the economy. Rather than "conquering"
system, which they have no hope of controlling, the goal of protest movements is to
indirectly "curb" or guide it toward an "equilibrium" between the integrative forces of
solidarity, money, and administrative power (PDM: 365). Undemocratizable "from within,"
the market and administrative state can be held in check solely by a "radical reformist"
approach aimed at erecting "a democratic dam against... colonizing encroachment" (1991b:
42; 1992b: 444). Relieved of the tasks of material reproduction, lifeworld-defensive
struggles take the form of altering attitudes through open discussion, demonstration, and
non-violent disobedience so as to provoke a general withdrawal of support from economic
and administrative policies. Only by "besieging" system in this way, by indirectly thwarting
its advance, can the public sphere register the legitimate and authentic claims and needs of
civil society (PDM: 364; NC: 64-69; 1992b: 452).
First articulated in the 1980s, this "siege model" is modified in Habermas' later work,
in particular Between Facts and Norms (1992). There Habermas extends his arguments
regarding post-conventional moral consciousness, legitimacy, and discursive procedures
into a full-blown theory of democracy premised on the workings of the modern
constitutional state. This turn entails a significant accommodation to the present, insofar as
existing states are no longer seen as wholly systemic or automatically reifying. In providing
a reconstruction of the liberal constitutional state, Habermas aims to disrupt Weber's elitist
conception of democratic rule. Identifying legality as a prime integrative force of modern
societies, he (BR: 154; BFN: 354) revises his view of law as necessarily juridifying, arguing
27 When informal groupings organize formally, they pay for the "gain in complexity by having
organizational goals detached from the orientations and attitudes of their members" (PDM: 364).
28 "Weber's prognosis has proven correct: the abolition of private capitalism would not at all mean the
destruction of the iron cage of modern industrial labour" (TCA, II: 340; 1991b: 38).
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now that law stands between lifeworld and system in the mode of a "transformer"
converting ordinary language into systemic codes and vice versa.29 Functionally
indispensable and therefore requiring no answer to the question "why be lawful?," law
grants and enforces extensive private rights to act strategically, but this granting and
coercive enforcement are internally linked to normative reasons arising out of
communication itself (PNC: 122). This seemingly "paradoxical achievement," the
intertwining of coercive law with normative reason, rests on the key claim that legitimate
law issues solely from citizens themselves, from their discursive co-determination of
behavioural expectations (BFN: 462).
From this claim Habermas attempts a number of reconciliations. In the guise of legally
enforceable human rights, law and morality are seen as twins, the stability of law rendering
moral injunctions efficacious and no longer solely reliant on individual motivations (PNC:
118). But as with law and morality, so too with law and democracy, which likewise stand
locked in a symbiotic embrace. Flere Habermas strikes at the heart of Weber's division
between passive and active subjects. Private and public autonomy, human rights and
popular sovereignty, are not opposed, as liberals and civic republicans wrongly suggest, but
in fact conceptually co-original and mutually implicated.30 Nestling on the discourse
principle, which is now understood as the "democratic principle," the "democratic process
bears the entire burden of [law's] legitimation" insofar as "individual private rights cannot
even be adequately formulated, let alone politically implemented, if those affected have not
first engaged in public discussions," which entails, in short, that private rights require
popular sovereignty and that sovereignty, the public right to participation, necessitates
private liberties (BFN: 450; 10: 207-208). This mutual presupposition rests on the socio-
psychological truth that the formation of individual identities is itself a process of
"socialization," of becoming a member of a community (PNC: 126). The intersubjective
and the personal are psychologically and politically inseparable.
The modern constitutional state therefore presumes private and public freedom in equal
measure. Conflating administration and image manipulation with democratic rule, Weber
reduced the state to an instrumental apparatus or means and suppressed the core normative
presuppositions of modern politics. Recuperating these presuppositions, Habermas can
reconstruct the "system of rights" upon which constitutional democracies must depend, the
29 This is not a radical change, since he had earlier understood law as both a lifeworld institution and a
systemic medium. See Deflem (1996), Dryzek (2000: 20-27), and Ferrara (1999: 50-60).
30 This "co-originality" thesis is a late development, but it goes back to Habermas' earliest writings,
where he (STPS [1962]: 178) postulated a link between "the undisturbed autonomy of society as a
private sphere" and "public discussion ... in the general interest."
62
Chapter 3 One-Sided Rationalization
most important being the right to equal liberty, the right to membership in a legal
community, the right to due process, the right to political participation, and the right to
material and educative resources necessary for exercising one's basic rights (BFN: 118-
131). This concern with constitutional rights lends Habermas' "radical reformism" a
decidedly liberal cast. However, he continues to think himself "socialist" in holding to a
proceduralized "radical democracy."31 With the "decentring" of society, popular
sovereignty itself undergoes a transference from enclosed spaces such as parliament to the
diffuse networks of autonomous and amorphous public spheres wherein the sovereign
subject "disappears in ... subjectless forms of communication" (1996c: 29). Retreating into
intersubjective forms of argumentation, radical democracy is reconceived in terms of
interactive deliberative procedures that run parallel to, but do not subdue, the routines of
delinguistified subsystems.32 In this way the legitimacy of political orders derives more
from the publicity and accessibility of deliberative processes than from the realization of
private interests or actual participation in government. Deliberative democracy therefore
offers a third way between the classic liberal reduction of politics to strategic action
hemmed in by inviolable private rights and the "naive" republican equation of politics with
a collective "macro-subject" or citizenry ordaining at will the shape of society in a process
of ethical self-clarification (BFN: 296-302).
To flesh out his third way, Habermas arrives at a "two-track model." This model
breaks with the siege metaphor, where lifeworld fights a rearguard action against system, by
forwarding an interplay between weak and strong publics that pressures the administrative
system to acknowledge lifeworld imperatives and even "determines" its direction (BFN:
304-308, 187). As with his view of "new social movements," Habermas understands as
"weak" those plural and polycentric unorganized public spheres wherein problems are
identified and opinions generated in a discursive contest over need interpretations.
Constituting the "public sphere" proper, these informal spheres enjoy unrestricted
communicative interaction insofar as they are relieved from the burden ofmaking decisions.
"Wild," "anarchic," shifting and virtual "placeless places," they represent contexts of
discovery and opinion-formation embedded within and overlaying civil society, which in
turn draws on modes of private interaction, the family and home (BFN: 186, 307-308).
Civil society is here understood not as Hegel and Marx understood it, as a "system of needs"
31 "Socialism" endures if the "structures of mutual recognition ... can be transferred to the sphere of
legally and administratively mediated social relations through the communicative preconditions of
non-exclusive processes for the formation of public opinion" (1991b: 42).
32 A deliberative politics depends "not on a collectively acting citizenry but on the institutionalization
of the corresponding procedures and conditions of communication" (1996c: 27).
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inseparable from the economy, but as the non-economic and non-administrative life of more
or less "spontaneous" associations that spring from face-to-face lifeworld interactions (BFN:
366-367; 1996c: 28).
Free to thematize all issues and to question arbitrary limits on public discourse — the
exclusion of domestic abuse from political discussion, for instance — weak publics "can
assume a surprisingly active and momentous role" (BFN: 312-314, 380). They assume this
role in crisis moments by transmitting opinions to the formal and organized "strong" sphere
of parliament, which, as a context of justification, specializes in arriving at political
decisions, at will-formation. In so distinguishing opinion- and decision-formation tasks,
Habermas (BFN: 298) dissociates himself from calls for direct democracy. Societies
marked by immense spatial and temporal complexity need parliament and its representatives
to provide the requisite focus for diverse strands of communication. Though part of the
"political system," like administration, parliaments are not bound by systemic codes but
rather by temporally restrained procedures of ordinary communication. Lacking the free¬
flow of interactions defining weak publics, they nonetheless gain in terms of cogency and
organization. Decisions or solutions eventually agreed to within these spatially delimited
strong publics are then transferred to the administration for implementation. In this
mediating fashion, the state as subsystem is tamed and rendered sensitive to the
deliberations of ordinary citizens.
Just as we must differentiate the discursive functions of the various parts of state and
government, so too must we distinguish various forms of power. Habermas understands
power as circulating through a series of "democratic sluices" (BFN: 185-186, 462). Each
sluice is contextually specific, tailoring the meaning and function of power to particular
tasks requiring fulfilment. As the well-spring of legitimacy, the political public sphere
generates influence, which, through the sluice of elections, is transformed into a
communicative power inhering in the legislature. Habermas (BFN: 147) defines
communicative power as the fragile, intersubjective "potential of a common will formed in
non-coercive [and non-distorted] communication." Although it must be differentiated from
the employment and strategic competition for power, which define administrative office and
party-politics respectively, communicative power underpins these as well as all legitimate
law-making procedures (BFN: 149-152). In healthy democracies it undergoes conversion
into administrative power via legislation secured by parliament. The administration, to
which the executive also belongs, then "acts," whereupon weak publics assess its effect on
lifeworld contexts, setting into motion once more the cycle of influence, communicative
power and administrative action. Hence Habermas' reconceptualization of the
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constitutional state as the "requirement" that administrative systems be reined in by a
"lawmaking communicative power" that minimizes the "illegitimate interventions of social
power," that is, the "factual strength of privileged interests" (BFN: 150). In other words,
administrative subsystems should undergo a "discursive rationalization" incepted by free¬
standing publics which, because only the administration can "act" or "rule," are pivotal to
any coherent endorsement of radical democracy.33
As the foregoing makes clear, for Habermas democracy's value rests in its capacity to
locate and counter injustice. But for democracy to endure two fundamental conditions must
be satisfied. On the level of motivation, there must be an over-arching "liberal political
culture" shared by a citizenry accustomed to political freedom. Ordinary subjects must
understand the rights of private and public autonomy as belonging to their culture, as part of
their particular and unique ethical inheritance, of who they are. A "constitutional
patriotism" dependent on self-identification with basic liberties and rights has to supplant, as
Habermas thinks it has in Western Europe, the older "organic" politics of blood and of Volk
that underlay Weber's nationalism (NC: 256-257; BFN\ 499-500). Such patriotism allows
for a plurality of forms of life without surrendering moral universals.
But for this culture to arise, actors must also be able to "synthesize" and make use of
their cultural inheritance. The cultural impoverishment induced by expertism's fragmenting
usurpation of the validity claims of true, right, and good can be undone only if actors,
sustained by democratic educative practices, once again appropriate and interrelate truth,
morality and art in their everyday life. Philosophy can point to the interconnections
between Weber's "rationality complexes," to the entanglement of art in science and both of
these in interpersonal relations.34 The unity of a reason which has become problematically
split since the rise of modernity is, Habermas claims, implied by speech itself, by the fact
that every utterance exhibits cognitive, normative, and expressive contents (TCA, II: 64, 84,
398; PDM\ 340). But whether a society really is successful here, whether it thrives on "vital
traditions" or suffers "diremption," is a question philosophy cannot answer. Despite the
pretensions of classical thought, philosophy merely points to the general conditions of a
rational life. Verdicts as to whether a particular society is "more or less failed, deformed,
unhappy, or alienated," on the contrary, must be left to citizens themselves, for these are
33
Only "the administrative system itself can "act." The administration is a subsystem for collectively
binding decisions, whereas the communicative structures of the public sphere comprise a far-flung
network of sensors" (1996c: 29).
34
Philosophy needs to "set in motion the interplay between the cognitive-instrumental, moral-




ethical questions of self-understanding and clarification, of whether we have achieved a
happy and flourishing mode of collective being-together (TCA, II: 73-74).
That societies might achieve better ways of interrelating cultural value spheres is a
reason for being hopeful. However, there is a further condition of vibrant democracy. No
meaning-conferring interrelation is possible if the social conditions of private and public
autonomy are not met. Though critical of state-welfarism, Habermas holds firm to the ideal
of a just distributive order. His early insistence that the moral principle of universalization
implies also a "principle of beneficence" or concern for the other's well-being is augmented
by his inclusion of welfare-rights within the system of basic rights and his defence of the
"principle of separation of state and society" (MCCA\ 181; BFN: 175-176, 402-403). A
similar egalitarian commitment also underlies his attempt to contain strategic interaction.
The rules of fair bargaining, that no voice be excluded or exploited, are so conceived as to
shift the burden ofproof onto those actors enjoying unequal social power and privilege.
Yet the immense subsystem of the global market, one dwarfing the state and
contemptuous of protective boundaries, threatens the realization of that ideal. With
economic globalization, territorial nation-states are increasingly unable to counteract
monetary imperatives, which, unlike power, can never be democratized. The consequent
whittling away of welfare-state provisions and social rights weakens citizens' resolve to
participate in and to uphold constitutional-democratic institutions (IO: 120-124). For
Habermas, the import of this latest, transnational stage of modernization is clear. Either we
surrender to the neo-liberal vagaries of "locational competition," where costs are reduced by
reducing income and occupational expectations, and thus give up on the power of politics to
do anything, or we refocus the thrust of political action from the national to the international
sphere (PNC: 53-57). Only if we spurn the old politics of "international relations," only if a
"world domestic policy" can be arrived at, will the diverse dangers of social power be
countered, and this requires the new integrative mechanism of a cosmopolitan solidarity
founded on "supranational" democratic organizations, of which the European Union
constitutes a prime example (PNC: 55-56, 89-104). The engine of this evolutionary advance
is that positive product of globalization, the global public sphere. Just as internal, national
political questions hinge on the vibrancy of civil society and autonomous social movements,
so too does the future world order. Where Weber saw competition between political leaders,
entrepreneurs and nation-states as the mark of a dynamic national and international political
order, Habermas imagines citizens cooperatively determining the foundations of their
coexistence, foundations reaching beyond the polity into the structures of global politics.
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Critiquing Habermas: Ethics, Norm-Free Sociality, and Strategy
Chapter Three examined Habermas' communicative theory of action and his attempt to
rescue modern politics from Weber's "iron cage." Our task now is to critically evaluate that
attempt. In positive terms, it will be argued that Habermas' work represents a major advance
in reorienting theory on the basis of an intersubjective paradigm (Ch 4.1.i). Stressing the
irreducibly social constitution of individual identities, this paradigm undercuts the
suppositions impelling Weber's subjectivist account of ethics and politics. So doing, it
allows Habermas to thematize the challenge posed by modern social orders without
surrendering modernity as a normative project. Most significant for our purposes is the
political consequence of this reorientation, that is, the recovery of "legitimacy" as a critical
concept and politics as an activity not of technocratic elites or charismatic leaders but
potentially of all citizens (Ch 4.1.ii).
Habermas' thought is not without serious difficulties, however. There is, first, his
problematic diremption of "ethics," the "good," from "morality," the "right," and his
incoherent claim that "discourse ethics" represents merely a minimal, procedural morality
(Ch 4.11.i). Understanding "ethics" as largely subjective or conventional, Habermas
unwittingly invites a return to Weberian decisionism, since his own theory is, in the end,
informed by a substantive ethical vision (Ch 4.II.ii). A second difficulty concerns
Habermas' understanding of the processes of critique. Insofar as the "ideal speech situation"
tends to efface the inherently multiple routes to emancipation it has, contrary to expectations,
slight critical value. Consideration of these philosophical difficulties prepares the ground for
an evaluation of his politics. The lifeworld-system dichotomy and its bifurcation of
communicative and administrative-economic realms generate an acute tension within
Habermas' project, to wit, that he endorses radical democracy but that his categories render
such endorsement intrinsically unstable, indeed paradoxical (Ch 4.1Il.i). This problem of
dichotomization also casts doubt upon Habermas' polarized division between
communicative and strategic politics (Ch 4.1II.iii). In response to Weber's equation of the
political with domination, he goes to the opposite extreme of identifying the political with
mutual understanding, an identification which is conceptually untenable and breaks down in
decisive real-world moments underplayed or simply ignored within Habermasian theory.
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4.1.) Habermas' Significance
4.1.i.) Maturity, Intersubjectivity, and the Undamaged Life
Maturity, humanity's coming to awareness of itself and its world, is for Weber and
Habermas the prime evaluative criterion and it is against this shared ideal that they judge the
goods and evils of modern life. Where they differ, however, is in their characterization of
mature personhood. For Weber maturity and its correlate, independence or autonomy, are
located within, in the selfs forthright embrace of a cause which it seeks to imprint on
external reality. Coupled with a strict separation of value and fact, this insistence on the
individual as the fundamental unit of sociological and normative analysis inevitably leads to
the view that merely means, not ends or values, are amenable to rational enquiry. Because
modern man faces a plurality of competing values and ideals, and because, as well, his
choice between them is fundamentally inscrutable, only the individual, in particular the self-
willing charismatic leader, is sovereign in matters of right and wrong.
Habermas takes a very different understanding of maturity. In sharp contrast to Weber's
monological subject, he endorses a "relational model of the self' wherein the self is formed
not just in interaction with itself and the external world but, more fundamentally, in its
interactions with others, the social world (Cooke, 1999a: 185). We saw this most clearly in
his discussion of the differentiation and reproduction of lifeworld horizons (Ch 3.1.).
Cultural knowledge transmission, social integration, and socialization, the three lifeworld
reproductive processes which ensure the continuity of shared meanings through time,
solidarity, and a personal identity marked by responsibility, are significant for Habermas
insofar as they dispute the classic modern conception of the self as inherited from Descartes,
one that reduces reasoning to a solitary activity and the object of reasoning to the external,
non-human world. This reductive conception is to Habermas' mind a distortion in three
rudimentary senses: in terms of the generation and maintenance of identity, in terms of the
concept of freedom or autonomy and the threats to it, and finally, in terms of the vision of
modernity implied.
The classic modern conception of the self distorts, first, in failing to account for how
mature or responsible human beings become who they are. Weber (PV: 115) celebrates
those who possess a "sense of proportion" in subjecting their aspirations, life-plans, and
projects to honest and rigorous re-assessment in the light of changing realities. The goal of
the teacher or interlocutor in the vocations of politics and science, he (SV: 152) claims, is to
"force the individual, or at least ... help him, to give himself an account of the ultimate
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meaning of his conduct," a role in which the interlocutor "fulfils the duty of bringing about
self-clarification and a sense of responsibility." As Habermas rightly contends, however, it
is radically unclear in what way, according to Weber's theory, interlocutors can help or even
"force" actors to give an account of themselves in either politics or science. When value is
amenable only to individual choice and decision, not discussion, no interlocutor can claim to
force or help actors come to self-awareness, for responsibility and honesty, themselves
values, are in this conception not shared between but instead somehow possessed by
individual subjects. The problem, therefore, is that Weber's inner-directed model of the self
neglects the processes by which a sense of responsibility is acquired and the intersubjective
bonds between actors underpinning these processes.
Habermas is important for giving these bonds of intersubjectivity their due, the truth that
becoming an individual is simultaneously a movement of socialization, of becoming a social
being. As he makes clear, maturity is an achievement as much as a personal attribute and as
an achievement it presumes an "integrative capacity" by which actors organize the
conflicting demands of their lives and interactions into relatively coherent wholes (CES: 91).
Yet this capacity is impossible without their gradual acquisition of reflexivity and
reciprocity, as Mead and many subsequent thinkers have noted (Taylor, 1985: 15-57). As
the ability to subject one's beliefs and utterances to reflection and critique, reflexivity
provides the spur to self-consciousness and self-clarification. But reflexivity and self-
consciousness are themselves dependent upon a rudimentary contact and reciprocity with
others. Without the presence of others with whom one interrelates linguistically a sense of
the self's distinctiveness, its being other to these others and the world, cannot arise.1 Thus
identity and self-consciousness are "not something immediate or purely inward" but in fact
form themselves "on the path from without to within, through the symbolically mediated
relationship to a partner in interaction" (Habermas, 1992a: 177, my italics). Weber can
speak intelligibly of a sense of proportion, responsibility, and an obligation to self-clarity,
then, only insofar as he already presumes communicative structures of action and interaction.
However, the presumption of communicative structures implies shared social meanings that
are not optional or chosen but in fact given to us as the socially constituted beings we are.
Contra decisionism, therefore, value-rational commitment is not rational simply by dint of its
expression of a subjectively held ultimate value, but also in terms of its embeddedness within
the sense conferring context of the social world. This social world, similarly, does not
1 The "identity of socialized individuals forms itself simultaneously in the medium of coming to an
understanding with others in language and in the medium of coming to a life-historical and
intrasubjective understanding with oneself'(1992a: 153; TCA, I: 40-42). See White (1988: 15-16).
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simply consist of preferences or static customs and mores but also of ideals and principles
that reach beyond the present to posit alternative futures.
An oft repeated counterargument to this view is that the problem of moral scepticism
nevertheless persists. It is still open to the sceptic, critics insist, to refuse all communicative
engagement with others, to act in a thoroughly decisionist and yet consistent manner
(Kambartel, 1974; Ltibbe, 1990). Habermas, for his part, concedes that it remains logically
possible for the sceptic to choose this course. However, the cost of this choice is excessive
in the extreme. Because even the capacity to choose is acquired in processes of socialization
dependent upon extensive relationships of mutual recognition, to deny the importance of
communicative structures is in the end to court madness. No sceptic could drop out of the
"language game" of everyday life without thereby denying human identity itself.2 Hence
Habermas' emphasis on performative, rather than logical, contradictions, the truth that what
is logically valid may nonetheless be utterly nonsensical in terms of real world activity (Ch
3.II.).
In stressing the intersubjective constitution of human identity Habermas is not denying
the possibility of moral conflict or arguing that the intersubjective paradigm will resolve all
such conflicts. His goal, instead, is to correct the false supposition shared by positivism,
rational choice theory, political realism, and existentialism, that the resolution of moral
conflicts is in principle rationally impossible. Reorienting perception, this correction also
has profound consequences for the concept of freedom or autonomy. Weber understands
freedom as an attribute of individuals who in exploiting opportunities contingently thrown
up by the world struggle to master that external world and their inner selves (Palonen, 1999:
536). Hence his (PV: 117) emphasis on internal discipline, the means of domination, and the
inevitable tragedy of frustrated intentions. Although internal discipline and frustrated
intention are certainly important, the difficulty with Weber's view is that by locating
freedom within the self and its relation to an objectified world it predisposes theory and
practice to a thoroughly instrumental politics guided by the ideal of self-authorship or self-
origination. To be free is to be able to mould the world according to one's own willed ends.
For Habermas, however, this is both a deformation of what it means to be free and an
impossibility, since no one can sensibly claim to be the sole author or originator of his
existence. Just as identity is a social outcome, so too is freedom a social phenomenon and
this means that it is not choosing or deciding per se which defines free action, but rather
2 See (MCCA: 100; 1992a: 192). My argument here relies on Apel (1999: 284) and White (1988: 52).
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accountable choice and decision.3 An actor who simply endorses his preferences is not free
but impulsive and blind (JA: 9-10, 43). To become free in Habermas' sense, to see his
preferences from all points of view and thus render them consciously chosen paths of action,
he must take into account the opinions of others. The force of this "must" has key
epistemological, ontological, and normative dimensions: epistemological insofar as to know
one's preferences from all points of view necessitates consideration of opinions voiced from
perspectives other than one's own; ontological in the sense that there is no possibility of
escaping this interdependence and assuming an Archimedean Point; and normative, finally,
to the extent that there must be a minimal regard for others, a willingness to listen. But all
this implies that the actor's freedom depends on the freedom of others. Simply put, true
freedom is not an individual attribute but an attribute of the relationships between
individuals, a phenomenon of actors speaking and acting in concert.
As we will see, both Arendt and Maclntyre concur with Habermas on the plural basis of
freedom, despite notably different emphases (Ch 6.1., 6.III., 9.III.). The significance of this
shared perspective is that it displaces mastery and domination as the guiding theoretical
motifs. Politics and ethics are more than the coercion of others and the self according to the
dictates of an inner will, and freedom, while it may be directed against certain groups and
frequently culminate in evil deeds, is also always freedom with others, a necessarily joint
venture. But with a change in our understanding of maturity and freedom comes a crucial
change in our understanding of the threats to mature personhood. We saw Habermas
endorses Weber's arguments as to the loss of freedom and meaning in modern societies (Ch
3.III.). The turn to intersubjectivity, however, allows for a more profound comprehension of
these threats than Weber's thoroughgoing individualism. When Habermas speaks of the
threat of colonization, in the sense of economization and juridification, and the threat of
cultural impoverishment, he means not only the diminution of the individual subject, which
Weber diagnosed under the rise of specialism and sensualism, but also, and more
fundamentally, the deformation of irreplaceable socially grounded functions, conditions, and
capacities.
Specialism, a consequence of colonization and the rise of hermetically sealed expert
cultures, and hedonistic sensualism, a vain reaction to colonization, are under the
Habermasian perspective symptoms of larger socio-pathological developments originating in
3 "The self... is dependent upon recognition by addressees because it generates itself as a response to
the demands of the other in the first place. Because others attribute accountability to me, I gradually
make myself into the one who I have become in living together with others" (1992a: 170). See
Cooke (1999a: 189), McCarthy (1984: xxii), and Wolf (1990: 10-14).
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the distortion of key lifeworld-reproductive processes (TCA, II: 140-147, 386-396). To
Habermas' mind lifeworld sociation presumes intersubjective and intrasubjective functions,
including enculturation, the communicative coordination of actions among plural actors, and
the formation of group and individual identities, which together yield the "structural aspects"
or conditions of the healthy or at least "undamaged" life (TCA, II: 144; MCCA: 203; NC:
69). Whether an effect of market crises being offset by damaging reinterpretations of
citizens' basic needs and expectations, as under certain welfare state policies and neo-
liberalism, or a result of increasing individual estrangement from collective identities and
social obligations, as initiated by the disturbance of familial, communal, and wider social
institutions, when socio-pathologies arise they endanger the transmission of cultural
knowledge, disrupt the intersubjective bonds ensuring transgenerational solidarity and
harmony, and impair the acquisition of cognitive, communicative, and emotional capacities
needed for engagement with others and with oneself. What is at stake, consequently, is far
more than the individual's freedom of action or the meaningfulness of specific value-
commitments, but the irreducibly interpersonal conditions by which freedom and
meaningfulness can endure at all. In focusing attention almost exclusively on the individual,
Weber's analysis is too narrowly construed to comprehend the full impact and import of
modern crises.
Here it is important to counter a serious challenge to Habermas' employment of
lifeworld reproductive processes. His reliance on reproductive processes, this challenge
goes, is not normative but rather sociological-functionalist in pointing to specific facts
concerning the perpetuation of certain societies (Vetlesen, 1991: 14; Eriksen & Weigard,
2003: 103). Thus, Habermasian theory is implicitly prejudiced towards conservatism, the
maintenance of existing sociation patterns, and unable to answer why actors ought to foster
the transmission of cultural knowledge, solidarity, and the formation of responsible
personalities. This challenge is mistaken, however. As Habermas understands them,
lifeworld reproductive processes or functions must somehow already pertain in the world, for
otherwise they could not be accorded a reproductive status. Yet these functions, which must
not be confused with "latent systemic functions," do not simply reproduce mere life, as in
crude forms of biological functionalism, but are instead informed by a conception of the
healthy or undamaged life.4 Wedded to the notion of health, as opposed to survival, they
4 It is imperative to note that the "functionalism" meant here, which has its roots in the Aristotelian
ideas of ergon (function) and dynamis (potentiality), differs dramatically from "functionalism" in the
sense of systems theory, which refers to the macrosociological idea of autopoietic sub-systems of
action (Ch 3.III., 4.III.i).
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therefore operate as anticipatory standards by which to critique existing forms of lifeworld
sociation (TCA, I: 398). Thus, far from being implicitly conservative, Habermas' theory
includes a strong perfectionist element pressing against the boundaries of the given.
Admittedly, that perfectionist element is deeply problematized by his insistence on minimal
proceduralism, but this is due to a corrigible fault in Habermas' own self-interpretation (Ch
4.II.i). As for the force of "ought," he (MCCA: 207-208) readily accepts that if actors have
not undergone, or have suffered damaging, socialization processes, they are indeed unlikely
to be motivated towards or even comprehend this "ought." Theory is therefore always a
handmaid to practice, since awareness of the importance of intersubjective life only stems
from having experienced and understood the intricacies of that life.
A robust defence of Habermas on this count is essential for another, more pressing,
reason. Later we will criticize his assumption that the modern age represents the culmination
of a universal and unilinear developmental logic (Ch 4.III.ii). But this justified criticism
must be tempered with the recognition that Habermas' intersubjective turn, his grounding of
the notions of identity and freedom on anticipatory interpersonal lifeworld-reproductive
functions, serves to rescue the present and our experience of it from an enervating, totalizing
pessimism (PDM: 119-130; West, 1996: 71). Certainly the modern age is characterized by a
technological will to mastery over nature and humanity, as Adorno and Horkheimer,
following Weber, made all too clear. There is no denying, as well, that it is torn by conflicts
of value threatening the bonds of solidarity. Yet this is but one aspect of a highly ambiguous
story. The difficulty with the Cartesian vision of the self perpetuated by Weber and the early
Frankfurt School is that it reduces the modern age to a will to mastery. With that reduction it
becomes impossible to appreciate the other side of modernity, the at times tragically
stubborn commitment to individual and collective freedom attainable under conditions of
equality and solidarity. No doubt the ideals of freedom, equality, and solidarity are not
unique to Western modernity and have in the modern age frequently been convenient
slogans for partisan goals. But so, too, have they inspired and secured praiseworthy
amendments to everyday life. We will see that Habermas' explanation of modernity's
ambiguity, the destructive movement of colonization, is flawed in positing a dualism that
reinforces rather than contests modernity's ills (Ch 4.III.i). But his assertion that modernity,
the present we now inhabit, remains normatively meaningful is not. If lifeworld-
reproductive processes did not already point to human beings' potentialities, if these
potentialities were not already in the world, even if only inchoately, then they could not even
be known, let alone striven for.
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4.I.U.) Legitimacy, Legitimation, and Modern Politics
The necessity of repudiating totalizing perspectives, whether optimistic or despairing, will
assume full clarity when we come to Arendt's critique of philosophies of history and
Maclntyre's disavowal of modernity (Ch 7.1.i, lO.Il.i). In the meantime our concern is still
Habermas' intersubjective paradigm, in particular its consequence for the concept of
legitimacy. We have already documented Weber's understanding of legitimacy or, in his
words, "legitimate domination" (Ch 1 .II.). Under this view legitimacy equates with "belief
in legitimacy," belief that has no constitutive connection with normative justification or any
value-rational stance, but which can instead be grounded upon a vast number of conflicting
value-rational stances, as well as habituation (traditional authority), emotional attachment
(charismatic authority), or, as is increasingly the case, simple confidence in legal correctness
(legal authority). For Weberian sociology what matters is the fact of belief, the probability
of a regime's continued existence over time secured by a sufficient number of subjects
obligating themselves to the rule of elite groups. As regards modern political orders, this
value-sceptical stance has two far-reaching consequences. First, the legitimacy of law is
assimilated to a formalist and positivist framework wherein justification reduces to the
following of legally enshrined procedures having no bearing to normative principles or
ideals.5 Second, because the only rationality compatible with formalism and positivism is
instrumental rationality, the state, the supreme modern organizational form, transforms into a
means for the enforcement of prohibitions, edicts, and contracts.
It is therefore unsurprising that Weber assigned politics to an antinomical dialectic
between charismatic leaders and administrative specialists, those whose will arbitrarily
establishes the positive legal framework in the first instance and those whose technical-
jurisprudential expertise ensures that its form remains subsequently intact. Yet once the
intersubjective constitution of human identity and freedom are taken seriously, the
implausibility of Weber's conception of legitimacy and law becomes clear. With many
others, Habermas thinks it is blatantly untrue that de facto belief in legitimacy and the form
of law can in themselves be self-confirming.6 They could be self-confirming only on the
assumption that law forms a self-contained realm and that belief in legitimacy equates with
5
Thus, in Weber's (ES: 215) view legitimacy equates with "the [formal] legality of rules and the right
of those elevated to authority under such rules." For Habermas' analysis, see (1975a: 97-105; TCA,
1:259-269; 1988a: 221-230; BFN: 66-73) and Eder(2002: 161-172).
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legitimacy per se. Were that so, however, the commonplace distinction between
"legitimate" and "illegitimate," the very opposition by which the term "legitimacy" derives
its meaning, would no longer make sense, since that distinction presumes criteria separating
de facto belief and law from justified belief and law. Indeed, it is the necessity of such
criteria and yet his clear inability to provide them which render Weber's rejection of the
cynical Machtpolitker and impassioned plea for political responsibility at once stridently
urgent and yet entirely idiosyncratic (Ch 1 .II.).
Habermas' intersubjective paradigm recovers the distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate from Weber's subjectivist dead-end by placing the concept "belief' within its
validating social structures. Because held by actors who cannot but understand themselves
in terms of their embeddedness within a socially constituted world, beliefs are
comprehensible only within the context of social interaction. Through interaction actors
both come to and express their beliefs, make assertions as to what is true, proper, or
necessary. They do not, however, simply assert their beliefs, but also provide reasons for
them. This is so because their beliefs are not self-referential, but always about something in
or of the shared world. A claim to expert craftsmanship, for instance, is considered idle talk
without evidence of craftsmanship, just in the same way that an assertion of the necessity to
wage war rings hollow and mad without attention to cause, purpose, and likely consequence,
those factors which delineate the necessary from the unnecessary. Thus, in claiming
legitimacy for a particular opinion, decision, or act, actors are not merely reporting their
belief in its legitimacy but also declaring that their belief has sound foundation, that this
opinion, decision, or act actually accords with values shared within their society, concurs
with what they consented to, or satisfies their needs.7 Needs, values, expectations, and
consent therefore yield some of the inescapable criteria by which legitimate and illegitimate
are routinely separated. The truth that reference to these criteria may be mistaken or even at
times ideological does nothing to lessen this point, for the idea of being mistaken or under
the spell of ideology presupposes the possibility of being correct and of seeing clearly.
The Weberian social scientist may nonetheless desist here. We can readily concede, he
will argue, that beliefs are inevitably interwoven with justifications, but this does not commit
social science to anything more than an agnostic notion of justification or legitimation.
What is important in predicting the continued existence of particular patterns of behaviour or
6 For related critiques of Weber, see, amongst others, Grafstein (1981: 456), Pitkin (1972: 283),
Schaar (1969: 284), and Strauss (1953: 49-50).
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regimes is ascertaining what grounds or justifications an actor gives for his beliefs, not
asking whether these justifications are themselves justifiable in the sense of being adequate,
internally consistent, or cohering with other elements of that actor's worldview. Thus,
whether a decision or act genuinely accords with the values, needs, or expectations that lead
individuals to think it legitimate is largely irrelevant to its real world efficacy. To ask for
more, to go deeper and to link beliefs and their accompanying reasons with the idea of
adequate or tenable justification, is to run the danger of blurring the distinction between
science and normative philosophy.8
Habermas is keenly aware of this objection, linking it to the empiricist supposition,
guided by the wish to disassociate science from contestable theories of rational legitimation,
that the "appearance of general acceptance or the likelihood of its being assumed" has causal
primacy in political science, whose concern, under this view, is simply the acquisition,
maintenance and perpetuation of power.9 However, this supposition is suspect in two
interrelated senses. It is suspect normatively in that by neglecting the qualitative distinction
drawn by actors between tenable and untenable justifications for ascribing legitimacy to
regimes, it falsifies how these actors understand themselves and their activities, reducing the
clash of their opinions to a zero-sum struggle for power. Yet when actors express
preferences for specific legal orders they claim support for these preferences not in terms of
desiring power for power's sake but primarily in terms of material interests such as security
or prosperity or in terms of ideals such as fairness, freedom, social justice, and so forth.
Without reference to interests and ideals, a preference for one order over another is generally
rejected as either ill-conceived or unwarranted. To excise from the concept "justification"
the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable arguments, as the empiricist emphasis
on the "appearance" or "likelihood" of acceptance does, is therefore to distort the
interactions that actually take place between actors by arbitrarily excluding their strongly
normative dimension. At minimum, then, the social scientist must show sensitivity to the
difference between tenable and untenable justification and acknowledge the role played by
normative claims if he is not to a priorily foist upon actors a self-understanding which they
7
Thus, when assessing legitimacy we offer an estimate "of the [actual] degree ofcongruence between
a given system of power and the beliefs, values and expectations that provide its justification"
(Beetham, 1991: 11, my italics).
8 I owe this counter-argument to Professor Russell Keat (personal conversation), but see also Hay
(1997: 45-52), Keat & Urry (1975: 196-204), and Lessnoff (1974: 147-152).
9 Habermas (1988a: 254; 1979a: 186-187). Under this empiricist view, which Habermas associates
with Weber, Schumpeter, Niklas Luhmann and Werner Becker, "one legitimation is as good as
another, so long as it sufficiently contributes to stabilizing a given political order" (BFN: 290).
76
Chapter 4 Critiquing Habermas
themselves would reject and which he would be loath to ascribe to himself (MCCA: 26-32,
47-48).
The empiricist insensitivity to the complexities of citizen interactions is not only
normatively questionable, a case of the political scientist arrogantly discounting actors' self-
interpretations, but also suspect from a social scientific perspective. For the goal of social
science is both to document the existence of power structures at given points in time and,
more fundamentally, to understand why and how power structures endure over time. A
regime may enjoy large-scale support at a particular historical juncture, but the more
pressing question is whether it will continue to enjoy that support in the future. To answer
that question, the scientist must attend to the claims made by the regime, its defence of a just
social order or achievement of citizen prosperity. However, to ascertain whether a regime
will endure he also has to judge the defensibility of its claims.10 If, for example, a
government declares its policies have secured economic well-being for citizens and yet most
citizens languish in poverty, it is highly likely that it will encounter concerted opposition.
To avoid this, a government must either engage in a policy of obfuscation, blinding citizens
to the reality of their situation, or try to remedy this reality. In coming to this conclusion, the
social scientist therefore distinguishes between the rhetoric and the reality of governmental
claims. But in distinguishing between rhetoric and reality he necessarily commits himself to
truth-criteria underpinning the distinction between tenable and untenable justification, even
if these criteria are contestable and inadequately articulated (Beetham, 1991: 10). Thus, the
distinction between tenable and untenable claims is not the preserve of normative philosophy
solely but in fact a rudimentary article of good social science (TCA, I: 269; BFN: 330-336).
Given the above argument, there is no possibility of holding to an agnostic notion of
justification or legitimation, since scientists are as dependent upon the concepts of adequacy,
consistency, and coherence as the citizens whom they study. Once this is accepted, however,
Weber's positivist and formalist reading of legitimacy and law ceases to make sense. When
legal frameworks are deemed legitimate on account of legitimating reasons, when these
reasons make reference to citizens' interests and ideals, and when, finally, a regime stands in
danger of delegitimation if its claims to authority fail to cohere with these interests and
ideals, then the law cannot be self-contained but requires, instead, justifications arising from
everyday lifeworld interactions. As Habermas argues, "belief in legality can produce
10 "For reasons to be sound and for them to be considered sound are not the same thing, whether we
are dealing with reasons for asserting facts [or] for recommending norms and values ... [Thus] the
interpreter cannot simply look at and understand such reasons without at least implicitly passing
judgement on them as reasons" {MCCA: 30).
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legitimacy only if we already presuppose the legitimacy of the legal order that lays down
what is legal" (TCA, 1: 265, my italics). And this presupposition entails the interconnection
of legality with normative principles, including, at the most basic level, the equality of
citizens before the law, due process, and procedures for criticism and redress. Indeed, Weber
gave clear, if inadequate, recognition to this. "Legality," he (ES: 36) wrote, "can be regarded
as legitimate in virtue of (i) voluntary agreement among interested parties, (ii) imposition by
an authority which is held to be legitimate and therefore meets with compliance." In neither
case, however, is the form of law self-validating; rather, the form of law depends on citizens
actively consenting to a specific legal order or, more indirectly, adhering to the injunctions
of a government or authority which conforms to their expectations, interests, and ideals
(TCA, I: 265).
The consequences of Weber's failure to integrate these insights into his wider theory of
law are considerable. As already implied, in excluding criteria for distinguishing tenable
from untenable justifications his theory of law is unable to account for processes of
delegitimation and change. Thus, it is prejudiced to a peculiar form of conservatism, one not
founded upon tradition or habituation, as is typically the case, but instead upon the settled
certainties of a judicial elite who understand themselves as administrators to a general,
abstract, and calculable system of rules (ES: 895; BFN: 73). As Habermas (TCA, I: 269) sees
it, there is a supreme ironism at work here. Decrying the increasing formalization or
"mechanized petrification" of social life in late modernity, Weber's theory of law
nonetheless reinforces this process of formalization. The freedom Weber desired for modern
individuals therefore suffers unnecessary occlusion in his thought. To break the strangle
hold of formal-legal bureaucratization and to allow for individually effected change, Weber
was led to the figure of the charismatic leader, the exceptional individual who possesses the
strength of will and character to alter the world. But this turn to "plebiscitary democracy"
does not so much preserve the principle of individual self-determination as surrender it to an
alternative form of domination now unbound by any rules or criteria except those originating
within the will of Reichsprasidenten, party bosses, and would-be prophets." In the
Weberian vision the individual is thus doubly enchained, to abstract regulatory systems, on
the one hand, and to capricious dictates of will, on the other.
The significance of Habermas' recovery of legitimacy as a critical concept is that this
double enchainment ceases to be a foregone conclusion. Once the structures of power are
11 Habermas (1971b: 62-86; 1979a: 187; BFN: 453). See also Beetham (1985: 266), Held (1987:
159), and Mommsen (1989: 33).
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understood as being dependent upon justifications arising within the everyday lifeworld,
these structures become amenable to the criticisms and interventions of ordinary citizens.
The elites which Weber and later Schumpeter privileged are thereby brought to ground and
rendered vulnerable to a sustained interrogation of their power and the injustices so often
associated with it. The result is to dispel the illusion that politics is inevitably defined by an
interplay between bureaucratic machines and their masters or "the factual strength of
privileged interests" (BFN: 150). More than this, however, the state itself, the prime organ
of government and political life, ceases to be the prerogative of an elect few and transforms
into the potential possession of all citizens. When government must subject itself to the
tribunal of everyday justificatory discourse, then "the only legitimate law is one that emerges
from the discursive opinion- and will-formation of equally enfranchised citizens" (BFN:
408). The institutional procedures for the production of coercive law and framing of policy
are therefore different from the procedures of everyday dialogue in degree, not kind. But
this is true only if citizens enjoy personal independence and can articulate their opinions in
non-trivial public fora. Hence, as we saw (Ch 3.IV.), Habermas' argument for the co-
originality or equiprimordiality of public and private autonomy. The genuine radicalism of
this argument is that the state is no longer simply a means of violence lording over citizens,
but also a vehicle for the mutual co-determination of the terms of their shared existence. In
modernity, in other words, there exists "no autonomous law without the realization of
democracy" (Habermas, 1988a: 279).
In summary, then, Habermas is of profound relevance insofar as his intersubjective turn
yields a model of human identity formation providing a far superior understanding of
individual maturity, accountability, and freedom than that found in Weberian subjectivism.
On the basis of this model and his account of non-pathological lifeworld sociation, he recasts
Weber's "loss of freedom" and loss of meaning" theses without succumbing to totalizing
critiques of modernity. Moreover, his arguments against empiricist interpretations of
legitimacy and law help reclaim politics as an endeavour and mode of life intimately bound
to normative expectations and potentially open to all.
As we will see, however, Habermas' call for political participation is deeply
problematized by his lifeworld-system dualism and celebration of civil society over the state
(Ch 4,III.i). But before examining why we must first address certain weighty philosophical
difficulties. Habermas' diremption of "ethics" from "morality" and argument for a minimal
proceduralism will be seen to conflict with the substantive and ethical grounds of his theory.
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This conflict is exacerbated by his portrayal of ethics in terms that threaten a recrudescence
of decisionism and by his understanding of the processes of critique, which is far too narrow
and reductive to be convincing.
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4.II.) Philosophical Perplexities
4.II.i.) Moral Proceduralism, Ethical Substance, and Diremption
Habermas is convinced discourse ethics provides a viable response to modern value-
scepticism. Our argument thus far is that this claim has merit. Nonetheless, the notable fact
that Habermasian discourse ethics has elicited contradictory evaluations suggests significant
underlying difficulties. Some theorists declare it so formalistic as to be empty, without real
normative import.12 Others contend that it has normative import in a real, substantive sense,
delineating the outline of a social order defined by individual autonomy and social
equality.13 Ironically, both interpretations are correct. Habermas' theory is in fact
substantive in two senses: first, insofar as the procedures he isolates presume a specific
content and outcome; second, and most significant as regards his critical impulse, in that his
understanding of communicative sociation draws upon a substantive universal-ethical vision.
However, this vision is regrettably obscured by his insistence on procedural minimality and
diremption of morality and ethics.
As to the first substantive element, Habermas denies that his theory presumes a specific
content or outcome. Discourse ethics locates reason within the regulative procedures of the
"ideal speech situation" and, to circumvent Weberian value-scepticism, disavows all content
bar that entailed by the presuppositions of a communicative process defined by reflexivity
and reciprocity. Yet, as an important debate between Habermas and John Rawls revealed,
this pretension to pure procedurality cannot be sustained. Habermas had long accused Rawls
of taking on too much, of trying to prescribe a conception of political justice which "only the
actual discourse of real participants can decide" (Rawls, 1995: 138). Rejecting Habermas'
criticisms, Rawls' trenchant response is that the justice of any procedure depends ultimately
on the justice of its outcome, that is, substantive justice. Indeed, Habermas himself suggests
as much when he (BFN\ 445-446) admits discourse ethics "cannot be merely formal," that it
"retains a dogmatic core" or idea of autonomy according to which human beings are free
"only insofar as they obey just those laws they give themselves in accordance with insights
that they have acquired intersubjectively." Habermas believes this idea is "'dogmatic' only
in a harmless sense," yet Rawls' point is that this "dogmatic core" is not at all "harmless" but
in fact thoroughly substantive inasmuch as it shapes and predetermines results in a particular
12 See Pettit (1982), Heller (1985: 1-17), Dwars (1992: 67-78), and Campbell (2000: 244-245).
13 See Benhabib (1990b: 337-338; 1992: 38-46, 71-76), Dunne (1993: 209-226), Bernstein (1995:
226), and Deflem(1996: 11-12).
81
Chapter 4 Critiquing Habermas
direction. This direction gets its meaning from our "considered judgements" regarding
offences to human dignity such as slavery, religious persecution, economic exploitation,
cruelty, and domination, which act as "substantive checks" on the processes of reaching
agreement or compromise. A positive and substantive ideal of autonomy illuminated
negatively by persecution therefore limits the reasons which may legitimately enter into
discursive processes in order to ensure the desired reasonable outcome, the satisfaction of
generalizable interests (Rawls, 1995: 178).
The Habermasian retort is to admit that discourse ethics does presume a degree of
substantive content, but nonetheless to insist that the idea of autonomy, the "self-binding of
the will by maxims we adopt on the basis of insight," is internal to the workings of a
procedural rationality (IO: 99-100, 278). Hence, the substantive elements rest not on a
potentially contentious understanding of human being-together but on the idea of reason
itself. This counter-argument is unconvincing, however. Not only does his reconstruction of
rational autonomy rule out slavery or explicit coercion, as would be expected from a theory
that identifies reason with free will. It also rules out perspectives considered acceptable by
many within mainstream political philosophy. Libertarianism and neo-liberalism, in
particular, are excluded as viable political alternatives on account of their "normatively
diminished conception of the person" (PNC: 93-94). Reducing the self to a "rational
decider," neo-liberalism simultaneously neglects the inviolable moral self of the private
person and the public self of the citizen, thus distorting the meaning of private and public
autonomy. What interests us here is not the truth or otherwise of this view, even though
there are good reasons for believing it true. Rather, Habermas can classify libertarianism as
a "normative foreshortening" only because he has already located the generation of the self
in processes of socialization. Individual personhood, as we saw, is the result of becoming a
member of a community (Ch 3.I., 4.1.i). But this implies that the procedures of
argumentation rely not on an autonomy internal to a procedural reason, but rather on an
autonomy which issues from and is co-extensive with the reproductive structures of society
itself. In being material as well as symbolic, these structures cannot be equated with
discourse alone, but must also include bodily, emotional, and psychological needs.14
Although these needs are not concretely specified, they underlie Habermas' inclusion of the
principle of beneficence and welfare rights within morality and the constitutional state.
Justice and solidarity thereby go hand in glove (MCCA: 200). But Habermas can link justice
14 As is variously argued by Guess (1981: 31), Keat (1981: 198), Lukes (1982: 137, 144), and Moon
(1983: 181-183). See White (1988: 69-71, 166) for a contrary interpretation.
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and solidarity only by ascribing a social and intersubjective identity to the self, and yet
identity, by his own theory, is a matter of substance.
It is by highlighting the theoretical work done by this identity that we can comprehend
why libertarianism appears automatically excluded from a theory which allegedly does not
"prejudice" its functioning in any substantive direction. Far from being procedural, then,
autonomy relies on a determinate identification, conception, of the human being as a
quintessentially social being. This reliance, however, shows Habermas' theory to be
substantive in a deeper sense than that meant by Rawls, that it presumes a determinate
content and outcome but also that this content and outcome are primarily ethical in
inspiration. Habermas (TCA, I: 73) enjoins theorists to refrain from judging the worth of
societies, since such judgements are judgements of the "good life" presuming models of
"sickness and health" that cannot be captured by the formal conception of procedural
rationality underlying his discourse theory. And yet we saw that the critical edge of his
critique of 20th century society revolves around the threat of socio-pathologies, sickness, to
lifeworld reproductive processes (Ch 3.III., 4.1.i). Anomie, delegitimation, alienation,
demotivation, loss of meaning, cultural impoverishment, these all refer to an image of
damaged subjectivity and intersubjectivity which, because sickness is incomprehensible
without reference to health, emanates from an affirmative ethical intimation of the whole or
fulfilled life.15 Socio-pathologies are the twins of healthy lifeworld reproduction, of action
coordination though mutual understanding, of stable legitimation, of inner psychic harmony,
and so forth. As such they affect in equal manner our ability to work out coherent plans of
life, self-realization, and to fix the terms by which we ought to live, self-determination.
Because this positive image of lifeworld reproduction has as much to do with ethical
self-realization as moral self-determination, we are entitled to doubt the prime role accorded
morality and thus to question Habermas' separation of moral "norms" from ethical "values"
as a feasible response to Weberian subjectivism (Ch 3.II.). Indeed, Habermas himself
proposes intimate conceptual interdependencies between ethics and morality. Ethical values,
he (TCA, 1: 89) says, are candidates for moral norms that must undergo a generalization test.
The motor of this transformation of values into norms is a concomitant evaluative
transformation of our need interpretations, our willingness to understand ourselves in novel
15
Indeed, from this it is clear that Habermas goes beyond the liberal perfectionist concern with the
conditions of autonomy to posit a strongly socialized personality ideal whose standard is not simply
individuality, as in Mill or Raz, but the achievement of individuality in community with others.
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terms.16 Moral debate requires not just solidarity or generality but also hermeneutic
"interventions into the self-understanding of participants who must be willing to revise their
descriptions of themselves and others" (IO: 42-43). Individual and societal learning
processes consist, then, in a limitless exchange of interpretations and experiences enabling us
to comprehend more clearly who we are and who we want to become.17 Moreover,
pragmatic, ethical, and moral discourses are merely "analytically distinct." In real political
discourse their logics overlap and must be treated simultaneously, a truth which frustrates,
Habermas (BFN: 565) concedes, his attempt to order "concrete questions in a linear fashion."
Again, deontological morality must go beyond Kant to include within it "those structural
aspects of the good life that can be distinguished from the concrete totality of specific forms
of life" (MCCA: 203, my italics). That morality must incorporate these structural aspects is
reason to believe that a well-ordered society would be just and relatively happy, one in
which all individuals could give effective expression to their individual life goals (JA: 152).
But if logics overlap, if arriving at the moral depends on a revision of need
interpretations that in turn requires hermeneutic reinterpretations of the self, and if, lastly,
morality concerns the general conditions of the good life, then morality and ethics stand in a
symbiotic, rather than subordinating, relationship. This symbiosis is not just a conceptual
matter, but one also motivating Habermas in terms of pressing contemporary problems. The
crime of Auschwitz yields the lens through which he judges the German present and this
judging concerns "forms of a desired political existence ... and the values that shall
predominate in it" (PNC: 28, my italics). The Nazi legacy demands an "ethical-political
discourse of collective self-understanding" wherein ideals of personhood and of political
responsibility undergo reassessment (PNC: 37). Such reassessment goes to the heart of
political life. No moral order endures without anchorage in citizen's motivations. Just as
Habermas' discourse ethics presumes a dogmatic, substantive core, so too does it rely on a
political culture that has become significant for us, for our identities (BFN: 445-446).
Morality needs to grow upon the soil of everyday lifeworlds so as to become the guiding
self-understanding of civil society and the public sphere. Culture transforms abstract moral
injunctions into a concrete and particular ethical identity and thereby constitutes, in the final
instance, the only barrier to threats to integrity and diversity (BFN: 500). Integrity and
diversity, at once both moral and ethical concepts because presuming inviolability and a
16 Hermeneutic experience in fact prevents the "stagnation of the structures of practical discourse"
(Habermas, 1979b: 59, quoted in White, 1988: 83).
84
Chapter 4 Critiquing Habermas
valued plurality, also underlie Habermas' recent concern with the politics of cloning. Here
especially the ethical and the moral become indistinguishable. The "revulsion provoked by
the vision of cloned human replicas" issues from a moral abhorrence at the loss of
reciprocity, of the scientist as master and the clone as his product, but this abhorrence
ultimately has ethical grounds in the "irreversible effects of the arbitrary decision of another
person on "me" — not insofar as I exist at all, but rather on the essential conditions of my
self-understanding" (PNC: 163, 172; 2003a: 39-40, my italics). What stands threatened here
is not an identity limited to one subject or to a single community, but an identity comprising
humanity as a whole. Habermas' revulsion at genetic engineering has a universal-ethical
basis.
This basis shows that the validity claims of right and good are conceptually and
practically indistinct. Insofar as the moral seeks to uncover generalizable interests it seeks,
too, to define what is universally good for human beings. Yet Habermas' theory is unable to
appreciate this overlap. Although he pictures the relation between differentiated rationality
complexes in a less antagonistic light than Weber, in adopting the same diremptive strategy
he perpetuates these antagonisms.'8 Habermas travels with Weber down the path of
diremption but then calls a halt before the image of cultural impoverishment. Differentiation
must stop short, we are told, of fragmenting everyday consciousness (Ch 3.III.). Yet the
paradox here is that Habermas calls into question the very thing that he prizes in modernity,
the structural differentiation of the lifeworld. His (TCA, II: 397-398) solution is to call for a
balanced rationalization to counter one-sidedness but this balance, insofar as it concerns
normative questions, again sits ill with his privileging of morality. It also runs against his
attempt to presumptively categorize questions as either moral, ethical, or pragmatic.
Questions of ecology and environmental protection, for instance, are considered ethical
whereas human welfare is ascribed to the moral, since "moral problems only arise within the
circle of subjects capable of participating in discourse" on the basis of equal responsibility
(JA: 105). This stipulation of a strict mutual responsibility limits morality to the interactions
between equally "rational" beings. But Habermas himself goes on to question the
anthropocentric "narcissism" of this limitation (MCCA: 211; JA: 107-111). Not only are
17 As when Habermas (TCA, I: 238) claims that within the ethical-existential rationality complex
"knowledge can take the form of authentic interpretations of need, interpretations that have to be
renewed in each historically changed set of circumstances."
18 Habermas' division of the "world into distinct domains of validity cannot be regarded as an
innocent methodological manoeuvre" because "once the constitutive or ontological unity of the
social is acknowledged, Habermas' formal account of balancing validity spheres ... begins to look
like a reification" (Bernstein, 1995: 232). See also Love (1995: 57-63) and Dews (1999: 20-21).
85
Chapter 4 Critiquing Habermas
environmental questions normatively urgent, but this urgency equals in significance the
question of justice between rational humans. Approached through the categories of his
theory, the narrow scope and referent of the moral represent an impoverishment of which
Habermas himself is painfully aware.
4.II.ii.) Ethics, Subjectivism, and Critique
Insofar as he demands that substantive questions be avoided in favour of a procedural ism
nonetheless underpinned by these questions, Habermas stands caught within a "strange
pragmatic contradiction" (Taylor, 1989: 88). Our argument has therefore been that
Habermas misinterprets himself on account of false emphases. This misinterpretation is
regrettable, we will see (Ch lO.I.i, 11 .II.), precisely because it is questions of substance, the
good, which form the bedrock of political endeavour. Here, however, we consider two
further difficulties. Related to the foregoing discussion, the first again concerns Habermas'
understanding of the good, an understanding which not only leads him to mischaracterize his
project but also to undermine it. The second concerns his understanding of critique, whether
the "ideal speech situation" is an adequate conceptualization of the conditions of non-
dominative interaction.
Habermas' self-misinterpretation underlies his denunciation of philosophical attempts to
lay bare the contours of the good life. The neo-Aristotelian and neo-Hegelian philosophies
ofMaclntyre, Martha Nussbaum and Charles Taylor repeat the errors of classical theories by
ontologizing or reifying "goods and values into entities existing in themselves" (BFN: 256).
This metaphysical or "moral realism," that there is a "purpose" to human existence
discernible by philosophy, depends on the discredited conviction that the universe forms a
meaningful teleological order within which human beings occupy a pre-given space.19
Under the conditions of a post-metaphysical modernity defined by a plurality of value
systems, all philosophy can do is delineate the basis of the moral point of view (JA: 74-76).
By stressing the good above right, moral- or metaphysical-realist theories endanger the
priority of norms over values and thus render the deontological, what is unconditionally
binding, subordinate to the teleological, what is relatively binding. Dangerous subjective
and utilitarian logics thereby threaten to override the deontological principles of "human
19 It is important to recall that "moral" or "metaphysical realism" has an entirely different meaning to
"political realism" (Ch 1 .II.). The former contends that moral ideals, beliefs, et cetera, have an
objective status; the latter, that politics is, as Hobbes said, a realm of hostility and conflict.
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dignity, solidarity, self-realization, and autonomy" in the name of expediency or of parochial
non-universal interests (BFN: 257).
Yet, given our arguments so far, this critique appears untenable. For all his talk about a
post-metaphysical age, Habermas' own elucidation of the structures of communication is
itself "morally realist." As the well-spring of normativity, moral life moves within an
objective scheme of discourses governed by non-subjective and therefore compelling
validity claims. Even if subject to differing interpretations, the rules of communication "play
the same role in every language community," existing outside the self in a social world
defined by "essential" linguistic structures.20 Furthermore, in a manner not dissimilar to neo-
Hegelian and neo-Aristotelian theories, Habermas also asserts a purpose or teleology to
human life, the attainment of mature selfhood. This teleology, as neo-Aristotelians readily
acknowledge, depends on processes of socialization.21 The mature self is not a self isolated
from others in his vocation, but a self that comes into being intersubjectively, as an
individual among others. To the extent, then, that Habermas shares such ground with moral
realists, his "deontological principles" of human dignity and solidarity can reasonably be
interpreted as requisite elements of the good life, of eudaimonia in the classical sense
Habermas resists this interpretation on account of a fundamental confusion that imperils
the foundation of his theory. Simply put, deontology and teleology need not, as Habermas
believes, conflict. Human teloi are neither merely "conventional," a matter of community
specific ethoi, "utilitarian," a matter of desire maximization, nor "subjective," a question of
individual or collective will, the three ways in which Habermas (1988a: 227; BFN: 254-261;
IO: 54-56) understands the good. The latter understanding is especially problematic. The
theories of the good discussed above do not adopt a subjective logic wherein values are
chosen according to individual or collective preference. Rather, they locate and analyse
those capacities and goals that render human life worthy of living, capacities and goals that
are not "relatively binding" but indeed inviolable.
Against this view, Habermas (Ch 3.II.) argues that ethical teloi are questions of "more
or less," lack the coherence and obligatoriness of norms, and are assessed according to the
urgency of desire. The problem here, however, is that the separation of norm and value on
the basis of coherence is unfounded. It is clearly the case, for instance, that the norms of
20 Rational reconstructions "reproduce the pre-theoretical knowledge that they explicate only in an
essentialist sense; if they are true, they have to correspond precisely to the rules that are operatively
effective in the object-domain" (CES: 16). On Habermas' moral realism, see Outhwaite (1994: 36).
21 As Habermas (1986: 207-208) himself puts it: "Aristotle was right in his opinion that the moral
intuitions which theory clarifies must have been acquired elsewhere, in more or less socialization
processes." See Dunne (1993: 213-216).
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personal liberty and social justice conflict and that even well-ordered societies have at times
to adjudicate between clashing moral imperatives. Thus, he vainly tries to apportion
fundamental disagreement to a neatly enclosed sphere of interaction, when in truth it inheres
within interaction as such. His attempt to side-step Weber's subjectivism by separating
rationally amenable norms from clashing values therefore fails. Furthermore, once it is
recognized that the ground of Habermas' critical vision is itself ethical, then his
characterization of ethics as preferential, subjective, and ineluctably contradictory entails a
surreptitious surrender to Weberian decisionism. Dependent on a vision of non-pathological
living together, Habermas' ideals of solidarity, self-determination, and self-realization are
prime goods which stand in danger of being consigned to arbitrary willing if ethical
discourse is denied an adequately rational status. In denying ethical discourse this status,
Habermas not only fails to account for the goods that impel his work but actually appears to
imperil them. Despite the real advances of his intersubjective paradigm, it is he, not the
moral realists, who presupposes a hazardous subjective logic.
We will return to the question of ethics and subjectivism later (Ch 7.II.ii, 9.III., 10.1.i).
Here it suffices to note that Habermas' misappraisal of ethics stems in part from his concern
to isolate the universal, the goal of critique. Because intimately tied to plural identities, the
good is (mistakenly) thought an unsuitable foundation for that quest. As a discourse of
justification, morality demands abstraction from the particularities of history, identity, and
desire. Habermas believes this abstraction ensures the possibility of arriving at generalizable
interests. A difficulty with deontological abstraction, however, is moral rigorism or
indifference towards the peculiarities of particular situations. To counter the desensitizing
acontextuality of justificatory discourse, Habermas argues for a supplementary discourse of
application so that abstract norms find purchase within concrete situations (Ch 3.II.).
Anxious to circumvent the Aristotelian emphasis on experience and formative traditions, he
maintains that morally right action cannot be decided in a single moment of justification.
Rather, it requires a two-stage process of argument consisting of justification followed by the
application of norms according to the criterion of "appropriateness." Thus, impartial
judgement implies that a norm is "valid and appropriate whenever the consequences and
side effects of its general observance for the interests of each individual in every particular
situation can be accepted by all" (Gunther, 1988: 50, quoted in JA: 36).
In the first order moment of justification participants take into account the consequences
of a norm's enactment, but because they merely possess knowledge of the present, not the
future, and can only imagine general scenarios in which a norm would have this or that
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effect, they cannot be expected at this stage of discourse to come up with the right answer for
all possible circumstances. Justified norms bear a "time and knowledge index" necessitating
the revision of earlier justifications when the historical conditions undergirding their
framework alter. The social world has an inescapable historical character, but this
"existential provinciality" does not weaken the deontological basis of norms, for it assumes
that, even though the meaning of norms changes with the passage of time, "the moral point
of view [i.e., moral validity and its presuppositions] remains identical" (JA\ 39, 162). The
second order moment of application saves deontology from rigorism through a two way
hermeneutic relation of valid norms to specific situations and from these situations back, in
turn, to the abstract conditions of a norm's applicability as specified in its first order
justification. In doing so, moreover, application generates a coherent normative order.
Norms eclipsed within the horizon of a particular moment lose none of their validity but are
instead subordinated to and combined with that norm relevant to the situation defined as
exhaustively as possible.
Yet, as with his failed attempt to separate ethical value and moral norm, this attempt to
differentiate and yet interrelate universal justification and particular application also runs
aground. It is not that we come to a universal norm first and then apply it to a particular
context; rather, norms issue and only make sense from the perspective of concrete
predicaments. The very fact that in the first order moment of justification participants
consider the consequences of a norm's enactment within "standard situations whose salient
features have been integrated from the outset" means that they are already performing an
"applicatory" task (JA: 13, my italics). "Standard situations" are only standard because
experience shows they tend to recur or are basic in moral-ethical life. To know whether a
norm should be endorsed involves imagining it at work in society, our imagination drawing
its contours from the actual societies in which we live. Instead, then, of just one level of
application at work in discourse ethics there are in fact two, the first order moment of
application-justification indicating just as strongly as the second order moment actors'
dependence on received knowledge, history, and personal and communal experience. There
is, then, no possibility of isolating an "identical" core in justificatory discourse. The two-
way flow of hermeneutic insight changes our awareness both of universal and particular
(Bernstein, 1995: 223). Because application and archetypal contexts are basic to
justification, morality depends on a prior knowledge of the effects proposed norms would
likely have on real, not hypothetical, situations which, as they alter, alter the meaning of
89
Chapter 4 Critiquing Habermas
morality. But when hermeneutic proficiency becomes a precondition of justification, then
the universal and particular stand in an intimate and indivisible symbiotic interrelation.
A number of consequences follow. First, Habermas' differentiation of /and we from all
as the criterion for demarcating moral discourse founders. Superficially this differentiation
makes sense. Arguments for interests that only affect me or us and no others have a different
referent than arguments for interests that purportedly affect all human beings. Yet, given the
historicity and contextual rootedness of argumentation, its reliance on an hermeneutic
proficiency drawing upon experience, and the fact that real discourse could never include all
human beings as participants, arguments for the interests of "all" must always be made from
the position of a determinate "we."22 There exists, then, no means by which to separate the
voice of "we" from "all" where general interests are at stake, no means to rid these interests
of their historical and dialogic specificity. Nor would it be desirable to so rid them, since
these interests get their sense from such specificity (McCarthy, 1998: 127). Acceptance of
this truth about moral-ethical life means a different understanding of normative questioning.
The question to be asked in discourse is not simply "what would all agree to?" but rather
"what would all agree to if faced by the circumstances we face, the real needs we share, and
the unique events contributing to them?" A universalizing intent is tied here to a necessarily
particular perspective or historical locatedness. Although, for example, the Holocaust
primarily affected the Jews, Gypsies, and Germans and can only be understood through the
particularities of their interrelation, these unique particularities nonetheless have a universal
significance that comes to light when we try to imagine whether, under those particularities,
the same calamity would have befallen us. In so imagining, the history of the Holocaust and
our unique histories interpenetrate. Yet by insisting on a first order moment of abstraction
Habermas effectively prevents the achievement of this interpenetration.23
These criticisms go to the heart of Habermas' theory. Because normative universals
issue from concrete particularities, his abstract "ideal speech situation" cannot do the critical
work he intends. Indeed, far from clarifying the grounds for critique, it reductively
mischaracterizes a multidimensional and complex phenomenon. The point is a simple one.
If subject to a strict implementation of rules 3.1 - 3.3 many unproblematic everyday
activities would be declared inherently unjust on account of presuming unequal competence
between actors or limits on what may be introduced into debate. For instance, by his own
22 Discourse can never be totally inclusive in that future generations are necessarily non-participants.
We will return to this presently (Ch 4,IIl.ii).
23
Moreover, because deontological morality is in principle context-transcending it cannot, as Pensky
(1999: 223) observes, encompass "the moral uniqueness" of the Holocaust.
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criteria Habermas' favoured mode of public discourse, the journal article, would appear
inherently flawed. Far from being open to all (rule 3.1) and receptive to every idea or self-
expression (rule 3.2 a - 3.2 c), article writing is subject to non-voluntary, non-consensually
arrived at standards of quality and professionalism that have to be achieved or learned before
one can participate within academic and literary spheres. These standards are upheld
through editing, which as both institution and social relation relies on an asymmetrical
apportioning of authority. A similar apportioning defines the roles of chairperson, party
leader, and judge.
Yet this everyday asymmetry is not usually thought to be oppressive. Although he
never addresses this problem directly, Habermas tries to side-step it by emphasizing the
regulative function of the "ideal speech situation." The conditions of that situation can never
be fulfilled, yet as regulative ideals they "must be satisfied to a sufficient degree," achieve an
"approximate fulfilment" (JA: 164-165; 1992b: 448-449). But the exact meaning of
"sufficient" or "approximate" is obscure. It can mean either that the rules themselves will be
interpreted differently depending on the activity or scenario at hand or that their meaning
remains constant but that they only ever find partial recognition. Given our assertion that
application entails a transformation of justified norms, that the core does not remain
"identical," we have to rule out the latter possibility. But the former understanding entails
that the nature of critique alters depending on the matter at hand. It entails furthermore that
any reduction of emancipatory paths to a set of rules impoverishes our understanding of the
multiple varieties and sources of critical awareness.24 In rigidly determining the path of
critique, the "ideal speech situation" amounts, if taken literally, to little more than a crude
method or rule of thumb. It cannot cope with the varieties of activity in which human beings
engage and, decisively, fails to account for the role of experience in these activities.25
Although he gives an impressive answer to Weber's de-radicalization of legitimation
processes, this answer suffers from an oversimplifying urge to render action abstract. This
abstraction renders us, in turn, blind to the historical and practical particularities that grant
activities their meaning.
24 Habermas' (JA: 171) admission that we quickly recognize, "like ethnologists integrated into a
foreign society, how emancipated ... our surroundings really are," suggests that critique takes its
orientation not from determinate rules but from experiencing and living the effects of diverse
activities.
25 Habermas (TCA, II: 181-183, 273-283) does speak in passing of actors who, because
knowledgeable or morally exemplary, have an unequal but laudable "influence" over others. The
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We will return to the entwinement of universal and particular, the dependence of critique on
experience, and the multidimensionality of argumentative validity when we consider
Maclntyre's idea of practices (Ch lO.I.ii). To summarize our argument thus far, we have
shown that Habermas' project is primarily ethical and that insofar as he subordinates ethics
to a procedural morality he stands guilty of misinterpreting himself. This self-
misinterpretation is exacerbated by a subjective reading of ethics which, in threatening a
return to Weberian decisionism, imperils the gains of his intersubjective turn. In the
following it will be maintained that these philosophical failings are accompanied by
noteworthy political failings. Habermas' diremption of system and lifeworld leads to a
dualist politics in which citizen's capacities suffer severe curtailment. Questioning this
dualism, we are also led to question his dichotomization of strategic and communicative
action, a dichotomy which purges lifeworld of contestation and glosses over the acute
uncertainty that frequently accompanies political action.
problem, however, is that he fails to explore the normative grounds of this unequal apportioning of
authority.
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4.III.) Norm-Free Sociality and Political Strategy
4.III.L) "Radical Reformism": a Paradoxical Politics
Habermas' believes his "radical reformist" project "radical" insofar as its ideals of self-
determination and self-realization entail that only those political and economic orders
permitting extensive citizen participation are just. Hence his "twin-track" model based on an
interplay of weak and strong publics which, through democratic "sluices," enables civil
society to direct administrative subsystems (Ch 3.IV.). This interplay is "reformist" rather
than revolutionary, Habermas insists, in respecting the "complexity" of modern societies, the
independent logics of administrative and market subsystems.
Important questions need to be asked of Habermas here. The first concerns his "two-
track" model, whether it in truth is as radical as he supposes. The second concerns his
emphasis on "weak publics" or civil society and whether these publics can and should
provide the central focus of citizen energies. The third, and most important, concerns the
lifeworld-system dualism on which his "two-track" model and celebration of civil society
rely. Delving deeper into his thought, it becomes clear that serious tensions abound,
suggesting that Habermas' "radical reformist" perspective is paradoxical, at once both
critical of and yet augmenting Weber's image of the "iron cage."
As to the "two-track" model, Habermas is confident that through the democratic
transformation of "influence" into "communicative power" and thereafter by the legislature
into "administrative power," individuals within civil society can bring administrative
subsystems to heel. It is telling, however, that when it comes to everyday politics he argues
that a "countercirculation" of power runs against the "official" circulation of power from the
public sphere into legislature and then into administration.26 Under "normal" conditions
"bureaucracies prepare laws ... parliaments pass laws and budgets, party headquarters
conduct election campaigns, clients exert influence on their 'administrations'" (BFN: 356).
That administrations and the executive and not parliament or the public sphere "possess the
power and initiative to get problems on the agenda" in moments of normality should not be
regarded as a terrible failure, for such routinization helps ease the considerable cost of
communicative opinion and will formation (BFN: 357, 380). Only in "exceptional"
moments do parliament and, less directly, the public sphere assume a dominant role. At
26 Habermas (BFN: 323-325, 354-358) draws this argument from Bernhard Peters' (1993) account of
modern constitutional democracies. What is interesting about Peters, as Scheuerman (1999: 166)
points out, is that his perspective is not at all critical-theoretical but in fact located within the
political realist tradition of Weber and Schumpeter.
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crisis times the public sphere forces "an extraordinary mode of problem solving" by which
parliament can thereafter actually determine the direction of power (BFN: 357).
Although Habermas' thinks this accords with critical visions of democracy, it is patently
clear that a politics which in "normal" times rests in the hands of elites differs in no
significant manner from existing representative democracy. However, the problem does not
just lie with Habermas' portrayal of "normal" politics. His normative-descriptive
characterization of weak and strong publics, the gap between the public sphere and the state,
already divides opinion and will formation into discrete domains, bestowing upon ordinary
citizens merely the capacity to arrive at convictions in "subjectless" modes of
communication, with periodic elections and occasional acts of civil disobedience as their
sole direct control upon leaders. This sharp division of competencies renders Habermasian
deliberative democracy difficult to comprehend as a radical-democratic project, for within it
popular sovereignty reduces to an attenuated, anaemic kind. Against this attenuation, critics
(Bohman, 1994: 925; Ferrara, 1999: 69) rightly point out that a robustly democratic order
would instead be one in which opinion- and will-formation were not separated but in fact
largely coincided. Such an order need not presume direct democracy, a gargantuan assembly
comprising all citizens, or a vision of the citizenry as some "macro-subject," as Habermas
(/O: 248) alleges. Rather, it presumes institutional mechanisms by which discrete
individuals can publicly deliberate pressing concerns and act upon their deliberations
(Cohen, 1989: 17-34). But this is also, we saw (Ch 3.IV., 4.1.i), the presupposition of
Habermas' (BFN: 121) argument regarding the equiprimordiality of private and public
autonomy, that for citizens to enjoy their private liberties they must participate "in the
practice of politically autonomous lawmaking." The paradox of Habermasian "radical
reformism," then, is that it extols the modern constitutional state as an institution in which
private and public autonomy are co-original and yet that state is not a site of popular political
participation.
Thus, by introducing a substantial gap between opinion and will, discourse and action,
Habermas lessens the critical force of his theory. Questioning this gap leads naturally to our
second query, the role of "weak publics" or civil society. Habermas privileges civil society
because of its informal and therefore non-colonized character, in contrast to the power-
ridden, formal organizational character of strong publics, state administrations, and
corporations. Yet many of his observations undercut any easy normative distinction between
colonized formal organization and non-colonized informal organization, thereby throwing
into doubt the public sphere's monopoly on emancipatory potentials. Wild and anarchic,
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"weak" publics may indeed allow for a greater number of voices than formally organized
"strong" publics, but they are also far more vulnerable to the whims of social power and
structural violence (BFN: 307-308). Indeed, the "democratic potential of [the] public
sphere" is rendered "ambivalent" by "the growing selective constraints imposed by
electronic mass media" (1992b: 456-457). Just as such media enable greater flexibility and
reach of message, thus disrupting unjust hierarchies, so too do they close down identities and
reinforce received views and interests. Within the public sphere, then, the green activist and
advertising mogul make use of the same "arsenal," except that the latter's use is abetted by a
distinct superiority in material and organizational resources.27
Given these admissions, it is highly unlikely that a public sphere which permits
government and non-governmental organizations to dominate decision-making processes in
times of normalcy would have the strength to reverse that dominance in times of crisis. We
will return to this when discussing Arendtian "substantive citizenship" (Ch 7.1.ii), but here
we should note that the progressive movements Habermas admires rarely limit themselves to
a wild and anarchic interplay of words. They, too, coalesce into formally structured
organizations and thus gain the stability and material wherewithal to campaign over long
periods of time. To counteract corporate lobby groups, they become like those groups in
many respects. What all this means is that a critical politics, if such is possible, cannot rely
on civil society or the public sphere alone, but must also incorporate aspects and enter into
the operations of formally organized institutions, especially the state.
In scattered but noteworthy passages Habermas comes close this view. Although
opposing communicative to administrative power, insisting that they adhere to alien
principles, he nonetheless proceeds to call for the institutionalization of communicative fora
within formal organizations and state bodies. Ombudspersons, judicial hearings, citizen and
client participation — these are the means by which to internally democratize administrative
structures, demanding "an interplay of institutional imagination and cautious
experimentation" (BFN: 191, 440-441). Here Habermas briefly returns to his 1960s
contention that emancipation lay in nurturing mtraorganizational communication and
participation, a remoulding of parties, lobbying groups, and the opening-up of state organs.28
This suggests an emancipatory path that avoids privileging civil society or opposing
communicative to administrative power.
21 On the power of corporations in civil society, see Ehrenberg (1999: 224), Scheuerman (1999: 167),
Stokes (1998: 128-134), and Shapiro (1999: 34-35).
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However, Habermas is prevented from consistently following this emancipatory path on
account of his lifeworld-system dichotomy. By separating "lifeworld rationalization" from
"systemic modernization" Habermas believed he could rescue "the project of modernity"
from Weber's vision of creeping instrumentalization (Ch 3.III.). As many have argued,
however, the costs of this rescue attempt are exceptionally high.29 The core problem is that
Habermas transforms an initially analytic distinction between lifeworld and systemic
integration into an essentialist dichotomy whose effect is to bifurcate communicative from
strategic action, symbolic from material reproduction, by assigning each to ontologically
opposed realms, the one a sphere of conscious human interaction, the other guided by
"latent" and opaque "systemic functions."30 The profound interrelation of communication
and strategy in all action contexts, whether symbolic or material, therefore disappears from
view. More gravely still, in ascribing formally constituted organizations and material
reproduction to a "norm-free" systemic rationality, Habermas (TCA, 1: 309) rules out, by
unsubstantiated theoretical fiat, important possibilities for conscious intervention and change
(McCarthy, 1991: 127-130; Bohman, 1999: 61-62, 76). Only by denying such possibilities
can he single out the lifeworld and public sphere as the loci of emancipatory energies, even
though they are permeated with oppressive relations.
Habermas believes he can accommodate these criticisms. He insists that both
communication and strategy occur within lifeworld contexts and that he therefore does not
neglect the negativity of power in these contexts. Nor does he (1991a: 258) equate system
with strategic action, even though formally constituted organizations do exhibit "an affinity
to purposive-rational action." As to his use of systems theory, he maintains that because the
action-theoretic concepts of communicative and strategic action are bound to the
presupposition of conscious intentions, they cannot fully grasp the phenomena of state and
market and their respective steering media of power and money. A systemic-functional
analysis is instead required to illuminate how such media "remain external to the structures
of [conscious] action" as mechanisms integrating partially perceived, unintentional action
consequences (1991a: 252; 1992b: 443-444). Bureaucrats and economic agents do
28 Then he (STPS: 209) believed bureaucracies "must first be organized in accord with the principle of
publicity and must institutionally permit an intraparty or intra-associational democracy — to allow
for unhampered communication and public rational-critical debate."
29 See Misgeld (1985: 56-69), Rasmussen (1990: 45-55), Joas (1991: 116-118), McCarthy (1991),
Bohman (1999: 75-77), Honneth (1999: 333-334), Scheuerman (1999: 168-172), and Leet (2002:
24-27). These theorists reflect critiques (Albert & Hahnel, 1981: 58-59; Giddens, 1982) of
Habermas' (1974: 142-169) early distinction between "labour" and "interaction."
30
Again, it is vitally important to distinguish this systemic functionalism, which works "behind the
backs" of actors, from the normatively informed functionalism discussed earlier (Ch 4,I.i).
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consciously aim for individual and collective goals, but the point is not that such actions do
not occur within systems, but rather that they do so "under the premises" of media that
narrowly circumscribe opportunities for thought and intentional deed (TCA, II: 310-311).
This accommodation succeeds only superficially, however. Objections are
acknowledged but Habermas does not really "acknowledge acknowledging" them, for his
key categories remain unchanged (Herrnstein-Smith, 1997: 112). He denies identifying
lifeworld with communicative action but then goes on to declare the goal of his lifeworld-
system opposition to be one of highlighting the "switch from communicative action to
media-steered interaction" (1991a: 262, my italics). This reinforces the impression that
lifeworld relations are, notwithstanding exceptions, primarily communicative, the very thing
critics object to. The same, too, with system and strategic action. When the steering media
of power and money are said to "demand a strategic stance" from actors and when there
exists a real "affinity" between systemic steering media and purposive rationality, albeit it
now "latent," then Habermas' (1991a: 254) avowal that he avoids equating system and
strategy falls decidedly flat. The accusation of ontological spatializing, of according distinct
logics to opposed realms of being, holds.
The consequences of this spatialization are far-reaching, especially as regards those
activities falling under "system." Habermas' recourse to systems theory was intended to
illuminate how systemic disequilibria are offset at the cost of lifeworld pathologies, thus
giving theory a firm frame of critical reference. Unfortunately, his (TCA, II: 154, 258)
identification of state and market with functional "blocks of norm-free sociality" in which
"norm-conformative attitudes and identity-forming relationships are neither necessary nor
possible" has the peculiar effect of isolating such deformations from critique. For to assert
that the coordinative actions of individuals within formally constituted organizations fall
"under the premises" of latent functionality is to place severe theoretical limits on the scope
for individual discretion and accountability in these organizations. The injustices suffered
by men and women are then no longer attributable to individual or group deeds but instead
issue from some reified, concealed logic. But even the most hierarchical organizations give
little reason to believe that coordination occurs through unconscious latent functions, alone
or primarily (McCarthy, 1991: 129-131). Such coordination can occur through actors
following orders consciously, out of habit, or under the threat of sanction, though more
usually a combination of all three. If managers and leaders are simply voice pieces to
steering media working behind their backs, as Habermas' deployment of systems theory
implies, then it is not they but the media they serve that has discretion. Yet he shies away
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from drawing this conclusion. Condemning Helmut Kohl's government for having reduced
German reunification to a technical economic question, thus preventing debate as to a new
constitution, he (1994: 33-54) is adamant that this reduction resulted from deliberate neo-
conservative policy, not money or power per se.
It is in economic matters, however, that Habermas' lifeworld-system dualism has its
most regrettable effect. Because constituted by the medium of money, which is far more
"deworlded" than power, the capitalist market has gained an "autonomy" unachievable by
state bureaucracies.31 Moreover, for Habermas (TCA, II: 340), as for Weber, market
capitalism represents a superior economic form, the only efficient means by which to
determine equivalences between disparate goods and interrelate spatially distant actions.
Consequently, although Habermas has been interpreted as a resource for alternative
conceptions of economic order, his work stands in tension with such rethinking. He (1991a:
261) defers to Marx's concept of "use value," celebrating those movements endeavouring to
realize an economic practice "no longer oriented to profit [alone]." And yet his {TCA, II:
396) general attitude towards those movements is that they "unrealistic." Imprisoned within
the sentimental dream of a fundamental reorientation of economic practice, they, like Marx
before them, have yet to come to terms with the "hard-to-resist imperatives" and "functional
demands" of "a globalized system ofmarket relations" (PNC: 124).
Yet what Habermas obscures from view in interpreting market interactions in systemic-
functional terms are the venerable normative arguments upholding this institution, that the
market supposedly ensures individual freedom and prosperity.32 Obscuring these arguments,
he also veils important normative counterarguments to market capitalism, one of the most
significant being that under capitalism the productive capacities of human beings suffer
avertable distortion. Habermas believes his "colonization" thesis an apposite diagnosis of
capitalism's ill-effects. The difficulty with this thesis, however, is that it suggests these ill-
effects are due to something extrinsic, the structures of material reproduction, invading
something intrinsic or uniquely human, symbolic reproduction. Attributing an extrinsic
status to the material, "colonization" as a theoretical device is therefore fundamentally
uncritical, a capitulation which in its very conception already forfeits labour and human
beings' productive capacities to the latent functionalism of system. With it the social and
psychological significance of one's work and occupation, their role in forming lifeworld
31
Owing "to the nature of the medium of power and the way in which it is institutionally anchored in
the lifeworld, [the political system] remains more dependent on its environments [lifeworld] than
does the economic system" (1991a: 259; PDM: 350-352).
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identities, is suppressed and thereby distanced from critical assessment (Honneth, 1999: 334;
2001: 54). Thus, while Habermas (TCA, II: 393) may wish to protect "endangered ways of
life," his ascription of the material to the systemic prevents any articulation of how the
material and symbolic interrelate to generate those ways of life at all. Just as it discourages
attempts to significantly transform political organizations, so too does his "radical
reformism" paradoxically discourage attempts to transform the economic sphere.
There is an acute irony in Habermas' endorsement of systems theory. A thinker whose
ambition has been to overcome false objectivisms and their political correlate, technocracy,
actually ends up consigning large parts of social reality to those very falsehoods. That being
the case, Habermas (TCA, I: 251) cannot justly claim to have "de-dramatized" Weber's
antinomical dynamic between political and entrepreneurial elites and their administrative
machines or to have escaped the dead-end of philosophies of consciousness.33 Despite his
argument for the co-originality of private and public autonomy, in Habermas, as in Weber,
the state and its administrative bodies are predominately "machine-like," their instrumental
structures as impervious to conscious intervention as those of the economy. In the
incongruous union of "radicalism" and "reformism," it is therefore "reformism," deference to
"complexity," which finally wins out. Absent throughout is the genuinely radical thought
that the division between Zweckrationalitat and Wertrationalitat might itself be suspect, that
Weber's depiction of large-scale organization is at fault.
4.III.ii.) The Enduring Significance of Strategy and Risk
In place of Weber's monist account of the "iron cage," where all spheres of life petrify under
the pressures of instrumentalism, Habermas offers a dualist vision which nonetheless fails to
contest the key assumptions of Weberian theory. But the problem is not simply one of
Habermas paradoxically surrendering the radical elements of his project. For in questioning
Habermas' bifurcation of lifeworld and system we are forced to question its underlying
rationale, that is, the desire to separate strategy from communication. We saw that
Habermasian critical theory rests on the claim of having avoided reducing reason to
instrumental reason, the error of philosophies of consciousness (Ch 3.1.). Strategy, action
governed by the criterion of success, is "parasitic" upon communicative action and therefore
321 owe this point to Professor Russell Keat (personal conversation), but see also Barnes (1995: 213-
215), Leet (2002: 27), and McCarthy (1991: 133).
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a politics defined primarily in terms of consensual mutual understanding (TCA, 1: 288). In
pointing to the entwinement of civil society with social power, we have already suggested
the empirical implausibility of this view. Here we argue that this attempt to side-step Weber
encounters two further obstacles. Because strategic action cannot be rendered derivative to
communicative action and because "hybrid" forms of interaction have an irreducible
practical salience, Habermas fails to confine strategy in the way he wants. Furthermore, he
gives inadequate recognition to those pressing moments when communicative reason runs up
against intractable limits, when action must be undertaken under conditions of staunch
dissensus and at the risk of destabilizing conflict.
Grave doubts have long attached to Habermas' "parasitism thesis."34 Appropriating
Austin's philosophy of language, Habermas maintained that perlocutionary or strategic
actions only succeed on account of egoistically masquerading as illocutionary or
communicative acts. However, as Apel (1995: 275) has argued, this only applies to
concealed strategic acts, certainly not to those strategic acts whose goal is immediately and
deliberately apparent. In such cases speakers openly declare their goals without deceptive
intent, hearers being apprised in full as to what is at stake. A minimal reliance on the
validity claims of truth and sincerity is presumed, but the aspiration to consensus is here
replaced by offers of cooperation and compromise or threats of sanction which hearers assess
in terms of their individual and collective ends. Habermas claims that such language use is
ultimately an egoistic "borderline" case of "normatively authorized" commands, that is,
imperatives backed up by communicative reference to mutually redeemable validity claims.35
But this "borderline" status hinges upon an ambiguous deployment of the concept of
understanding. Habermas can subordinate these speech acts to action oriented to mutual
understanding because he reads understanding exclusively in the maximal or emphatic sense,
in terms of reaching consensual agreement on matters for the "same reasons" (Ch 3.I., 3.11.).
Openly strategic action, however, does not presume such understanding; it presumes the
minimal sense of comprehending what is said. Consequently, strategic rationality does in
truth exhibit an internal form of understanding and this understanding is underpinned by an
everyday mode of reflection, that of goal consciousness and goal maximization (Apel, 1999:
33
Indeed, he admits as much: "It may be that "linguistically generated subjectivity" [lifeworld] and
"self-referentially closed system" are now the catchwords for a controversy that will take the place
of the discredited mind-body problematic" (PDM: 385, my italics).
34
See, for example, Alexander (1991: 64-69), Apel (1999: 283-284), Culler (1985: 135-137),
Outhwaite (1994: 47), Rasmussen (1990: 38-41), and White (1988: 45-46).
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283). Habermas' assimilation of openly strategic acts to communicatively authorized
commands works on account of performing a misleading slight of hand.
Accepting this, it becomes clear that the parasitism thesis fails to hold, since openly
strategic acts do not logically depend upon speech-acts oriented to consensual mutual
understanding. However, this does not mean that strategic action is independent from
communicative action, indeed quite the reverse. This is because orientation-to-success and
orientation-to-understanding are in fact irreducible aspects of most social actions (Barnes,
1995: 212). Forced by repeated criticisms, Habermas (1991a: 240) has eventually conceded
that illocutionary and perlocutionary acts are not opposed in a subordinating relationship but
necessarily occur together. Understanding, even in its maximal sense, is as much concerned
with success and effects as effects and success are concerned with understanding. Asking
someone "Could you close the window?," to use Culler's (1985: 137) example, is
simultaneously a communication and a wish to alter the world, to produce an effect.36
Moreover, the will to success and the will to argue on the basis of validity claims can occur
within one and the same sequence of actions. "In a complex action context," Habermas
accepts, "a speech act that is directly performed and accepted under the conditions of
communicative action can at the same time have a strategic position at other levels of
interaction" (TCA, I: 295; 1991a: 291). Political oratory, for instance, represents a "hybrid"
case of action in which the strategic goal of persuasively securing votes or support combines
with a communicative intention of setting out policy. A similar ambiguity occurs within
attempts to "indirectly" bring about understanding. In such cases, Habermas admits,
speakers seek to "shock" listeners into recognizing something previously ignored by
"inferentially working up perceptions of the situation," that is, by deploying rhetorical tricks,
irony, sarcasm, emotive appeal (TCA, I: 288, 331).
It is essential to be precise as to the repercussions of this argument. It would be a
mistake to dismiss Habermas' intention in sharply differentiating strategic and
communicative action, for his goal is to illuminate the difference between unoppressive and
oppressive interactions, normatively enriched power and power premised solely on strength.
In defending his distinction between justified and de facto legitimacy we, too, have relied on
a distinction between legitimate power and brute strength. However, our argument here
suggests that the distinction between oppressive and unoppressive interactions does not
35 "The bank-robber's demand, sanctioned by his 'Hands up!,' belongs to those borderline cases of a
manifestly strategic usage of speech acts ... [dependent on] the conditions under which normatively
authorized demands ... can be used" (1991a: 239; 1985: 11 1-112).
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correspond with that between strategic and communicative action. Whereas concealed
strategic uses of language constitute in principle a parasitic manipulative relation, openly
strategic acts need not, especially when it is by no means clear that these acts are indeed
egoistic, since offers of cooperation and compromise or threats of sanction may be motivated
by completely altruistic intentions. Furthermore, not only does Habermas' parasitism thesis
fail, but conceptually and in real action contexts strategy and communication stand
interlinked. But if there is no unambiguous way by which to separate the two, then
Habermas' foundational opposition between purposive and communicative reason appears in
the same questionable light as his lifeworld-system bifurcation. Just as the lifeworld-system
dichotomy relies on an ontological division of reality into free and fallen realms, so too does
the opposition between communication and strategy presume a pure reason that is
normatively imbued and one that is thoroughly amoral. The intricacy of real action contexts
is thereby masked by a reductive theoretical construct.
We will return to the opposition between purposive and communicative reason when
considering Arendt's contrast between poiesis and praxis and Maclntyre's notion of
"practice" (Ch 6.II., 7.II.i, 9.III., lO.I.ii). Our point here is that most actions have strategic
and communicative dimensions which will be differently accented in different
circumstances. This does not entail a rejection of Habermas' intersubjective turn or the
theoretical gains secured by his account of identity formation and legitimacy. Weber's
monological conception of the subject gives rise to an equally monological instrumentalism
where political endeavour can only be conceived in coercive terms. Against this, it is
assuredly true that speech oriented to mutual understanding is basic to human life, for
without it that life is impossible. Thus there must be some political situations in which it has
primacy. Yet there are others where strategy and an adversarial orientation, conceived now
not in monological but intersubjective terms, that is, as engaged in by subjects whose
identities are intersubjectively generated, is politically appropriate. In subordinating
strategic to communicative action Habermas conceals this possibility, seeking instead to
render strategy derivative and thus to contain its risk. Yet the effect of this turn is to exclude
from view pivotal crisis moments where risk, the necessity to pursue policies and ends
without the fully legitimating support of consensus, cannot be contained but has to be
embraced.
36 Hence the implausibility of the claim that we can "clarify the structure of linguistic communication
without reference to structures of purposive activity" (TCA, I: 293).
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By way of illustration we can defer to an example of intractable conflict employed by
Habermas himself, the abortion controversy. Because both sides of this controversy have
until now "good, perhaps even equally good, arguments," abortion presents itself as an
apparently incorrigible moral problem, one made all the more impassioned by being
inextricably tied to divergent ethical self-understandings and life-projects (JA: 59). For
Habermas, however, the way to surpass this intractability and pre-empt the turn to non¬
consensual interaction is to pitch the question at "the more general level of the legitimate
ordering of coexisting forms of life." Thereby the question becomes one not of identity but
of securing "the integrity and coexistence of ways of life ... under the conditions of equal
rights" (JA\ 60; 1998c: 392-393). By re-interpreting this debate in terms of equal rights, it
becomes amenable to consensual argumentative resolution.
However, what Habermas ignores here is that the intractability of abortion comes not
solely from divergent identities but from the divergent ways in which these identities
comprehend the concept of moral right. Pro-life advocates extend the right to life to the
foetus, regardless of stage of development; pro-choice campaigners resist this extension,
usually limiting that right to developed foetuses. Here ethical conceptions of the self impel
contradictory conceptions of human rights, which means that any attempt to secure
"coexistence of ways of life" will inevitably involve heated contention. Recourse to moral
rights discourse is no solution, for what is at stake is divergent understandings of these same
rights. Thus, even with the most selfless will, it is possible for actors to come to
argumentative stalemate. The "hybrid" processes, mentioned by Habermas, by which actors
use rhetoric to "inferentially" kick-start mutual understanding can and commonly do work
the other way round. From an initial moment of genuine communicative intent, actors
subsequently find themselves at loggerheads over issues of recognized general significance.
Communication, in other words, has led not to the transcendence but rather to the
entrenchment of disagreement. Although procrastination remains an alternative, the pressure
of temporal urgency, the need to act, under which practical existence stands means that
outcomes must be determined through action, through the rendering of an informed yet
contested decision.
Sometimes a solution can be found via compromise or negotiation, as Habermas
proposes with his notion of "fair bargaining" governed by rules "indirectly" derived from the
"discourse principle" (Ch 3.II.). But this solution faces two serious difficulties. First,
disagreements arise not only over substantive outcomes but also over the procedures leading
to these outcomes. Thus, the rules for "fair bargaining" might themselves be vigorously
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contested. Second, when fundamental interests are at stake, actors are likely to reject
bargaining in favour of a majority vote. Contesting the ideals and goals of opponents who
"know" themselves to be in the right, they simultaneously act strategically and
communicatively: strategically insofar as the rhetorical conflict with words directs itself
against the rhetorical arsenal of their avowed opponents; communicatively insofar as those in
conflict also seek to reap further support. This hybrid form of interaction culminates in the
casting of votes, signalling a halt to contest. But this halt entails winners and losers, the
victors determining the legal-political landscape in which they and their opponents must now
live. The success of pro-choice advocates in securing a legislative foothold for abortion
means a coercively enforceable defeat of their pro-life opponents. This defeat, because it
permits a course of action which the latter group finds abhorrent, cannot sensibly be
construed as securing "the integrity and coexistence" of opposed ways of life, but amounts,
instead, to a legislative dismissal of moral-ethical assumptions basic to the pro-life camp.
And yet if there is to be movement, if abortion is to be permitted or not, such a defeat and
dismissal must take place.
In the abortion controversy, then, the strategic attitude is not "contained" but is in fact a
key mode in which opponents interrelate. Habermas is gravely insensitive to the complex
nature of this interrelation. In line with his communicative political ideal, he (BFN: 179,
306) interprets majority decisions as the "interim" results of an ongoing "discursive opinion-
forming process" directed towards "truth," but neglects that this process is not solely
discursive but also adversarial, a question of struggle and at times enmity. Indeed, the resort
to majority voting stems not from a quest for "truth" but rather from the prior failure of this
quest, the entrenchment of disagreement. It is assuredly true that majority decisions need not
stand for all time, that the minority can usually return to an issue (Habermas, 1998c: 397).
Yet Habermas disregards the irreversibility of many democratic decisions, the fact that the
aborted foetuses and highways which result from legalizing abortion or rescinding
environmental protections cannot be repealed. Thus, while in many cases minorities can and
should live with the majority opinions, in some these opinions are so objectionable or
destructive as to provoke non-cooperation and civil disobedience. Habermas would like to
interpret civil disobedience as a "symbolic" mode of "rule violation" towards which the
constitutional state can show "toleration."37 But in reality no polity can or does tolerate the
contravention of its democratically secured decisions, since the effect of such toleration
37 Constitutions stretch "to cover even the conditions for overstepping [their] own boundaries. A
democratic constitution can thus tolerate resistance from dissidents who, after exhausting all legal
avenues, nonetheless oppose legitimately reached decisions" (2003b: 41-42; BFN: 382-383).
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would be to render the rule of law conditional. Whether non-violent or not, the illegal
contravention of democratic decisions has to be coercively countered, the only normative
question being the severity of the means used in counter-contravention.
This is not to denigrate the resort to principled disobedience, but to keep the
implications of this resort in sight. The first is that with political engagement comes the risk
of sometimes having to takes decisions which endanger peace, disrupt solidarity, and make
enemies of fellow citizens. Thus, insisting upon a pre-eminent communicative logic is both
empirically untenable and normatively undesirable, since the challenges faced by citizens in
crises moments are suppressed. The second implication is that the legitimacy of most
political decisions and orders is a relative matter of more or less. We will return to this
problem (Ch 7.I1I.ii, 10.III.ii, 11.IV.), but here it is essential to recognize the implausibility
of Habermas' assertion that a law "may claim legitimacy only if all those possibly affected
could consent to it after participating in rational discourse" (2001a: 116, my italics). Not
only is this assertion dependent on agreements which may not be forthcoming but, as
intimated in our discussion of the problem of separating "we" from "all" (Ch 4.II.ii), such a
strong criterion of consensus is unsustainable, given that polities are contextually limited
transgenerational projects in which "all those possibly affected," those who are not present,
including the young and unborn, could not possibly lend their consent.38 Habermas (MCCA:
92; JA\ 163) would complain that this ignores the counterfactual role of his "ideal speech
situation," its status as a guiding but unattainable corrective to everyday practice. But in
admitting the unattainability of this ideal he in fact concedes the intricacy of the
circumstances faced by actors who inhabit a real, as opposed to ideal, world, thus reinforcing
our argument.
In Habermas, then, Weber's one-sided stress on competition and coercion is answered
by an equally one-sided stress on communication and consensus. What is needed, instead, is
an understanding of politics where the moments of discursive unity are acknowledged
without denying the moments of radical dissension, the fact that while we must provide
justifications for our opinions and deeds, these justifications frequently fail to convince.
Although deeply problematic, Hannah Arendt's thought brings us nearer to this requisite
perspective (Ch 7.1.i). She does so, however, by significantly departing from Habermas'
preferred mode of philosophizing, his recourse to "developmental logics" and "rational
reconstructions" where the "structures" of modernity are said to be defined "by ...
38 See also Chambers (1995: 234), Ferrara (1999: 64), Mansbridge (1996: 51-55), McCarthy (1998:
115-153), Moon (1995: 155-157), and Rasmussen (1990: 43).
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communicative action not accidentally but directionally, that is, in dependence on [world-
historic] learning processes" (TCA, II: 145, my italics). Conceived in developmental-logical
terms, the modern constitutional state and the co-originality of private and public autonomy
presume a linearly conceived evolution of individual consciousness, which in turn relies
upon a phylogenetic progression from pre-conventional, through conventional, to post-
conventional societies, each stage a higher moment of reflection (Ch 3.I.). Thus, while
Habermas {TCA, I: 67, 150-156) denies forwarding a "philosophy of history" or thinking that
these developmental logical learning processes are "necessary," it is assuredly true that his
thought does conceptually presuppose an end-point to history, the triumph of communicative
reason (Hutchings, 1996: 71-72). The difficulty with this view, unfortunately, is that it
obscures the fact that modernity represents an achievement secured and maintained through
political conflict and struggle, not solely or even primarily through consensual discourse.
Looked at from the viewpoint of "developmental dynamics" or history as it actually unfolds
through "hybrid" forms of interaction, the contingent origins and chance successes of
modern democratic orders come to the fore.
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Conclusion
Our study of Habermas is now at a close. We have shown that he draws heavily from
Weber's diagnosis of modernity, but critiques that diagnosis and its underpinning
assumptions in the hope of a politics defined by autonomy and solidarity. Habermas'
significance consists in offering an intersubjective account of identity formation which
rescues normative political evaluation from the dead-end of Weberian subjectivism, its
emphasis on the inner will. This intersubjective turn also enables a recovery of the concept
of justified legitimacy, thus seriously problematizing Weber's political realism and providing
a foothold for a critical politics. When we come to Arendt and Maclntyre these
incontrovertible gains will be repeatedly emphasized.
But Habermas can not be endorsed in full. His proceduralism, diremption of "morality"
and "ethics," and understanding of the "good" have all to be rejected, since they undermine
his project and threaten an ironic recrudescence of Weberian decisionism. The same, too,
with his understanding of critique, wherein the manifold paths of emancipation are forced to
conform to a reductive and contextually insensitive "ideal speech situation." However, it is
his lifeworld-system dualism and its underlying division between strategic and
communicative action which pose the greatest difficulty. Instead of contesting Weber's
vision of the "iron cage," this dualism in fact reinforces it, thus surrendering vast arenas of
human endeavour to "mechanized petrification." Critiquing Habermas' bifurcation of reality
into free and fallen realms, we are also led to critique his privileging of communication as
genuinely "political." Just as there is no realm defined by "norm-free sociality," so too is
there no sphere of human activity in which conflict and struggle play an ancillary role.
To preserve what is positively significant in Habermas we therefore have to go beyond
the bounds of his thought. In the following we consider Hannah Arendt's response to the
"iron cage." Like Habermas she largely accepts Weber's diagnosis ofmodernity, but rejects
his understanding of the grounds and possibilities of politics, thinking him complicit in the
realities he sought to resist. In rearticulating these grounds and possibilities, Arendt provides
a key corrective not only to Weber but also to Habermas. Yet her thought is not without
serious problems. Some are specific, but others are shared with Habermas and Maclntyre,
suggesting that behind their very different approaches and disagreements lie fundamental
theoretical continuities which must be challenged.
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Hannah Arendt and the Promise of Politics
Chapter 5
Introduction
Hannah Arendt presents a profoundly original challenge to Weber's understanding of
politics. It is imperative from the outset, however, to recognize her distance from Habermas,
not least because he claims her as precursor, a claim reinforced by Arendt scholars close to
his philosophy.1 As her "successor" Habermas can all the more easily denigrate those
elements of her thought at odds with his. Thus he (CES: 201-202; BFN: 147) accuses Arendt
of "dogmatism," of being bound to discredited "metaphysical" modes of thought that his
theory circumvents. Her ideal of politics, for one, is hopelessly nostalgic and its "rigid"
separation of the political and economic "unimaginable" for modern citizens.2 This nostalgia
and rigidity are exacerbated on the level of theory by her distinction between philosophical
and moral thought on the one hand, which are guided by criteria of rational truth and non¬
contradiction, and opinion and judgement on the other, which alone are political. By this
unhappy distinction Arendt denies herself the cognitive criteria by which to critique
instances of oppression in the lifeworld. Although we have shown his own theory to be
highly problematic on that specific count (Ch 4.II, 4.III.i), Habermas is confident that his
lifeworld and system dualism and theory of argumentative discourse avoid Arendt's errors.
And yet, despite these criticisms, he praises her for recovering the distinction betweenpraxis
and poiesis that yielded the basis for his distinction between communicative and
instrumental reason. She is celebrated, too, for re-conceptualizing the "generation" of power
along communicative lines, even if this re-conceptualization failed to account for "structural
violence" or strategic action.3 By effecting these two conceptual innovations, Arendt
provided a roughly adumbrated, albeit idiosyncratic, impetus to what would, Habermas
(1977: 4; 1980: 128) declares, become in his hands the regulative ideal of "a common will"
formed in "communication directed to reaching agreement."
However, this corrective appropriation of Arendt is in many respects a
misappropriation.4 Real bonds certainly do exist, both emphasizing intersubjectivity, the
equality of speakers, the centrality of freedom, and the interrelated dangers of welfare-state
clientelism and a mass representative democracy that transforms politics into a "tremendous
1
See, among others, Benhabib (1996a: 199-203), Bernstein (1983: 217-223), D'Entreves (1994: 26-
28, 152-155), and Wellmer (1997: 46).
2 Habermas (1977: 14-15). It is ironic that he should criticize her for dichotomizing "political-
practical activity and productivity" when he adheres to a similar construct.
3 Habermas (1974: 286; 1977: 16-18). Again, this reproach rings hollow, given our criticisms of
Habermas' unsuccessful attempt to subordinate strategy.
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business concern" dominated by private interests.5 This shared "platform" is, after all, our
reason for grouping them and Maclntyre into a broad, yet diverse theoretical front
simultaneously drawing from and yet trying to elude Weber's pessimistic vision (Ch 1 .III.).
It is also the basis for the critical theme of our study, that they fail in significant respects and
for similar theoretical turns to fully break beyond that vision. But it is a further, important
goal of our study to show the distinctiveness of each and why, largely because of their
disparity, each might nonetheless represent a partial advance upon Weber. Therefore, and
profound similarities notwithstanding, by no means can Habermas be said to understand
intersubjectivity, equality, freedom, or "mechanized petrification" as Arendt does, their areas
of overlap being complicated by deep discontinuities signalling her enduring originality.
Most obvious is her distance from Habermas' partisan modernism, indeed temporal
partisanship of any variety. He understands the transformation of the 18th century bourgeois
public sphere as a betrayal of modernity's promise, steadfastly believing that modernity
represents an incomplete or unfulfilled project. This philosophical-political identification
with modernity contrasts sharply with Arendt's condemnation of the bourgeois age as the era
of "the Social," one necessitating redemption rather than fulfilment. We shall explore why
she came to this view, but here it is enough to note that Arendt thinks modernity inherently
tragic, a momentous event of forgetting our humanity.
A prominent and saving exception, however, is the occurrence of modern revolutions.
Arendt's passionate, if qualified, celebration of modern revolution reflects not some
underlying progressive view of history in a Habermasian developmental-logical sense, but
instead a conviction that even in "dark times" the contingent world of politics guided by no
historical logic still leaves room for freedom and action. It also reflects her unwillingness, in
spite of modernity's inherent tragedy, to privilege one era to the exclusion of others (BPF:
97; EU: 52; OR: 162). In contrast to Habermas' idealizing endorsement of the 18th century
public sphere and, conversely, Maclntyre's outright hostility to all things modern, Arendt
makes equal use of ancient Greek and modern sources and events. Her "nostalgia" is, then,
of a plural, historically diverse sort, while theirs in being single-mindedly dedicated to one
time remains caught within a single political horizon. In refusing such constraints she
ironically turns Habermas' charge of rigid nostalgia against him and secures for herself a
distinct advantage. Because theoretically committed to seeing rationalization in both its
lifeworld and systemic forms as an intrinsically progressive development, Habermas cannot
4
As argued by Canovan (1983: 108), Villa (1996: 67-72; 1999: 143), and Brunkhorst (2000: 182).
5 See (STPS: 222-235; OT: 17). It is worth noting that Arendt (CR: 192) considered the young
Habermas "one of the most thoughtful and intelligent social scientists in Germany."
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easily, unlike Arendt, call for a turning back of rationalization (Dunne, 1993: 206;
McCarthy, 1982: 70-73). Thus, whereas his thought remains tied to progressive
Enlightenment philosophies of history, and Maclntyre's to a pre-modernist narrative of
doom, hers is free to range over the whole course of Western civilization, allowing her to
imaginatively embrace, for instance, both Aristotle's understanding of praxis and Kant's
theory of judgement.
Arendt's simultaneous disavowal of modern progress and pre-modernist doom mirrors
further dissimilarities. Foremost among them is her suspicion of deontological theories and
their emphasis on justificatory discourse. As we will see, in place of deontological morality
Arendt strives towards a distinctly political ethic drawing less from a principle of
universalization than the capacities for promising and forgiving internal to action, friendship,
the faculty of judgement, and the thoroughly perfectionist ideal of a dignified, cultured life.
Understanding the latter aesthetically, in terms of the quality ofwhat appears in the common
world and its meaning for how we understand ourselves, Arendt endorses a "cultured
humanism" which owes more to Cicero and his heirs, Montesquieu, Lessing, and
Tocqueville, than to the Enlightenment quest for philosophic certainty underpinning
Habermas' "rationalist humanism."
Behind this difference lie fundamental methodological and ideological discrepancies.
Arendt's account of politics proceeds phenomenologically, letting the phenomena "shine
forth," rather than reconstructively, that is, endeavouring to read history or language
counterfactually as a rational development governed by valid discursive criteria. To
appreciate the phenomenon of politics one must look to political experience itself and refuse
the authority of pre-given categories, theoretical or everyday. Arendt's mode of
philosophizing therefore runs directly contrary to Habermas' attempt to derive an
authoritative blueprint of discourses and their domains of application. This attempt, she
argues, entails a Platonic remodelling of politics in accordance with abstract theory and
threatens not only to distort the realities of political life but also to pre-emptively close off its
potentialities, not least the fact of "natality," the human ability to begin the heretofore
unimagined.
Furthermore, while Habermas' Kantianism is of a straightforwardly progressive,
rationalist kind in its concern with formal procedures and presuppositional absolutes,
Arendt's thought, because it encompasses often disparate and conflicting phenomena, lies
consciously between the poles of radicalism and conservatism, capitulating to neither (BPF:
95-104; Heller, 2001: 31-32). Arendt's circumvention of inherited political categories comes
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from her insight that politics is not solely a matter of discursive questioning and answering
decided by rational means, but an unpredictable, fragile activity wherein different
perspectives and realities continually intersect, demanding at certain moments radical change
and at others moderation and care. Extolling the free capacity to begin anew and alter the
world as quintessentially part of the human condition, she nonetheless condemns the
hubristic, wildly progressive dictum that "all is possible," this modern superstition having
paved the way for totalitarianism. Arendt, therefore, desires balance, a delicate, vulnerable
interrelation of careful preservation and free action, and it is this interrelation that yields, in
the act of founding a republic in concert with others, her novel answer to Weber's
abandonment of political legitimacy to the fickle will of charismatic rule.
The issue is not merely one of methodology or their position along the spectrum of
political ideologies, but also has to do with what they prioritize in political life. Where
Habermas privileges discourse, consensus, and a unified post-conventional consciousness,
Arendt privileges action, dispute, and plurality (Canovan, 1983: 109). She privileges action
because political life is about speaking and transforming the world, deciding how it should
look. In Arendt politics is granted an ontological supremacy absent in Habermas, to the
effect that action becomes the very mode by which a "common world" comes into being. A
consequence of this supremacy is that citizenship limited to discursive interaction or
opinion-formation, as is the case with Habermas' "twin-track model," entails an
abandonment of authentic politics, which instead demands full participation in decision¬
making, literal self-rule (Wellmer, 2000: 238-239). Arendt's conception of political agency
and citizenship is thus far more radical than the Habermasian conception, demanding not just
access to "wild" and "anarchic" informal public spheres, but also a reorganization of the
formal public realm and government. This insistence on formally constituted, durable
participatory institutions partly explains her profound ambivalence towards "civil society"
and "new social movements," which she thinks as much a danger to as an expression of
genuine politics.
Arendt privileges dispute and plurality because the contest of opinions is the life-blood
of politics. For Arendt political life is a site of uncertain diversity and change. It would,
admittedly, be unfair to accuse Habermas of ignoring dispute and plurality, especially since
his "ideal speech situation" is presuppositionally organized around the contest of
argumentative claims among plural speakers. However, the very idea of a regulative ideal
speech situation, its hypothetical assumption of a moment of perfect communication, and the
attendant, non-hypothetical demand that consensus be achieved, imply that what interests
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Habermas is not plurality and distinctiveness but their overcoming. The theory of
communicative action presumes that there exists a true end to debate and that disagreement
is negative, corrosive of the polity. This is exemplified by Habermas' (BFN: 166) repeated
insistence that participants must agree on moral-political matters for the same reasons, these
reasons being solely those in congruence with post-conventional identities. Thus, although
offering a nuanced exploration of the monotonicity of mass "public opinion" (STPS: 236-
250), Habermas comes uncomfortably close to Rousseau's "general will," which instead of
facilitating plurality actually entails the suppression of difference.6 Arendt (EU: 436), by
contrast, rejects assertions of a true end to debate, declaring, with Lessing, that in politics the
truth can never be known and that attempts to prove otherwise through "compelling
argumentation" constitute subtle forms of coercion. Instead, she wishes to conjoin equality
and distinction in a political realm held together not by a common will or belief that we all
think alike but by the recognition that we share a world, a recognition resting less on rational
proofs than on promising and faith. Politics is therefore a risk, a fragile potentiality
nourished by contingencies that no theory can determine or ensure.
Whether she gives full expression to this risk will be a focus of Chapter Seven,
especially insofar as it relates to her attempted, anti-Weberian exclusion of violence and
strategy from the essentially "political." For now it suffices to recognize that Arendt's
thought does not equate with some prototypical and inferior theory of communicative action,
as suggested by Habermas. Indeed, a key argument of the following is that she is in many,
but not all, regards his superior. Her understanding of the uniqueness, contingency, and
frailty of political life and its dependence on vulnerable webs of relationships held together
by storytelling, that is, existential narratives of who we are, opens up a vision of politics far
richer than that allowed by Habermas' proceduralism and subordination of the "ethical."
Rejecting his insistence on purging theory of substantive ideals or goods, she also avoids
cutting herself off from the orienting ideal of her politics, that of humanitas or of a cultured
existence and mode of appreciating the world. Furthermore, Arendt's radical critique of
modern mass society goes far beyond his timid critique of monetary sub-systems in spurning
capitalism as a thoroughly nefarious mode of social organization. In this and her political
perfectionism she is closer to Maclntyre, although her anti-teleological conception of action
and suspicion of civil society and local community as the locus of political action
significantly complicate their relation.
6 For Arendt's critique of "public opinion" and Rousseau as "tyrannical," see (OR: 76-79, 221-228).
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However, Arendt's response to Weberian politics is not without serious internal
shortcomings. One stems from her "performative" conception of action, which in sidelining
the concepts of "goals" and "consequences" has the unfortunate effect of distorting the
activity of politics, rendering its content and purpose mysterious. The reason for this
distortion is Arendt's overriding, aesthetic concern with "meaning" and how action appears
to the spectator, a concern encouraging her to overlook how action is and must be regarded
by the actor. A second failing relates to political ethics and her answer to Weberian
decisionism. In spite of her hostility to subjectivism in all its forms, we will see that her
understanding of reflective judgement does not escape subjectivism but, in fact, presumes a
continued endorsement of its central categories: spontaneous freedom versus predetermined
necessity, indeterminate reflection versus determinate knowledge, autonomous judgement
versus heteronomous action. That these categories endure strongly suggests that Arendt
remains bound to worn conceptual paths. Furthermore, because she understands judgement
from the retrospective viewpoint of the disinterested spectator and because, too, she
implicitly assumes an ethical Archimedean Point, something she explicitly denies in her
critique of modern philosophy, her theory of ethics falsifies the realities of ethical existence,
which is intrinsically a matter of prospective action, and the dynamic yet ever historically
bound ways in which ethical change comes about. Reproaching philosophers for mistaking
theory for reality, Arendt herself ends up endorsing a speculative absolute, the myth that
there can be a "privileged position." Although very different, her political ethics does not,
then, represent a sufficient advance upon Habermasian morality.
These shortcomings peculiar to her philosophy compound shortcomings shared with
Habermas and Maclntyre, that is, their exclusion of violence and strategy from the
essentially "political" and their related bifurcation of politics into free and fallen realms.
Like them, Arendt begins with Weber's diagnosis of modernity, accepting it for the most
part, but rejects his "solution" of a politics founded upon a monopoly of force and elite
domination. This rejection has the beneficial effect of showing Weber's conception of the
political to be hyperbolically bloody-minded, that politics is not simply a matter of
domination. But it inverses this error and goes too far in excluding coercion, struggle, and
antipathy from the horizon of authentically political activity. That strategy and coercion
cannot be excluded from politics is attested to even by Arendt's own thoughts on power,
discriminating judgement, and the foundational act of constituting a republic. Only by
recognizing the interwovenness of friendship and hostility, it will be argued, can the full
reality of political risk be understood.
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Moreover, as with Habermas and Maclntyre, it will be shown that Arendt's antinomical
"Dual-State" ideal, where administrations fulfil socio-economic functions in radical
separation from participatory fora devoted to "genuinely" political concerns, perpetuates
Weber's symbiotic antinomy of the "leader" and "machine," the former category now being
occupied by "self-selected elites" sprung from the people. Her thought therefore fails to ask
whether Weber was correct to frame the relation of administration and politics in antinomical
terms, whether his understanding of modern organization and genuine political elan was
wrong to start with. This failing is exacerbated by her relegation of the socio-economic to
the level of pre-political "necessities" that require fulfilment but which are in no way the
objects or ends of "free" political action. Although Arendt promises a politics where gifted
citizens might escape the deadening apoliticism of late modernity, her exclusive ascription of
the social and economic to administration renders her vision far less radical than it otherwise
might have been. More seriously still, this ascription runs directly counter to her critique of
modern technology and technological thinking. Denouncing technocracy or the modern
instrumentalization of politics, she paradoxically ends up endorsing a technocracy of her
own. In the end, then, the most political of our three critics of Weber, one supremely
sensitive to the problems and aspirations unique to political life, provides us with a
perspective that is both deficient and in some respects dangerously misleading.
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Bearing the Burden of Our Times: Arendt on Modern Oblivion and
the Promise of Politics
"If philosophers ... were ever to arrive at a true political philosophy they would have to make
the plurality ofman, out of which arises the whole ream of human affairs ... the object of
their thaumadzein" (Arendt, 1990: 103).
To understand Hannah Arendt's challenge to Weber we must first understand what she
called "the burden of our times" (Ch 6.I.).1 This burden emerged with modern capitalism
and technological thinking, which in mistaking "necessity" for "freedom" contributed to
"world alienation," the rise of the "Social," and the deterioration of active existence into the
passivity of animal laborans. Here Arendt recalls Weber's "iron cage," yet she accuses
Weber of perpetuating those currents leading to the destruction of the "common world."
One current is the glorification of violence and sovereignty feeding on an "instrumentalist"
conception of political life wherein fellow actors become disposable means to fickle ends.
(Ch 6.II.). Coupled with modernity's hubristic veneration of History and Nature, this
instrumentalized politics proved fertile ground for totalitarianism. Arendt's analysis of
modernity therefore goes beyond Weber's "iron cage" to incorporate what she calls "the iron
band of terror" (EU: 344).
Arendt answers totalitarian terror with a political vision revolving around "performative
action," friendship, and the faculty of judgement (Ch 6.III.). As the opening quotation
indicates, the wonderment impelling her thought is the dignity of a world manifesting the
unique plurality of interdependent human beings. Politics' redemptive promise is the
possibility of mutual endeavour and freedom without denigrating "worldly culture," without
succumbing to Weber's decisionism, and without domination. This promise became real
with the advent of modern revolutions (Ch 6.IV.). Celebrating their appearance, Arendt
believes they reveal an important distinction between socio-economic matters and those truly
germane to politics. Hence her "Dual-State" ideal where administrative bodies provide the
socio-economic necessities of life and deliberative fora the basis for a free politics. Fearing
bureaucratic domination and Weber's antinomy of leader and machine, Arendt insists that
these two tasks and realms be kept separate, since a free polity derives its legitimacy not
1 The Burden of Our Times (London: Seeker & Warburg) was the title given The Origins of
Totalitarianism when first published in England in 1951.
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from instrumental efficiency in satiating men's needs but from the free event of founding or
"constituting" a republic in the company ofone's equals.
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6.1.) Worldly Culture, World Alienation, and the Rise of the Social
Arendt's concern is the authentic political life (bios politikos), a life of "worldliness" or
"worldly culture." For Arendt "worldly culture" is simultaneously a political and aesthetic
term. Politics and art are intimately intertwined because both concern human existence
under its most "useless" aspects, when inherently meaningful and not an instrument to
external ends or goals. Understood phenomenologically, the intertwinement of political
deeds and art inheres in their similarly intense "publicity" or appearance within a common
world. Without this intense "shining forth" in a public realm there would be no reality, no
sense of others or ourselves.2 In presuming full appearance, art, politics and their respective
criteria, "beauty" and "glory," are inseparable, for "without beauty ... the radiant glory in
which potential immortality is made manifest in the human world, all human life would be
futile and no greatness could endure" (BPF: 218). Art, in other words, preserves "meaning,"
which arises from the actions and thoughts of men, and this "meaning" is the foundation of
human reality, the "world" itself.
Arendt understands the concept "world" in two interrelated ways. In the first it means
the "human artifice" of things and objects that relate and yet separate human beings, thus
providing an objective home for their shared life. The physicality of walls, meeting places,
and objects grants people an objective, tangible "in-between" or common frame of reference
in which they are "inter-ested" and which survives their short life-spans (HC: 182). A
concern of all and incorporating political fora, galleries, marketplaces, theatres, universities,
and courtrooms, the world is that space within which human beings meet and interact.
In this world contrasts sharply with self. By self Arendt means both our biological self,
driven by the needs of the body, and our psychical self, that undisciplined "chartless
darkness" of emotional urges accessible only through introspection (OR: 194). The
subjectivity of the body, its urge to satisfy itself in consumption, and of the soul, its location
in inner recesses, are "unfit" for disclosure in the world. They are unfit because they reflect
our "animality" or demand that we substitute a mercurial inner existence for a tangible
worldly existence with others.3 Contemptuous of romanticism, psychoanalysis, and modern
philosophy of consciousness, Arendt sees the celebration of subjectivity as symptomatic of a
loss of culture and politics. Particularly "pernicious" is the age-old identification of political
2
Appearance, "being seen and heard by others as well as by ourselves — constitutes reality" (HC:
50). On Arendt's phenomenology, see Dunne (1993: 88-97), Luban (1994: 90-95), Taminiaux
(1996: 216-220), Moran (2000: 306-316), and Kateb (2000: 137-139).
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freedom with the solitary freedom of the will, which led Weber to identify politics with
sovereign mastery and inner charisma (BPF: 162-165). In opposition to the inner self, world
and culture coincide because they must be shared and endure. Enduring, this objective frame
relates human beings to each other by drawing them out of the intimacy of the family and the
privacy of the self. Without a durable world in this relational sense, "there would be nothing
but eternal recurrence, the deathless everlastingness of the human as of all other animal
species" (HC: 96-97).
The second meaning of "world" is the intersubjective "in-between" which "overlays"
the human artifice. Arendt means by this the "web of human relationships" generated by the
convergence of "innumerable perspectives" through speech and action (HC: 183-184). Here
world means neither things inherited from the past or produced in the present, nor physical
space, but rather those past and present deeds of human beings that inform and continue to
inform their interrelation. In their interactions human beings display their defining
characteristic, the ability to begin something new. This condition of "natality," the ability to
"insert ourselves into the human world," re-confirms the unique novelty accompanying each
individual birth (HC: 176-177). Insofar as the web of relationships nurtures this ability, it
secures human dignity, for dignity corresponds to human uniqueness.4
Yet dignity is vulnerable to destruction, a vulnerability having become all the more
urgent with modernity's fateful confusion of the discrete activities constituting the "vita
activa," the active life. Against Weber and Habermas, modernity does not signal a world
historic differentiation between spheres the ancients held to be one. Instead it signals a
momentous movement of de-differentiation, the divide between distinct spheres and
activities undergoing dramatic erosion. Reaching back to Greek antiquity to recover
ontological balance, the truth "that each human activity points to its proper location in the
world," Arendt arrives at a philosophical anthropology incorporating the activities of labour,
work, and action, as well as the conceptual pairs ofprivate and public, nature and culture,
necessity and freedom, by which to judge our modern condition (HC: 73).
As the constituent activities of the vita activa, labour, work, and action form a hierarchy
whose criterion is the degree of freedom, self-containedness, or human uniqueness exhibited
by each activity, action occupying the highest position. A matter of consuming and
begetting, labour (ponein) serves the condition of earthly life (zoe), by which Arendt means
3 "The passions of the soul are not only body-bound, they seem to have the same life-sustaining and
preserving functions as our inner organs" (LM, I: 35).
4
Again art and politics coincide, for if beauty is "an end in itself because all its possible meaning is
contained within itself," so too does "man's dignity demand he be seen ... in his particularity ...
without comparison" (LKPP: 77).
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the fertile "metabolism" of the body with an abundant nature (HC: 98). This life is swayed
by a necessity that never finds satisfaction because it lies within the eternal, ineluctable
process of hunger and consumption. Here entities and individuals give way to
"development" and "function," the immense cycles of life, death and rebirth swallowing up
the particular. Futile, in labour what appears is never the human person but merely his
subjective physical and emotional needs, animal laborans.
Labour differs radically from work, which encompasses fabrication (poiesis) and art, in
the broad sense of instrumental or technological skill (techne). Arendt's examples are tool-
making, sculpture, manufacture, architecture, and rulership, all those activities requiring
mastery and control. Work or "making" generates the first dimension of world, the "human
artifice," and is, unlike labour, a creative activity. Through it the craftsman fabricates an
artificial space between nature and human beings, ensuring the objectivity required for a
sense of stability and continuity (1987a: 35). Governed by a utilitarian logic of
purposiveness or instrumentality, work is "entirely determined by the categories of means
and end," the techniques employed by homo faber hinging on the belief that all matter is
manipulable according to a consciously conceived image (HC: 143). This manipulation is
inherently violent, involving the destruction of nature by a creator whose use of tools places
him in the solitary position of sovereign lordship.
Governed by the ideal of sovereign mastery, the self s will to impose itself, work has no
intrinsic relation to human plurality, which Arendt defines as "the twofold quality of equality
and distinction," by which she means human beings' similarity in being human and yet
uniqueness in terms of their irreplaceable personalities (HC: 175-176). A gulf therefore
separates homo faber from Aristotle's zoon politikon, the man ofpraxis or action belonging
in the "public realm" (ecclesia, agora), wherein the "glory" of men's deeds, their meaning,
shines forth. Action is the ability to spontaneously initiate "unprecedented processes whose
outcome remains uncertain and unpredictable," which Arendt identifies with freedom (HC:
177, 231-232). In its freedom, action escapes from labour's natural and necessary
cyclicality. It differs from work in not proceeding from a preconceived model and in
presuming an irreducible intersubjectivity. Corresponding to the second dimension of world,
"the web of relationships," action is always "in concert" because action is speech.
Allocating labour, work, and action to the subjective, objective, and intersubjective
dimensions of reality, Arendt believes these activities belong to discrete spheres that should
be kept in equilibrium. Labour belongs in darkness, the household or oikos, work in the
workshop and marketplace, and action in the public realm, the polis, where diverse persons
meet. But through processes of world alienation or subjectification caused by fundamental
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shifts in knowledge and the rise of "the Social," modernity destroyed this equilibrium (HC:
313; BPF\ 61). Nature and culture having been rendered indistinguishable, the distinction
between freedom and necessity was lost, leading to the loss of politics as man's true mode of
freedom and the perverse belief that it is by labouring or serving bodily necessity that
humanity becomes free, the ascendancy of animal laborans.
Here the similarities between Arendt and Weber are striking. In line with his (SV: 155)
observation that "the ultimate and sublime values have retreated from public life" into the
privacy of intimate relations and romantic fantasy, "world alienation" denotes for Arendt the
loss of a common sense of reality, and therefore of identity and shared meanings, which
throws individuals back upon their subjective inner life. It does not mean that the world has
ceased to exist, but rather a radical change in our existential attitude initiated by the modern
"flight from the earth into the universe and from the world into the self' (HC: 6). Arendt's
understanding of this dual flight recalls Weber's account of the disenchanting movement of
theoretical and formal rationalization. Galileo's Archimedean science wished to leave the
earth to attain a God's eye view and, in using the telescope in place of the five earthly
senses, substituted experimentation for wondering contemplation as the path to knowledge.
But when geocentric perceptions were acknowledged as false, men lost confidence in their
mundane senses and began to doubt existence. Descartes' radical solution was to turn in
upon the self and introspect the mind to reveal indubitable verities. The moderns thereby
concluded that knowledge could only issue from what came ofman, his mind, and from what
he himself has "made" through experiment. A pragmatic interpretation of science as know-
how, as the manipulation of nature, was thereby born, occasioning a fundamental
reassessment ofman's defining attribute. Thus poiesis and not praxis, as in Greek antiquity,
became supreme.
The early modern period, the age of homo faber, saw its task as imitating and
remodelling nature. This remodelling hinged upon homo faber's technological prowess, but
there was a decisive difference to this remodelling from earlier use of the tool. This
difference had to do with the central term of the new science, the idea of process that had
usurped the old position of Being. Conceptually, process implies becoming over Being and
presumes fluid instability as opposed to permanence and durability. Thus homo faber's
ascendancy was doomed from the start because this creature dedicated to producing a realm
of stability within which human beings can live had, in placing process above product,
surrendered stability to flux, to the natural cycles of animal laborans (BPF: 59, HC: 307).
This surrender of stability also coincided with a surrender to subjectivity. The problem
with homo faber's utility criterion is that it degrades all things into means to ends and these
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ends, in turn, into means to further ends, ad infinitum. Because nothing has worth apart from
its "usefulness" and "usefulness" itself has no "use," meaninglessness results (HC: 154-158).
To escape this cannibalistic logic, homofaber is forced to regard the user as the sole "end-in-
itself' (1987a: 37). But ifman is the "measure of all things," then nature, world, culture, and
politics lose their intrinsic worth and degrade into mere vehicles for the expression of man's
subjectivity. The objective reality of world and culture therefore reduces to man's internal
life, the body and "dark heart" of animal laborans.
Scientific endeavour also underwent fundamental alteration, slipping from pre-modern
contemplation of nature to early modern imitation of natural processes, and then finally to
actual interference in these processes. This third stage of initiating processes in nature
culminates in the ability to unleash nuclear forces and to radically alter the developmental
course of the body (HC: 148-149). Science and technology no longer conceive themselves
strictly in terms of fabrication, which properly culminates in a product, but have melded
fabrication to aspects of action, the ability "to start new unprecedented processes whose
outcome remains uncertain." Arendt thinks this a madly Promethean turn, for action
properly belongs to the human "web of relationships" where promising and forgiving, as we
shall see, keep its uncertainties in check (HC: 238). Protruding onto nature, action loses
these checks and thus becomes gravely unpredictable, even to the extent that the scientist
might not know when he is destroying himself and humankind as a whole.
Labour, work, and action have, then, been perilously confused. Initiated by modern
science and technology, this confusion was compounded by the rise of "the Social." Arendt
uses the term in at least four senses to denote the public organization of economic goods or
the social-as economic, 20th century mass society, 18th century good or "polite" society, and,
finally, discriminating or "parvenu" society. Each sense contrasts negatively with her notion
of the "political," either because it refers to non-political aspects of human existence or poses
a threat to the capacity for political action. The social-as-economic and mass society are
especially important as they correspond to the two aspects of Weber's "iron cage," that of
"mechanized petrification" and hedonistic consumerism.
By the social-as-economic Arendt means a society "in which ... mutual dependence for
the sake of life and nothing else assumes public significance," in contradistinction to
antiquity, which ascribed labouring to the oikos (HC: 46). No matter what is done, it is
typically done for the sake of material well being. The origins of the social-as-economic lay,
as Weber maintained, in the Reformation. Stirred by an '"innerworldly asceticism'" that
excised "care for or enjoyment of the world" and "whose deepest motivation" was "worry
and care about the self," the reformers initiated processes of accumulation which,
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expropriating the Church and then the peasantry, gave birth to capitalism (HC: 251, 254).
The deprivation of certain groups' "place in the world and their naked exposure to the
exigencies of life," expropriation entails the loss of property, the "elementary political [pre-]
condition for man's worldliness" (HC: 253-255). Although denoting "privation," lacking the
opportunity to appear publicly, the private also has an irreducibly positive aspect. The
private-as-property, the "fences around the houses and gardens of citizens," grants the
individual psychological shelter, a home (HC: 72).5 Driven by burgeoning cycles of
accumulation, capitalism fatally undermined this shelter. Instead wealth, fluid capital,
became the orienting ideal and because fluid denied the expropriated a locus for the
formation of worldly identities. They were thrown back on themselves and what they
experienced in being thus thrown was, as with introspection, the brute necessities of their
bodies.
Automation, the transformation of homo faber as craftsman into superfluous animal
laborans, furthered this tendency. When "work specialization" succumbed to the "division
of labour," the creativity associated with work gave way to the functional "qualitative
equivalence of all single activities" (HC: 123). Production was therefore transformed into an
accelerated, quasi-natural movement (HC: 153). This movement, in turn, led to an
unprecedented abundance of worldly goods, resulting in their conversion from durable
objects into consumables. Captivated, Marx believed this proliferation a dialectical
unfolding of '"man's metabolism with nature.'" He was thus led to celebrate labour as
mankind's defining attribute. This revolutionary elevation of labour meant animal life itself
became the "end" of human endeavour, understood now as the realization of man's "species
being," which, embodied in a collective "class" subject, would culminate in "socialized
mankind" (HC: 89). Marx's communist "utopia," wherein all groups and all property have
been absorbed, is not at all Utopian but the realizable fulfilment of capitalist expropriation.6
The logic of expropriation appals Arendt, just as it did Weber, because when reduced to
animal functions human activities cease to be attributable to single men in their uniqueness.7
Governed by the homogenizing imperatives of "national economy," the state, or rather
"welfare-state," becomes an all-encompassing "family" defined by one perspective and the
way is secured for property to succumb to the absurdity of "collective ownership" (HC: 28-
5
Implicit in Arendt's (HC: 254) argument is Marx's distinction between use and exchange value.
6
(CR: 211-215). Indeed, capitalism and socialism belong to a single continuum encompassing the
early bourgeoisie, the birth of the welfare-state in Bismarck's reforms, and pointing to the possible
ascendancy of a classless society.
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29, 321). Absurd because "ownership relates to what is my own by definition," but
nonetheless attainable, collective ownership reduces politics to the "administration of things"
(CR: 137-138). Because the social-as-economic presumes just one perspective, politics
becomes the servant of one interest and such service presumes bureaucracy, what Arendt
famously calls the "rule of Nobody" and the most tyrannical form of government insofar as
"no men, neither one nor the best, neither the few nor the many, can be held responsible"
(CR: 137-138).
The fundamental import of the social-as-economic is, then, a confusion of activities and
a blending of public and private culminating in the extirpation of freedom. Dissolving the
bonds of family and the space for appearance, the social engulfs the entirety of human
existence to generate mass society and its "normalizing" conformism (HC: 40). Emerging
from the destruction of the European class system, mass society denotes two transformations
of worldly life. First, the ability to act gives way to passive behaviour because society
recognizes only "status" and in 20th century mass society the only status recognized is one's
function or "job," as exemplified by Adolf Eichmann (HC: 41; 1959: 48-51). Not a fanatic
but a dutiful family man, Eichmann was led to his crimes out of a will to advance within SS
bureaucracies born of experiences of unemployment and loneliness caused by post-WWl
economic dislocation. Typical of mass-man's homelessness, his lack of a secure position in
the world, and loneliness, his having become an "atomized individual," Eichmann's inability
to judge or speak beyond the mumbling of cliches signalled his utter immersion within much
broader processes ofmassification (OT: 318; EJ: 47-49).
Yet mass-man also owed his appearance to the "philistine" bourgeois. Hence the
second transformation effected by mass-society, its debasement of culture, world, nature,
politics and truth into "values" or "commodities that have no significance of their own but...
exist only in the ever-changing relativity of social linkages and commerce" (BPF: 32, 204).
The bourgeois appreciated others as currency by which to trade favours and, in subordinating
art to the self s social betterment, corrupted culture, which "insofar as it contains tangible
things — books and paintings, statutes, buildings, and music" should encompass and testify
to the glories, the stories, of past civilizations (BPF: 203). Instead, when internalized, the
"good," "right," and "beautiful" ceased to be intersubjectively meaningful categories, their
worth now being their "value" to the individual alone and not to men in their plurality.8
7 We should note, however, that Arendt's understanding of "function" and "socialized mankind" does
not correspond with Habermas' normative understanding of "function" and "socialization," but
rather to the Habermasian ideas of "latent functionality" and "systemic integration" (Ch 4.1 .i, 4.III .i).
8
Good, for example, became a value exchangeable with "those of expediency or of power. The
holder of values can refuse this exchange and become an "idealist," who prices the value of "good"
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But it is by subordinating all values to the "prime" value of mere life (zoe) that the
social-as-economic finally drives the social-as-mass to its nihilistic extreme. Even if not
immediately connected with making a living, culture is enslaved to life as entertainment, as a
consumable to be devoured by jobholders seeking transitory diversions from the rhythm of
labour. Arendt's fear, then, is the same as Weber's. She fears the ascendancy of a social
form reducing politics to administration and debasing culture into sensuous gratification.
With him, too, she argues that this social form exhibits a disenchantment brought to fruition
by science, bureaucratic rationalization, and capitalism, although these came not from
differentiation but from de-differentiation.
higher than the value of expediency; but this does not make the "value" of good any less relative"
(BPF: 33, my emphasis).
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6.II.) Anti-Politics, Hubris, and Totalitarianism
There are notable similarities in Arendt and Weber's assessment of modern politics. Both
believed existing representative democracy conduced to mediocre politicians concerned less
with the true interests of state than with "horse-trading" (PW: 351). Both feared that without
true political "spirit," the "routinizing" or "normalizing" effects of bureaucratic rule would
overwhelm the opportunity for action. Both admired and yet castigated Marx, praising his
understanding of capitalist economic structures and yet condemning socialism as the end
point of modern expropriation. Yet this convergence veils profound disagreement. As
Arendt sees it Weber is implicated in the developments he sought to resist. Lamenting the
loss of freedom, his defence of capitalism nonetheless insulates the very thing that made
"socialized mankind" possible. Moreover, because he understood the "iron cage" as
extirpating inner creativity, he stands guilty of the "anthropocentrism" that drove homo faber
to subjectify world and culture (HC: 157-158). Reducing politics to an internal calling,
Weber frames action in terms of the self, not the world or the actor's relation to others in the
world. No matter whether the actor acts responsibly or out of conviction, the criterion of his
commitment is an "inner balance ... that his life has meaning in the service of a 'cause'" (PV:
84). Meaning is therefore internalized, which for Arendt is absurd, since meaning demands
publicity, speech, and a shared worldliness.
But Weber's greatest mistake, in Arendt's view, was his perpetuation of an error
initiated by Plato and definitive of the Western political tradition in general. Plato stands at
the beginning of that tradition because it presupposes his substitution of work for action
(HC: 220-230). Plato's goal was to ensure that the ignorant many would be led by the
knowledgeable few who alone possessed truth. But this resulted in politics and freedom
being reinterpreted as the prerogative of a single mind, the sovereign, "modelling" a polity
and its people according to his inner will. Such modelling presumes domination and
rulership, which, in turn, presume "strength," a quality of the individual in isolation from
others and finding increase through the use of implements and instrumental violence. For
Arendt an intimate connection exists between violence and rulership. Just as the household
head used violence to "emancipate himself from life's necessity," so too does the Platonic
ruler deploy it to render his subjects obedient (OR: 114). But whereas the former deploys
violence where it is necessary, in the pre-political realm, the ruler introduces it into the polity
and brings political life to an end.
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To counter this fateful error Arendt returns to the Athenian conception of citizenship.
Such citizenship is isonomic, involving a relation of equality between actors who in their
private life enjoy unequal degrees of skill and talent. A cultural achievement, isonomy
allows naturally unequal persons to deal with each other as co-builders of a shared world. It
presumes, furthermore, that archein, "to begin" or "to rule," and prattein, "to finish" or "to
follow through," are not separate but part of the same activity, action.9 No citizen could
suffer domination or claim to dominate. It was only by avoiding such claims that he could
excel in the company of his peers and attain a degree of immortality, for one can only excel
in competition with others. This intersubjectivity means that the basis of action is non-
sovereignty, a lack of the strength harnessed by the craftsman. Accordingly, Arendt deems
power a pure actuality existing only when equal people act in common. The basis of all
government, power drives the political realm and is, by implication, the well spring of
meaning. And because politics has inherent worth, so too does power. Whereas violence is
always "instrumental" to some higher goal, power, because the condition of political
engagement, comes into being as an end-in-itself (CR: 150). A matter of vocal togetherness
or relation rather than command, it is more a mode of existence than a means and cannot be
possessed by any individual alone.
The contrast with Weber is stark. Power is to him "the probability that one actor within
a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance" (ES:
52, my emphasis). Weber does recognize natality, since prophetic charisma is the
revolutionary motor of rationalization, but Weberian charisma is thoroughly inimical to the
plurality and equality characteristic of Arendtian natality. When he extols competition, he
understands it as the interplay between factional leaders. Other actors are necessary to the
leader's success, but this necessity is envisaged negatively, entailing the "intellectual
proletarianization" of followers — since the "apparatus" must blindly obey — and the
leader's inevitable complicity in satisfying his underlings' "base" material and emotional
desires (PV: 99, 125-126). Both follower and leader are tainted by the relationship of power
but that taint defines politics. Notwithstanding his break with natural law and classical
liberalism, then, Weber remains solidly "traditional" in carrying forward Plato's separation
of archein and prattein, with the Reichsprasident winning out over bureaucrats,
revolutionaries and the mediocre mass.
9 "Far from being connected with justice, as in modern times," equality "was the very essence of
freedom: to ... move in a sphere where neither rule not being ruled existed" (HC: 33). The
difference between isonomy and modern egalitarianism is that the latter presumes a natural equality
where the uniqueness of the person is reduced to sameness.
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Defining political activity as the deployment of the means of violence, Weber
generalized homo faber's mute means-end mentality beyond the realm of work with the
effect that action became a question of coercively maximizing benefit and minimizing harm.
For Arendt this usurpation of speech by command is thoroughly anti-political (CR: 155).
Admittedly, when Weber wrote that the actor must contract with "diabolical powers" and
accept that "the attainment of "good" ends ... pay[s] the price of... morally dubious means,"
he meant to condemn the moral absolutist whose disregard for consequences would lead to
greater, as opposed to lesser, evil (PV: 122). For Arendt, however, this condemnation is
itself no less deadly than absolutism.
Her critique issues from her understanding of action. Unlike work, which always has a
definite end, the distinguishing mark of action is to have no conclusion. When we act we
insert ourselves into the world, but the consequences of that insertion always remain
unknown. Accordingly, actors do not lord over their activity, but are non-sovereign doers
and sufferers whose deeds are both "boundless" and "irreversible" (HC: 190). But ifpraxis
is inherently unpredictable and if no one can ever foresee the outcome of their deeds, then
means-end calculation is "ruinous" precisely because such calculation assumes we know the
conclusion, which is impossible (MOT: 147). Indeed, in politics it is the "means" or our
present performance that counts and not some hypothetical end-state, there being no way to
ascertain whether the killing of an innocent will save many innocents or whether it might
result in innocence ceasing to be a protective barrier to atrocity.10 Far from protecting us
from greater evil, the doctrine of the lesser evil actually threatens to lead us to it.
To counter this murderous instability Arendt endorses the principle that "the concern of
one is the concern of all" (EU: 284). But there is a further reason for that endorsement.
When nothing lies beyond consequentialist calculation — and Weber recognizes no limit
except success — then any end can become acceptable.11 This surreptitious effacement of
limits enabled totalitarianism, a uniquely modern form of rule. Arendt's encounter with
totalitarianism, a refugee in 1933 and briefly interned by the Vichy regime in 1940, is the
core experience unifying her inquiries into culture, politics, and modernity. Unlike Popper
or Marcuse, she does not think totalitarianism the direct consequence either of anti-liberalism
or liberal instrumentalism. Dependent on the chance collapse of Western mores precipitated
10
"Every good action for the sake of a bad end actually adds to the world a portion of goodness; every
bad action for the sake of a good end actually adds to the world a portion of badness. ... whereas [in
work] ends are totally dominant over means, just the opposite is true for acting" (MOT: 148).
11 Weber (PV: 121-122) denounced the Zimmerwald revolutionaries as "cosmic-ethical rationalists"
for wanting to prolong WWI so as to realize a socialist economy which they knew could not be
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by mass society, its arrival was as contingent as any other political event. However, even if
Plato and Weber did not cause the "iron band of terror," they did indirectly facilitate it.
Their instrumentalization of politics constituted one step in a series that, including science's
Promethean pretensions, gradually lent credence to the attempt to remodel humanity
according to the "suprahuman" absolutes of History (Stalinism) and Nature (Nazism) (OT:
465-466; EU: 283).
Crucial here was the birth of modern "historical consciousness." As with the new
science, this consciousness pictured history as a great over-arching process, the "whole,"
time's progression from the infinity of the past into the infinity of the future, rather than
particular events, now considered the purveyor of meaning. Thus man's "dignity" was
interpreted as conformity to an immense pattern of species development which, as a law of
"Progress," would culminate in the end of History or Nature.12 Mirroring natural science
technology, this self-imposed conformity was conceived as a form ofmaking, of forcing men
to be what development "dictated." The "science" of History therefore gave rise to social-
scientific techniques for manipulating man as pliable matter (BPF: 59). The result was a
technicization of politics premised on the belief that men do not act but behave, the
backbone of modern ideology, which functions by reducing reality to the deductive
unfolding of a single absolute: that the proletariat are History's chosen people, that the
Aryans will by Nature triumph. The danger of ideology, however, is not its false absurdity.
As Eichmann attests, its danger is that it might become true, that the attempt to make human
beings pliable will render them behaving units (1971a: 418).
Notwithstanding his strictures against weltanschauliche Politik, Weber was not immune
to ideology, for in seeking an "end-in-itself' beyond utility's cannibalistic logic he too ends
up endorsing an overawing absolute. Although rejecting the Enlightenment idea of Progress
central to the adulation of History, he sustains such adulation in attenuated form by
capitulating to the Machtstaat as "destined" to ensure the survival of the "national species"
through conflict with rival civilizations.13 Waning during his life but never disappearing,
this Darwinian conception of struggle is of a piece with those imperialist theories of race that
would later yield Nazism's conceptual core (OT: 463-464). The difference between the
achieved by that means. By implication, however, if that end had been achievable then they would
have acted responsibly. The limits to action so conceived are entirely contingent.
12 See (BPF: 41-90). Modern historical consciousness arose with Vico and was carried forward by
Kant ("the ruse of nature") and Hegel ("unfolding spirit") until finding clearest expression in Marx.
Arendt (OT: 463) thought Marx "the Darwin of history," for "if one considers [their] philosophies"
it turns out that "the movement of history and the movement of nature are one and the same."
13 "We do not have peace and human happiness to hand down to our descendants, but rather the
eternal struggle to preserve ... the quality of our national species" (PW: 16, 75-79).
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impeccably unracist Weber and the Nazis was, of course, that he held firm to liberal values
providing a check on the Machtstaaf s progress. But once these subjective values were
rejected in favour of other equally subjective preferences, the limits on totalitarian
remodelling catastrophically gave way.
This catastrophe was further enabled by modern large-scale organization, which drives
expropriation and automation to an extreme. Situated within a vast apparatus coordinated by
faceless superiors, the bureaucrat does not think himself the originator of his actions.
Instead, and analogous to labourers in the modern "division of labour," he is an
inconsequential "cog" whose dignity inheres in facilitating the functions of the apparatus,
whatever these may be. Anonymous and subject to anonymous powers, the bureaucrat is
shorn of his natality, with the result that his capacity for responsible action succumbs to a
passivity perfectly suited to the totalitarian project of "perfecting" man.
The essence of such perfecting is a terror which, in merging public and private,
condemns subjects to a loneliness corrosive of personal and worldly identity. Quickening
the "processes" of Nature and History, totalitarian persecution executes the "objective
judgements" of ideology, that this race or class is "decadent," by actually transforming races
and classes into decadent categories, thereby paving the way to their "justifiable"
elimination. The danger is not, as Weber's theory of bureaucracy implies, crushing
stagnation, but, through expropriation and automation, an acceleration of movement such
that nothing but "becoming" remains: no culture, no world, but a "permanent revolution"
feeding off itself (OT: 389-390). This arbitrary "becoming" is characterized by a profound
disregard for consequences. The Nazi practice of multiplying offices so that many
bureaucracies addressed identical tasks was not a device to ensure efficiency but a hugely
expensive attempt to diffuse the "will" of the leader and conceal the real organ of power, the
secret police (OT\ 417-420). That the apparatus of terror assumed priority even over regime
survival meant that terror had become the beginning and end of government, regardless of
repercussions (OT\ 464). Totalitarianism is, then, the insanely hubristic conclusion of homo
faber's generalization, his search for an ultimate entailing the denial of utility as a sensible
category, and a parody of the "lesser evil" doctrine, since it was through accepting a host of
lesser evils that totalitarian functionaries were led to the greatest crime in Western history.
The enormity of that crime is encapsulated for Arendt in the death camps, totalitarianism's
"laboratories." In their mad unreality the camps verified the blasphemous assurance of
organizational omnipotence by destroying all vestiges of spontaneous dignity. But the
import of that assurance is perversely tragic. Totalitarianism assumes that man can achieve
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everything and yet, paradoxically, the attempt to demonstrate this omnipotence ends in his
complete reduction to a Pavlovian dog (OT: 438).
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6.III.) Action, Friendship, and Judgement
The terrible tragedy of the Western "Tradition" is its culmination in totalitarian paradox.
Arendt contends that only by understanding what was lost under totalitarianism can worldly
existence be redeemed as worthy of attention. She therefore returns to the Greek polis not
out of a desire to found Athens anew but to disclose a treasure almost destroyed, the
"promise" of politics. This promise centres on the capacities for action and friendship
denied by totalitarian rule.
History is not the unfolding of some logic, as modern historical consciousness assumes,
but the contingent occurrence of extraordinary events throwing light on the everyday, the
ordinary, and generating meaning.14 Through storytelling or narration we come to an
understanding of these contingent realities, the "web of relationships" also being a web of
stories. What is revealed in stories is the "who," actors' unique personalities. As opposed to
their "what," skills, talents, or imperfections, their "who" comes to light only in speech.
Hence Arendt's claim that drama and action stand interlinked, for both players and actors
need the presence of others, an audience or fellow-actors, so that their uniqueness may show
forth. Politics, indeed, is a "kind of theater where freedom [can] appear," a self-contained
activity leaving no product behind but exhausting its "full meaning in the performance
itself."15
Arendt arrives at a performative conception of action, meaningful in and of itself, to
counter the instrumentalization of human beings in the service of "higher" absolutes, Nature
and History. An end in itself, the glorious or memorable act exhibits a virtuosity or
"excellence with which man answers the opportunities the world opens up before him"
{BPF: 153). Harmonizing world and man, virtuosity is a response to uncertain situations
with the right words at the right moment. Virtuosic competition means that action involves
struggle, an agonistic striving, but one, Arendt insists, conducted in the mode of deliberation,
persuasion and negotiation, and requiring courage, the ability to forgo concern for oneself
(HC: 41, 197). To believe action's meaning inheres in its performance entails that motives,
goals and consequences do not lie at its core. Motives are essentially private, knowable only
through introspection, and thus have only tangential significance for public political life.
Goals and purposes, on the other hand, impose one path or design and thus threaten to reduce
14 The "meaningfulness of everyday relationships is disclosed not in everyday life but in rare deeds"
{HC: 42).
15
{BPF: 154; HC: 206). Thus in opposition to work, "this specifically human achievement lies
altogether outside the category ofmeans and ends" {HC: 207).
132
Chapter 6 Bearing the Burden ofOur Times
action to monological work. To view action consequentially is to confuse coercion with
speech and to legitimize a false idolatry of victory and might.16 Because of its "spontaneity
and practical purposelessness," action is free only when it transcends motives and goals
regardless of success, as the figures of Hector and Rosa Luxemburg show.
A polls is not the mere physical location of the city-state, but the organization of its
people and their binding relationships (HC\ 198). The only free realm, it is an institutional
space of "organized remembrance" facilitating the appearance of greatness. But the public
realm is a fragile achievement. Action is the most meaningful ofmen's activities, the sign of
their spontaneous natality, but because unpredictable this very natality can also take an
horrendously destructive course, as totalitarianism shows. Action's "enormous risks" are
avoided only if men celebrate the existence of others, prize "moderation," and exhibit
humanitas (TIC: 191, 245). By "humanitas" or "cultura animi" Arendt intends a mind
cultivated in the appreciation of worldly culture (MDT: 15-30, 71-80). Exemplified by
Cicero and Lessing, humanitas designates, first, an ability to care for and add to world. In
this sense it signals an augmenting and conserving quality that protects the old from the
ravages of time and increases its beauty by adding new art objects, thoughts, or actions
(BPF: 213, 219). Irreducible to the Nation or Machtstaat, culture in this sense is a universal
yet vulnerable attribute of human civilization. World preservation and augmentation depend,
however, on a second, more fundamental aspect of humanitas. No matter how beautiful, the
world remains an alien place without being "humanized" through an "incessant and
continual discourse" embracing what Aristotle meant by philia politike, "friendship" or
"solidarity."17
A politics ofpraxis rather than purposive poiesis is distinguished by "being-with," not
Weber's hostile "being-for" and "being-against" (HC: 180). But by friendship Arendt does
not mean "intimacy" or "fraternity." It is a subjectivist mistake initiated by Rousseau to
think friendship equivalent to the closeness of intimates or the compassionate fraternity of
the oppressed (OR: 79-95). Intimacy and fraternity are apolitical in that their overwhelming
warmth closes up that "interspace" established between distinct persons in the world.18 Love
and compassion seize hold of the soul and destroy the distanced relatedness pivotal to
political engagement, for such engagement entails having to do with those one does not love
16 If understood in terms of success, action loses its revelatory character and becomes "no less a means
to an end than making is a means to produce an object" (HC: 180).
17 "We humanize what is going on in the world and in ourselves only by speaking of it, and in the
course of speaking of it we learn to be human" (MDT: 25).
18
Friendship is "a regard for the person from the distance which the space of the world puts between
us" (HC: 243).
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or regard as belonging to one's group.19 When rendered political, fraternity's compassion
easily degrades into pity, and pity, as Robespierre showed, possesses "a greater capacity for
cruelty than cruelty itself."20 Solidarity, in contrast, is often aroused by suffering but its
decisive characteristic is that it comprehends both the weak and strong, poor and rich, as co-
builders of a common world. Only when we engage as friends do we come to a plural
"community of interest" and escape the non-worldly interest of the self or our particular
group (OR: 88).
This engagement obviously implies a "political ethic." The terms "ethics" and
"morality," which Arendt, unlike Habermas, uses interchangeably, take on three very
different meanings in her thought, exemplified by the figures of the "good man," the
"parvenu," and the "good citizen." The "good man" exemplifies morality-as-conscience.
Rarely of political relevance, morality means here the internal accord between "me" and
"myself," as when Socrates declared it would be better that '"multitudes of men should
disagree with me rather than that I, being one, should be out of harmony with myself.'"21
Arendt understands by morality-as-conscience Kantian practical reason, whose incongruence
with the world is acute. At the centre of practical reason lies the idea of an utterly
autonomous being who gives the law to himself. His criterion is not speech, but the logical
demand that the "will" concur with the dictates of reason. The will's self-imposed
commandments are guided by a monological absolute, the categorical imperative, which runs
counter to the "fundamental relativity" of the "interhuman realm" by constraining the infinite
particularities of human life under one determinate, universal law (MOT: 27). By raising this
law and noumenal "Man" above "men," Kant's Critique ofPractical Reason stands guilty of
"inhumanity," of eclipsing world, culture, and natality under the shadow of a sovereign
internal will. Bound to the thinking ego in its solitude, Kantian conscience is driven by an
hubristic concern for the "integrity" of the private self regardless of the needs of others or the
world and oblivious to the terrible connotations of uFiat iustitia, et pereat mundus" (BPF:
228).
Politics and morality-as-conscience are therefore fundamentally distinct. For the
individual-qua-self what matters is internal harmony, yet this harmony is too subjective, too
anarchically idiosyncratic, to be a basis for plural interaction and remains genuine only in the
19
(MDT: 12-17). Love and compassion are authentic, yet they belong in the realm of privacy where
they do not transform into dangerous "sentiments" (HC: 238-242; 1978b: 246-247).
20
(OR: 89; 1978b: 247). Weber and Arendt concur here, but whereas she rejects compassionate
goodness because its realization renders the world violent, Weber rejects goodness precisely because
the world is violent.
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private sphere (CR: 64-66). Like Weber, Arendt fears the violence that can follow from
absolute conviction.22 In the sense represented the "parvenu," however, Arendt means by
morality and ethics those behavioural conventions — "mores" or "ethoi" — by which actors
become respectable, "normalized." These conventions are the "social" equivalent to the
private deontology of the "good man."23 Transmitted unreflectively over generations, this
Kantianism for the "little man" subsumes reality under existing custom and law. The
problem with respectability is that it invites not reflection but a fetishism of "duty"
compatible with rival, even perverse, sets of conventions. When exacerbated by social
crises, this fetishism is used to disastrous effect by demagogic movements preaching new
social "moralities."24
Arendt, therefore, wishes to overcome the radical subjectivism of morality-as-
conscience, prone as it is to idiosyncrasy and violence, and the deadly banality of
respectability, which can lead ordinary men like Eichmann to heinous crimes. Her
alternative to the dualism of subjective will and social conformism, which can be likened to
Weber's antinomy of charisma and passive functionality, is the figure of the "good citizen"
(CR: 62). This citizen accepts that worldly realities must take precedence over the self s
congruence with itself. Thus he resembles Weber's (SV: 147) mature actor whose devotion
to a "cause" is infused by a "feeling of responsibility" open to "inconvenient facts." But, as
we saw (Ch 1 .II.), Weber's ethic of responsibility is entirely subjective. The actor's "cause"
may demand that others be taken into account or it may not; what matters is that it is his
cause, that his life derives sense from it. There exists, then, an acute paradox in Weber's
(PV: 125-126) claim that "he who seeks the salvation of the soul ... should not seek it along
the avenue of politics," for the only measure he has of politics is precisely the actor's soul.
The emphasis on soul means that his demand to look to the world differs radically from
Arendt's. Like Arendt, Weber is fully aware of action's contingency, that freedom brings
into being and is a response to the unexpected. But the risk of politics stemming from other
actors' natality is to him a frustrating obstacle (HC: 235). Hankering after an illusory
21 Arendt (1971a: 439) quoting Gorgias. The "good man" is not selfish, but unworldly, willing to
sacrifice the world and himself for what he thinks is right.
22 Dwelling on Melville's tale of Biddy Budd and the evil Claggart, Arendt is convinced "that absolute
goodness is hardly any less dangerous than absolute evil" (OR: 81). See also Camus (1956: 297).
23 A perverse equivalent, Arendt (EJ: 135-137) admits, insofar as it denies Kant's ideal of independent
thinking, but one reflecting key aspects of his second Critique, not least the subsumption of
experience under a determinate absolute.
24 "People get used ... not so much to the content of the rules ... as the possession of rules under which
to subsume particulars. How easy it was for the totalitarian rulers to reverse the basic
commandments ofWestern morality — "Thou shalt not kill" in the case ofHitler's Germany, "Thou
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sovereignty, Weber's mature individual stoically accepts the realities of a base world out of a
resigned honesty to himself. Arendt's actor, in contrast, loves the world because it is only in
the world that he can be free among his peers. Freedom, contra existentialism, is thoroughly
intersubjective, the natality of others not primarily a threat but a joyous condition of action
preserved by philanthropia, a "readiness to share the world with other men" (MDT: 25).
The "good citizen" concerns himself neither with respectability nor his soul but with the
endurance of the common world, which is a gift, a home, never a burden. His opinions arise
not in silent discourse with himself but through dialogue with others, just as the "moral
code" internal to action, the faculties of promising and forgiving, depend on the existence of
others.25 This plurality is constitutive of reality, because it is only by engagement in the web
of relationships that the real and the illusory can be determined. Since it is a condition of
being human, the web of relationships can never be escaped. But it can be damaged, as
when the parvenu blindly subsumes reality under ideological absolutes or when the good
man, attending to his soul, claims to know what is definitively true or right. The citizen,
however, accepts the existence of other opinions, that he does not possess definitive truth,
and believes that whether an evil damages his soul is immaterial, for what matters is whether
the world is damaged (1987b: 47-48). Arendt gives a suggestive example. In the mode of
the good man, the "conscientious objector" declares "This, / cannot do," fearful of doing
something that he will not be able to live with (CR: 63). "Civil disobedients," by contrast,
organize together for a common objective, declaring, "This we will not do." Whereas the
former is guided by personal will, the latter are bound by explicit public agreements resting
on a constitutive plurality (CR: 98). Theirs is not the expression of a subjective viewpoint
intent on moulding the world according to an inner image, but an open declaration to uphold
shared political principles clarified by publicly examined opinions and directed towards
altering or maintaining institutional bonds. They realize, in other words, that protective
boundaries arise and are preserved only through political organization. Caught within his
subjectivity the good man was powerless to stop totalitarianism and the parvenu actually
aided it, but if there had been enough good citizens they would have prevented atrocity by
organizing politically (Canovan, 1992: 178).
shalt not bear false testimony against thy neighbour" in the case of Stalin's Russia" (1971a: 435-
436; 1979: 313-314).
25 We return to promising below (Ch 6.IV, 7.1.i, 7.III.ii), but it is crucial to recognize that for Arendt
(HC: 237) promising and forgiving "correspond so closely to the human condition of plurality, [that]
their role in politics establishes a diametrically different set of guiding principles from the [solitary]
moral standards inherent in the Platonic notion of rule," morality-as-conscience.
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It is the faculty of reflective judgement (Urteilskraft), of discerning "this is beautiful,
this is ugly, this is right, this is wrong," Arendt claims, that enables man to escape his
subjectivity.26 In his second Critique Kant fell into "inhumanity" but in the Critique of
Judgement he gave voice to a genuine political ethic. Arendt turns to Kantian aesthetic
judgement because it promises to avoid reducing reality to the dictates of the inner will, the
categorical imperative, or to the imperiousness of knowledge (truth, fact) which underpins
Plato's separation of archein and prattein. Both involve compulsion, the will compelling
itself to be lawful, the cognitive intellect (Verstand) compelling assent through sensuous
intuition or logical self-evidence.27 Both are also "determinate," subsuming reality under
universal rules or laws. Judgement, by contrast, works the other way and is "reflective"
inasmuch as it is not a matter of knowledge but of interpretation or understanding, of
arriving at a general meaning or concept after having reflected upon circumstances which,
because contingent, are irreducible to universal laws.28 Presuming a disjunction between the
realms of fact and meaning, Arendt's account of judgement therefore mirrors her account of
action. As with action, judgement is concerned with meaning, which implies that one judges
not in accordance with instrumental success or goals (fact) but in terms of an event's unique
import, its performance. This gives rise to "opinion" which, in opposition to truth, is
persuasive and seeks to "woo" the consent of others.
The basis of judgement is non-cognitive taste, an immediate, discriminating feeling of
pleasure or displeasure. Seemingly idiosyncratic or subjective, taste is rendered non-
arbitrary by the imaginative process of "representative thinking," whereby the judge
distances himself from his private idiosyncrasies by taking the possible opinions of others
into account. The ability to assume this "enlarged mentality" Arendt calls "common sense"
(sensus communis) (LKPP: 69-72). Whether one's opinions are genuinely enlarged,
appropriate or right, depends on whether they are publicly communicable or, like envy or
greed, must be hidden from sight. This emphasis on publicity highlights the key difference
between Weber's (PV: 115) "sense of proportion" and Arendtian reflective judgement. Both
demand openness to reality, the forgoing of customary rules and cliches to appreciate the
complexity of new constellations, but reflective judgement is an intersubjective rather than
an individual faculty, since an enlarged mentality "presupposes the presence of others"
26
(LKPP: 15). The judging "historian [is] the inquiring man who by relating it sits in judgement over
it... [and reclaims] human dignity ... from the pseudo-divinity named History" (LM, I: 216).
27 "Truth is what we are compelled to admit by the nature either of our senses or of our brain" (LM, I:
61).
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(LKPP: 74). Yet — and this will be crucial for our subsequent critique — although Arendt
(1971a: 446) calls judgement "the most political of men's faculties," it is not an attribute of
actors, but rather of spectators who are "present" only to other spectators. "Withdrawal
from direct involvement to a standpoint outside the game" being the "sme qua non of all
judgement," only "disinterested" and inactive onlookers who play no part but simply delight
in the spectacle can, in considering each others' opinions, attain the impartial distance
requisite for proper judgement.29 The citizen, by contrast, is wedded to his part or role in
specific circumstances and cannot come to awareness of the general meaning or import of
his deeds. Whereas action is heteronomous, always conditioned by the acts of others,
spectatorship is "unconditioned" and "autonomous," a transcendence of the game or "the
web of relationships," albeit temporary (LM,, I: 70-71).
28 This general meaning inheres in an "exemplar" adequate to the new phenomenon, as when the
particular figure of Bonaparte gave rise to the more general concept "Bonapartism," which is "valid
for more than one case" (LKPP: 85).
29
(LKPP: 55, 68-69). The actor-spectator split is a vexed issue, Arendt sometimes coalescing the
actor and spectator perspectives, sometimes severing them. However, as her thought progressed this
divide became increasingly pronounced. See Beiner (1982: 89-156), Bernstein (1986b: 221-237),
Benhabib (1996a: 172-198), Hutchings (1996: 81-101), Villa (1999: 87-106), and Yar (2000: 1-27).
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6.IV.) A Political Politics
It was Arendt's judgement that the "organized oblivion" of totalitarianism is but one part of
the modern age. Reconfirming natality, and in direct antithesis to totalitarianism, the other
"innermost meaning" of the modern age is the fateful story of revolution. The American
Revolution and the revolutionary bodies that sprang up suddenly in Paris 1871, Russia 1905
and 1917, Germany 1919, and Hungary 1956, show that, defeats notwithstanding, "political
elan has not yet died" (HC: 217). These events inaugurated a new form of government,
council democracy, born not of violent frustration but of a grass-roots urge to found a stable
public realm. Brought into being by the people, not by revolutionary elites, the wards,
councils, Soviets or Rate were limited to no one class but characterized by a plurality of
classes, from the workers to the intelligentsia, and rested on an equality that did not level
difference or distinction, but presumed a non-ideological commitment to public
participation.
Without such plurality politics degrades into the rule of cliques.30 Because freedom
"means the right "to be a participator in government," or it means nothing," Arendt equates
this rule of cliques with a denial of the "political" (OR: 218). In this the councils contrasted
favourably with "revolutionary" parties, the Jacobins and Bolsheviks. Weber argued that the
deterioration of the councils into hierarchical parties was inevitable, that they were doomed
to become machines (PV: 100, 125-126). Arendt, on the other hand, believes no
transformation took place, but rather that the parties usurped and destroyed the power of the
councils, placing in their stead an ideological apparatus, as is proved by Robespierre's
proscription of the societes populaires and Lenin's crushing of the Soviets.31 The result,
"dictatorship resting on the exploitation of mass emotionality," was therefore not at all
inevitable, but the tragic outcome of a contest between two antagonistic organizational ideals
(PV: 107).
There is, nevertheless, a further reason for the triumph of parties. When the councils
failed, it was sometimes due not to party antipathy but to a fundamental confusion on the
part of council members as to the object of their endeavour (OR: 273). Their error consisted
30 This applies as much to representative democracy as to non-democratic systems. Liberalism
upholds private liberties, but these important barriers to injustice are maintained at the cost of
surrendering natality to representatives who hold a monopoly on political life and pander to the
sectional interests of an apolitical electorate (OR: 252, 269-270).
31 (OR: 240-41, 255-258). Weber had himself participated in the 1919 Heidelberg Workers and
Soldiers' Council. His bewilderment ("Who, I'd like to know, is in charge here?"), recounted by
Jaspers (Arendt, Jaspers, 1992: 338), was proof for Arendt that he had little inkling of a non-
dominative political order.
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in mistaking freedom for socio-economic and juridical liberation. This distinction between
freedom and liberty underlies Arendt's "Dual-State" ideal of "political politics," which
stipulates a sharp separation of strictly political and strictly administrative matters, in
contrast to Weber, who would see political leaders dominate the machine.32 On one side
there is an "elementary republic," giving vent to political passions and devoted to genuinely
public questions; on the other, a hierarchical administrative apparatus whose organizational
criteria are managerial competence and proficiency. The resulting gap is unyielding insofar
as it draws from her basic dichotomies of culture versus nature, freedom versus necessity,
polis versus oikos. In Athens laboring was confined to the oikos, the realm of women and
slaves, who, tied to life's eternal recurrence, could never gain the status of citizens. Arendt
does not mean to justify slavery or female domination, yet she is certain that behind these
unjust practices lay a genuine intuition, that the "economic" concerns necessity and has in
itself nothing to do with culture or freedom (Levin, 1979: 524-525).
Arendtian freedom concerns the vocal ability to engage and participate with others in
matters of common significance whose status is uncertain and thus amenable to debate.
Liberty, by contrast, is liberty from despotism and from hunger, necessity. Whereas the
foundation of freedom is truly political, securing an enduring house for action, liberation is a
pre-political condition ofpraxis, immensely important to be sure, yet not free in that it does
not and cannot presume equal actors engaging in concert. The routes to freedom and to civil
and economic liberty are therefore distinct.33 Civil, juridical liberation may be secured
politically, that is, through persuasive speech, but more often than not violence is employed
and violence presumes technical expertise used for the benefit of subjects who remain
largely passive. Related to the natural condition of life, economic liberty can only be secured
technically.34 In The Human Condition Arendt speaks of the social-as-economic as an
aberration, yet in subsequent writings, On Revolution and Crises of the Republic in
particular, she accepts it as a given whose intrinsic problems, poverty or "the Social
Question," must be addressed but which also have to be kept from invading politics. By way
of illustration, she cites Lenin's "entirely unMarxist" admission that the goal of struggle had
been "Electrificationplus Soviets." Arendt takes him as meaning that economics and politics
are separate and that poverty, "the state of constant want and acute misery," falls under the
32 "Dual-State" is my term, but it adequately reflects Arendt's intention.
33 Liberation can be "fulfilled under monarchical ... rulership, ... [but freedom] necessitates ... the
constitution of a republic" (OR: 33).
34 Because labour entails being "enslaved by [a] necessity ... inherent in the human condition," it is
"quite doubtful whether the political principle of equality and self-rule can be applied to the
economic sphere" (HC: 83-84; OT: 498).
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remit of an expert administration having the skill to solve it (OR: 60, 65). Politics, the
establishment of a new body politic, cannot help here because when social problems such as
wage levels, "electrification," and production are at issue, people find themselves caught
within private and group-specific interests or needs that prevent the articulation ofworldly or
common interests. Because "enlightened self-interest" is a corrupting falsity, it is to the
expert, the controller of politically neutral machines and techniques which "neither prescribe
nor preclude any specific form of government," that we must turn to discover a determinate
common interest where social matters are concerned.35 Despite her profound worries as to
the dangers of bureaucracy, for Arendt the arbiter of social justice is not the citizen but the
apolitical technocrat.
A more fundamental reason, however, for the socio-economic's pre-political status is its
being a question of cognition or knowledge and not of opinion. "There are," writes Arendt,
"things where the right measure can be figured out ... things [that] can really be
administered" and need not, indeed should not, be debated (1979: 317). These things are
givens, the natural necessities of life. To use her example, experts can know for a fact
beyond all discussion how large an apartment must be for adequate living. However, what is
debatable is whether apartment blocs should be used to further racial or class integration,
whether integration is a politically wise course. Politics comes into being only when matters
are indeterminate, uncertain, which is not a feature of economic-administrative questions.
Contrary to some interpretations, Arendt does not call for some "night watchman"
administration.36 If hemmed in by legal controls and kept apolitical, welfare-state
administrations are best positioned to halt the processes of expropriation by ensuring that
"the masses, dispossessed by industrial society in capitalist and socialist systems, can regain
property" (CR: 214). Regaining this pre-condition of political life is administration's goal.
If politicized, however, chaos ensues. Arendt's controversial contrast of the American and
French revolutions illustrates this point. Because America enjoyed a natural abundance
unknown in the Old World, "the Social Question" did not trouble the Founding Fathers, who
properly concerned themselves with the outline of the new republic, its constitution. The
French case was very different, its attempt to enshrine freedom soon foundering on the social
conditions of the Old World. Overwhelmed by the spectacle of extreme poverty, the French
let themselves be driven by pity to think their prime goal not the erection of a durable
35
(OR: 65; 1987a: 32) "Self-interest, when asked to yield to 'true' interest — that is, the interest of
the world as distinguished from that of the self— will always reply, 'Near is my shirt, but nearer is
my skin'" (CR: 175).
36 Habermas (1977: 15), Mommsen (1989: 70), and Wolin (1994: 295) note Arendt's exclusion of
social justice from political debate, but fail to note the welfare role accorded to administrations.
141
Chapter 6 Bearing the Burden ofOur Times
political realm but the alleviation of misery. The private, bodily need of the poor thereby
entered the political realm and in its urgency destroyed the class-transcending solidarity
emblematic of action. In its stead came a celebration of violence as the servant of
necessity.37
Under the baleful influence of party elites most subsequent revolutions have taken
inspiration from the French experience. Sadly the councils were not immune. Here Arendt
draws a distinction between revolutionary and workers' councils. As in the Hungarian
Revolution, which gloriously reconfirmed the significance of council democracy, the former
remained political throughout until crushed by police and military force. The latter,
however, saw their role as social, as the reorganization of factories. This blunder meant that
proper management was drastically hindered, giving the council principle an undeserved bad
name, and that "revolutionary" parties came to be seen as the sole alternative, if only because
their hierarchical structures resembled those ofmanagement (OR: 274-275).
What the workers' councils forgot was the need for boundaries. Radical and yet
cautiously conservative, Arendt's "Dual-State" ideal places limits on politics and economics
in the hope of preserving them both. The disastrous course of Western politics is due
precisely to a faith in unlimited power mistaking freedom for sovereignty. Weber's
centralized state dominated by a president who enforces order is a case in point. Although
he (PW: 305) called for constitutional checks on the Reichsprasident, so that the "the gallows
[would be] the reward awaiting any attempt to ... govern autocratically," these are of a
wholly negative kind and do not amount to a dispersal of power among citizens but its
concentration at the centre. Such monopolization is perilous because once one concedes the
legitimacy of sovereign rulership one also concedes the legitimacy, in supposed
emergencies, of the decision to overstep constitutional checks (OR: 151).
To counter unbounded rule, Arendt imagines political legitimacy as resting on the event
of constituting a republic. Her paradigmatic constituting event is, again, the American
Revolution. The word "constitution" has a two-fold meaning, denoting both a document and
a beginning, the act by which a people constitutes itself as a political entity (OR: 203).
Initiating a new departure, the Founding Fathers opened a glorious gap for the relative
"immortality" of the public realm and culture (HC: 55-56; LM, II: 210). More than
beginning, however, they also tried to preserve the freedom they experienced in acting by
rendering it "objectively" tangible as written law. In the idea of foundation, therefore, the
37 "Violence justified and glorified because it acts in the cause of necessity, necessity no longer
rebelled against ... but ... faithfully worshipped as the great all-covering force which surely, in the
words of Rousseau, will 'force men to be free'" (OR: 115).
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radical and conservative currents of Arendt's thought coalesce, for to constitute is both to
begin and to conserve that act in the basic law of a polity.
Arendt is acutely aware, nonetheless, of two paradoxes in the attempt to conjoin
revolution and preservation. The first concerns the tension between beginning and
conservation, freedom and foundation (OR: 223-224). To act is to begin spontaneously, to
break with the past and to disrupt order. Paradoxically, however, the founding act is a free
act that nevertheless shackles all subsequent action by laying down a body of law that will
become a restrictive "past" for future generations, the founders' freedom becoming tangible
at the cost of the freedom of their successors. Spontaneous freedom and stable foundation
seem, therefore, to conflict and point to the inevitability of coercion, "This far and no
further!," in the origin of a polity.
This conflict between foundation and freedom is exacerbated by a second paradox, the
"unconstitutional" authority of founding acts (OR: 160-162). A constitution purports to be
the source of all authority, yet the derivation of its own authority appears wholly mysterious.
An eruption in "temporal time and its continuity," the founding act has no higher authority
from which to legitimate itself and thus, like all beginnings, appears "to carry ... a measure of
complete arbitrariness" (OR: 205-206). This problem Arendt terms the "abyss" of freedom,
that every act, because it could have been otherwise, appears to rest on opaque
contingencies. A hiatus in the chain of legitimation, this "abyss" presents actors with a
dilemma. Either they content themselves with Weberian charisma, the fickle will of
exceptional individuals who rule by right of superior strength, or they go in search of some
transcendent authority in the form of God, Nature or History. Both paths deny the
"political," the one inviting coercion, the other a sublime politics easily degenerating into
totalitarianism.
In line with her "good citizen" ideal, Arendt's answer to the paradox of
"unconstitutional" authority is the faculty and act ofpromising. Intrinsically plural, since a
promise can only be made between actors, promising sidesteps coercion insofar as it secures
"limited independence from the incalculability of the future" by binding actors back to a
sworn "agreed purpose for which alone the promise [is] valid and binding" (OR: 171; HC:
245). By a fundamental covenant embodied in their constitution, and not by deference to
any external authority, the Americans secured and justified the authority of their power.38
Indeed, this legitimacy can be traced back further to the Mayflower Compact. When the
Pilgrims combined "themselves ... into a 'civil Body Politick'" they erected a structure
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"powerful enough to 'enact, constitute, and frame' all necessary laws and instruments of
government" (OR: 167). Despite their many differences, they achieved this by conceiving
themselves as a plural "We" based on mutual consent. Most significantly, they realized that
their consenting to be a "We" housed within itself the source of political authority, the very
moment of consent being what determined their polity's form.
The beginning brought into the world by mutual promising suffices to assure the
legitimacy of all that follows. It also suggests a "solution" to the first paradox inhering in
the tension between founding and freedom. Only if someone begins can there be future
freedom, yet this beginning must be of a specific sort to avoid its equation with violent
command. True to their experience of "public happiness," Arendt argues, the Founding
Fathers alighted upon a form of law whose essence is not coercive but relational, a matter of
mutual association. The act of constituting a republic generates an institutional web of
relationships preserved by "rapports," which spring not from philosophy, concerned as it is
with generalities and universals, but from contingent speaking and doing. The significance
of these legal rapports is that they establish an enabling connection between "two partners
whom external circumstances have brought together" (OR: 187). Constitutional law is
therefore "directive," bringing institutionalized activities such as electing into being, and
only secondarily, if at all, "imperative," determining what can and cannot be done (CR: 193).
Moreover, as the term "directive" suggests, a founding act and its law do not trespass against
the natality of subsequent generations if they allow for augmentation and revision. Genuine
authority, which derives from augere, to augment and increase, is a living balance between
preservation and change. An inherited constitution secures freedom for those who follow
and enables them to engage their "capacity for building, preserving, and caring for a world"
when it admits of amendment and refuses to dictate all that may subsequently be done.39
The failure to see the profound "coincidence" of freedom and preservation in the practice of
augmentation, "that the "revolutionary" act of beginning something entirely new, and
conservative care, which will shield this new beginning through the centuries, are
interrelated," is yet one further negative legacy of the French Revolution, which gave birth to
the antagonistic but twin ideologies of liberal radicalism and romantic conservatism, both of
which are premised on the anti-political belief that order comes and is enforced from above
(OR: 202, 213).
38 Power "applies solely to the worldly in-between space by which men are mutually related, combine
in the act of foundation by virtue of the making and the keeping of promises" (OR: 175).
39 (BPF: 95). "Thus ... the very authority of the American constitution resides in its inherent capacity
to be amended and augmented" (OR: 202).
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Judging With and Against Arendt: Citizenship, Risk, and the Scope
of Politics
Chapter Six set out Arendt's narrative of modernity and vision of politics. The task of this
chapter is to interrogate that vision. We first explore what is positively significant in Arendt.
Admirably aware of the risk of politics, its utter dependence on uncertain particularities, her
account of active, substantive citizenship promises far more than Habermas' radical
reformism (Ch 7.1.i, 7.1.ii). In particular the demand for a rooted institutional politics
represents a laudable alternative to his prized "subjectless" public sphere and civil society.
But Arendt's thought exhibits serious philosophical shortcomings, specifically her false
bifurcation of freedom and necessity, her equation of necessity with labour and nature, and
her unwitting subjectivization of judgement (Ch 7.II.i, 7.II.ii). Most serious of all, however,
is her elimination of purposiveness from action. A consideration of these philosophical
perplexities sets the stage for a critique of her politics, which recalls our critique of
Habermas (Ch 4.III.). Arendt endorses active citizenship, but her separation of the political
from the social renders such citizenship highly problematic (Ch 7.III.i). Moreover, the
attempt to "ontologically spatialize" reality along the lines of her "Dual-State" ideal
culminates in a series of self-vitiating quandaries, not least an indirect endorsement of
Weberian political realism. These quandaries are exacerbated by regrettable inadequacies in
her otherwise admirable understanding of political risk. As with Habermas' failed attempt to
confine the role of strategic action, Arendt's portrayal of the social as the realm of necessity
and violence, and the political as that of "being-with" or non-coercive freedom, also fails and
for reasons immanent to her thought (Ch 7.III.ii).
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7.1.) Arendt's Significance
7J.i.) Contingency and Risk
Supremely sensitive to the contingency of world and culture, Arendt's understanding of
action and the central ity of particular events reaffirms key concerns underplayed by
Habermas and, as will be argued (Ch 10.11.i), by Maclntyre. In this respect she is better able
to counter Weber's political vision, for that vision claims superiority over "naive" normative
perspectives precisely on account of giving contingency and risk their due. Arendt's goal,
however, is to appreciate these phenomena without succumbing to political realism.
We saw how she resists the reduction of history to some universal developmental logic.
Habermas' evaluative division of historical time into pre-conventional, conventional and
post-conventional periods is implicitly ruled out by her equal regard for Athens and the
American Revolution. His presumption that modernity, despite its one-sided rationalization,
is the age of freedom fails to take account of human natality, the fact that no one can predict
the course of future events. The unprecedented rise of totalitarianism proves this beyond
question. More seriously still, Habermas' ideal speech situation endorses as a regulative
standard a moment of perfect communication where the "wearisome processes of persuasion,
negotiation, and compromise" have been overcome (OR: 86-87). For Arendt, on the
contrary, there can be no era free from the problems of politics and to presume otherwise,
even on the level of counterfactuals, is to desire the end of political life and humanity's natal
capacities.
The ineliminability of uncertainty, the very essence of contingency, is due to the nature
of action itself. Because action's condition is plurality, every actor both affects and is
affected by other actors, meaning that action alone stands out as the only activity demanding
the presence of others. But the presence of others means that action is boundless and
irreversible. It is boundless because every act initiates a chain of subsequent acts whose
direction remains unknown, and hence no actor can tell the consequences of his deeds or
those parts of the web of relationships they will alter. Arendt thus agrees with Weber (PV:
117) that the result "of political action often ... stands in completely inadequate and ... even
paradoxical relation to its original meaning." Action is irreversible and therefore frequently
tragic because once done, no deed can be undone. Hence the risk of politics. Our deeds may
run counter to all expectation and go disastrously astray, but we must nonetheless act.
Boundlessness and irreversibility together indicate why action is always frail, natality
imbuing deeds with the "inherent tendency to force open all limitations and cut across all
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boundaries" (7/C: 190). Action brings the space of appearances into being and attempts to
preserve that space by setting boundaries and laws, but the active "onslaught" of every new
generation threatens to uproot and transgress those same boundaries, even to the extent of
destroying the public realm. To be aware of the contingency of action and its location, that it
need not exist, is, then, to embrace the vulnerability of humanity's defining attribute: that we
are free to do what might otherwise be left undone.
Stressing action's risk-ridden contingency Arendt targets the philosopher's tendency to
substitute theory for actual practice (LM, II: 198). Philosophers occupied with theoretical
delineations of political existence are mistaken because in politics we rely not on
philosophical constructs but worldly deeds. Habermas' developmental-logical account of
modern democracy is a case in point. The very idea of law, he claims, contains within itself
the germ of liberal democratic legitimacy, the private rights of the legal subject pointing
necessarily to the public rights of the citizen and vice versa (BFN: 31-32, 449-454). Private
liberty conceptually presumes democratic rule and this rule likewise presumes liberty.
Arendt distrusts this neat demonstration not because it is philosophically suspect but for
what it occludes. Concentrating attention on the unfolding of a general, universal logic, it
downplays the truth that freedom is always a particular attainment of specific times and
places. We enjoy liberty and public participation not because of conceptual implications, but
because of previous and ongoing political struggle (BPF: 168). In other words, what is
important in politics is "developmental dynamics," not logics.
Habermas admits the importance of developmental dynamics or historically specific
"political cultures," but this recognition takes second place to his reconstruction of discursive
logics. Arendt's thought, in contrast, prioritizes political culture in the form of the "good
citizen." Many commentators have objected to her account of "morality-as-conscience,"
seeing in it a failure to adequately theorize the moral dimensions of political action.1 To an
extent this criticism rings true. Arendt's portrayal of morality-as-conscience as a private
concern for oneself ignores the truth that all morality, whether public or private, is concerned
with the self s relation to others, and not with the self s harmony with itself, since others also
populate the "household." That Arendt believes her account of "morality-as-conscience"
adequately describes private morality suggests she holds to a "narcissistic" conception of
conscience reminiscent ofWeber's account of "inner balance." This subjectivist conception,
if it were all she had to say about morality, would end up repeating Weber's antinomy
between conviction and responsibility. However, her account of political morality, the
' See Kateb (1984: 85-112; 2000: 143), Winters (1987: 188-194), and Benhabib (1996a: 193-198).
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"good citizen's" care for the world and those in it, does point beyond this antinomy. Here
the actor is motivated by a "conscience," but this conscience recognizes its embeddedness
within a world populated by others, the need to publicly examine opinions which can never
claim to be definitively right, and the fragility of shared life.2 Arendt's portrait of the
morality-as-conscience of the "good man" can therefore be interpreted not as a description of
conscience per se, but as a critique of "certainty," of the philosophic vice of assuming that
theoretic rules can tame reality's complexity, and, more significantly, of moral fanaticism, of
those who do not recognize the existence of others or, if they do, refuse to acknowledge their
opinions.
Supremely confident, the fanatic ignores the plurality of opinions, the condition of
politics. But this ineluctable condition means that to prevent evil we must be '"committed to
political solutions to political problems ... devote ourselves as citizens to maintaining and
improving the public world'" (Canovan (1992: 2000), quoting Arendt). Because active
intervention constitutes the sole antidote to active wrongdoing, the ground of an ethical
politics inheres not in theory but in action itself. Hence Arendt's turn to the "moral code"
internal to praxis, promising and forgiving (HC: 238-243). Countering irreversibility, the
fact that once done no deed can be undone, forgiving breaks the stranglehold of the past and
saves the actor and the world from revenge. Countering action's unpredictable
boundlessness, a genuine political ethic rests upon actual agreements to live together, on the
one hand, and agreements not to commit certain acts, on the other (CR: 92). This two-fold
promise can only be made and upheld by citizens who, recognizing the intersubjective
ground of their freedom, mutually establish the parameters of good and evil. Without such
promising the rights of man are idle fancy, for only through collective endorsement do such
rights come into being. The illusions of philosophy notwithstanding, natural rights and
norms are not at all natural but the precarious achievement of political endeavour.3
It is inaccurate to conclude, however, that Arendt endorses a "foundationless" or proto-
postmodernist conception of politics (Villa, 1996: 206-207; Canovan, 1992: 197-200). To
be sure, she denies that ethical foundations exist in some transcendent realm, timeless and
unchanging. Yet politics does have worldly, as opposed to theoretical, foundations, with
Arendt's wholly substantive image of a dignified life operating both as standard of conduct
and treasured ideal. This dignified life depends on an equilibrium between equality and
2 Thus, Biskowski (1993: 867-887) and Williams (1998: 937-950) are right that Arendt's account of
world, natality, solidarity, and preservation entails a profoundly rich political ethic.
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distinction sustained by relations of friendship and civility. Preferring evaluative
phenomenology to justificatory analysis, Arendt's cultured humanism spurns Weber's
nationalist interpretation of culture to maintain a universal conception of the worth of
politics, a conception which emphasizes the practical, as opposed to philosophical, nature of
that worth. Although her theory of judgement unwittingly ends up endorsing a philosophical
or transcendental solution to politics' problems, as will be seen (Ch 7.II.ii.), the core message
of Arendt's thought is that while human dignity is assuredly real, there are no guarantees
outside of particular events and actions that it will obtain.
But lack of guarantees is no reason to endorse Weberian realism. From the fact of
uncertainty Weber concludes that action equates with diabolical contracts and polytheistic
conflict, politics being a mere means to individual wills. Viewing other actors' natality as an
obstacle, not a source of joy, what this also ignores is the narrative constitution of plural
political life. Taking individual desire as its prime referent, Weber's decisionism neglects
the undeniable truth that it is actors acting in concert who comprise politics. Being in the
world is not reducible to decision or will, the stunted condition of the fanatic, but a matter of
belonging to intersubjective networks reaching from the past to the present and into the
future (HC: 184). Without embodiment in political narratives or stories this network remains
inhuman and alien. But to place a political constellation into a narrative, to attempt to
understand it, is to raise the question of legitimacy. This question demands that actors
understand the network they inhabit as meaningfully theirs. Obscuring this "web of
relationships," Weber succumbs to the Platonic myth that politics can be legitimated by an
individual ruler. Even though it will be argued that Arendt mistakenly excludes coercion
from the genuinely political and, ironically, is realist as regards the social, her emphasis on
promise and care does function as a correcting counter-weight to dangerous fantasy of
coercive sovereignty. Every enduring political accomplishment is a plural accomplishment
dependent on the potential, implicit or active consent of others. Without this stabilizing
promise and without the possibility of subsequent augmentation, which the image of a
sovereign maker excludes, all effort is ultimately futile. And the possibility of augmentation
depends in turn upon the key political virtue of moderation, the realization that the common
world is easily destroyed when one man claims to know what is definitely right or thinks
himself equal to the task of remodelling his fellow citizens. Arendt is profoundly significant,
3
Rejecting the natural law tradition from which Habermas ultimately draws, Arendt (OT: 290-302)
concurs with Burke that rights are neither natural nor inherent in discourse, but contingent political
achievements, a fact "displaced persons" learn to their cost.
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then, in responding to the risk of an uncertain world not by declaring its futility but by
stressing the plural care and nurture required to keep it in existence.
7.I.H.) Institutional "Spaces of Appearance" and Substantive Citizenship
The combination of conservatism and radicalism encapsulated in Arendt's conjunction of
foundation and freedom hinges on the truth that polities come into being through the deeds
of many actors. In this respect Arendt recalls Habermas' incisive critique of Weberian
Herrschaft, that legitimacy and authority are far more than questions of brute factual belief
but fundamentally depend on unending intersubjective processes of understanding, critique,
and re-constitution (Ch 4.1.ii).
Yet Arendt's radical conservatism is certainly not Habermas' radical reformism. For
one, it does not relent before capitalist expropriation. Where Habermas has made his peace
with the market, believing only in a defensive realignment of system and lifeworld, Arendt's
"Dual-State" calls for an ambitious policy of de-expropriation so that citizens might possess
the property needed to counter further massification. Nor does she surrender work to system
functionality. Labour is misunderstood, as will be seen, but work remains a genuinely
creative activity constitutive both of the objective world and human identity. Despite her
firm belief that Marxism gave succour to totalitarian impulses, Arendt is staunchly Marxist
in holding to the distinction between use and exchange value, which underlies her
differentiation of property and wealth (Parekh, 1979: 88-89). Furthermore, unlike
Habermas' problematic separation of ethical and moral domains, she does not distance
herself from the ethical impulses motivating her theory. Humanitas or cultured existence
constitutes the end of political activity and that end is quintessentially a matter of ethics,
meaning, or identity, of who we are, and who we want to be. When we act we reveal
ourselves as unique human beings and this revelation confirms that "[meaningful] tragedy
rather than [meaningless] absurdity is ... the hallmark of human existence" (HC: 235).
Habermas desires a strict division between questions of identity and of norms so as to avoid
Weber's value-scepticism, but Arendt recognizes that the norms regulating politics only
make sense with reference to the reasons why this existence is valuable at all. The
totalitarian denial of dignity, its gainsaying of natality as the defining attribute and end of
human beings, was the first step in the revocation of normative checks on atrocity. Ethics,
the ends of human beings, and morality, the obligations protecting these ends, therefore
stand and fall together.
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Arendt differs from Habermas in one further respect. Where Habermas places a
disempowering division between opinion-formation and decision-making, identifying the
former with civil society and the latter with a largely systemic state, Arendt urges a full¬
blown revitalization of citizenship, a recouping not just of opinion forming competencies but
also the power to participate in and decide the course of government. A prevalent
interpretation of her thought is therefore seriously misleading. According to this
interpretation Arendt's radically "anti-statist" politics perfectly coheres with those
fluctuating new social movements appearing on the peripheries of existing governmental
systems to protest and urge change.4 Because representative government frustrates the
capacity for action, it is "only" in civil society that "public freedom [can] become tangible"
(Bernstein, 1986c: 257).
There is support for this reading, even if it rests on a fundamental misinterpretation.
The Civil Rights movement and the Vietnam War protests indicated beyond doubt the
admirable "spirit that has informed voluntary association" (CR\ 98). This spirit infused
groups whose purpose was not self-advancement but the betterment of a shared, public
world. Realizing the joys of engaging, organizing, and striving with diverse others
celebrated by Tocqueville, they challenged the tendency towards administrative "bigness" or
centralization that Arendt saw as eroding political authority in 1960s America (CR: 181-
184).
Yet Arendt shares Tocqueville's profound ambivalence toward civil society. The truth
is that civil society has no intrinsic connection to isonomy, the artificial or culturally secured
equality-in-difference permitting naturally unequal subjects to combine in concert. Arendt
distinguishes the public realm from the social-as-economic and mass society, but she also
distinguishes it from discriminating society. In this associative realm subjects find
themselves members of linguistic, ethnic, and status groups linked by uniform standards of
identity that are either given or consciously "exclusive." Bound by the non-political
principles of fraternity and intimacy, these groups grant members a sense of belonging
especially important in times of crisis (MDT: 13-17). In opposition to political equality,
however, discriminating society is thoroughly conformist, tending towards an
homogenization of difference.5 Whereas in politics there is a plurality of diverse, non-
interchangeable actors, in discriminating or, synonymously, civil society there is a plurality
4 See Bernstein (1986c: 256), Ring (1991: 449), Isaac (1992: 248-258), and Benhabib (1996a: 29,
195-204).
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of groups whose members are or choose to be the same. The freedom characteristic of
discriminating society is not, then, political freedom, but that of groups to associate
exclusively with others of like background and outlook (1959: 51-52; OR: 279).
Controversially, Arendt thought social discrimination as "indispensable a ... right as
equality is a political right," even to the extent of opposing federal enforcement of school de¬
segregation.6 She was wrong to believe the social and political so easily separable, but the
point here is that she feared the political effect many civil-social groups could have, not least
a recrudescence of organized racism. Social conformity endangers political freedom, even
while it must be allowed exist alongside it. As much as it can enable the equality-in¬
difference definitive of authentic politics, so too does civil society enable lobby and other
interest groups whose goals are sectional and destructive of a shared public realm (CR: 96).
Moreover, that some associations transcend sectional interests does not mean they
necessarily escape the vices characteristic of party politics. If anything, they are as
vulnerable to "fanaticism, ideologies, and a destructiveness that often borders on the
criminal."7 These are all dangers if civil society directs itself to politics. Yet many other
associations encourage an equally dangerous retreat from the world. The "communes of
hippies and dropouts" are associations of world renunciation and as such do nothing to
prevent political evil (CR: 232).
Given these deep reservations, it is wrong to regard Arendt as a civil society enthusiast.
Instead, her demand is for a transformation of the state itself. Her councils or "elementary
republics" entail "a new concept of the state" contributing to a "direct regeneration of
democracy" (CR: 233; OR: 263). To locate citizenship within "wild," "anarchic," and
"anonymous" weak publics is therefore to be guilty of severing citizenship's constitutive
connection with decision-making. For Arendt, civil society theory is flawed because it
unwittingly legitimates Weber's Platonic separation of archein and prattein in holding to his
model of the state, where effective power is monopolized at the centre. Associations are
celebrated because they resist the "powerful" few who occupy the core, but this resistance is
already a capitulation, for it works on the assumption that state and government are not for
5 In discriminating society "we become subject to the old adage 'like attracts like' which controls the
whole realm of society in the innumerable variety of its groups and associations" (Arendt, 1959:
51).
6 "The question" is "not how to abolish discrimination, but how to keep it confined within the social
sphere," and this means leaving large areas of social, as opposed to private and political, existence
open to discrimination even on racial grounds (1959: 51). See Young-Bruehl (1982: 308-318).
7 Arendt (CR: 204). She had in mind the excesses of some student movements in Germany and
France and Black Power separatism in America.
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and by citizens but over and against them.8 When Arendt praised voluntary associations she
did so in the belief that they were demanding a hold on the reins of power, entry into the
state itself.9
Thus Arendt calls for direct, substantive, rather than indirect, procedural, citizenship.
Substantive citizenship demands that power be spread throughout a polity in the manner of
republican federalism. A federal republic beginning with "grass root" councils and
concluding with national, even international, fora, does not monopolize praxis and invite
rebellion but relies on institutionally "separated" and "mediated" power. Power is
"separated" when there is not just a balance between the arms of government but also a
balance between different locations and sources of power, that is, between federally
constituted town, city, state, and national deliberative councils. Because "only 'power
arrests power,'" juridical constraints on autocracy are figments of abstract right without the
interplay between a multiplicity of powerful locations (OR: 151). Indeed, only through
federation does a polity manage to preserve and increase power through the combination, as
opposed to assimilation, of distinct political bodies.
Power is "mediated," differently, when diverse opinions undergo a process of
institutional distillation. In Arendt's ideal republic opinions and decisions are filtered from
the bottom to the top so that the "arbitrary and the merely idiosyncratic" are more likely to
be purged (OR: 227). This mediating process also changes the meaning of authority, which
instead of being imposed downwards is continually generated at each deliberative layer (OR:
278). Leaders are selected not because they have the requisite will to force policies through,
but because they enjoy the "special trust" of peers who think them fit to represent their
opinions at the next higher level. Through such multiple processes of selection the tension
between authority and equality is lessened, thus side-stepping Weber's dominative and
unmediated leader-follower relation.10 The members of such "elementary" republics would,
Arendt admits, constitute a "self-selected elite" of those having shown "a taste for public
freedom," but she is anxious to distinguish this from Weber's model of the active leader and
passive mass (OR: 279). The number of spaces for active participation being dramatically
8 As Pitkin (1998: 282-283) puts it, "Seeking to force "them" [the rulers] to change "their"
government and policy does not yet recognize government and policy as ... ours, everyone's
concern."
9 Thus, "wherever knowing and doing have parted company, the space of freedom is lost" and it is
lost precisely when citizens lack the "right to vote, choose and control their government" (OR: 164,
264).
10 Unmediated in that the Reichsprasident and the electorate are linked not through multiple
deliberative fora but by plebiscites (OR: 228). Weber did think parliament a pivotal "mediating"
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increased, all would be given the "opportunity" to participate and those who chose not would
be "self-excluded," a non-derogatory exclusion since resulting from personal choice (CR:
233; OR: 280).
Although Arendt did not think through the implications of "self-selected elites," as will
be argued (Ch 7.III.i), hers is an ambitious vision. It is impressive, however, not for its
ambition but for what it reveals about citizenship. Because they are weak and anarchic,
peripheral public spheres cannot provide the separation, mediation, and ordered continuity
needed for institutional spaces of appearances, a "house where freedom can dwell" (OR: 28).
Both a privilege and a precious achievement, citizenship demands formal stabilization in
bounded locations to ensure the polity's endurance through time, its identity." This identity
is secured through the constitutionalization of roles, prerogatives, immunities, and
disabilities. Granting politics a "tangible" or "objective" worldly space, these uphold the
boundaries of the public realm and prevent it from disappearing. When hemmed in by
counter-balancing prerogatives and disabilities, citizenship is structured so as resist the
whims and hubristic enthusiasms which often engulf mass public opinion and proved so
amenable to the ceaseless flux of totalitarianism. Self-control, in other words, depends not
just on character but also the institutional structure of the spaces we inhabit.
The soil of civil society is therefore too unstable for citizenship or a determinate
institutional praxis to take root. That institutional praxis best pertains when the relationship
between citizens is one of civic friendship, defined by a balance between commonality and
difference, solidarity and distance. Citizens are motivated to maintain the integrity of the
public realm when they regard themselves as co-originators of a shared project. This project
does not presume sameness, but rather people of diverse and irreducible backgrounds acting
in concert. Separating and relating, friendship preserves the particular and unique identity of
each actor while at the same time facilitating the commonality requisite for joint action. A
final problem with civil society, or at least with how it has been theorized, is that it fails to
maintain this delicate balance. Habermas prizes civil society because its "subjectless
networks" and "anonymous publics" permit the universal standpoint of the "generalized
other."12 To Arendt's mind this subjectless anonymity errs on the side of distance,
ground, but his increasing enthusiasm for the plebiscite lessened the possibilities for separating
charlatans from politically responsible leaders.
" Thus contradicting Sullivan (1973: 183-198), Jay (1978: 364) and Winters (1987: 200-201), who
think her politics an anarchistic celebration of sheer spontaneity. See Waldron (2000: 201-219).
12 "The 'self of the ... legal community disappears in the subjectless forms of communication that
regulate the flow of discursive opinion- and will-formation" (BFN: 301). For an Arendtian critique
of "subjectless communication," see May (1997: 92-96).
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surrendering the unique particularity of each actor to a levelling generality and mistaking
solidarity for anaemic proceduralism. The motivational impetus behind joint action then
becomes obscure, for actors are unlikely to combine if that combination fails to reflect who
they are, their unique substantive particularity. The contrary error, perpetuated by the New
Left and some communitarian successors, is to over-emphasize commonality. Civil society
is here prized not because it facilitates a levelling generality but, oppositely, the "natural
ties" of fraternity and intimacy. Modelled on the family and the commune, the danger here
is that equality-in-difference gives way to a suffocating sameness of outlook which closes
down the space between people and their different locations in the world. Warmth and
romantic sentimentality thereby over-ride the situated impartiality and sober solidarity
needed when diverse actors meet as citizens.
Embracing the phenomena of contingency and risk and yet spurning Weber's political
realism, Arendt reacquaints us with the peculiarities of political life in a way that still leaves
room for hope, natality. That hope comes to the fore in her vision of substantive citizenship,
whose importance is that it refuses to accept the inevitability of the "iron-cage," at least in
the political realm. A fragile achievement, citizenship is both a manifestation of freedom
and the result of world-preserving moderation and care. As will be argued in Chapter
Eleven, a robust politics holds to a substantive notion of citizenship and marries institutional
preservation with change in awareness of the possibilities and dangers of political existence.
This is Arendt's enduring contribution to the attempt to rearticulate the potential of politics.
But Arendt is also an obstacle. In the following we will criticise a number of
philosophical errors marring her understanding of action and political judgement. The goal
is to disrupt her dualism of necessity and freedom, which permits her to denigrate labour and
economics as less meaningful than politics, and to show the inadequacies of "performative
action." Questioning her model of political judgement, we also show that Arendt's
bifurcations render political ethics obscure, lead us back into speculative solutions to
political problems, and, ironically, reaffirm Weber's subjectivism.
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7.II.) Philosophical Perplexities
7.II.i.) Necessity, Freedom, and "Purposeful Performance"
Responding to totalitarian chaos Arendt bifurcates self and world, raises action above labour
as the most meaningful of human activities, and understands action, by contrast to work, as a
self-contained performance lying "altogether outside the category of means and ends" (HC:
207). These three manoeuvres are wrong and in ways detrimental to a proper
conceptualization of politics.
In its physical and psychical dimensions Arendt's self is a subjective darkness lacking
the tangible reality of the phenomenal world. World and intersubjective existence being
illuminated by a free publicity, the self is a realm of pure interiority swayed by ephemeral
emotions and subject to brute bodily appetite. This is Arendt's prime reason for relegating
labour to "necessity" and the household, and for sidelining "inner" motives and intentions in
her analysis of deeds.
But this relegation and sidelining depend on dubious assumptions. The first is that
freedom and necessity can be accorded distinct realms, the second that these realms are self-
contained. As to the first, by her own account of phenomenal appearance and natality
Arendt cannot spatially divide freedom and necessity. She differentiates labour and action in
terms of intensity of appearance, action being the most intensely public, but then nullifies
this division by arguing that men and animals all exhibit an urge to self-display.13
Appearance therefore does not of itself entitle us to confine labour to darkness, for like
action it too appears in the light of day. The same problematic overlap characterizes natality.
"Labour and work, as well as action," we are told, "are also rooted in natality insofar as they
have the task to provide and preserve for, to foresee and reckon with, the constant flux of
newcomers."14 This is a telling admission, since it contradicts Arendt's subsequent claims
that labour must necessarily be cyclical, repetitive, and animal. If natal, then labour, and by
extension the economic, also bears the imprint of human freedom, even while it deals with
bodily conditions that are given, not willed. But if labour admits freedom, then so too must
action admit necessity. Just as the labourer faces givens, so too does the actor face historical
irreversibilities, deeds having been done which no one can now change. Bodily need and
past deeds are clearly different, but both stand as obstacles in the way of desire. Yet it is not
13 All "living things make their appearance like actors on a stage set for them" (LM, I: 21).
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the case, as Arendt maintains, that need must elicit a pre-determined response, whereas past
deeds lie open to vengeful reaction or forgiveness.15 Need lies open to numerous responses
dependent not just on natural abundance but also on how that abundance is interpreted. The
fact, for instance, that distributive justice from ancient to modern times embraces concepts
such as personal desert attests to the interpenetration of nature and culture. Whether needs
ought to be satisfied is therefore not a matter of mute compulsion but dependent on norms
and ideals.
If labour is natal and material need always interpreted need, then Arendt's claim that
political action alone reveals human uniqueness, the "who" of doers and sufferers, must also
be contested. In labouring labourers reveal both themselves and their cultural or interpreted
condition, and this revelation yields part of their identity.16 But once freedom and necessity
blend, the self-containedness of Arendt's realms likewise gives way. Because ontologically
boundless, because snaking out along a web of relationships and a web of human activities,
natality imbues every sphere of life to disclose not radical disjunction between activities but
their co-determination. Arendt concedes as much. "Specialization of work and division of
labor" have in common "the general principle of organization," which owes its origin to "the
strictly political sphere of life, to the fact of man's capacity to act and to act together" (HC:
123). She therefore suggests that the gap between labour and action, perceived necessity and
perceived freedom, is sociological rather than ontological, a question not of Being but of
cultural, historical construction.
This, we will see, has weighty ramifications for Arendt's understanding of the "social."
Equally weighty problems impair her theatrical notion of action. Action, it is claimed,
exhibits a "practical purposelessness" standing beyond "mere productive activity" (HC: 111,
180). The "innermost meaning" of the deed inhering in the moment or performance itself,
action is unburdened by motives and intentions, which are private, and by purposes and
consequences, which in the manner of work impose a single path or design inimical to
plurality. Idolizing success and violently degrading all things into means for external
14
(HC: 9, my italics). She admits this repeatedly, even using a labour metaphor ("A child has been
born unto us" HC: 246) to convey natality's meaning, yet all the while failing to note the
implications for her conceptual landscape.
15
Deeper philosophical questions arise here. Necessity and labour are conceptually tied to "process,"
an automatic movement lacking "any inherent telos" (HC: 47). Yet action is also "process-like" in
the sense that it initiates "unprecedented processes" and that these once initiated become automatic
cycles of reaction and counter-reaction (HC: 230-231). But if process is germane to both activities,
then Arendt is not entitled to draw a strict contrast between them (D'Entreves, 1994: 53-58).
16 Thus the results of "human labour are therefore vehicles of meanings and values, and not mute
objects upon which meaning is subsequently conferred by some other activity" (Parekh, 1979: 86).
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"higher" ends, when work becomes the mode of politics it leads to the Utopian yet
totalitarian "hope that it may be possible to treat men as one treats other material" (HC: 188).
There is much to be said for Arendt's anti-instrumentalism. Against the monological
image of the sovereign maker, Arendt strives toward a truly intersubjective ideal of
interaction. This interaction is radically plural and therefore uncertain, it being impossible to
negate risk or control the future. But the excessive cost of this recovery is that action as a
concrete activity becomes arcane. Specifically, Arendt's account is philosophically flawed
in erecting a radical disjuncture between elements which only together render action
comprehensible. As to motives and intentions, it is not true that they are publicly
inaccessible or, as Arendt claims elsewhere, that because psychological data they are
somehow natural and therefore the same in everyone, unremarkable (HC: 206; LM, I: 34-36).
Intentions and motives are as accessible as personality and exhibit a rich variety
commensurate with human diversity. Moreover, Arendt's own "banality of evil" thesis, the
horrible truth that some actors were led to atrocity out of no wickedness but a failure to
think, attests to the importance of motives in our assessment of political events. Neither is it
true that purposes and consequences do not affect the "meaning" of a deed. Certainly action
may "never achieve its purpose" but that does not change the fact that action is always
purposive (HC: 184). Issuing from the interaction of many actors, a deed's purpose lends it
its sense, and only when this purpose is compared with both the enactment and eventual
consequences does the virtuosity, tragedy or absurdity of an act shine through. Meaning is,
then, a complex concept irreducible to a singular "moment," but like Arendt's "web of
relationships" composite and multi-dimensional.
Some commentators attempt a defence here. Knauer points to passages where action is
said to be "interested" in "some worldly objective reality in addition to being a disclosure of
the acting and speaking agent" (HC: 182). Thus, Arendt does not exclude purposes,
consequences, motives or intentions from her concept of action; she simply claims that the
meaning of action transcends these to embody a "principle" disclosive of the actor (Knauer,
1980: 725). But that she acknowledges motives, purposes and goals does not redeem her
position. Arendt's error is to accord these phenomena a secondary incidental status, for only
if incidental can they be transcended at all. If, by contrast, one emphasises the complex
internal constitution of action, then these phenomena cannot be transcended. Instead, it is
their constitutive interrelation that illuminates the essence or "principle" both of actors and
their worldly circumstances. Knauer's attempted reconciliation glosses over the core
problem, that Arendt's concept of action is defined through a fundamental opposition to
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purposiveness or work.17 Thus, even though she remembers purposes, these stand out as the
disjointed parts of an unintegrated, discordant whole. The only way this whole can be
integrated is to reject her theatrical account and to reconceptualize action as, in Dietz's
(1994: 882) words, purposeful performance.
A fuller exploration of purposeful performance, which disputes the easy opposition
between work and praxis, will come later (Ch lO.I.ii). For now it is important to ask why
Arendt came to her theatrical account and what it means for her broader theory. Arendt's
theatrical politics springs from a crude understanding of purposes based on the instrumental
utilitarianism articulated in Weber's Zweckrationalitat. That articulation pictures purposive
action as monological, inherently dominative, governed by technical models, and driven by a
will to victory at all costs. Excluded from the outset is a conception of purposive action
defined by human plurality, non-technical criteria, and open to future uncertainty.18
The repercussions for her broader theory are considerable. Culture and world must be
preserved from destruction by laws and boundaries, but the mode of this preservation is left
untheorized. The careful organization and reflexive forethought needed to surmount
unpredictable obstacles and crises are brushed aside in favour of celebrating the "glorious
moment" which, surpassing mere "achievement," is alone supposed to save human dignity
(HC: 180). Arendt thereby ensnares herself within traps of her own making. She speaks of
excellence or virtuosity in action as "finding the right words at the right moment" in
capricious circumstances (BPF\ 137). Yet by relegating purposes, consequences and what
goes on temporally in between them, she eliminates criteria for assessing the aptness of
specific words in particular situations.19 Virtuosity signals an unerring ability or excellence
in navigating a course through dangerous waters. It means success without surrender of
ideals and without deifying "Progress" or some determinate Platonic Idea. Mistaking this
unerring ability for an idolatry of "Progress" and a willingness to surrender dignity,
however, Arendt is unable to distinguish prudent sailing from errant recklessness, the
frivolous or foolish gesture blending with the wise and prudential act with no hope of
differentiation. Tragedy may in the end be all there is to redeem human dignity, yet tragedy
17 He (1980: 728) in fact perpetuates the problem when speaking of the concern for purposes as a
concern for "mere achievement," "mere instrumentality." See Dietz (1994: 885).
18
As Dietz argues (1994: 883), Arendt conceives all "means-end relations as necessarily and not just
contingently connected to acts of violence" and thus rules out "liberatory forms of instrumentality."
19 One solution proposed by D'Entreves (1994: 84) and Benhabib (1996a: 124) is to emphasize the
communicative aspects of Arendt's theory of action over the theatrical. That solution fails for the
reason that Habermasian communicative action also depends on a fundamental opposition between
purposiveness and speech.
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is not comedy but instead a lament for what really might have been achieved had not
stupidity or fate intervened.
Arendt, then, misunderstands the point of action. Beginning anew and preserving that
beginning for future generations is an intrinsically prospective affair whose inchoate
meaning must be present to actors. That she understands praxis as performative or theatrical
means she takes an exclusively retrospective or historical view. The "meaning" of the deed
reveals itself only to those, the audience or historian, who see the whole. The problem here
is that the storyteller can narrate past deeds only if he knows what it means to act. Arendt
narrates the sudden rise of totalitarian terror, a terror defined, as we saw, by a complete lack
of concern with the consequences of one's deeds (OT: 417-419). It is unfortunate that,
despite her watchful care, she should verge on a similar lack of concern.
7.II.ii.) Reflective Knowledge, Experience, and "Interested" Judgement
One danger of Arendt's theatrical account of action is that because it fails to reconceive
purposiveness it ends up legitimating Weberian Zweckrationalitdt by default. This is at least
true as regards the activities falling under social-as-economic (Ch 7.III.i). Our immediate
concern, however, is to see how the relegation of purposes impacts on her theory of
reflective judgement. The argument is that this relegation prevents humanitas gaining
concrete purchase on everyday politics, an error compounded by her separation of
heteronomous actors and autonomous spectators. Wrongly emphasizing "disinterested"
impartiality as the condition for thinking and judging, Arendt succumbs to an alienating
Archimedean Point which reinvites subjectivism and threatens to render impossible the good
citizen's "thinking-in-acting."
Arendt, we claimed, turns to the faculty of judgement to avoid Weber's decisionism and
to suggest how men come to an understanding of political contingencies without their
subsumption under received ideas or categories, the danger of modern ideology. Judgement
is not monological but takes its orientation from a plurality of intersecting perspectives.
Declaring the self the ultimate arbiter in matters of ethical commitment, as opposed to
questions of efficiency and coherence, Weber places an impermeable divide between persons
thwarting the possibility of ethical exchange. Ethics degrades either into the dominative
assertion of a "true" path revealed to the isolated self or, in line with charismatic leadership,
into a matter of overawing audiences with the potency of one's words. The publicity Arendt
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defends as the criterion of good judgement is not a manipulated publicity, but instead relies
upon persuasion, the attempt to woo others by appeal to a shared "community sense."
But Arendtian judgement represents only a partial advance upon Weber. In particular,
her insistence upon an opposition between cognition and non-cognitive reflection indicates
her adherence to a problematic conceptual framework. Thoroughly Kantian, it is
problematic precisely because it is the framework largely adhered to by Weber. We saw that
Arendt believes cognition or knowing concerns matters of fact and is therefore detached
from the realm of meaning, which is the concern not of the cognitive intellect but of
judgement. To this opposition between determinate truth and indeterminate opinion, she
adds the binaries of nature versus culture, necessity versus freedom. In her exploration of
judgement the free and the cultural concern and give rise to feelings of purposiveless
pleasure and displeasure, never knowledge. The problem here, again, is that purposes, ends
and goals are understood as falling under the shadow of a determinately conceived, hence
unfree, monological knowledge, which always pursues "a definite aim ... like fabrication
itself' (HC: 170-171 ).20 Arendtian judgement reproduces the disjuncture of purposes and
meaning marring her account of action.
This epistemic disjuncture has serious practical effects. Because it is cognitive, and
because cognition is conceived along the "certain" lines of fabrication, knowledge becomes
the unpolitical possession of subjects inhabiting scientific, administrative, philosophic or
other "expert" realms. These experts acquire their knowledge not through "uncertain"
processes of reflective questioning and dialogue, but through contemplation or experimental
manipulation of mute sense experience. Since the truth of their endeavours compels assent
via logical deduction or brute sensual intuition, the realms of expertise are thoroughly
inimical to free citizenship. Yet this understanding is philosophically suspect insofar as it
holds to modern epistemology's "singular cognitive subject," where knowing and knower
are deemed prior to speech and where logical compulsion excludes imaginative thought
(Wellmer, 1997: 41-42). Following Descartes and his empiricist opponents, Arendt elides
the "symbolic structure" or linguisticality of knowledge attested to by the debate regarding
paradigm shifts in science.21 That Arendt should conceal the role language and reflection
play in scientific theories is remarkable given the central position accorded the history of
20 Arendt (LM, I; 56-57; LKPP: 72) posits a constitutive link between cognition, science, and
fabricating technology, science utilizing the laboratory "where that which does not appear of its own
accord is forced to appear" and having nothing to do with "judgement, properly speaking."
21 Arendt at times concedes this linguisticality, declaring that truth "as soon as it is uttered, is
immediately transformed into one opinion among many, is contested" (MDT: 27). What she failed
to note here was that truth, because recognisable only in language, always takes a contestable form.
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science in her narrative of modernity, the turn from contemplative to imitative and then to
interferential modes of cognition. That these turns were possible at all suggests the cognitive
"subject" is not monological or determinate but plural and underdetermined, a meeting place
of free creative energies both for good and for ill.
Once the reflectiveness of knowledge is recognized the inadequacies of Arendtian
reflective judgement become plain. Not only does this theory of reflective judgement
misconceive scientific truth, but in bifurcating knowledge and opinion it occludes criteria
needed to discriminate between absurd and wise actions, the distinction between better and
worse opinions then becoming impossible to draw. Arendt cites communicability or
publicity as the basic criterion of good judgement, believing that men are never "overeager
to express joy at the death of a father or feelings of hatred or envy" (LKPP: 69). But while
necessary, communicability is hardly sufficient to fulfil this critical role, since people
frequently give voice to nonsense and hatred. Fulfilment of this role means embracing
substantive questions as to the content of action, the purposes involved, its historical context.
And that embrace necessitates including cognitive matters, such as whether a judgement
relies on an accurate assessment of facts, whether judges have requisite experience, whether,
in short, they really know what they are talking about (Beiner, 1982: 137-138).
Without this substantive dimension Arendt's humanitas remains a formal construct with
tenuous purchase on concrete affairs. The substantive and the procedural are not divided, as
in Habermas' division of ethics and morality, but she ends up with a peculiarly "contentless"
substantive ethic where an ideal of human life (bios politikos), an identity, is extolled as best
but with little concrete being able to be said about it. This problem can be traced to the
conceptual apparatus inherited from Kant. Severing morality and cognition from feeling,
Kant distanced judgement from truth, separated form from content, and, lodging the
experience of art solely in the subject's feeling of pleasure and displeasure, brought about
taste's radical subjectivization (Feldman, 1991: 9-10). This disjunction facilitated the rise of
romanticism in art and subjectivism and emotivism in ethics, against which Arendt herself
rails.22 The irony is, then, that while she attempts to arrive at a worldly political ethic, the
framework she chooses impels her toward a subjectivist refusal of anything but the most
formal, and hence abstract, of bonds between subjects. Running counter to her idea of world
as the space of cultural "tangibility" and the "web of relationships" (Ch 6.1), this choice also
blinds her to those truths arising in the process of acting itself, an indeterminate knowledge
22 See Gadamer (1989: 41, 55). She railed against subjectivism, but her identification of conscience
with the self s preoccupation with itself does suggest a strong residual subjectivist element (Ch
7-1.i).
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assimilable neither to episteme nor poiesis but arising directly out of practical experience.
This concrete experience, the "common sense" arising out of it, is neither abstract nor rooted
in subjective feeling alone but "acquired through [actually] living in ... community"
(Gadamer, 1989: 22). Arendt wishes "to say how one came to an opinion and for what
reasons one formed it," but her concentration on the non-cognitive feelings of "pleasure and
displeasure" decontextualized by Kant leads to a "mythology of judgement" wherein situated
reasons and arguments no longer seem possible.23
We will return to the question of practical truth (phronesis) and situated argument when
defending Maclntyre's neo-Aristotelian account of practices (Ch 9.III, lO.I.ii). However, the
most serious flaw in Arendt's theory of judgement, and therefore in her theory of political
ethics, lies in her separation of heteronomous actors and autonomous spectators. Where
actors are heteronomous, dependent on what other actors and onlookers think of them,
spectators transcend the realm of doxa, opinion or fame, and in attaining an unconditioned
autonomy establish the meaning of the whole to confer sense on human affairs.
The problem here is the presumption of unconditioned autonomy. Like Kant and yet in
sharp contrast to her otherwise staunch refusal to substitute philosophy for politics, Arendt
offers a transcendental account of judgement and its standard, sensus communis. This
account presumes an unconditioned, a priori mental ability to achieve the distanced or
enlarged perspective of "world spectator" (LKPP: 74-76).24 This distanced perspective
operates as a regulative ideal, an ahistorical, unverifiable as if, which is nonetheless assumed
so as to permit the rendering of non-idiosyncratic judgements. But the assumption of
autonomous distance conflicts with other aspects of Arendt's thought. Her narrative of
modernity hinges on the experience of earth and world alienation precipitated by humanity's
twofold "flight" into the Archimedean Point of the universe (Galileo) and of the self
(Descartes). Because the universal Archimedean Point is enabled by the radically de-
worlded language of algebraic mathematics and this language is dependent on "patterns
which are identical with human, mental structures," this twofold flight is in the end really a
single retreat into the self, which, as "subjectification," helped to initiate the multiplicitious
transformations of intersubjective freedom into inner willing, property into fluid wealth,
cultural artefacts into consumables, and ideals into exchange values (HC: 265-266).
23 Arendt (LKPP: 41; LM, II: 217). See Beiner (1983: 133-134) and Wellmer (1997: 38).
24 The sensus communis '"takes account (a priori) of the mode of representation of all other men in
thought, in order, as it were, to compare its judgement with the collective reason of humanity,'"
(LKPP: 71, quoting Kant).
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Paradoxically, however, her transcendental sensus communis can be accused of a
similar subjectification, the spectator's distance from the game replicating the physicist's
distance from the earth. By her own account, it is only by retreating to a point at which he
"might stand still and look back with the backward glance of the historian," and by
comparing his "judgement with the possible rather than actual judgements of others," that
the judge escapes the partiality of the actor.25 The danger here is that by believing he can so
distance himself from the game, "the web of relationships," the spectator might not in fact
enlarge his mentality and come to a better awareness of his own and other identities, but
instead continually encounter his private idiosyncrasies, himself repeatedly. Outside, the
spectator is supposedly "not involved" in the things judged, but this non-involvement means
he is insulated from events and without the rootedness and reality needed to discipline his
opinion and subjectivity, the self itself. Arendt (LKPP: 63) claims that while the spectator
"is not involved in the act ... he is always involved with fellow spectators," and hence that
judgement, though autonomous, is nonetheless intersubjective. This does not solve the
problem, however. Equally distanced, such spectators may all be similarly caught within
subjective preferences, their "enlarged mentalities" simply a reflection of shared preferences
and prejudices. Moreover, although the game is scrutinized, the spectators performing this
scrutinizing, their parts or positions in the web of relationships, are not.26 To demand
withdrawal from the game is, then, analogous to demanding withdrawal from the world and
its interconnected stories, an indirect embrace of the world alienation.27
Categorically separating actor and spectator, presuming an unconditioned autonomy,
and supposing an a priori community sense, Arendt catches herself on the horns of a
dilemma. The dilemma is that her theory of action rules out unconditioned autonomy and
illusory sovereignty in stressing the heteronomous intersubjectivity of freedom, but her
theory of judgement, supposedly the most political of men's faculties, presupposes this very
autonomy in presuming a transcendence of the web of relationships by spectators who play
25
(LKPP: 77, 43, my italics). This possible/actual judgement distinction underlies the a priorism of
Kantian Urteilskraft, since if compared judgements were actual the sensus communis would be
empirical, not universal. Here Arendt masks the distinction, but earlier (BPF: 221) she argued that
because judgement takes actual opinions into account it can never be universally valid. Crucially,
however, that argument occurs in a passage where actors are said to judge.
26 Arendtian "disinterestedness," in other words, obscures how events transform "the selves who
come to judge them by exposing internal conflicts and involving those who judge in an event of
being that challenges their settled self-understandings" (Feldman, 1991: 8).
27 She (LKPP: 42) rules out some "higher standpoint ... [settling] the dispute by being altogether
above the melee," yet this contradicts her insistence on seeing wholes, standing still, withdrawal.
There is, then, a basic inconsistency in her theory, that the autonomy linked with sovereignty and
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no part. Thus, she either sides with autonomy and declares the "as if' transcendental
community sense to be real, thus leaving herself open to the charge of concealing subjective
prejudices behind a speculative Archimedean Point, or she admits that for judgement to be
sound it must take stock of the actual opinions of others. But "taking stock" means two
things. First, that the web of relationships can never be transcended, even temporarily, since
it is only by engaging with this web in thought that an informed view of others and ourselves
can be attained. Thought in fact presumes such engagement, since its condition is language,
the living word. Second, it means speaking to others, and speaking, according to Arendt's
phenomenology, is acting, which is never autonomous, because rooted in the game, but is
nonetheless free. Arendt, accordingly, escapes an Archimedean conceit she elsewhere
properly rejects only by repudiating the superiority of spectators over actors.
It is only by the latter course that Arendt can speak of a worldly, rather than speculative,
community sense. But the cost of taking it is that impartiality can no longer be understood
as "disinterested" and that the difference between actors and spectators, citizens and
historians, becomes one of degree, not kind. Political actors and onlookers differ inasmuch
as they face discrete problems and tasks, but both play parts and are "interested," caught up
in the flux of circumstance and struggling to make sense of events. Judgement and
understanding are, like action, ever ongoing, there being no space within which one can
stand still. In suggesting there might be, Arendt falls guilty of what she accuses Habermas,
of substituting theory for worldly engagement, and consequently threatens to destroy her
cherished balance between excessive distance and suffocating commonality (Ch 7.1.i.,
7.1.ii.). She does so because even she is tempted by the possibility of philosophic absolutes,
of stepping out of politics. This time the chimera is not "perfect communication" but rather
an "arbiter" or "privileged position" which, in judging the glorious self-contained "moment,"
saves existence from absurdity.28 To refuse this "arbiter," to admit instead a heteronomous
impartiality rooted in the world and premised on the awareness that the surge of political
events washes over everyone, would in fact reconfirm what is enduringly significant in
Arendt's thought, her recognition of worldly existence as contingent, never sovereign, and
therefore never unconditionally autonomous, but for all that precious. It would also
reconfirm judgement as a truly prospective political capacity. When declaring the actor
denied actors is presumed as regards spectators. Compare, as well, (LKPP: 27), where the
spectator's autonomy is denied, with (LKPP: 55), where it is affirmed.
28 (LM, I: 94, 207-209; Beiner, 1982: 148). Arendt denies this "arbiter" can ever judge with finality,
but in thinking him "autonomous" and in arguing for an absolute superiority over the actor, she
neglects the truth that the "historian does not simply stand over against his object, historical life, but
is himself part of the same movement of historical life" (Gadamer, 1989: 506).
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could only play his benighted part, Arendt in fact implied that "thinking-in-acting" is
impossible, the demands of the vita activa being too great a distraction. Unbeknownst to
herself, however, she thereby ruled out the question she addressed Eichmann, "did you not
think while committing your crimes?" To reject the superiority of the spectator is, thus, to
preserve personal responsibility, the "good citizen," as a meaningful category.
In the following section we return to Arendt's ideal of citizenship and understanding of risk.
Arendtian citizenship goes beyond Habermasian "radical reformism," but it depends on a
dualism strikingly similar to his lifeworld-system binary. Through bifurcating or
"ontologically spatializing" reality into the social and political Arendt hopes to challenge the
"iron cage," yet she covertly fortifies it by ascribing vast areas of socio-political existence to
the technocrat and his inherently violent tools. In questioning her equation of social
problems with necessity and violence, however, we are also driven to question her insistence
that only relations of "being-with" or friendship are genuinely political. In thinking coercion
anti-political Arendt commits the inverse of Weber's error, his equation of political
leadership with domination, and thus occludes those moments when a robust politics must
take the form of overt and principled hostility.
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7.III.) Truncating Politics and Attenuating Risk
7.IILL) Political Experts and Social Citizens
Arendt's "Dual State" ideal holds to a radical disjunction of social experts and political
citizens, administration and republican participation, economic liberty and political freedom.
Because the social-as-economic concerns necessity and matters about which no "enlightened
self-interest" can be secured, only experts having requisite knowledge and neutral techniques
should determine its functioning. To avoid the hubristic, ceaseless flux of totalitarianism, it
is imperative to draw boundaries and secure a balance between the different realms of human
existence.
But is Arendt justified in separating the social-as-economic and the political?
Regarding her equation of the social-as-economic with necessity, we saw she cannot
coherently argue for this separation when by her own admission natality imbues all realms of
existence. She must, instead, argue that politics should direct itself to genuinely political as
opposed to private "interests," that when economic issues are at stake citizens lack the ability
to make mature judgements, and that the social concerns pre-political questions or conditions
which are important, certainly, but not the proper subject of political deliberation. As with
her extrapolations from necessity, however, these arguments founder.
Regarding discrete "interests," Arendt contends that because the public realm "existed
before us and is meant to outlast our lives in it," the "primary concern" cannot be "individual
lives and the interests connected to them" (BPF: 156). There are "interests," she suggests,
which properly concern politics, as opposed to "interests" in the self or one's own group.
Her example is of jurors occupied not with personal gain but with the integrity of a world
"common to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned place in it" (HC\ 52; 1979:
317). What jurors "share is an interest in the case — something outside themselves," an
equitable rendering of justice differing fundamentally from bodily needs and personal desires
(1977d: 105). Indeed, when actors attend to such interests it is often at the cost of sacrificing
personal advantage, the only compensation for which is a feeling of "public happiness."
It is assuredly true that certain concerns are intrinsically public and because
fundamentally interpersonal, unlike choice of entertainment, cannot be reduced to personal
likes or advantage. To the example of juries one might add systems of government,
infrastructures, and cultural goods such as history, language, art. But Arendt errs in thinking
this warrants relegating the social-as-economic to privacy. Simply put, individual welfare —
as opposed to entertainment — and worldly interest cannot be separated. To believe they
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can is almost to believe there can be a world without individuals and individuals without a
world. As her own claim about economic pre-conditions attests, justice cannot be rendered
except by jurors with the material resources enabling them to look to public concerns and
engage in deliberation. This question of resources relates not merely to brute physical need
but also, we saw (Ch 7.II.i), to how need is interpreted. And such interpretations are, contra
Arendt, fundamentally political matters disclosive of the spirit governing a public realm. A
jury system wherein participants received no financial support, for instance, would be one
structurally predisposed towards oligarchic or other dominant interests. The spirit or
principle of justice endorsed would then not be of an isonomic republic but of a privileged
class.
Arendt's fundamental worry regarding the economic is that because livelihoods are at
stake people fail to muster the courage required to take long-term views, the short cycle of
their individual lives predisposing them to selfishness and immediate benefits (CR: 175).
This is a genuine worry, but not confined to material matters, to animal laborans. It is just
as plausible that actors suffer a similar short-sightedness regarding "ideal" interests such as
status, esteem and power, that selfishness is a general, rather than specific, problem.29 If so,
then public-spiritedness and responsibility become questions of attitude or mentality, not
content (Pitkin, 1994: 277; Benhabib, 1996a: 141). Arendt herself suggests as much.
Citizens are distinguished by courage, the ability to think representatively, and a love of
equality and freedom, yet these are virtues of character peculiar to no one activity. The real
import of political responsibility is, then, that citizens take into account other viewpoints and
perspectives regardless of theme. The danger Arendt courts in alleging that some matters
necessarily incapacitate or corrupt the ability to think representatively is that this ability
might be considered unrealizable, naive, in all spheres of life. If material conditions lie
beyond reflection, then there is little hope for citizenship itself.
If Arendt errs in thinking economics beyond the capacity of mature judgement, is she
nonetheless right to consider it a pre-condition, basic to politics but not its concern? The
implausibility of this view is plain even under the doctrine of raison d'etat, that the state has
unique, irreducible concerns. At the very minimum the state must itself secure the
conditions of its continued survival, its means of subsistence and commerce.30 Far from
being a pre-condition to be settled before politics can begin, these tasks have from ancient to
modern times persistently yielded a core element of political deliberation. Arendt's own
29 Arendt's (HC: 197; 1990: 83) observation that reckless ambition doomed Athens is a case in point.
30 As Aristotle (Rhetoric, 1359b, my italics) declares, the chief political subjects are "ways and
means; and war and peace; next, national defence; and imports and exports', finally, legislation."
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recommendations regarding expropriation are pertinent examples. The retrieval of property
from senseless cycles of wealth accumulation is quintessentially a decision motivated by
political crisis, the rise of mass society. And it is because this crisis arose out of
unemployment, inflation and the disintegration of class systems that the economic can in no
explicable sense be thought a pre-condition (OT: 315, 437). Indeed, Arendt has to accept the
irreducibly political nature of economics if her council republics are not to become
ideological covers for further expropriation. If "self-selected elites," those who are
supposedly the best politically, should hold the reins of power, then, as with juries, to
prevent that hold from subsequently denying others the "opportunity" to participate, political
isonomy has to be matched by wide-ranging economic isonomy.31 This latter isonomy would
not simply demand a recovery of "property," but also a reorganization of production and
capital markets. That Arendt did not think through these wider ramifications of her
republicanism suggests a regrettable naivety on her part.
The problem is not simply one of naivety, however. The overall effect of Arendt's
sidelining of the social-as-economic is the truncation and de-radicalization of citizenship as
an ideal. The promise of politics is the human capacity for beginning anew, but because so
much is excluded from the authentically "political" the scope for the exercise of that capacity
becomes extremely limited. Once the social is banished all that remain are founding,
preserving the contours of republics, and public display. "Substantive citizenship" surpasses
Habermas' "radical reformism" by refusing to separate decision-making from opinion-
formation and by insisting upon structured institutional sites for action. Yet Arendt
surrenders that gain in suggesting this institutional praxis is secured only by radically
circumscribing the content of political debate.32 The problem of content therefore afflicts not
just her theory of judgement but her thought as a whole, with the consequence that serious
and perennial features of political endeavour fall from view.
A truncated citizenship is but one negative effect. Her account of the social also has the
paradoxical outcome of legitimating the diametric opposite of her bios politikos, bureaucratic
technocracy. As with Habermas' dichotomization of system and lifeworld (Ch 4,III.i), by
confining the machine within a specific realm Arendt hopes to escape Weber's monistic
31 See especially Sternberger (1977: 142-145) and Bernstein (1986c: 249). It is therefore not
insignificant that "government by the people" in Athens "was in some degree at least the result of
the introduction of payment for public service" (Walker, 1927: 106).
32 Arendt (1979: 316) eventually admitted that the topics of public debate change constantly, that
"what these matters are at any historical moment is probably utterly different." But this means that
her (OR: 89) claim that economic concerns lead necessarily to the destruction of solidarity is
untenable. See Bernstein (1986c: 255-257) and Wolin (1994: 300).
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antinomy of machine and leader. Yet instead of disrupting the "iron cage," huge swathes of
human existence are shunted under the shadow of a social-scientific rationality authorized on
the basis of an allegedly "neutral" technical instrumentalism. The self-conception of social
scientists and bureaucrats, that theirs is the serious task of determining the material existence
of humankind, is then perpetuated with the effect that it becomes isolated from sustained
criticism. The paradox is that Arendt should think technology "neutral" when the thrust of
her critique of modernity is against the Promethean faith in humanity's technical prowess
and its political counterpart, the rule of "Nobody." In truth, however, her deep fear of
technology's political implications, of the "negative solidarity" atomic weapons have
enforced on the earth, coexists with an equally deep, yet naive, faith in technology as regards
"the Social Question."33
This odd trust in technical neutrality presupposes her separation of "certain" knowledge
and "uncertain" reflective understanding, which, we argued, is philosophically unsound.
Arendt herself comes someway to conceding this. Whether new housing should preserve the
fabric of old neighbourhoods is a matter of political opinion, whereas the factual "adequacy"
of housing, "how many square feet human beings need," should only be decided by experts
(1979: 318-319). This concession is important insofar as it undermines the division between
expert and political realms, every question irrespective of its location now having a "double
face." But even here her rigid binaries endure. Holding to the myth of neutrality, she fails to
realize that the very process of calculating essential "square feet" is itself uncertain and relies
on non-expert assumptions. The indeterminate and inherently evaluative term "adequacy"
depends, for instance, on whether the chosen goal is survival or flourishing, which are
themselves indeterminate. Technology and expertise are intrinsically interested, the decision
about what gets built, for whom and where, relying on interpretations of political priorities
and crises driven by frequently unthematized assumptions and expectations. The
interrelation of politics and expertism is therefore not one of "aspects," but of a much more
fundamental dynamic between assumptions impelling know-how and know-how impelling
future expectations. But to acknowledge this is to acknowledge experts as political and
citizens as social and to reject Arendt's boundary drawing.
The elementary repercussion of ontological spatializing, however, is that she and
Habermas persist in thinking administrative and economic organization "machine-like."
When Habermas thinks of system as governed by a "norm-free sociality" and Arendt speaks
33 "Mankind owes its existence not to the dreams of the humanists, not the reasoning of the
philosophers and not even, at least primarily, to political events, but almost exclusively to ...
technical development" (MDT: 82).
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of administration as a neutral tool, they reinforce Weber's understanding of bureaucracy as a
vast, supremely efficient instrument. Arendt condemned the "rule of Nobody" for its
anonymity, for insulating men from reality and deadening their ability to think. It is the
"nature of every bureaucracy to make functionaries and mere cogs in the administrative
machinery out of men, and thus to dehumanize them" (EJ: 289). But while this illuminates
palpable dangers, its unintended effect is to render them inevitable in like manner to the
virtual inevitability of Habermas' "systems functionality." Arendt is correct if she means the
perception of anonymity leads to a loss of responsibility. But instead of correcting
perception and stressing the active role played by "functionaries," thereby re-empowering
bureaucrats and citizens alike, her firm identification of bureaucracy with the technical only
intensifies feelings of powerlessness and superfluity. To avoid this she would have to accept
administration and the "social" as human endeavours responsive to intervention and
change.34
The most serious failing of Arendt's conceptualization of the social, however, is its
legitimation of violent instrumentalism. We suggested Arendt's relegation of purposes and
prospectivity in action could end in an unwitting legitimation of Weber's Zweckrationalitat
by default. Yet in the social realm this legitimation is not so much unwitting as actively
embraced. Only "by means of violence, by forcing others to bear the burden of life," Arendt
tells us, did ancient citizens become free, and only through manipulative technologies, which
replaced human "tools" with machines, was this "old and terrible truth" overcome (OR: 114;
1987a: 32). Where politics is free, divorced from coercion, the social and its administrators
are inextricably intertwined with domination. Two unacceptable conclusions follow. First,
the master-slave relation suffers depoliticization, the problem of slavery and economic
oppression being transformed from an ethical into a technical one of finding a technology
that will substitute for human tools.35 Gone, consequently, is any sense that such oppression
stems from human relations per se, and although work retains a strong association with
creativity, unlike in Habermas, the reduction of a quantitatively conceived labour to toil has
34 Indeed, her (CR: 3-47) criticisms of the Pentagon's "problem-solvers" presumes that action and
thought are possible in large-scale organizations. If these technocrats really had been cogs, her
criticisms would have been forlorn, just as her condemnation of Eichmann would have been cruel.
For a similar argument, see Lozowick (2001: 214-223).
35 See especially Brunkhorst (2000: 183). Admittedly, Arendt did not hold firm to this technical
understanding, at times affirming the Hegelian point that "the rule of master over slaves ... did not
rest on superior means of coercion as such, but on superior organization of power" (CR: 149).
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the effect of impoverishing human identity.36 Together with her relegation of purposiveness
and her subjectivizing account of judgement, this foreclosure renders Arendt's theorization
of the human condition suspect. Second, and most significantly, Weber's realist definition
of the state as the monopoly on the means of legitimate violence is transferred from its
political context and rooted in the economic as a totalizing, incontrovertible truth. Because
she imagines mankind's interrelation with nature as inherently dominative, it being the
essence of technology to batter and destroy, and because she excludes a conception of
purposive action defined by human plurality, this transference is an unavoidable
consequence of her thought. Apart from dehumanizing economics, the danger is that once
Arendt's erroneous division between freedom and necessity has been dismantled, as we have
done here, it is just a simple step to assuming that the same realist logic applies
foundationally to all interpersonal activities.
Weber's presuppositions are therefore not so much contested as relocated to an
allegedly unrelated realm in the vain hope that they will obediently remain there. That
Arendt should legitimate a blanket violent instrumentalism in a sphere capable of freedom is
deeply paradoxical when her work had set itself the task of contesting the Platonic roots of
Western political thought. "Substantive citizenship" challenges the necessity of the "iron
cage," only later to covertly fortify it, to abandon that challenge. On this inadvertent
abandonment two observations can be made. The first is that the great perils attributed by
Arendt to modern mass society cannot be countered by seeking some ontological equilibrium
or balance, human activities being simply too interwoven for that. The second is that crude
dualist containment strategies lessen our understanding of politics, its significance,
challenges and dangers. But this is to accept that necessity and violence belong no more
uniquely to the social than do non-coercive freedom and power to the political, and therefore
that the risk of politics is far more acute than allowed by Arendt.
7.III.ii.) Ineluctable Conflict, Political Enmity, and Risk
Earlier we praised Arendt's understanding of risk for posing an alternative to political
realism (Ch 7.1.i). In contrast to Habermas, she stresses politics' dependence upon
contingent narratives held together by contingent promises between equal, yet distinct,
actors. Stressing plural, worldly care, Arendt provides a corrective counter-weight to
36 See Bakan (1979: 54). Although breaking with her categories, Arendt on occasion accepted that
labour and economic organization could admit freedom, as when she (1948: 398-406; CR: 216)
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Weber's coercive sovereignty. The cost, however, of Arendt's specific circumvention of
political realism is a thoroughgoing social realism. But once her division of the political and
social, freedom and necessity, is questioned, the allocation of violence to the social alone
must also be rejected. Arendt imagines the authentically "political" as a relation of non¬
coercive friendship or "being-with" and considers any deviation "anti-political" (Ch 6.III).37
Recalling Habermas' failed containment of the strategic (Ch 4.III.ii), this portrayal is wrong
for the reason that her account of the social is wrong, that is, it separates what cannot and
should not be separated. Our argument relies on two immanent critiques, the first showing
politics and coercion, power and violence, to be interwoven, the second showing this
interwovenness to be an inherent, rather than incidental, feature of political life. Only by
acknowledging this inherent interwovenness can the full risk of politics be understood.
As to the first critique, we saw that Arendt's assault upon the Western political tradition
presumed a radical disjunction between power and violence. Vocal and plural, power is the
essence of all government and, because "inherent in the very existence of political
communities," an "end-in-itself' (CR: 151). Violence, by contrast, is mute and monological,
an instrumental means relying on implements and strength without intrinsic relation to
politics' condition, plurality. The significance of this perspective, we argued, is that it rules
out coercive sovereignty as the basis of politics, if not of the social. Yet closer scrutiny of
her thought reveals real problems. The equation of the social with mute necessity and of
necessity with violence entails that violence occurs "outside the political realm, strictly
speaking" (OR: 19). Yet elsewhere Arendt (CR: 145-146) rejects this spatializing,
essentialist view, claiming instead that the distinction between violence and power is
analytic, "nothing ... [being] more common than" their "combination." Similarly, she admits
that "neither violence nor power is a natural phenomenon," for both "belong to the political
realm of human affairs whose essentially human quality is guaranteed by men's faculty of
action" (CR: 179, 133). As with her example of "adequate housing," this admission
collapses the division between violent and free realms, every political matter now
conceivably admitting both speech and coercion.
Arendt further undercuts her oppositions when speaking of "justified" violence. Where
power is "legitimate," directing its appeal to some past moment of joint action, violence is
"justified," instrumentally appealing to the future ends it aims to achieve (CR: 150-151).
praised co-operativism in Denmark, Yugoslavia, the GDR, and Israel.
37 We are not saying that Arendt had no understanding of violence. We are simply saying, in
opposition to Isaac (1992: 133-136), that her architectonic theoretically depoliticizes violence and
thereby buries normatively momentous features of political existence.
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She subsequently asserts that the deployment of violence for short-term goals is often
reasonable, as when used in self-defence, to dramatize ignored grievances, or to gain "a
hearing for moderation" (CR: 176). Two problematic implications follow for her
identification of politics with non-coercive "being-with." First, her totalizing critique of
Weber's "lesser evil" doctrine collapses. Her complaint was that far from protecting us
against "greater" evil this doctrine actually leads us to it, the means of violence becoming the
end of politics. Certainly, Arendt's argument has relevance. A real tendency exists to
glorify or romaticize the resort to violence. Reducing politics' "meaning" to battlefield
death, Weber (RRW: 335) succumbed to such romanticism and thereby occluded the political
realities of careful preservation and mutual endeavour. And once romanticized, it is but a
short step to remove all limits and to equate politics with destruction and killing, as
happened with totalitarianism. Yet Arendt (EU\ 284) cannot respond to totalitarian excess
by simply endorsing the principle of solidarity, "the concern of one is the concern of all," for
in accepting "justified" violence she concedes that solidarity is sometimes perilously
inappropriate. She fears the threatened loss of limits, yet all politics, including her own,
must at times take the risk of using violent means, and therefore all politics, not just Weber's
Platonism, is constrained to accept the inescapability of "lesser evil." Assuredly, the
exercise of violence demands great caution and should struggle to limit itself to determinate
goals, but the "political" can no longer be defined exclusively in terms of friendship.
Destructive, certainly, but violence now appears an authentic part of politics.
The second, more profound consequence of thinking violence "justifiable" is the
disruption of Arendt's elementary opposition between vocal power and mute physical force.
When violence can be justified as a means towards political dramatization or reform, then
whether a specific violent deed is deemed justified or not depends upon debate among actors.
The unavoidability of debate in the moment of ascertaining justifiability suggests, in turn,
that violence is not at all mute, but relies temporally upon the political processes of speaking
and "being-with" others, no matter how small the group. But if so, the divide between it and
speech is far less sharp than Arendt believes.38 Furthermore, in presupposing a plurality of
actors, whether they be conspirators, revolutionaries or ordinary citizens, political violence
cannot be equated with monological coercive sovereignty. In its execution the violent deed
depends upon magnified strength, but the processes preceding, enabling, and initiating its
execution presume plural speech, the very bedrock of Arendtian politics.
38 Even "the totalitarian ruler, whose chief instrument of rule is torture," she admits, needs a vocal
inner coterie and "a power basis — the secret police and its net of informers" (CR: 149, my italics).
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That violence and coercion are not identifiable with the use of implements per se finds
further confirmation in her intermittent ruminations on the intrinsic negativities of power.
The predominant tone of her analysis is celebratory. Power is that wondrous dynamis
generated when men combine to establish a public realm wherein the glory of their deeds
find preservation. But Arendt also notes its destructive qualities. Only power, not violence,
can destroy individuality; only power, not the use of implements, can extinguish the strength,
independence and spontaneity of persons.39 Although never assuming the impossible form
of coercive sovereignty, the "being-with" identifiable with power often takes the form of a
peculiarly destructive mode of "acting together," mob rule (HC\ 203). Moreover, it was their
"acting together," not the possession of killing technology, which enabled a handful of SS
guards, friends among themselves, to control and systematically dehumanize countless camp
inmates. Power, in other words, has a constitutive connection to "being-with" but that
connection can be even more balefully coercive than "pure" violence, which, we saw, also
has a constitutive temporal connection to "being-with." What this suggests is that Arendt's
account of violence as an essentially mute deployment of instruments represents a crude
phenomenology blind to the various forms coercion takes, the least effective being perhaps
the use of arms.
We have so far shown that by Arendt's own account power and violence, speech and
coercion, are often intimately interwoven. Without recognizing this interwovenness, the
boundlessness and irreversibility she ascribes to action cannot fully explicate politics' risk.
As "justifiability" suggests, the risk of politics is that sometimes steps have to be taken
which endanger peace and stability, disrupt solidarity, and make enemies of fellow actors.
Arendt downplays that risk by identifying politics with non-coercive friendship. Yet she
might still insist on seeing this interwovenness as an incidental matter of "perverted" forms
of acting-together or, if occurring in uncorrupted polities, a question of instrumentally
deploying violent means when tragic occasions arise, but not a basic feature of the political
qua political. Even if sometimes necessary, the use of violent means remains "anti-political"
insofar as it undercuts solidarity, the basis of all politics. There is point to this retort.
Violence does threaten chaos and if solidarity is defined as the foundation of political
existence, then violence is "anti-political." Yet, while foundational, solidarity is never
politics' sole foundation, despite Arendt's definitions. Indeed, the inherent interwovenness
39 "The strength of even the strongest individual can always be overpowered by the many, who often
will combine for no other purpose than to ruin strength precisely because of its peculiar
independence" (CR: 143; OT: 455).
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of violence and power, enmity and solidarity, is in fact implied by her answer to Weberian
charismatic authority, the act of constituting a republic.
Arendt seeks to combine revolution and preservation in a constitutional law that is
relational, not commanding. Such law, she believes, originates in the act of mutual
promising and is upheld by the practice of augmentation, which overcome respectively the
paradox of "unconstitutional" authority and the paradoxical relation between foundation and
freedom (Ch. 6.III). Here Arendt presents a truly potent vision. For a constitution to be
stable it must be present to citizens as meaningfully theirs and this is achieved only if a
majority of citizens accept it as something they could have endorsed had they been present
during its original formulation. Furthermore, without the capacity to be amended or
augmented, a constitution's authority dies, for authority must be responsive to ever-changing
circumstances and crises. This insightful combination of meaningful belonging and
augmentation also underlies, we will see, Maclntyre's account of practices and traditions (Ch
9.III).
The problem, however, with Arendt's vision is that it supposes mutual promising and
augmentation can occur without remainder, without there being citizens who vehemently
disagree with what has been promised or who resolutely spurn particular augmentations.
Certainly the connection binding citizens is not some "identical will which somehow
magically inspires them," but rather "an agreed purpose for which alone the promises are
valid and binding" (HC: 245). But this "agreed purpose" which validates an individual
promise is always a specific purpose, and in being such it necessarily excludes others.40 In
other words, the act of founding is simultaneously an act of constitution and of exclusion, a
setting of "worthy" as against "unworthy" goals. And because exclusionary, there is the
ever-present likelihood that there will be some who reject the prevailing understanding of
"citizenship" as arbitrary and "unconstitutional." In allowing for gradual change and
modification, the practice of augmentation mitigates this problem without solving it, for the
very same quandary recurs here, too. Every augmentation is specific, one among a vast
number of possibilities.
Arendt could claim to have escaped the paradoxes of founding because she underplayed
the many ways in which polities and the world can be interpreted. Actions, she says,
"possess an enduring quality of their own because they create their own remembrance," but
the problem here is that "remembrance" is not at stake, rather remembrances (HC: 207-208).
40
An institutionalized promise must "to function as a foundation and a law, place limits on the
freedom of all that follows it... for it is always a particular law of freedom" (Keenan, 1994: 315).
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The American Revolution proves a telling example. In Arendt's hands it appears as the
collective project of an entire people conjoining in their difference to bring into being a
shared polity. No mention is made of the Federalist strategy to limit colonial legislatures in
favour of a consciously preferred centralized state or that the constitution was devised in
secret.41 There is little mention, either, that the Mayflower Compact, the precursor of the
Constitution, required for its success the deracination of native cultures (Keenan, 1994: 321).
What Arendt offers is a "fable," a story whose purpose is to inspire future action, to
empower (Honig, 1991: 97). The difficulty, however, with her empowerment is that it
screens out the conflictual course of the Revolution. Had she not, she would have realized
this event was as much about silencing voices as generating a new one and that such
silencing lives on in dominant interpretations. Had she, as well, extended her frame of
reference to include nineteenth century America, then she would have had to accept that
particular conceptions of citizenship, of "separated" and "mediated" power, must subdue
rival conceptions, even at the cost of war. Because partly fought over who could claim the
title "citizen," the American Civil War shows law and its interpretation to be simultaneously
relational and commanding, that the attempt to privilege the relational, as Arendt does, is
mistaken.42 To legitimate power is to legitimate an "authoritative" interpretation, and, as the
elimination of slavery illustrates, often properly. Constraint, the command "this far and no
further!," is not therefore something secondary or incidental, requiring justification if the
need arises, but actually bound up in the origin of polities themselves, their "very existence."
The same is true of judgement. Arendt thinks judgement "the most important activity in
which ... sharing-the-world-with-others-comes-to pass" (EPF: 221). But because
discriminating, deciding this is wrong, this good, this ugly, this beautiful, judgement and
taste cannot be identified with friendship. Instead, in judging the judge decides who is to be
classed a friend and who is to be considered an opponent, an adversary, or even an enemy.43
Judging is never a simple matter of "being-with" but a complex process of simultaneously
"being-/or" and "being-against," wherein friendship and enmity are constitutively
interconnected. Arendt's insistence on persuasion, communication and pleasure is, then, but
41 On her neglect of Alexander Hamilton's "drive for centralization ... and vision of a national
economy presided over by a strong state," see Miller (1979: 181) and Wolin (1994: 298-299). On
the far from "open" circumstances surrounding the drafting and ratification of the 1787
Constitution, see Hampshire-Monk (1992: 197-199).
42 In underplaying the "primordial crime" (OR: 71) of Black slavery during the Revolution, Arendt, as
Benhabib (1996a: 160) observes, relegated to a parenthesis what would later almost destroy the
Republic. On her failure to fully explore "constraint," see Morgenthau (1977: 127-131).
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one side of a broader story encompassing prescription, reticence and displeasure. Despite
one-sidedness, she does acknowledge this core conflictual dimension. Judgement "decides
not only how the world is to look, but also who belongs together in it" and she was certain
that Eichmann did not deserve to belong (BPF: 223, my italics). If so, however, she must
accept there can never be a combination of equality and distinction without remainder, for
some deeds and some actors must be considered beyond the pale. We claimed earlier (Ch 5,
7.1.i) that Arendt displays admirable sensitivity to plurality and contingency. This remains
the case, but notwithstanding her laudable prioritization of "political culture," her privileging
of persuasive communicability over conflict comes unfortunately close to relinquishing an
important feature of that plurality and contingency. Even while it resists speculative
solutions to worldly problems, such as Habermas' "ideal speech situation," her account of
founding and judgement itself presumes an impossible moment of "perfect legitimacy"
where opposition and coercion do not figure (Honig, 1991: 106). Moreover, as with
Habermas' occlusion of "argumentative stalemate" (Ch 4.III.ii), this straining for perfect
legitimacy occludes those temporally urgent moments where decisions and discriminations
have to be made under conditions of staunch dissensus and with the risk that they might
prove inappropriate or wrong.
The pressure of temporal urgency reveals the full scope of politics' "enormous risk"
(.HC: 245). We will return to this question in Chapter Ten and, finally, Chapter Eleven,
where a general account of Habermas, Arendt and Maclntyre's failure to adequately
thematize coercion, hostility and conflict is offered. To argue for re-thematization is not to
revert to Weber's political realism, which is similarly false in presuming but one underlying
logic, but rather to make the mediating claim that politics is about speech and coercion,
friendship and enmity. Standing between Arendt and Weber, this mediating view recognizes
friendship as something to be cherished. It also recognizes, with Arendt, the central
importance of promising and forgiving for political stability. But this goes hand in hand
with an awareness of those moments where friendship is not possible. Whether a particular
moment is of this sort cannot be determined by theory but only by actors in the myriad
circumstances they, and no others, face. In according necessity to the social and freedom to
the political, Arendt denies those circumstances and thus narrows the challenges faced by
"good citizens" in the "wearisome processes of persuasion, negotiation, and compromise."
43 With Feldman (1991: 16), "good taste serves as a marker of distinction that separates classes, and
what unites subjects is not a dialogic process of persuasion ... but rather a common experience of the
"vulgar" which good taste struggles to overcome." See also Kristeva (2001: 181-182, 224-225).
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Our goal, consequently, has been to recover the complexity of intersubjective existence, to
argue that the social is capable of freedom and the political sometimes constrained.
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Conclusion
Our study of Arendt is now at a provisional end. We have established what is significant in
Arendt, her awareness of contingency and risk and her substantive notion of citizenship,
which vigorously contests both Weber's Reichsprasident and Habermas' privileging of civil
society. Arendt is important, then, for stubbornly insisting upon a robust ideal of citizenship
without denying the contingent fragility of political existence, the worldly care needed so
that polities may endure. These together will inform our study of Maclntyre and the
arguments of Chapter Eleven.
Yet we have also shown what is suspect in Arendt. Arendt's opposition of necessity
and freedom, her performative account of action, and her ironic subjectivization of
judgement, the basis of political ethics, must all be repudiated if an adequate comprehension
of politics as both reality and ideal is to be achieved. In disrupting her bifurcations and
uncovering false turns, we laid the basis for a broader critique linking up with earlier
criticisms of Habermas. Just as in Habermas' response to Weber, reality is separated into
emancipatory and fallen realms to produce a dualism that is not only false but also a covert
surrender to the "iron cage," a denial of possibilities. With Habermas, as well, Arendt tries
to exclude the strategic, enmity, from the authentically "political." The result is that her
conception of citizenship and understanding of political risk are far less compelling than they
might have been.
There is, then, both discontinuity and continuity between Habermas and Arendt, the
continuity suggesting that their errors are not idiosyncratic but symptomatic of much
theorizing which takes Weber's diagnosis of modernity as its starting point. Turning to
Maclntyre, we will find this suspicion confirmed. Like Arendt and Habermas, Maclntyre
divides reality into emancipatory and fallen realms and like them, too, he desires a politics
free from the strategic and coercion. Mirroring the claims set out here and in Chapter Four, a
key argument of the following will be that his thought suffers from contrary currents
rendering it simultaneously radical and defeatist. But this is but one part of our goal.
Despite his failings, some specific and some shared, Maclntyre yields valuable resources for
thinking beyond Weber in those areas where he can be surpassed and for correcting errors
engendered by Habermas and Arendt, just as they provide correction to his. Maclntyre's
contribution is a partial one, but significant nonetheless.
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Part III
Alasdair Maclntyre and the Politics ofVirtue
Chapter 8
Introduction
Insightful and challenging, Alasdair Maclntyre proves an important figure in thinking
beyond Weber. For this claim to gain credence, however, two recurrent charges must be
addressed. The more prevalent is that Maclntyre is an eminently dispensable arch-
reactionary who "fraudulently eradicates the problem of dominance" by surrendering
Enlightenment universalism and the possibility of critique to the pre-rational authority of
inherited practices and traditions.' Having broken with the "Enlightenment Project"
Maclntyre cannot identity and address conditions of manipulation and injustice, and cannot
therefore be considered a resource in combating either Weber's decisionism or his reduction
of politics to charismatic leaders. A less prevalent but graver charge is that because he has
undergone such dramatic turns, once Marxist, then anti-Marxist, and now Thomist
Aristotelian, his thought is so inconsistent as to render it useless to sustained attempts to
theorize the present.2 These charges together suggest Maclntyre has nothing coherent to say
to modern theorists or actors and, even if he has, ought to be ignored.
Yet ignoring Maclntyre would constitute a real loss. Against his detractors, he is not
reactionary but, like Arendt, combines conservative and radical themes. He is self¬
consciously radical in opposing Weber's "iron-cage" and the liberal status quo not in the
name of unreflective custom, as did Edmund Burke, but for the sake of a vision of human
flourishing articulated in terms of intrinsically meaningful activities, practices, conceived in
direct antithesis to instrumental dominance over or manipulation of citizens. Underpinning
his virtue ethics is a universal conception of the human good providing a standard by which
to critique the present, albeit one very different from the abstract universalism endorsed by
Maclntyre's liberal critics. Through engagement in practices actors extend their uniquely
human powers and attain a coherent sense of self, the sign of a fulfilled or flourishing life.
The extension of such powers or capabilities demands that they achieve independence of
mind by continually questioning previous conceptions of human excellence to arrive at more
complete, less narrow understandings. Because the institutional structures of modernity and
1 Okin (1989: 71). See as well Nussbaum (1989: 36-41), Putnam (1992: 185-186), Holmes (1996:
93), Baier (1997: 277), Bellantoni (2000: 102) and, less aggressively, Bernstein (1986a: 134-138),
Benhabib (1992: 76), Gutmann (1992: 131-133), and Frazer & Lacey (1993: 180; 1994: 275).
2 Thus what apparently distinguishes "Maclntyre is not the number of beliefs he has doubted, but the
number of beliefs he has embraced" (Gellner, 1974: 193, quoted in Ferguson, 1998: 109).
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their philosophical underpinnings frustrate such questioning, or so he contends, Maclntyre
understands his work as having not just corrective but also revolutionary potential.3
Maclntyre is conservative, on the other hand, in emphasizing the historical rootedness
of all activity, that thought begins "unquestioningly with the unquestioned" (1999c: 315).
Their identities constituted in large degree by inescapable historical circumstances, actors
can reason and exercise their powers only when first educated into specific cultures. Every
conception of human capability, justice, and rationality is therefore a particular conception
which to endure must uphold its own standards, both educational and political. To neglect
the need for authoritative standards, to believe instead in the fiction of a free-floating
autonomous subject, is to repeat those errors of 18th century philosophy that gave rise to the
extreme subjectivism of Nietzsche and Weber. It is precisely this emphasis on transmitted
standards that leads many to dismiss Maclntyre as reactionary. But this dismissal ignores his
equally trenchant insistence that to remain viable each culture has to attend to the best
standards of capability, justice and rationality realized thus far and also to the never-ending
challenges from rival systems of belief. The charge of reactionism holds, it will be argued,
only if one ignores the "dialectical construction" and fallibilism central to Maclntyre's
account of how plural cultures and political traditions sustain themselves and engage
creatively with others.
Against the second charge of gross inconsistency, it is clear that guiding Maclntyre's
work from the late 1950s to the present is the attempt to articulate the philosophical and
political implications of that core ideal. Maclntyre's turn from Marxism to Aristotelianism
is less surprising than at first glance, for the simple reason that much of what he admired in
Marx is what Marx himself drew from Aristotle, not least the distinction between use and
exchange value, a stress on essential human powers, and the distinction between man-as-he-
is and man-as-he-could-be if he realized those powers or potentials.4 Moreover, it is not
simply that he now only accepts in Marx what first arose in Aristotle. In sharp contrast to
Aristotle's condemnation of banausic crafts and hierarchization of human types, from slaves
to free citizens, Maclntyre regards productive activities as genuine practices and endorses an
universal-egalitarian theory of justice centring on Marx's injunctions regarding desert and
3
Maclntyre is predominately pessimistic, yet he (1998: 235) does endorse Knight's (1996: 896)
reading of his work as a "revolutionary Aristotelianism" capable of legitimating the activities of
plain persons so "that previously isolated struggles might be transformed into a new class war of
attrition." See also (1980: 178) where Maclntyre claims his and Gadamer's "reinterpretation" of
practice enjoins the "most fundamental form of change."
4 Thus explaining the strong similarity between Maclntyre's early and later critiques of liberal
morality (1958: 41-44; 1994b: 223-229). On Marx's indebtedness to Aristotle, see Nussbaum
(1995: 119-120), McMylor (1994: 46-73), Meikle (1995: 184-190), and O'Neill (1998: 28-30).
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need. He remains convinced, as well, that Marx was essentially right in thinking moralities
always give expression to particular social orders and that liberalism functions as an
ideological cover for arbitrary sectional interests. Thus, despite disillusionment with
orthodox historical materialism, the proletariat as a privileged class, and socialism's willing
subsumption under bureaucratic nation-state politics, Maclntyre persists in understanding his
project as a continuation of the spirit of Marxism by better means.
There have been significant turns, it is true, and a number will be sharply criticized, yet
these render his thought neither any more incoherent than Arendt and Habermas' nor any
less relevant. Indeed, for the purpose of this study Maclntyre's relevance consists in
providing a pivotal correction of their rejoinders to Weber. Regarding Habermas, a central
argument will be that Maclntyre's account of human capabilities or flourishing recalls
Habermas' emphasis on non-pathological socialization as a central reference point for a
critical theory of society. Both believe Weber erred in neglecting the intersubjective
processes generative of individual maturity and both are certain that awareness of these
processes has liberatory implications. We saw, however, that Habermas' account of
socialization is gravely problematized by his separation ofmorality (right) and ethics (good)
and his portrayal of the good in subjectivist, conventional, and utilitarian terms. Insofar as
his theory depends foundationally on a notion of human socialization and this in turn
depends on the ethical, Habermas' separations and subjectification of the good threaten a
return to Weber's decisionism (Ch 4.11.i, 4.II.ii). Maclntyre's insistence, with Weber, that
politics is foremost a substantive question of what people are and will become, that the good
is prior to and incorporates right, and yet that conceptions of flourishing are amenable to
rational debate promises to halt that return. A further significant feature of his work is its
dialectical characterization of moral learning and change, which sidesteps Habermas's
indefensible separation of justification and application and escapes the extreme abstraction
and departicularization of political experience wrought by his ideal speech situation and
Arendt's insistence on spectorial disinterestedness (Ch 4.II.ii, 7.II.ii).
Maclntyre's most important contribution, however, is his non-dichotomous theorization
of action, "purposeful performance." Where Habermas (Ch 4.III.i, 4.1Il.ii) sets the
communicative off against the instrumental and Arendt (Ch 7.II.i, 7.III.i) the performative
against the purposive, Maclntyre's teleological concept of practice combines these falsely
dirempted elements into one, a combination due in part to his rejection of Aristotle's
denigration of the productive arts. Because practices are bound by internal goods operating
as self-sustaining intersubjective conditions and yet also directed towards ends outside
themselves, Maclntyre is able to avoid Arendt's equation of work (poiesis) with instrumental
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violence and Habermas' ascription of material reproduction to functional rationality, an
avoidance reinforced by his critique of bureaucratic technicism and his defence of politics as
a phronetic art. The results are considerable. Because knowledge or experience of ends and
means is not substantively divided according to Weber's analytic separation of
Wertrationalitdt and Zweckrationalitat, reality no longer divides into the antagonistic
binaries of lifeworld versus system or the social versus the political. Maclntyre thereby
recoups "system" and "the social" as arenas of life intimately connected not just to the
conditions of human potentialities but also to the very mode of their realization. Far from
equating with "norm-free sociality" or neutral technical expertise, as Habermas and Arendt
falsely contend, the economic and the material now become centrally ethical concerns.
Insofar as Maclntyre, on the level of theory, is aware of and tries to escape the tendency
towards ontological spatialization in responding to Weber's monistic antinomy of the leader
and machine, his perspective both arises within and poses a powerful reply to a key modern
problematic. In this sense he is a squarely modern theorist, despite his espousal of the
"classical tradition of the virtues." There are, nevertheless, serious shortcomings. The first
has to do with Maclntyre's opposition of modernity and pre-modernity on the supposition
that, in contrast to the more consensual foundations of pre-modern communities, the extreme
conflictual nature of modern socio-political orders precludes an ethical politics. From this
supposition he pessimistically concludes that hope rests solely on those marginal and
embattled local communities which have successfully distanced themselves from the
irredeemably corrupt politics of the nation-state and capitalist market. As will be seen,
however, Maclntyre's depiction of pre-modernity is naively nostalgic in failing to
consistently apply the "genealogical" tools he uses so cuttingly against modern societies.
This inconsistency leads him to downplay his extensive philosophical and political
indebtedness to modernity, but it also undermines his account of education and ethics. For
if, according to his virtue ethics, actors come to an awareness of the good only through
engagement in historically rooted practices, then such awareness becomes impossible when
modernity, as Maclntyre portrays it, stands devoid of such practices. Yet if this were true,
not only would education and ethics be deeply problematic, they would have ceased to exist.
The tension between Maclntyre's Aristotelian ethics and his dismissal of modernity is
but one result of poor genealogical analysis. The more serious is that notwithstanding his
non-dichotomous theorization of action, his pessimistic reading of modernity returns him to
a position remarkably analogous to Habermas and Arendt's. In line with their partition of
political space into fallen and emancipatory realms, he dichotomizes communal and state
politics with the consequence that the antinomies circumvented by his theorization of
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practice reappear. Over and above the substantial practical problems generated, such as how
community and state interrelate in questions of distributive justice, this dichotomization
ensnares Maclntyre within two paradoxes. The first he suffers with Habermas and Arendt,
namely that he claims to deflate the pretensions of bureaucratic technocracy but in effect
reinforces it. The second, specific to Maclntyre, is that while his conception of ethical
change stresses the creative overcoming of crises and impasses, the political order he
commends neglects the crises detected in modern politics. His ideal of local community
urges instead a "politics of withdrawal."
A second serious shortcoming stems from Maclntyre's turn to Thomist moral realism.
Underlying this version of moral realism is the belief that the virtues form a seamless unity,
that moral dilemmas do not occur or, if they do, are the result of corrigible errors, and that
the various goods pursued by human beings form a hierarchy, the ultimate good being
contemplation of God. This form of moral realism, it will be argued, conflicts sharply and
negatively with Maclntyre's earlier defence of the reality of moral dilemmas, stress on
human frailty, and assumption that flourishing admits of plural specifications. Furthermore,
his insistence upon the goal of a perfected ethics as the realization of a monist summum
honum also undercuts the plurality of standpoints, fallibilism, and dialectical interchange that
Maclntyre believes requisite if a genuine conflict of traditions is to occur. For the purposes
of this study, however, two implications of Thomist realism are especially relevant. First,
the supposition that there can be a perfectly ordered politics, each good finding its place in a
stable hierarchy, suggests that Maclntyre's ideal is one where politics as a serious endeavour
has been surmounted. Spurred on by his reductive contrast between consensual pre-
modernity and conflictual modernity, he therefore downplays the unpredictability and
contingency definitive of political life, even though the fact of unpredictability occupies a
primary role in his critique of bureaucratic technocracy. Second, and related to our earlier
criticisms of Habermas and Arendt, the denial of fundamental conflict between genuine
goods induces Maclntyre to attribute political opposition, strife, and compromise to the
ruinous state of liberal politics. The politics of local community is, oppositely, a consensual
politics where Weber's polytheistic clash of rival gods and consequent emphasis on strategy
and coercion have been rejected or overcome. Yet this easy opposition is compelling only if
one believes that local communities could be devoid of clashes of interest or that such
clashes could always be consensually resolved, something which Maclntyre's portrayal of
the conflict between the Sophists and the Socratic School in classical Athens roundly
contradicts. Thus, in his desire to counter Weber's equation of politics with coercion,
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Maclntyre goes to the opposite extreme by denying temporal urgency and thereby occluding
the real challenges faced by citizens.
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The New Dark Ages: Maclntyre on Bureaucratic Individualism and
the Hope for an Ethical Polity
"... if the tradition of the virtues was able to survive the horrors of the last dark ages, we are
not entirely without grounds for hope. This time however the barbarians are not waiting
beyond the frontiers; they have already been governing us for quite some time" (AV\ 263).
Ours is a "new dark age," an unprecedented time of crisis and confusion. In the following
we explain why Alasdair Maclntyre thinks modernity barbarous and his proposals for
keeping barbarity in check. It is important to note, however, that our focus will be the
entirety of his "After Virtue project."1 This period of Maclntyre's work is certainly not
without internal tension, but the difficulty with many critical appropriations is that their
selective emphases occlude his over-riding goal, the liberatory attempt to show a path
beyond the "iron cage" even while accepting Weber's pessimistic diagnosis.
Thus, we begin with Maclntyre's narrative of modernity and the "Enlightenment
Project" (Ch 9.1.). Modernity is the age of the "individual" understood in separation from
social and historical context. Abetting the move from pre-modern non-market to modern
market driven societies, Enlightenment philosophy sought to ground this subject only to
culminate in the debased "emotivist culture" identified by Nietzsche and his heir, Weber.
The antinomy between instrumental managerialism and the irrational inner will that Weber
perceived in this culture, and which in turn defines his work, impel the political structures of
"bureaucratic individualism" (Ch 9.H.). These structures, the nation-state and capitalist
market, claim legitimacy but are the agents of unprincipled power.
Maclntyre's limited "grounds for hope" rest on an Aristotelian conception of the
individual and practical activity (Ch 9.III.). This individual is rooted in socio-historical
contexts and understands his and the common good through engagement in specific forms of
intersubjective activity, practices. By entering into practices and adopting, questioning, and
augmenting standards of excellence, individuals transform themselves and their community
to advance their essential powers. But this transformative activity requires institutional
structures threatened in advanced modernity. Only in local communities committed to the
1 This project, Maclntyre (1991b: 269) makes clear, began with his late 1970s essays on social science
and includes After Virtue (1981), Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988), Three Rival Versions
ofMoral Enquiry (1990), and Dependent Rational Animals (1999).
188
Chapter 9 The New Dark Ages
virtues conducive to political deliberation can the human telos, flourishing, be achieved (Ch
9.IV.).
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9.1.) Modernity, the Enlightenment Project, and Emotivist Culture
"Every action is the bearer and expression ofmore or less theory-laden beliefs and concepts;
every piece of theorizing and every expression of belief is a political and moral action" (A V:
61). For Maclntyre the ascent of modern man and the rise of Enlightenment philosophy are
therefore aspects of one and the same event. To better understand the present, he sets
himself the genealogical task of unearthing the origins of this event. Unlike the Nietzschean
"Genealogist," however, Maclntyre's goal is not to dispute the possibility of a rational
politics, but to show that what has until now been thought "rational" is distinctly irrational,
the result ofmomentous false turns in thought and practice.2
The decisive event heralding the modern subject is the appearance of modern
capitalism. Weber's study of the "Protestant Ethic" and Karl Polanyi's (1944) analysis of
the "Great Transformation" show that during the 16th and 17th centuries there came into
being social and political structures radically different from pre-modern societies.3 From
Homeric Greece to the Medieval period, earlier societies had understood the "individual" as
embedded in wide social relationships and incomprehensible without reference to the
expectations and obligations generated by these relationships. The pursuit of wealth, power,
and status, what Maclntyre (AV: 188; WJ: 32) calls "external goods" or the "goods of
efficiency," was consequently kept in check by economic and non-economic institutions
which presupposed the existence of a "common good" upheld by shared virtues of character,
the "goods of excellence." Turning inwards towards the self, Luther, Calvin and, later,
Catholic Jansenism threw these relationships and the presupposition of a common good into
doubt. No longer understood as dependent for its identity on social contexts and other
historically rooted individuals, the individual-gwa-individual became the source and arbiter
of all value.
Of course, the Protestant reformers justified their turn towards the self on political and
theological grounds. Politically, it represented a break with the injustices of a corrupt feudal
culture. Theologically, there was no authority but scripture and it was the individual
believer, not the Church, who bore ultimate responsibility before God. Maclntyre (1996b:
124) thus concurs with Weber that the initial impetus to change was understood primarily in
2
Understanding modernity means constructing "something akin to what Nietzsche called genealogy"
(1990c: 196), since rationality is rationality as envisaged within specific social structures, but not
adherence to the "Genealogical" tradition advanced by Deleuze and Foucault, which confuses a
historicization of "universal" and "true" with their dismissal (TRV: 205).
3 On Maclntyre's indebtedness to Polanyi, see (AV: 239; 1984: 253-254; WJ: 211), McMylor (1994:
97-103), and Pinkard (2003: 178-180).
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religious-ethical terms. Yet this new social order disrupted the bonds interlinking
individuals. The individual being the sole site of value, these bonds had to be reconceived as
existingprior to any social relationship, which meant the "common good" had to be replaced
by a contract or agreement between individuals abstracted from their social circumstances.
The basis of such agreement, in turn, could only be individual "desire," with the result that
social institutions were reconceived as instrumental means for the fulfilment of private
interests (1994b: 228). Hence the realization of a key precondition of modern capitalism, the
reduction of economics and politics to formal means-end rules which take no account of
actors' social relations. The Reformers' efforts led, as Weber (ES: 93) saw, to a "capital
accounting" that in "its formally most rational shape presupposes the battle of man with
man."
The processes of "disembedding" initiated by the turn towards the self led to the
economic gaining unprecedented autonomy from wider society. But, and decisively, behind
this autonomy and the formal rationality of market relations lay a substantive commitment to
impoverished moral norms. For Weber (PE: 14-20) and Maclntyre (AV: 185) the figure
encapsulating this impoverished normativity is Benjamin Franklin. Franklin believed the
goal of the righteous to be salvation and he considered this a God-ordained duty. Yet his
criterion of duty was not the common good or brotherliness but utility, material success.
With time this injunction lost its theological referent and became crudely hedonistic, the
pursuit of desire without reference to duty or God.
Prior to this eventuality, the great Enlightenment thinkers strove to ground the modern
subject through impartial and objective secular moral principles. It seemed for a time that
the newly arisen "educated public" in Germany and Scotland would succeed in this. Bound
by a shared Protestantism and inhabited by a cultured class of civil servants, clergy, and the
propertied, this public, Habermas' bourgeois public sphere, appeared to have the unity and
coherence requisite for rational progress. Yet its attempt at rational justification "was bound
to fail" (AV: 52). Here we can offer only a broad sketch of Maclntyre's narrative. The
Enlightenment project necessarily failed because it inherited a once coherent moral scheme
that had been fatally fragmented by the turn towards the self. Articulated first by Aristotle
and enduring until the late Medieval period, this moral scheme comprised three
interdependent elements: an understanding of untutored human nature, "man-as-he-happens-
to-be," an understanding of human potentiality, "man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-
essential-nature" or telos, and, finally, the principles of a rational ethics "which enjoin the
various virtues ... [instructing] us how to realize our true nature and to reach our true end"
(AV: 52-53). Man is here a "functional concept," that is, a being whose nature it is to
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achieve certain goods, to live well.4 To say that a particular man is a "good man" is, under
this scheme, to make a factual statement about that person's circumstances and character, to
evaluate his success or failure in abiding by the precepts requisite for living well across his
various roles as student, parent, craftsman, citizen, and believer. Ethics being the "science"
enabling actors to understand how to move from their untutored state to their better nature,
the precepts or principles of morality stem from and are unintelligible without orientation to
man's telos, eudaimonia or flourishing (A V: 52).
Animated by a profound scepticism and reducing reason to calculation, the effect of the
Puritan inward turn was to eliminate reference to man's telos, with grave consequences.5 As
with Weber's differentiation of value spheres, morality transformed into a sui generis
enquiry divorced from the purposes and ends definitive of theology, law, politics,
production, or aesthetics (A V: 39, 45). As the "moral" narrowed to a sense of duty abstracted
from human well being, the understanding ofman as a functional being having essential and
normatively significant potentialities or ends was rejected. This meant, in turn, that the
derivation of rational moral precepts from the potential nature of human beings, that because
we are capable of friendship we ought to nurture this capacity, was no longer possible.
"Ought" now deemed underivable from "is," moral norms were no longer understood as
factual statements but as injunctions, although the rationale of such injunctions, divine
commandment, had also by now been rejected, leaving the source of their "unconditionality"
radically unclear (ASIA: 171-172; TRV: 178; Anscombe, 1997: 31).
Most problematically, however, with the loss of an evaluatively significant telos an
unbridgeable lacuna appeared between man's untutored nature and the precepts of a rational
ethics. Where once they took their sense from a perfected human nature, moral precepts
could now only be grounded on man's untutored nature, yet this "disobedient" nature is
precisely what the precepts of a rational ethics are required to correct and cannot coherently
provide their foundation. Thus, without the linking term ofman's potentialities, that second
element of the old moral scheme, the relation between man-as-he-happens-to-be and the
principles needed "to correct, improve and educate" him became obscure (AV: 55).
In response, Hume tried to ground moral precepts on human passions, but he could
never convincingly explain why actors concerned with their own interests would opt to act
altruistically. Reacting to Hume's failure, Kant grounded morality on a human reason
4
Thus, "'man' stands to 'good man' as 'watch' stands to 'good watch' or 'farmer' to 'good farmer',"
an evaluative relation of ends or purposes that can be assessed factually and rationally (AV: 58).
5 The "power of reason was destroyed by the fall of man [Calvin] ... it can assess truths of fact and
mathematical relations but nothing more [Pascal]. In the realm of practice therefore it can speak only
ofmeans" (A V: 53-54).
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divorced from passion and inclination. In the place of sympathy, he endorsed an abstract
morality of rules underpinned by the categorical imperative as a universalization test which
would separate moral from immoral injunctions, no matter the context (AV: 45-46, 236).
The problem, one still faced by contemporary deontological theorists, is that his categorical
imperative divorced moral reasoning from the contexts within which such reasoning takes its
sense, rendered the relation between moral obligation and human well-being unintelligible,
and failed to exclude the possibility of consistently willing to treat others as mere means,
thus leaving him caught in Hume's quandary.6 Kierkegaard noted Hume and Kant's failures
and sought instead to ground morality not on passion or reason but a fundamental act of
choice lying "beyond all reasons" (AV: 42). This moment signals the end of the
Enlightenment Project, for Kierkegaard thereby gave up all pretence of rational justification.
It was Nietzsche, of course, who understood the full implications. If morality reduces to
expressions of will, then morality is simply what my will creates. All else, the rational
abstract self, rights, utility, is fiction, a cover for a supreme yet arbitrary decision. Like the
19th century Polynesian taboo system, the Enlightenment assurance in an impartial and
objective morality amounted to a grand superstition (AV: 111-112; TRV: 185).
Hence the birth of late modernity's "emotivist culture." That this culture is Weberian is
unsurprising, since Weber and Nietzsche "together provide us with the key theoretical
articulations of the contemporary social order" (AV: 114-115). For Maclntyre three
characteristics of this culture are decisive. The first is the appearance or, better, perceived
appearance of a thoroughly "democratized self," a self which because it "has no necessary
social context and no necessary social identity can then be anything, can assume any role or
take any point of view" (AV: 32). But this self for Maclntyre, as for Arendt, means the
extirpation of human identity, since when reduced to the inner will, identity becomes
ethereal, infinitely malleable, a meaninglessness nothing. Meaninglessness is heightened,
second, by the contemporary reality of interminable conflict and disagreement. Because
Enlightenment thinkers failed to justify an independent secular morality, debate is
necessarily fragmented between deontologists, consequentialists, and contractarians between
whom, because their presuppositions are radically opposed, there is no possibility of
consensus (AV: 8-7; 1983: 451; 1994b: 223). Emotivism as a moral theory gives vent to this
reality by declaring all apparently impersonal reasons and arguments the expression of
6
Maclntyre's (AV: 43-49, 66-69; 1983: 449) critique of Kant and his successors, including Gewirth,
Dworkin, and Habermas, is basically Hegelian in stressing the excessive rigorism, formalism, and
motivational deficit of his theory. See O'Neill (1983: 390-392) and Bernstein (1986a: 137-140).
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individual preference.7 But this means the obliteration of the distinction between
manipulative and non-manipulative interaction. When impersonal reasons collapse into
personal inclination, "argument" can only be the attempt to influence and cajole others'
feelings (AV: 24). Weber's failure to distinguish between belief in authority and justified
belief in authority is therefore one instance of a much larger predicament. The dominant
roles or characters of late modern culture, the manager, aesthete, therapist, and protestor,
unite in treating others as instrumental means to unquestioned ends, the logic of capitalism.
These characters reveal the third characteristic of emotivist culture, its
compartmentalization of actors' roles and activities. Familial and private life are
incompatible with work and work with political engagement, each sphere of activity having
"its own role structure governed by its own specific norms."8 Accustomed to thinking
themselves dirempted or split selves, actors suffer passification, unable to achieve a critical
awareness dependent on viewing life in its entirety and unable to see the conflicting demands
of opposed spheres as not how things have always been but rather the sign of a
problematically disjointed age. The true nature of this passifying compartmentalization is
revealed and reinforced by Weber's antinomy between leader and machine, which perfectly
reflects the division of "fact" and "value," "is" and "ought," inaugurated by Protestant
theology and modern science. On the one side, there is the individual who lords over
questions of value, these questions being unamenable to rational criticism or debate. The
private manifestation of value-irrationalism is the aesthete who lives to consume, whereas its
public manifestations are the protestor who rants against consumption and the great man,
Weber's charismatic Reichsprasident or Lukacs' "ideal proletarian" (SS: 55; AV: 26, 262).
On the other side, there stand the therapist and manager who claim competence over facts
and "efficient" technique and who eschew consideration of "subjective" values. The
therapist attends to the neuroses caused by compartmentalization so private individuals can
subsequently all the better consume. The manager, differently, claims competence over
public administrative techniques yielding the resources for consumption. These poles,
private and public irrational individualism, private and public rational efficiency, together
constitute the politics of "bureaucratic individualism."
7
As a theory of the meaning of moral utterance emotivism is false, but as a theory of use it has
plausibility, since contemporary moral utterance is often nothing more than the expression of
preferences (AV: 12-15). See Mulhall & Swift (1996: 74) and Knight (1998: 7).
8
(1999c: 322). But see also (1977b: 217-237; WJ: 337, 397-398; 1992b: 193-199; PP: 235-236).
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9.II.) Bureaucratic Individualism
The "crushing polarities" of modern society illustrate its underlying "paradox," that actors
think themselves "autonomous" but stand caught in dominative relationships rendering their
freedom illusory (ASIA: 11; AV: 68). As the dominant terms ofmodern society, bureaucracy
and individualism appear to conflict, the one concerned with collective utility calculations,
the other with inviolable individual rights. Yet this apparent conflict hides a relation of
mutual support, the opposed sides joined by the assumption that there are only two modes of
social life, either one where the arbitrary individual choice reigns, or where managerial
planning is sovereign (AV: 35). When Maclntyre attacks managerialism and the liberal
nation-state he means to illuminate the self-deceptive nature of this assumption.
Managerial organization arose to accommodate the pressures of a nascent
individualism. There had always been managers, Maclntyre (SS: 67) suggests, but in pre-
modern societies they served traditions in which organizational authority had to justify itself
by appeal to the religious and political ideals of these traditions. In modernity this relation is
reversed; managers, not the communities or traditions they serve, determine the terms of
justifiable authority. Weber's "mechanized petrification" is therefore an apposite description
of the present. Corporate and governmental bureaucracies claim justification on the basis of
competencies not possessed by ordinary citizens. The ground of these competencies is an
"aspiration to value neutrality and a claim to manipulative power" (AV: 86). Modelled on
modern physics, managers' value neutrality is achieved by eliminating actors' subjective
intentions and beliefs from their nomenclature and reducing analysis to quantitative
variables. Their claim to manipulative power derives, differently, from a supposed ability to
predict actors' future behaviour derived from law-like generalizations generated on the basis
of these quantitative variables (SS: 65). Managers demand recognition because they, unlike
the emotional mass, possess the sober "objectivity" necessary for securing an efficient
ordering of scarce resources.
This self-conception of civil servants, analysts, and social scientists conforms to
Weber's ideal-type of minutely regulated, hierarchical organizations administrating to an
entirely predictable world.9 Underlying is a presupposition of the "end of ideology," the
belief common among Weber's heirs, but not Weber himself, that politics reduces to
management because fundamental social conflict has come to an end. For Maclntyre,
9
Maclntyre (SS: 66) acknowledges that many managers would reject his characterization of their
activity. His point, however, is not that managers fail to live up to Weber's ideal-type, but that when
managers justify their authority they do so it in terms of this ideal-type. See McMylor (1994: 135).
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however, this "end of ideology" thesis is itself ideological. It does, of course, reflect partial
truths about advanced modernity, that it is dominated by managerial elites and that these
elites possess power. Yet it is ideological in obscuring the conflictual nature of modern
society and, more significantly, in parading as real competence a "masquerade" of
competence (A V: 75).
Maclntyre employs two arguments to show the hollowness ofmanagerial authority. His
first is to deny the value neutrality of "effectiveness" and to question it as an ideal.
"Effectiveness" is not neutral but a moral ideal buttressed by a peculiar metaphysics in
which men are consumers and they work so as to consume. Man as a consuming being
justifies in turn man as a managerial being, the latter's manipulations designed to increase
opportunities for consumption. But this ideal stands contested by the reverse, Aristotelian
view that "what is essentially human is rational activity," consumption existing to serve this
activity as it manifests itself in work, leisure, and interaction (SS: 55). Here the justification
of managerial manipulation, its claim as the only source of order, is ruled out, for when
actors are not irrationally appetitive but instead rational they must be capable of ordering
themselves. Managerial neutrality is therefore a chimera suppressing rival ethoi or
moralities. Moreover, there is a deep tension within the manager's self-conception (AV: 84-
85; 1994b: 230). The manager regards his charges as behaving beings causally determined
by predictable and pliant patterns. He regards himself, however, as an autonomous being
exempt from the laws governing the manipulated, their behaviour moulded by his conscious
intentions and purposes. As a moral ideal, managerial effectiveness legitimates the
domination of man over man but this domination is internally inconsistent, swaying
erratically between determinism and voluntarism.
If managerial neutrality is fraudulent, so too is managerial expertise. Maclntyre's
second argument hinges on fortuna, Machiavelli's "bitch goddess of unpredictability" (AV:
93). Managerial expertise presumes the possibility of predicting future behaviour according
to law-like generalizations, yet the inherent unpredictability and contingency of human life
renders this expertise impossible. Unpredictability comes in many forms. There is, first, the
reality of "radical conceptual innovation," Arendtian "natality." No one, for instance, could
have predicted the invention of nuclear physics. To say nuclear physics will come into
being, Maclntyre argues, one must also say what nuclear physics is. Yet in saying what
nuclear physics is, one is not making a prediction but actually inventing nuclear physics here
and now. Prediction of conceptual innovation in natural science is thus both conceptually
incoherent and practically impossible.
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The problem of unpredictability is even greater in the social sciences, for the reason that
human agents are the focus and no one can reliably determine their future actions and
decisions. Here Maclntyre points to everyday experience. If, as often happens, I have not
yet decided between two mutually exclusive courses of action, I cannot say which one I will
eventually take. An observer might try to predict my actions, yet he would be "unable to
predict his own future in just the way that I am unable to predict mine," and one important
aspect of his future actions is their possible impact on my future decisions (A V: 96). But if
he cannot predict the impact of his actions on my decisions, he cannot claim to predict
actions at all. This problem is heightened in complex situations where observers must take
numerous agents into account and face the related difficulty of defining what a particular
action context is, whether a factory stoppage is primarily due to a conflict of employer and
worker interests or whether union, party, or governmental interests also play a crucial role.
In Maclntyre's view, then, to think one can secure law-like generalizations governing the
socio-political world is to presume an omniscience unavailable to human beings. The future
is unknown and unknowable.
Managerial expertise is therefore a masquerade and its authority unjustified.10 When
managers succeed their success is more often than not a matter of sheer luck and
coincidence." But if managers do not control social reality, then the basis of contemporary
organization should be vulnerable to rival organizational schemes and ideals. Yet Maclntyre
is decidedly pessimistic on this count. The problem is that managers have convinced
themselves and "plain persons" that their expertism and authority are in fact real. That they
might be instead a fictional cover for domination and sectional interest has fallen from view.
The same is true of liberal nation-states. Like Weber in his final years, Maclntyre takes
a dim view of liberal parliamentary democracy, accusing it of perpetuating self-interested
and ineffectual elites, but unlike Weber he spurns commitment to the "nation." Maclntyre's
(1999b: 140) critique of the liberal nation-state, a "huge, single, complex, heterogeneous,
immensely powerful something or other," mirrors his critique of managerialism. The liberal
state presents itself as neutral between conceptions of the good, but this neutrality hides a
commitment to the emotivist self. This commitment, in turn, presents the liberal state with
insuperable difficulties in its attempt to justify citizens' allegiance to its structures and
decrees.
10 The manager's status is "fatally undermined when we recognize that he possesses no sound stock of
law-like generalizations and when we realize how weak [his] predictive power ... is" (AV: 106).
" When "imputed organizational skill and power are deployed and the desired effect follows, all that
we have witnessed is the same kind of sequence as that to be observed when a clergyman is
fortunate enough to pray for rain just before the unpredicted end of a drought" (A V: 75).
197
Chapter 9 The New Dark Ages
Fundamental to liberalism is its privatization of value. Because no conception of the
good can prove itself rationally superior, government's goal is to facilitate the equal
satisfaction of subjective ends. The common good therefore transforms into "an artefact
compounded out of individual and partial interest" (SS: 56). Citizens ought to obey the state
because the state provides those external goods necessary for pursuing their ends. The
liberal state is therefore structured according to a specific understanding of justice, which
operates according to four levels of debate (fVJ: 342-345). The first is that at which
individuals forward preferences sustained by conflicting ethical presuppositions. Because
rational agreement on these presuppositions is denied, debate at this level amounts to a
ceaseless tussle of assertion and counter-assertion. Hence the need for liberal justice to
abstract to a higher level of debate. This second level involves weighing and balancing
utility and individual rights according to "fair" procedures and rules. As when Habermas
(Ch 3.II) separates "morality" from "ethics," "right" from "good," liberal theorists hope a
proceduralized justice will lead them beyond the pitfalls of subjectivism.
Yet procedures must themselves be justified, hence the need for theorizing a morality of
rules. This third level of debate lends prima facie respectability to the neutral state by
suggesting it enjoys philosophical foundation. The problem here, however, as with
Enlightenment thought generally, is that there is no consensus on the ideals underpinning
rules and procedures (AV: 252). Zealous libertarians contend with radical egalitarians and
these in turn with moderates. The confusion marking the first level of debate therefore
infects discussion throughout, including the fourth level of liberal justice, the formal legal
system. Lawyers and judges are set the task of reconciling utility and rights claims, but in
doing so can only appeal to the competing philosophical ideals articulated at the third level
of debate, citing one at a particular juncture and thereafter its opposite.12 They cannot
invoke a shared morality, for none exists, but must instead impose temporary modi vivendi
between antagonistic maxims. What appears rational is a mercurial melange of ad hoc
compromise.
The liberal state, then, is sustained by an incoherent intellectual framework. This
incoherence has serious repercussions, not least an increase in the passification effected by
managerialism. When political systems seek to neuter ethical conflict, ethical debate loses
its political status. This means the emotivist presupposition of liberal orders, man as a
12 Our principles "express rival and incompatible social ideals and policies and ... furnish us with a
pluralist political rhetoric whose function is to conceal the depth of our conflicts" (A V: 253).
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consuming animal, is insulated from public criticism.13 Insulated, as well, is the true nature
of liberal compromise. Liberal theory defends egalitarian principles but liberal practice
consists in unequal competition between socio-economic factions, the state inextricably
bound to capitalist imperatives. Those who are vulnerable inevitably suffer exclusion from
the bargaining fora through which resources are appropriated (PP\ 237). Seemingly pacific,
liberal politics is in fact a "civil war" where the "goods of excellence," justice, charity, and
moderation, are systematically subordinated to the "goods of efficiency" and the vice of
pleonexia, avarice (A V: 253).
It is here that the liberal state's claim to justified allegiance unravels. When the state's
model of rationality is instrumental self-interest, when its core justification is its facilitation
of individual desire, and when the common good is interpreted as an aggregation of
individual interests, then it is rational for citizens to be "free riders," to surreptitiously
disregard its authority, so long as this better serves their interests and they can avoid
penalties.14 Correspondingly, it is irrational to accept an unequal share of the costs
upholding the state and its structures, as when soldiers, fire-fighters, or police officers risk
their lives to maintain its order. This is especially so for those excluded from bargaining
fora. To overcome these difficulties, the liberal state needs to develop interconnective bonds
strong enough to encourage citizens to bear fair and at times demanding burdens. But this it
cannot coherently do, since it is bound to an emotivist and aggregative conception of the
good.
The allegiance enjoyed by existing states is consequently an allegiance secured by
deceiving citizens as to the true character of the state. There have been attempts to rectify
this character. Herder and his romantic successors re-envisaged the state as an ethical
totality bearing the destiny of a singular, homogenous Volk. Although Weber condemned
the quasi-mysticism motivating this view, it nonetheless endured in his understanding of
Germany as a Machtstaat whose "fate" it was to "preserve and raise the quality of [its]
national species" (PW: 16). For Maclntyre a similar line of thought guides present-day
communitarianism.15 Yet the communitarian anti-neutralist rehabilitation of the state is
doomed to failure in dangerous ways. Because of their immense size and oligarchic
structure, states lack the public fora necessary for rational debate as to the common good.
13 "There is little place in such [liberal] systems for the criticism of the system itself, that is, for
putting liberalism in question" (WJ: 392; TRY: 235). See Warnke (1992: 127).
14 See (PP: 242; 1995c: 225), Mulhall & Swift (1996: 94), Murphy (2003: 154-155), and Pinkard
(2003: 188).
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When states laud values as embodying the shared life of citizens, these values are not arrived
at through open deliberation but imposed from above by political and economic elites
substituting media hype and manufactured charisma for dialogue and argument. To believe
the state a site of genuine political aspiration is therefore to further blind oneself to its
inherent oppressiveness. Indeed, 20th century politics shows the result of thinking the state a
"bearer of sacred values," authoritarianism and terror (AV: 238; 1994a: 303). Endeavouring
to correct individualism's failings, communitarian adherence to a corrupt institutional form
threatens a collective form of emotivism no less irrational, but far deadlier, than its
individualist twin.
15 On Maclntyre's understanding of the state as Volksstaat and rejection of communitarianism, see
(1988b: 149; 1991a: 265; 1994a: 302-303; 1995b: 34-35; PP: 241; DRA: 132; 1999b: 141), Knight
(1996: 891-892; 1998: 21), Ferguson (1998: 127), and Murphy (2003: 159-160).
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9.III.) Transformative Practice and the Good of Human Beings
Unlike liberals, Weber and Nietzsche acknowledge the greatest political questions as
concerning the "quality" of human life, the good to which it directs itself.16 Hence
Maclntyre's admiration for these thinkers. The problem, however, is that their value
irrationalism impels the emotivist conception of man and practical reasoning, a change in
thought which accompanied and augmented the modern market marginalization of those
activities expressive of human excellence as opposed to avarice. The Aristotelian tradition,
Maclntyre (AV: 117) contends, provides the only coherent alternative to that conception and
marginalization. Articulated first in the Socratic School and finding expression in the New
Testament, Aquinas, and, much later, 18th century Jacobin republicanism, Ferguson, William
Cobbett, Jane Austen, and the early Marx, this tradition conceives practical reasoning as both
substantive and intersubjective. It is substantive in that to reason is to direct one's
intelligence towards realizing goods or teloi. To "have a reason for action" means simply
that one's action is guided by and is intelligible only with reference to ends (DRA: 21-28).
Teleological reflection or "purposiveness" is thus a basic feature of human beings, but this
purposiveness is not identifiable with Zweckrationalitat, instrumental reason. Instrumental
reason concerns the calculation of means to given ends, whereas purposive reasoning in
Maclntyre's sense is both the determination ofmeans and the evaluation of ends. Moreover,
where instrumental reasoning is itself an antecedent means to the satisfaction of desires,
purposive reasoning constitutes an integral part of achieving any good. Humans are rational
animals, and part of their good therefore consists in exercising their rationality (DRA: 105).
If the capacity to reason cannot be identified with instrumental calculation, neither is it
attributable to the isolated emotivist self. Aristotelian practical reason is intersubjective in
two interrelated senses, one species-specific, the other socio-historical. The first stems from
Maclntyre's "moral realism," the metaphysical contention that the facts of human nature are
objectively knowable and evaluatively significant.17 Maclntyre (AV: 164, 196) had earlier
rejected Aristotle's "metaphysical biology" in favour of a cultural or sociological account of
human teloi, but in later work he combines the two. Moral realism takes many forms, the
later Maclntyre endorsing a strong Thomist version, but in general it dictates that because
members of the species homo sapiens sapiens, human beings exhibit specific capabilities and
16
(AV: 118). In Weber's (PW: 15) words, "we do not want to breed [material] well-being in people,
but rather those characteristics which we think of a constituting ... human greatness and nobility."
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are directed to a determinate set of goods definitive of that species. These capabilities and
goods, among which Maclntyre includes physical and mental well-being, familial and social
interaction, emotional attachment, and imaginative curiosity, are not merely what individuals
want but, as basic aspects of their functioning well, are common to all individuals prior to
wanting or desiring.18 In a fundamental sense, then, practical reasoning is reasoning about a
shared reality, not personal preferences or compartmentalized parts. Basic to this reality are
two prime conditions of human life, the fact that all humans are vulnerable, finite, and yet
despite this vulnerability are capable of achieving a specific sort of independence. These
conditions are dynamically interrelated, our vulnerability necessitating dependence in
childhood on those who are already relatively independent, parents or teachers, and these
others aiding us in achieving a relative independence of our own. As Maclntyre (DRA: 77;
1999c: 316) sees it, independence of mind, the reflective ability to critique our desires, is
humanity's highest attribute, yet this independence is a plural achievement arising out of
interdependent "networks of giving and receiving." It is only attained, however, within
temporally determinate circumstances, hence the second, socio-historical sense of
intersubjectivity. Inherently social creatures, human beings come to awareness of their good
within historical contexts structured by specific roles and upheld by particular networks of
care. And understanding these networks requires understanding how everyday activities, our
relations to others, the communities we find ourselves in, and the histories we inherit shape
and are shaped by our ideals of the good.
Maclntyre's stress on vulnerability and interdependence recalls Habermas on
socialization, the developmental processes culminating in personal maturity. Yet from a
Maclntyrean perspective Habermas' division of morality and ethics, "right" and "good," is
impossible, since without reference to human teloi, "man-as-he-could-be-if he-realized-his-
essential-nature," theories of justice are condemned to the failures of Kant and Hume.19 Of
course, Habermasian socialization has its own telos or ideal of flourishing, but his
proceduralism leads to a minimalism at odds with the strong substantive assumptions of his
personality ideal and reduces moral enquiry to the language of rules. For Maclntyre,
however, rules are secondary to virtues, to the qualities of character motivating actors to
obey principles and enabling them to cooperate.
17 Whether an "individual or group is or is not flourishing qua member or members of whatever plant
or animal species to which it or they belong is ... a question of fact, even though the question ofwhat
it is to flourish has to be answered in part through evaluative ... enquiry" (DRA: 64).
18 (DRA: 63-98). For a similar account of good human functioning, see Nussbaum (1990: 219-226).
19 Unlike Habermas, Maclntyre tends to use the terms "ethics" and "morality" interchangeably. We
will return to the relation between "ethics" and "morality" below (Ch lO.I.i).
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From a virtue-ethical standpoint, morality is neither attention to the dictates of inner
conscience nor action in accordance with principles of universalization, but rather the
disposition to act in a manner that one's good and the good of others is realized (AV: 60;
Hursthouse, 1997: 220). What this disposition entails, its constituent elements, can only be
known in the concrete, hence Maclntyre's emphasis on practices or, in Marx's terminology,
"objective activities." Whether architecture, music, farming, or politics, a practice is "any
coherent form of socially established cooperative" activity in which the goods unique or
"internal" to that activity are realized in the attempt to attain recognized "standards of
excellence" (AV: 87). Thus defined, practices have three notable features. First, they are
interpersonal and sustained by shared authoritative criteria. Entering a practice means
subjecting one's "attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the standards which currently
and partially define [that] practice" (AV: 190; WJ: 113-114). This process depends on an
active dialectic of acceptance and critique, the learner taking on board existing standards and
eventually critiquing these in a never-ending movement towards excellence. And one key
part of this dialectic consists in acknowledging the role played by the "master virtues" of
honesty, courage, and a sense of justice in maintaining cooperative endeavours.
Second, practices are neither to be identified with technical skill nor their internal goods
equated with the external goods of money, power, or status. Against those who equate
technical skill with blunt instrumentalism, it is essential to recognize that every practice
involves the employment of skills. However, in practices skill and skilfulness are integrated
within and subordinate to a wider performance or way of life directed towards over-arching
goods. These sense-conferring goods undergo change with each reassessment of a practice's
standards or purpose and necessitate the full exercise of human capabilities (AV: 193). In
contrast to assembly line production or administrative divisions of labour, which reduce
work to the repetitive execution of isolated tasks, practices require a broad proficiency
irreducible to unequivocal maxims or law-like generalizations. Where managerial expertise
is transmitted and assessed according to bureaucratically fixed criteria, practical knowledge
or "modest expertise" is progressively acquired through habituation and reflection (AV: 107).
Experience, what Aristotle called phronesis or "practical wisdom," and not official
qualification, defines the competent practitioner.
The modern zweckrational subordination of internal to external goods is pernicious,
Maclntyre contends, in tempting men to neglect their true capabilities and ends. Having no
intrinsic connection to specific practices, external goods can be attained without broad
knowledge or proficiency. Moreover, because "zero-sum" goods, when power, status, or
wealth become the predominant social concern actors are induced to treat others as
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manipulable objects. Maclntyre (A V: 196) takes care to note that external goods "genuinely
are goods," that practices such as fishing or farming are simultaneously directed towards
internal and external ends, and that all practices require external goods to endure, a feature of
his thought which will be emphasized (Ch lO.I.ii), yet the meaning of practical activity
transcends products, power, or wealth. Hence the third feature of practices, their being
activities where actors' "achieve something of universal worth," "transform and educate
themselves through their own self-transformative activity" (1994b: 225, 231). Within
practices actors do not just attain extrinsic ends but exhibit, actualize, and extend their innate
powers. Action and work are here not something incidental, subservient to consumption, but
fundamental modes of being in which individuals take hold of their lives. The means they
deploy in producing art works or in ordering their political life are thus inseparably bound to
the ends they hope to achieve.20 One is not a worker or consumer, a generic figure, but
rather a painter, farmer, or politician, a character whose exertions are not extraneous to but
provide the bedrock of one's identity.
Maclntyre and Weber (PE: 123) agree that modern occupational structures entail a
"renunciation" of the "universality of man." It is therefore a grave misreading to think
Maclntyre a conservative or communitarian relativist, for motivating his thought is Marx's
hope for an end to "alienation," the dissociation of humanity from its essential powers. Yet
the non-alienated life is an integrated life, hence Maclntyre's idea of narrative unity. In line
with the socio-historical sense of intersubjectivity, for an actor to know his good, he must
know how that good manifests itself in his various historically effected roles as son, father,
citizen, craftsman, and believer. To know who one is to therefore to understand oneself as a
whole, as having a past, present, and future. Indeed, the very intelligibility of human action
demands this narrative form, since actions are incomprehensible, alien, without
understanding the settings in which they occurred, the intentions of actors, and the ends they
hoped to secure (1977a: 458-459). The implications of this narrative constitution of human
life are far-reaching. To have an identity is to be one about whom a story can be told and to
be able oneself to tell that story. Identity is therefore inextricably connected with the
concept of accountability, the presupposition of intelligibility being that actors can recount
and account for the circumstances, experiences, and causes underlying their intersecting life
histories (AV: 218, 258; TRV: 196-197). The emotivist "democratized self," where the
20 The aim of practices "is never only to catch fish, or to produce beef or milk, or to build houses. It is
to do so in a manner consonant with the excellences of the craft, so that not only is there a good
product, but the craftsman is perfected through and in her ... activity" (1994a: 284).
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individual dissolves into a succession of unconnected desires and events, is thus illusory and,
when actually believed, a pathology abetting degenerate modes of practice.
Lives are incoherent and prone to injustice without some overall continuity between
different practices, a sense of how the virtues should inform our actions across boundaries
and between diverse others. Yet narrativity also entails a reconceptualization of political
enquiry. When settings, intentions and purposes are basic to understanding social reality, it
becomes impossible to sideline actors' understandings of their action contexts. The
managerial and behaviourist hope for a quantitative political science is therefore absurd
(ASIA: 264-279). When political scientists do attain real knowledge of the social world, their
knowledge is similar in kind to that possessed by ordinary subjects, one that must necessarily
include contestable concepts such as "legitimacy" and "illegitimacy." These concepts,
likewise, cannot be conceived in value-neutral terms, but are inherently evaluative, the
question of "legitimacy", as Habermas argued, being both a question as to whether actors
believe an authority legitimate and whether in truth it is legitimate. As with political
practice, the study of politics is an ethical endeavour.
Just as flourishing individual lives take the form of a "narrative quest," an
underdetermined search for the best ordering of one's activities, so too do robust societies
seek to coherently order their collective existence (A V: 220). Here the concept of tradition
has application. The intelligibility of actions depends not only on their being identifiable
within specific practices and the broader narrative of individual lives, but requires
understanding these practices and lives as embedded within larger histories and inheritances.
A vibrant tradition, Maclntyre argues, "is an historically extended, socially embodied
argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition"
as it is manifested in institutions such as universities, schools, hospitals, or political fora (A V:
222). Maclntyre therefore takes issue with Weber's (ES: 25, 36) characterization of the
"traditional" as "ingrained habituation," a blind faith in "that which has always been." This
Burkean account of tradition opposes authority to reason and extols pre-rational commitment
above reflection.21 Here "tradition" functions as the flip-side of liberalism, Burke's
conservative surrender to a statically conceived past the reverse image of the liberal subject's
distance from all contexts, all inheritances. For Maclntyre, however, belonging to a tradition
or historical community with shared standards and values is not inimical to reason but a
fundamental condition of being able to reason at all. Liberalism is itself a tradition in this
sense, but its individualism and faith in an atemporal rationality show it to be incapable of
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recognizing communities as trans-generational projects (WJ: 326-348). Maclntyre's
Thomism commits him to a belief in one true conception of reality, but he remains certain
that the "real," the universal, only shows itself though history. The goal of rational enquiry
is therefore not to escape tradition or community or even particularity, since to repudiate my
past would be to "deform my present relationships" and sever myself from the well-spring of
moral knowledge, but instead to overcome arbitrary and unjust limitations by endorsing the
best conception of rationality, justice, and the good thus far articulated.22
21 For Maclntyre's critique of Burke, see (1977a: 461; SS: 68; AV: 42, 221; WJ\ 353), McMylor (1994:
159-160), and Gutting (1999: 97-99).
22 It is in moving forward from "particularity that the search for the good, the universal, consists. Yet
particularity can never be simply left behind or obliterated. The notion of escaping from it into a
realm of entirely universal maxims ... is an illusion" (AV: 221; 1994a: 289; TRV: 64).
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9.IV.) The Politics of Local Community
Maclntyre's ideal is of citizens socialized within cultural networks comprising roles that
enable, rather than inhibit, their capacity to reason in concert. Balanced between dependence
and independence, these citizens belong to an "educated public" bound by shared norms and
directed towards common ends, a public wherein enquiry is conducted rationally and without
manipulation.23 Yet because no commonly accepted standards now exist, the chance for a
society-wide educated public is also non-existent. More gravely still, with the barbarians
already within our gates, attempts within the confines of the state to reverse the passification
of citizens all tend towards "collaboration" or "degenerate into terrorism" (1991a: 265; AV\
109). As Maclntyre sees it, Weber (PW: x) was right to believe modern mass revolutionary
endeavour fated to augment managerial organization or dissipate in "bloody carnival."
There is some room for hope, however. The alternative to emotivism is a communal
politics organized towards the common good. As opposed to preferences or sectional
interests, common goods are those "that can be mine only insofar as they are also those of
others" (DRA: 119). An Aristotelian politics therefore sets itself the threefold task of
nurturing the conditions of human flourishing, vulnerability and independence, facilitating
those diverse practices in which flourishing manifests itself, and advancing communal ideals
through reflective critique. So conceived politics is an activity "through which other types of
practice are ordered so that individuals may direct themselves towards what is best for them
and for their community" (PP: 241). Its goal is the provision of the institutional means
necessary for engagement in science, art, family life, or non-alienated production.
Maclntyre takes care to distinguish practices from institutions. The practice of medicine or
education is concerned with the internal good of health or knowledge, whereas hospitals or
universities are hierarchical bodies overseeing the procurement ofmaterial and other external
goods. Because structured in terms of power and status, institutions often corrupt the
practices they claim to support. But while institutions do frequently corrupt, "the making
and sustaining of forms of community ... [that is] institutions ... itself has all the
characteristics of a practice" (AV: 194, my italics). An Aristotelian politics is an
institutional praxis where power and status are subordinated to the furtherance of
practitioners innate powers, thus realizing the internal goods of civic friendship and
communal independence.
23 For the idea of "educated publics," see (1987a: 16-19; TRY: 216-217; DRA: 156-157; 1999c: 318-
322; 1999d: 245-264; 2002: 16-17).
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Maclntyre's strongly perfectionist vision recognizes the need for differentiating arenas
of life and defends a private realm defined by strong discretionary rights.24 Yet, to disrupt
modern compartmentalization, the need for protective boundaries must not occlude the fact
that the spheres of individual, family, and communal life are interdependent. An optimally
integrated community, one escaping the binary of liberal fragmentation and romantic
collectivism, is impossible without certain fundamental conditions being fulfilled. Because
the exercise of reason is a presupposition of achieving any good, communities must first
institutionalize forms of inclusive public debate so that a "common mind" can be attained.
In contrast to Weberian elitism, a genuine politics includes all those concerned or affected
within the processes of opinion-formation and decision-making. Cogent action requires
citizens to fundamentally agree on their purposes, implying a large degree of shared culture,
yet this culture is maintained through deliberative argument (PP: 241). Furthermore, for the
common mind to be oriented toward the common good, the positive enactment of law must
be founded upon rational ethical norms.
Although Maclntyre (AV: 192-193) has long argued for cross-cultural "master-virtues,"
his later work comprehends these under the nomenclature of natural law. Natural reason and
its exceptionless precepts arise jointly out of our being educated into traditions or
"languages-in-use" and our basic capacity for thought. So that speech be meaningful, some
basic commitment to "conversational justice" must exist between deliberators in public fora.
The virtues of truthfulness, listening, and openness to refutation are not external constraints
upon but conditions of enquiry and criticism (DRA: 111). Those who reject these conditions
and the shared narratives underpinning networks of care destroy the very tongues that allow
public deliberation to occur. Criticism and dissent are paramount, the indicators of a robust
society, but when unlimited they destroy all chance of securing the good. The task, then, is
to walk the path between suppression and disruption, something that relies not on general
proscriptions but the character of each case (1999b: 134). Communities are justified in
ignoring those who maintain long discredited views, phrenology or phlogiston theory, and
excluding those who despite all evidence continue to deny events such as the Holocaust or
engage in racist tirades. As voices from the outside hostile to the living ties of communal
interdependence, they can never "participate with us in rational conversation, criticism, and
enquiry."25
24 On differentiation, see (PP: 248; DRA: 109; 1999c: 322). See (2002: 11) for Maclntyre's defence
of the parental right to choose a particular form of education.
25
(DRA: 165). See also (1987a: 23-24; 1999b: 148, 151-152) and Porter (1993: 528-530).
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The urge to participate arises, of course, from the reality of conflict. Practitioners find
themselves within received contexts of value and established claims to authority, but these
contexts and claims are continually challenged by novel experiences of inconsistency and
contradiction occurring to those within a tradition and by claims forwarded by rival
traditions. When received verities break down in moments of conflict or "epistemological
crisis" there is no recourse to an "encyclopaedic" point of view, since every conception of
justice, rationality, or the good is a particular conception with a determinate history (1977a:
453; WJ: 361; 77? F: 173). The Enlightenment belief in a transcendent reason, entirely
transparent to any rational agent whatsoever, is an illusion. A plurality of traditions or
"languages-in-use" exists and the presuppositions of these traditions are often
incommensurable, untranslatable into the vocabularies of their rivals. Maclntyre therefore
recognizes the possibility of fundamental conflict in communities oriented to the common
good, but this conflict does not, he insists, vindicate Nietzschean relativism or the liberal
privatization of value.
Maclntyre's metatheory of "traditions-in-conflict" or "the rationality of traditions"
argues that communities can overcome internal and inter-communal conflict through a
dynamic process of dialectical construction (WJ: 100, 358; 1990c: 190). To prove their
commitments rational, actors must imaginatively enter the conceptual and linguistic world of
rival perspectives. Having acquired a "second-first-language," an internal understanding of
their rivals, actors can then compare these perspectives to their own and assess whether they
better explain reality, are less contradictory, more adequate to experience (WJ: 374). In this
interchange three outcomes are possible. A tradition may show itself rationally superior to its
rivals, as when Newtonian physics triumphed over Aristotelian physics.26 There may be a
melding of traditions, as when Aquinas combined Aristotle and Augustine. Or, finally,
stalemate may result, a situation of enduring conflict currently beyond rational resolution.
But even when a tradition proves itself superior, its superiority is always provisional and
fallible, vulnerable to future interpretations. This is especially so with ethical matters, where
the knowledge concerned is necessarily inexact, of a phronetic rather than theoretical kind
(AV: 159). Thus, in contrast to the aspirations of managerial expertise, "there is and can be
no finality" (77? F: 125).
It will become clear (Ch 10.II.ii) that Maclntyre's theory of dialectical construction is far
from unproblematic, that in combining it with Aquinas' insistence upon a hierarchically
26 A tradition is rationally superior when through conceptual innovation it resolves problems in ways
others cannot, explains why these problems occurred, and in all this maintains a continuity with its
own intellectual and moral inheritances (WJ: 362; TRV: 120).
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ordered universe, a monistic summum bonum, and a perfected deductive science, his thought
succumbs to internal tension.27 This tension arises in part from his (WJ: 165-166, 179-188)
repudiation of themes defended in After Virtue, the (AV: 157-163, 178-180) Sophoclean
claims that human teloi do not form a seamless whole and that the virtues often conflict,
leaving actors in ethical dilemmas. For the time being, however, it is important to recognize
that despite his turn to Thomist moral realism, Maclntyre continues to believe communities
attain maturity only by subjecting themselves to dialectical interrogation.28
A further condition of Aristotelian communities, one enabling the institutionalization of
participatory fora, is the co-existence of two principles of distributive justice, desert and just
generosity (DRA: 130). These are embodied respectively in Marx's injunctions regarding, on
the one hand, socialist society, and on the other, the ideal society of communism. Between
able bodied independent practical reasoners, each should receive according to what he has
given and deserves. Yet, between the able and the unable need takes precedence, each now
giving what he can and receiving, insofar as possible, what he lacks. This distributive
structure presumes a market form which does not simply reward on the basis of satisfying
uninterrogated economic demand (1985b: 245). Committed to the ideology of economic
growth for its own sake and demanding high labour mobility, capitalist markets disrupt
interpersonal bonds, condemn the vulnerable to tedious or dangerous forms of labour, and
reduce education to the acquisition of saleable skills (DRA: 145). Genuinely free markets,
instead, do not treat productive activity as a mere means but as an intersubjective mode of
self-transformation.29 These markets, in other words, require embedding in non-market
relationships found only in the space lying between nation-state and family, those relatively
self-sufficient, small-scale local communities "within which the activities of families,
workplaces, schools, clinics, clubs dedicated to debate and clubs dedicated to games and
sports, and religious congregations may all find a place" (DRA: 135).
In this space usually called civil society, a term Maclntyre (1994b: 223, 234) is loathe to
use for largely Marxist reasons, plain persons can decide as to their ends free from the
deceptive cant of modern parliamentary democracy. This does not mean, however, the
intended death of the nation-state. Although radically opposed, committed to each other's
subversion, members of local communities should circumspectly acquire from nation-state
27 It is worth noting that this internal tension characterizes his later Thomist writings, when from
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? onward he emphasizes dialectic and fallibility and yet defends
the possibility of complete and perfect comprehension of the cosmos.
28
"Only those whose tradition allows for the possibility of its hegemony being put in question can
have rational warrant for asserting such a hegemony" (WJ: 388).
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functionaries those public goods which they themselves cannot provide, security against
external threat and material resources procurable only through large-scale organization. This
licences an "ad hoc participation" in governmental structures premised on the realization that
such participation is strategic or instrumentally appropriate (PP: 252; 1994a: 303). Here
Maclntyre makes a key claim. Liberals neglect that a politics limited to ensuring individual
security lacks proper authority, is vulnerable to free riders, and is blind to the intrinsic worth
of political life, but they are certainly right to fear states which present themselves as the
guardians of sacred values. Thus, while castigating the liberal claim to neutrality, Maclntyre
(1999b: 144) nonetheless argues for an "ostensible neutrality" of states, for even though such
neutrality is "never real, it is an important fiction, and those of us who recognise its
importance as well as its fictional character will agree with liberals in upholding a certain
range of civil liberties."
State neutrality must extend even to Holocaust denial, for when states try to defend
values they end up destroying them.30 Under modern conditions, only communal politics can
defend truth against revisionism or arrive at rational value consensus. For Maclntyre it is
therefore clear which realm has primacy. Community is the sole site of political aspiration
and the legitimate determination of needs; the nation-state has purpose merely to the extent it
satisfies those needs and holds back from imposing its own ethos or rationality. If it refuses
to hold back, if it blunders into the space of the "face-to-face encounters and conversations of
local community," then plain persons have leave to fall back on their natural reason and
emulate the "revolutionary struggles of the past that broke down barriers to achieving modern
citizenship" (DRA: 142).
Inimical to the state and capitalist market, Aristotelian communities rely upon goods
internal to citizens' activities, to their lives in general, and upon a market of uncoerced
participation which is about profit and the wider relationships of loyalty, respect and
goodwill that should exist between producers and their patrons. An avowedly "Utopian"
understanding of the potential of community life, certainly, but Maclntyre (PP: 252; DRA:
143) claims there have been groups and organisations, Donegal farming co-operatives,
Mayan towns in Guatemala and Mexico, Welsh mining communities, and numerous fishing
villages, which have more or less realised this ideal. Yet no utopianism should occlude the
truth that without the virtues local communities are no better than the most bureaucratised
29
As Maclntyre (1958: 39, my italics) once put it, "the economic basis of a society is not its tools, but
the people co-operating using these particular tools in the manner necessary to their use."
30 As exemplified, in Maclntyre's (1999b: 143, 151) view, by the disastrous effect state embodiment
had for the practice of Irish Roman Catholicism.
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and callous of nation-states. The essence of our personal and communal good lies not in
community, whatever communitarians might think. Rather, it rests in the virtuous
relationships at work within networks of giving and receiving. The relationships constitutive
of our identities have also dominative aspects. Therefore we have to recognise that
"institutionalised networks of giving and receiving are ... always structures of unequal
distributions of power, structures well designed both to mask and protect these same
distributions" (DRA: 102). It was by retreating from the virtues that barbarity arose, and it is
only by returning to the virtues that barbarity can be held in check.
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Engaging Maclntyre: Flourishing, Modernity, and Struggle
The preceding explored Maclntyre's repudiation of bureaucratic individualism and his
ethical-political ideal. Here we interrogate that ideal, first by assessing its positive
dimensions. Flourishing is recovered as a primary political concern but in avoiding the
pitfalls of Habermas' theorization of the good Maclntyre prevents a return to Weberian
decisionism (Ch lO.I.i). This is complemented on the metatheoretical level by a dialectical
characterization of change, which rejects Habermas and Arendt's abstract departicularization
of ethical experience without succumbing, as liberals charge, to authoritarian
conventionalism. Maclntyre is most significant, however, for a non-dichotomous
theorization of political practice or "purposeful performance" that recovers "system" and
"the social" as centrally ethical arenas (Ch lO.I.ii).
There are notable deficiencies, nonetheless. The first consists in his suspect contrast
between consensual pre-modernity and conflictual modernity, which obscures Maclntyre's
own modernism and threatens to undercut his Aristotelian account of ethical life (Ch lO.II.i).
Led astray by this binary, Maclntyre surrenders the gains of his non-dichotomous theory of
practice by opposing local community to the politics of the nation state, thus implicating
himself in the ontological spatialization performed by Habermas and Arendt (Ch 10.III.i). A
second deficiency arises from his Thomist moral realism. This version of moral realism
spurs Maclntyre to contradict elements of his thought and to downplay the possibility of a
non-compartmentalized, non-subjective pluralism, which is inadequately distinguished from
emotivist pluralism (Ch 10.II.ii). More seriously still, Thomism and poor genealogy together
culminate in a denial of fundamental conflict between genuine goods and the ineradicable
role opposition, struggle and compromise play in all politics (Ch 10.III.ii). Thus, although
Maclntyre differs greatly from Habermas and Arendt, his thought ends in quandaries
strikingly akin to theirs.
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10.1.) Maclntyre's Significance
lO.I.i.) Flourishing and the Good
The "quality" of human beings secured by socio-political orders provides the ultimate
standard of judgement and to ignore it is to pacify debate (PW 15; PP: 236-237). In this
Maclntyre and Weber concur, yet Maclntyre sees "quality" not as characteristic of isolated
selves but possessed by individuals whose identities are constituted through engagement in
activities with others. Stressing the intersubjective grounds of a maturity defined by
independence and vulnerability, he strongly recalls Habermas on socialization and non-
pathological development. But Habermas' theory is problematic. We saw that he
misunderstands the critical fountainhead of his work by subordinating ethics to morality and
arguing for an untenable proceduralism (Ch 4.II.i). This failing is compounded by his
inconsistent refusal of teleological accounts of ethical life, which, when coupled with his
equation of the good with conventional, subjective, or utilitarian categories, concludes with a
surreptitious reassertion of Weberian decisionism (Ch 4.II.ii).
Maclntyre shows a path beyond these problems. As regards the relation between
morality and ethics, he acknowledges their different referents without resorting to
subordinating diremptions.1 In determining just behavioural expectations morality lays
down what ought not be done by placing an obligating barrier between inviolable individual
or collective competencies and oppression. In seeking out the contours of the worthy life,
ethics, instead, locates those competencies warranting such protection in the first place. As
Maclntyre sees it this difference in no way justifies Habermas' prioritization of right over
good, for right or justice is incomprehensible without there being something deemed worthy
of protection. The very fact, he argues, that human beings, because human, are deemed to
require privacy in order to live successfully is reason to uphold and maintain a sphere of
interaction protected by private liberties. Determination of the boundaries of private life
therefore begins and concludes with evaluations of the significance privacy should have in
the structure of diverse lives. Here good is prior to right, yet right is not subordinated but
itself forms a constitutive part of the good, for in laying down obligatory rules we are also
saying that without obedience to these rules there can be neither excellence nor eudaimonia
1
Maclntyre (WJ: ix) also rejects those feminist perspectives opposing right to good, justice to virtue.
As articulated by Gilligan (1982: 64-105) and Baier (1997: 263-277), the problem with such views
is that their separation of "masculine" justice from "feminine" care perpetuates the oppositions
definitive of Habermas' morality and ethics divide. See Hursthouse (1997: 220-221) and Statman
(1997: 28-30).
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(AV: 151; TRV: 139). Justice is not grasped in abstraction from human goods or ends and
thereafter superimposed on life plans, but arises and is understood in pursuit of such ends.
Because justice remains unintelligible without reference to human well-being, to opt for
moral proceduralism over ethical substance is to err. Maclntyre's analysis of
"conversational justice" is, of course, an analysis of the procedural dimensions of rational
enquiry. But these dimensions are underpinned by substantive commitments which place
firm checks on what can be said or done (1999b: 146). Maclntyre therefore concurs with
Rawls' critique of Habermas (Ch 4.II.i). Yet he also surpasses critique. Not only does
conversational justice presume the substantive ideals of independence, reciprocity, and
reflection, but these ideals in turn presume a general account of good human functioning.
Maclntyre, we saw, breaks with liberal individualism in asserting the irreducibly social
nature of independence, the fact of its dependence upon roles in which the ability to question
is nourished by fragile interpersonal and institutional structures. Politics' task is to ensure
the continuity of these structures. But this task cannot be performed without adequately
understanding what people are capable of being and becoming, the ends they pursue. Hence
the importance ofMaclntyre's teleological analysis of practices. Because human capabilities
and ends become known solely in their actualization, this analysis provides a concrete
reference-point to assess whether activities are free and have meaning. Negatively confining
attention to "damaged life," Habermas finds himself unable, like liberals, to speak of the
positive, non-alienated "standards of livability" motivating his theory (MCCA: 205; TCA, II:
394). Attending to the internal ends of education, work, and political engagement,
Maclntyre rejects Habermas' ban on teleological reflection to recover these fundamental
standards. This recovery enjoins a firm rebuttal of subjectivist, conventional, and utilitarian
categorizations of ethical issues. Utilitarian categorization is ruled out by the distinction
between "good" and "mere" functioning. Maximizing preferences taken as given,
utilitarianism fails to distinguish between internal and external goods, reducing all desire to
the latter (AV: 63-65, 198-199). This reduction means it is at best an uncritical theory of
"mere" functioning limited to calculations ofmaterial distributions and conceptually blind to
the distinction between reasoned and irrational desire, real interests and self-deceptions.
Thus, appreciation of "good" functioning demands more than attention to the preferences of
actors or the quantitative material resources they possess, important though they are, but
sensitivity to qualitative questions, whether these resources enable actors to lead fulfilling
lives, whether their various roles are enhanced or impeded by specific distributive patterns
(PP: 250).
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Qualitative judgements of this sort exclude subjective categorization. Assimilating
ethics to self-clarification and doubting that ethical conflict can admit of rational agreement,
Habermas submits to Weber's battling gods. Yet because practices are located within
intersubjectively established, historically rooted, and intersecting narratives and traditions,
ethics cannot rest on subjectivity alone, whether individual or conceived as some macro-
subject. Subjectivity, awareness of oneself in action and the motivation to act, is intrinsic to
ethical experience, but that experience incorporates a history and standards of excellence not
at the disposal of individual wills. Entering into a practice to achieve enduring goods
involves the gradual internalization of standards of excellence which relate to practitioners
not as preferential options but as the very grounds of their being able to participate in that
practice at all.2 Indeed, our analysis (Ch 4.1.i) of Habermas' intersubjective alternative to
decisionism, Weber's preoccupation with "inward calling," confirmed this. Without
motivation to partake in science or architecture these practices cannot be appreciated, but
lack of motivation on the part of particular individuals does not mean that science or
architecture cease to endure as tangible components of a social existence guided by
interpersonal criteria. The "fundamental unit" of ethical life is "persons-in-social-
relationships," not the person in communion with himself (1995a: 358).
Ends and standards therefore stand over individuals whilst at the same time emerging
from their interactions. There is a further reason for rejecting subjectivism, however. As
Maclntyre sees it, to identify the good with hermeneutic self-clarification, the authenticity of
a "shared form of life or collective identity" (Habermas, 1999c: 24), is to fall guilty of a
conservative narcissism. If understood exclusively as self-clarification, ethical discourse
degrades into narcissism in the sense that its core referent becomes oneself or one's
community, not oneself or one's community in relation to others. It is prejudiced towards
conservatism, on the other hand, insofar as this referent is determined by our past, what we
alone have experienced, and not the experiences of different forms of life and their
implication for our future interactions.3 This misportrayal occludes the critical element of
ethical discourse, the fact that it challenges, rather than simply explicates, given identities.
Ethical discourse goes beyond self-explication to enquire whether identities are worthwhile,
whether they serve equally all they purport to serve. In other words it poses the problem of
the common good. This problem includes interpretations of needs and collective goals
2
Maclntyre (1991a: 261; 1994b: 233). Hence the untenability of Bernstein's (1986a: 131) claim,
repeated by Okin (1989: 46), that Maclntyre concludes with the '"decisionism' that he finds so
objectionable in Nietzsche and Weber."
3 As can be seen from Habermas' (1994b: 107-148) debate with Taylor, where his tendency to
subsume ethics under the conservative rubric of "cultural preservation" is pronounced.
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relating not only to the norm of authenticity but, more fundamentally, to the ideals of
independence and community. A prime example, for Maclntyre (1994a: 289; DRA: 3-4), is
the feminist rearticulation of womanhood. Critiquing received views of women's capacities
and wants, feminists made public their experience of repression to contest theretofore
unproblematized conceptions of the common good, which had been a good common only to
men. Their struggle therefore derived less from a will to self-clarification than a wish to
educate others into the suffering of a specific group so as to alter shared socio-political
frameworks.4 Furthermore, in condemning the status quo they called for agreement as to the
accuracy of their rearticulation of needs and goals, thus directly contradicting Habermas'
(IO: 55) denial that values or goods can attain the level of acceptance achievable by moral
norms.
Lodged within ethical discourse, then, is an "Utopian" element demanding
acknowledgement of genuinely common, as opposed to sectional, goods (Maclntyre, 1996:
81; Cooke, 1999b: 186). If so, our argument disputes conventionalist as well as subjectivist
portrayals of the ethical. Although inescapably beginning with received understandings,
feminism's critical impetus derives from an exploration of how such understandings distort
women's capabilities. Key to their project, consequently, is a distinction between essential
capabilities and prevailing conventions. But in making this distinction feminists commit
themselves to asserting, as Maclntyre does, a revised concept of human nature, presuming in
turn the moral- or ethical-realist claim that there are knowable truths about human beings,
one such truth being that women are not biologically or emotionally predisposed to a
household existence. Habermas (Ch. 4.II.ii) rejects realist claims on account of his
erroneous assumption that realism presupposes an external point of view by which to
definitively disclose humanity's essence. Although seriously problematic, as will be argued
(Ch 10.II.ii), Maclntyre's realism denies the possibility of external "encyclopaedic"
perspectives, averring, with Nussbaum, that human nature can only be known from within as
"the most fundamental and broadly shared experiences of human beings living and reasoning
together" (Nussbaum, 1995: 121; Maclntyre, 1994a: 301).
We come to know who we as humans are not by attaining the impossible "objectivity"
sought by the managerial sciences, but through multifaceted processes of dialectical
questioning. Because this questioning always begins within specific contexts there is no
4 To quote Cooke (1999b: 180-181), ethics is not simply the "explication of collective value-
orientations or self-understandings but also ... the articulation, and struggle for recognition, of
particular (group) needs and ... goals." Cooke also makes clear that insofar as Habermas (BFN: 418-
427) defends feminist critiques of liberal and welfarist legal paradigms, he presumes a conception of
ethics irreducible to authenticity.
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possibility of separating justificatory from applicatory discourses or achieving the privileged
point of view definitive of Arendtian spectators. Contra Habermas, to know what is just and
good one must first have experience of the just and good, a concrete awareness of their
actualization that precedes theoretical justification.5 Thus Maclntyre concurs with our
arguments against differentiating first-order universal norms from second-order particular
applications (Ch 4.II.ii). Contra Arendt, to be able to think at all one must be located within
a polis or community, and this necessary location means that reflection takes its leave
primarily from our role as participants, not spectators (fVJ: 122-123). Distance is required
for practical understanding, yet because temporally rooted and dependent on our
embodiment in real communities, this distance is never autonomous but rather a
heteronomous achievement heavily dependent on theoretical and practical resources
originating in others.6
Maclntyre's critics level two serious accusations here. First, despite his desire to
uncover capabilities and proper ends, because Maclntyre concentrates upon given practices
and their internal standards he concludes with a disguised form of conventionalism
insensitive to those processes of change "generated by debate across traditions and on the
basis of values external to prevailing cultures."7 He therefore lacks the criteria necessary for
exposing "evil practices," oppression. Second, and on account of his implicit
conventionalism, he stands guilty of subordinating critique and reflection to the prevailing
authorities of community and tradition.
Close attention to Maclntyre's thought as a whole, rather than focusing on partial
elements, shows these accusations to be misplaced. As to the charge of authoritarianism, if
Maclntyre did subordinate reflection to authority then he would suffer Weber's inability to
differentiate de facto belief in legitimacy from justified belief. Yet his metatheoretical
account of the traditions-in-conflict presumes the possibility of so differentiating. For a
tradition to remain viable it must engage dissenting standpoints that are in key respects
incommensurable with its presuppositions. This engagement implies the recognition of
conflict and the imaginative ability to learn "second-first languages" so as to enter into the
experiential world of rival groups and ascertain whether they escape the tensions afflicting
5 "When I speak of learning what our common good is, I am ... referring to how we acquire practical
knowledge of the good, not the mastery of some theoretical formulas, but the acquisition of a
directedness towards the good embodied in our everyday practice" (DRA: 135-136).
6
"Nothing can claim exemption from reflective critique, but well-founded reflective critique can
never be disengaged from [the] contexts of practice" (1994a: 289).
7
Fraser & Lacey (1993: 144, my italics; 1994: 275-276). See also Okin (1989: 43), Barry (1989: 160-
168), Nussbaum (1989: 40), Markham (1991: 259-267), Coleman (1994: 82), and Holmes (1996:
113, 263). These accusations are directed at both his Thomist and earlier non-Thomist periods.
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one's own position (WJ: 374, 398). But because the process of dialectically interrogating
rival beliefs presupposes a plurality of viewpoints and the fallibilism of all claims to
authority, the charge of authoritarianism cannot be sustained.8 Authoritarianism entails the
suppression of conflict and difference, whereas Maclntyre (AV: 163-164, 277; TRV: 201;
1991a: 262) acknowledges the role these phenomena play in augmenting the common good.
There are difficulties with Maclntyre's understanding of conflict and plurality (Ch
10.II.ii, 10.III.ii), but clearly he believes legitimate authority to be authority having
withstood the test of reflection. That Maclntyre's account of traditions-in-conflict relies
upon a dynamic between acceptance and critique is also reason for discounting the
accusation of conventionalism. It is simply untrue that he limits critique to criteria internal
to practices, not least because this limitation would reinforce the vice of
compartmentalization and contradict his broad avowals regarding need and desert.9
Moreover, whether one conception of a particular good is superior to others can only be
determined if the practice in question is understood in terms of its impact on human lives
taken as a whole, their narrative unity in the context of many practices and roles. Guided by
the presupposition that clashing goods can be integrated and not just traded off against each
other, change and the possibility for critique take on a sophisticated character within
Maclntyre's thought. There is, first, the conflict that arises within practices as to their
internal goods or meaning, whether the end of teaching is to foster culture or to transmit
specific expertise, for example. This conflict is compounded by the conflict between
practitioners and the institutions in which they find themselves, their Church or union, since
"even the best of such institutions is always corruptible ... and it would be difficult to
exaggerate the harm resulting from such corruption" (1994a: 290). Practitioners must also
harmonize as best they can the competing demands of distinct spheres of life, of work and
family, ambition and responsibility, so that their lives attain a passable balance. And, finally,
the traditions and histories they inherit are not monological, but riven with contradictory
claims which they have to assess for themselves using careful judgement and reason.
To Maclntyre's mind the meaning of human activities is never static and what is evil
justly deserves to disappear. The ultimate standard for judging political orders is whether
they enable essential human powers, including the power of reflection. Although every
8 "No one at any stage can ever rule out the future possibility of their present beliefs and judgements
being shown to be inadequate" (WJ: 361). This fallibilism commits Maclntyre, as Porter (1993:
523) notes, to "the virtues of tolerance, respect for pluralism, and openness to revision and change."
9 This is a frequent criticism (Scheffler, 1983: 446; Frazer & Lacey, 1994: 274; Miller, 1994: 256),
despite the fact that his (AV: 275; 1994a: 284; 1999c: 315-321) account of flourishing depends upon
the three-fold framework of practices, individual narratives, and traditions.
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assertion of the good is rooted in a particular context, the task of ethical enquiry is to move
from partial to genuinely universal conceptions of flourishing.10 Thus Maclntyre breaks with
conventionalism in asserting a universal human "function" or telos, that human beings seek
to become the best that they can be. This telos entails increasing control over the conditions
and ends of one's life, but a control dependent upon engagement with others, never their
domination.
lO.I.ii.) Experience, Purposeful Performance, and Institutions
Aversion to Weberian Herrschaft also unites Habermas and Arendt, but their differing
articulations of the political generate considerable problems. Habermas' "ideal-speech
situation" abstracts from concrete experience in a manner mischaracterizing non-dominative
relations of authority and expertise as inherently oppressive (Ch 4,II.ii). Arendt's concept of
"performative action" renders political endeavour obscure by detaching it from purposes,
consequences, and intentions, an obscurity reinforced by her separation of determinate
knowledge, truth, from indeterminate reflection, opinion (Ch 7.II). The dangers of these
turns are clear. Without explicating the role expertise plays in political life, we risk
surrendering politics to Weber's leaders and bureaucratic elites, whose authority is
legitimated precisely in terms of expertise. And without incorporating purposes,
consequences, and intentions within an intersubjectively conceived praxis, we risk
surrendering these primary concepts to Weberian Zweckrationalitat and its connotations of
monological violence.
It is certainly true that Maclntyre (1995a) has gradually come to a greater appreciation
of Habermasian arguments regarding conversational justice and "performative
contradictions." But it remains a decisive feature of his thought that universal norms can
only be understood in medias re, in actually living the particularities of one's life. This
concretization implies not only the inseparability of justification and application but also the
realization that abstractly construed norms, such as Habermas' process rules 3.1-3.3,
represent a crude shorthand for a very complex reality." Unlike mathematics ethics is not an
accurate science, and unlike mathematics, too, it does not reduce to a series of fundamental
10 Without "moral particularities to begin from there would never be anywhere to begin; but it is in
moving forward from such particularity that the search for the good, for the universal, consists" (AV:
221; 1983: 462-463).
" Hence his rejection (TRV: 46) of Habermas' "neo-Kantian thesis that allegiance to one specific set
of ideal norms is a necessary condition of acts of communication." To characterize ethical life in
this way is to subordinate it to theory.
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formulae or principles (WJ: 114-115). Hence the significance of the intellectual virtue
phronesis. The ability to discern what is appropriate, good or just in specific action contexts,
phronesis or "practical wisdom" is acquired through long processes of learning and struggle.
Although awareness of universal goods and rules is a part of such wisdom it is but one part,
the other being experience of particulars. And as the experience of particulars, this context,
this problem, phronesis is governed by no fixed rules but is, instead, the fundamental ability
to apply rules within novel situations.12
The importance of Maclntyre's argument here is that in recalling Aristotle's critique of
Plato it illuminates a conspicuous lacuna in Habermas' thought.13 Aristotle reacted against
Plato's Philosopher-King and "pessimism about the social world" to defend ordinary citizens
in the real world (AV: 147; WJ: 90-93). Likewise, Maclntyre defends the phronetic
knowledge of ordinary practitioners against the "generalized other" inhabiting Habermas'
"ideal-speech situation." Concentrating on ideal procedures this situation occludes a key
element of any defensible claim to authority. Whether proper procedures have been
followed is insufficient to ascertain legitimacy, for participants in debate must also possess
competence and experience in the problem area concerned. But insofar as there are many
problem areas, as many as there are practices, argumentative validity is itself a multi¬
dimensional concept. To recognise this is to accept that the particularities of any one
practice will alter the norms appealed to. It also means accepting inequalities of competence
between citizens deemed equal before the law. In drawing attention to epistemic inequality,
Maclntyre makes explicit what Arendt and Habermas assume.14 It is wrong, however, to
understand this as a return to Weber's separation of active elites and passive masses.
Understood in terms of practices, competence cannot be possessed by a well-defined elite
sealed off from the mass, but must be seen instead as the varying possession of many
practitioners who abide by shared standards of excellence. Although there are excellent,
poor, and mediocre painters, the practice of painting is open to all, should they pursue it.
Thus there exists a strong contrast between managerial or therapeutic elites whose authority
derives from an ideological monopoly over esoteric methods and authoritative practitioners,
for the latter are always vulnerable to critical evaluations from those being educated into a
12 Political wisdom cannot "be embodied into a method which can be taught, precisely because the
maxims relied upon are open-textured and open-ended, and the sense of when which maxim is
relevant cannot itself be unpacked into a set ofmaxims" (ASIA: 275). See Gadamer (1989: 317).
13 The analogy between Plato and Habermas is also drawn by Benhabib (1990b: 332).
14
Although ignoring the question of differing competence, Habermas' (MCCA: 116-188)
differentiation between preconventional, conventional, and postconventional consciousness places
extremely demanding cognitive and emotional requirements on citizens. Arendt (OR: 279-280) is
far more explicit, arguing for the birth of a new political elite to replace professional politicians.
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practice. Furthermore, because politics, unlike painting or journal writing, is basic to man,
zoon politikon, as such, the goal of an ethical polity is the facilitation of political capabilities
in all citizens and not just their cultivation in extraordinary individuals.
Maclntyre therefore tries to correct liberal insensitivity to variations in experience and
authority without succumbing to elitism. There will certainly be exceptional individuals, but
they are recognized as exceptional only on basis of standards shared with "plain persons"
who themselves possess practical wisdom (DRA: 140). Attention to the content and form of
that wisdom also reveals the indefensibility of Arendt's concept ofpraxis. Fundamental to
the Maclntyrean theme of narrativity is that an act is intelligible if and only if we can ask of
actors the reasons why they undertook it or attribute to them such reasons.15 But this
condition of intelligibility requires attention to the context of action and actors' intentions,
the purposes they hoped to achieve (AV: 206-207; ASIA: 244-259). It is by reference to
contexts and intentions that, let's say, mural painting is distinguishable from vandalism.
Moreover, only by comparing avowed intentions with eventual consequences can we
determine whether actors are telling the truth as to their intentions, whether they were
themselves confused as to their purposes, or whether fortuna intervened to produce
unanticipated good or ill effects.
Together these conditions of intelligibility show that to downplay intentions, purposes
and consequences is to marginalize those criteria by which action is distinguished from
unreflective or insane behaviour. Two weighty ramifications follow. First, once
purposiveness is understood as central, then Arendt's opposition between poiesis and praxis
crumbles. That opposition relies on an equation of purposiveness with technical work and
work with violence. Maclntyre breaks this inferential chain whilst shunning the blunt
instrumentalism underlying Weber's Zweckrationalitat. Instrumentalist or technicist
conceptions of action are feasible solely on the assumption that action is entirely predictable
and reduces to the execution of technical skills. Maclntyre, we saw (Ch 9.II, 9.Ill),
possesses powerful arguments against that assumption arising from the fact of fortuna or
unpredictability, but he is careful not to devalue the possession of skill and knowledge.
Practices are quintessentially intersubjective activities whose meaning goes beyond
skilfulness to incorporate the realization of specific ends, yet this realization is impossible
15 "To identify an occurrence as an action is ... to identify it under a type of description which enables
us to see that occurrence as flowing intelligibly from a human agent's intentions, motives, passions
and purposes" (A V: 209).
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without the employment of skills.16 Skills or technai constitute, as Aristotle argued, the
subordinate but nonetheless integral means to achieving internal and external goods.17
Inserting technical skills as constitutive elements within an inclusively conceived praxis,
Maclntyre thereby effects an analytic melding of the value-rational and instrumental-rational
which prevents the identification of action either with mere instrumentality or pure
performance. He accomplishes this, as well, without relinquishing the distinction between
manipulative and non-manipulative activity. All worthwhile goods are attained in company
with or through reliance on others and this necessary relatedness takes two rudimentary
forms, a virtuous relatedness where others are treated with regard or a vicious relatedness
where they suffer debasement into objects.
There is a key distinction to be made, consequently, between crude instrumentalism and
a reflective praxis incorporating techne in a humane, non-objectifying manner, the
"purposeful performance" of which we spoke earlier (Ch 7.II.i). The second ramification of
Maclntyre's argument is equally important. Asserting the significance of purposes, skill, and
knowledge means that the political can no longer be understood in Arendtian terms as
inhering in retrospectively perceived "moments" or "events." As with his metatheoretical
description of traditions in "epistemological crisis," Maclntyre understands politics as the
resolution of conflicts and impasses so that common goods are enhanced rather than
impaired. This enhancement presumes a prospective application of hard-won experience
requiring deliberation, knowledge of facts, and careful preparation. To limit the political to
epiphanic moments is therefore to neglect the sequences of forethought and cooperative
effort culminating in those moments. Similarly, because the "creation and sustaining of
human communities," the political is not autonomous from other spheres of activity, as
Weber and Arendt contend, but overlays these spheres to determine their scope and
boundaries (AV\ 187-188; PP: 241). A "master-practice," it overlays in the sense of
providing or withholding the institutional sustenance required by every practical activity. A
consequence, however, of emphasizing institutional sustenance is that politics must now be
understood as the simultaneous pursuit of internal and external goods. Actors achieve
internal goods insofar as they expand their deliberative capacities and phronetic knowledge
through ever-wider experience of conflictual situations in the company of others. Increasing
16 "What is distinctive in a practice is in part the way in which conceptions of the relevant goods and
ends which the technical skills serve — and every practice does require the exercise of technical
skills — are transformed and enriched" (AV: 193).
17 It was Aristotle's "explicit statement that practical intellect {phronesis) governs (archei) productive
intellect. And phronesis not only supervened on techne ab extra ... but also could be an intrinsic
element in the exercise of the techne itself' (Dunne, 1993: 364).
223
Chapter 10 Engaging Maclntyre
independence, awareness of proper ends, and civic friendship are the result. They achieve
external goods or the means of institutional sustenance, differently, insofar as they secure the
wealth, power, and recognition of status needed to maintain the practice of teaching or
nursing, for instance. A politics neglecting either type of good is bound to fail, for without
external goods there can be no independence and without internal goods and the virtues
required to achieve them the pursuit ofmoney or power concludes in avarice.18
But if stark oppositions between praxis and poiesis cannot be sustained and if politics
concerns both ideal and material interests, then there is no possibility of an ontologically
spatialized political reality. Thus Knight's (1996: 895; 1998: 293) claim that Maclntyre's
distinction between practices and institutions recalls Habermas' dichotomy between system
and lifeworld, or Arendt's between the social and the political, rests upon a fundamental
misunderstanding. Simply put, Maclntyre does not believe practices and institutions
opposed, for there can be no practice which is not institutionalized. Rather, his core
argument is that particular institutional forms guided by specific conceptions of human
nature and rationality lead to the corruption of practices. These forms and conceptions were
abetted by changes in ethical self-understandings from Aquinas to Hume, Kant to Nietzsche,
and thereafter to emotivism and romantic collectivism. Conceiving individuals as part of a
Volk or reducing them to rational egoists, the institutions of the nation-state and capitalist
market adhere to conceptions of humanity and consequent practical teloi that undermine
institutions directed towards human flourishing. It is neither systemic de-linguistification, as
suggested by Habermas' metaphor of "uncoupling," nor ontological conditions run amok,
Arendt's basic thesis, but perverse ethical understandings and misapprehensions of
institutional ends which alienate human beings from their essential powers.
Thus the critical focus of Maclntyre's thought is on clashing institutional orders and
their discrepant practical rationalities, not opposed spheres or realms. This refusal to
theoretically dichotomize reality has profoundly salutary effects. To the degree that all
institutions, no matter how malformed, are guided by ethical ideals, there cannot be a realm
of "norm-free sociality" or mute "necessity" (TCA, II: 258; OR: 114). Habermas' ascription
of material reproduction to systemic integration and Arendt's relegation of labour to
animality are therefore obfuscating and highly uncritical turns. They obfuscate in
downplaying the integral contribution of material reproduction and labour to human self-
18 Miller (1994: 250) castigates Maclntyre for focusing upon the internal goods of "self-contained"
practices such as chess at the expense of those "purposive practices" such as farming which serve
external "ends beyond themselves." Maclntyre sometimes encourages this view, yet his (AV: 194,
196; WJ: 35; PP: 240, 249; 2002: 4) analyses of politics and the genuinely free market stress the
necessity of pursuing internal and external goods together.
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understanding (1994b: 226). Labour and the economic have pronounced impact on the
narrative unity of individuals' lives, shaping not only their hopes and aspirations but also
their bodies, and were they to fall under the sign of a norm-free latent functionality actors
would lack freedom in an arena definitive of who they are. Yet for Maclntyre the economic
is as open to conscious intervention as the political and it must, accordingly, be the goal of
communities to encourage a market form and "occupational structure" which uphold rather
than destroy networks of giving and receiving (WJ\ 105).
Habermas and Arendt's principal error is to believe that there could be realms properly
defined in terms of latent functionality or necessity, where ethics has less relevance than
questions of efficiency or bodily imperatives. Thus the Habermasian (TCA, II: 339) claim
that system's uncoupling from lifeworld entails a positive evolutionary advance in social
complexity has to be rejected. For Maclntyre systemic interpretations of economics or
administration are theoretically baleful, disguising as laudable the impoverishment of
integral lifeworld activities. The task, then, is not to push back "colonization" of lifeworld
by system, all the while respecting the dirempted logics of these opposed arenas, or to
prevent the social melding with the political, but to recognize and to recover system as
intimately part of lifeworld and the social as intimately political. To Arendt's (Ch 7.1.ii) call
for a full realization of citizens' decision-making powers he therefore adds the demand for a
full realization of practitioners' productive powers, a demand surpassing Habermas' quietist
"sluice-model" and Arendt's more radical injunction to de-expropriate citizens' property.
The latter are uncritical in either equating productivity with quantitative resources or lodging
it in the hands of putatively neutral administrators. A matter of identity, quantitative
resources are inseparable from the qualitative interpretations attaching to them. Likewise,
neutral administration operates as a value-bound myth to suppress alternative understandings
of political and economic organization that might oppose the ideology of bureaucratic
authority and its concomitant, the great charismatic personality. Habermas and Arendt begin
by critiquing technocracy but insofar as they surreptitiously reinforce it, their thought (Ch
4.III.i, 7.III.i) stands implicated in Weber's worldview. A stoutly critical perspective would
instead usurp or significantly alter that worldview. Maclntyre's (Ch 9.11, 9.Ill) arguments as
to the impossibility of technocratic expertise and defence of phronetic knowledge, that
"modest" expertise drawing inductively from lived experience and denying the prospect of
pronouncing law-like generalizations, furnish this requisite perspective.
Maclntyre is significant for recovering ethics as the central category of a non-decisionistic
politics without concluding in authoritarianism or conventionalism. Weber's polytheistic
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vision of battling gods, each to be chosen according to the depth of passion animating one's
soul, is but one understanding of ethical life and gravely inadequate at that. An adequate
understanding necessitates attention to the interpersonal processes by which ethical and
practical knowledge is gradually amassed and employed. But the form and content of such
knowledge and the actions issuing from it recognize no theoretical boundary on the pursuit
of eudaimonia. The whole of human life, from the home, the workplace, to the debating
chamber, is the proper subject of political deliberation.
We will see, however, that Maclntyre's idealization of local community unfortunately
undermines his non-dichotomous theory (Ch lO.III.i). But before exploring why we must
first consider some weighty philosophical problems. His celebration of consensual pre-
modernity over conflictual modernity is not only contradictory, insofar as he relies on
modern philosophical resources, but also destructive of his account of practical learning.
That account is further problematized by Maclntyre's later endorsement of Thomist moral
realism, a philosophical perspective disavowing the possibility of an objective plurality of
the good.
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10.11) Philosophical Perplexities
lO.II.i.) Modernity and Nostalgia
Modernity is the context within which Maclntyre writes, but he spurns that context,
convinced of its corruption. Weber and Trotsky rightly despaired of the chances for genuine
revolution, for the dominant social forms would condemn revolution either to collaboration
with the status quo or atrocity (A V: 262). The best achievable is the maintenance of local
communities free from the interminable conflicts of mass liberal society and hostile to the
modern philosophies perpetuating those conflicts. Embodying the pre-modern classical
tradition of the virtues, these communities yield the sole site of resistance to the
subordination of the goods of excellence to the goods of efficiency.
This temporal contrast is undoubtedly vivid and dramatic but nevertheless untenable for
a number of reasons. The most obvious is that Maclntyre's thought issues from and is
incomprehensible as anything other than modern philosophy. As he himself admits,
Aristotle had no sense of the historicity of human endeavour and thus no understanding of
"tradition" (AV: 146, 277). Maclntyre's anti-Burkean concept of tradition presumes the
fundamentally modern recognition that erstwhile infallible metaphysical frameworks and
ethical ideals were in fact the fallible and sometimes pernicious standpoints of historically
rooted communities, a recognition spurred on by the Reformation, the various republican
revolutions, and the counter-critique of these events by social conservatives, on the one
hand, and socialists, feminists, and anti-colonialists, on the other. It is unsurprising, as well,
that the idea of dialectical conversation between incommensurable epistemic positions
recalls Popper on refutation, Kuhn's analysis of scientific revolutions, and Hegel's vision of
increasingly more adequate and comprehensive syntheses or solutions to theoretical and
practical problems.19 Moreover, the practice of modern, as opposed to classical or medieval,
science proves a paradigm of robust rational enquiry (WJ: 134, 363; TRV: 118). But if
modern science is an exemplary practice, if Popper and his critics provide key theoretical
resources, and if the study of specific moralities and their practical rationalities necessitates a
historicization of argument reminiscent of Nietzschean genealogy, then Maclntyre's
19 Hence Maclntyre's (1977a: 453-472) attempted integration of Popper, Kuhn, Michael Polanyi, and
Lakotos, four squarely modern philosophers of science. See Stern (1994: 150-153) and Gutting
(1999: 107). On Maclntyre's relation to Hegel, see (WJ: 360-361, 1987b: 134), Warnke (1992: 117-
118) and Graham (1994: 161-174).
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resuscitation of the "tradition of the virtues" is a peculiarly modern revival employing
philosophical means quite alien to pre-modern thinkers.20
Maclntyre's partisanship for pre-modernity therefore collapses, at least on a
philosophical level. But there is a more pressing reason for doubting this all too easy
opposition. Modernity, we are told, is especially fragmented, an era where "politics is civil
war carried on by other means" (A V: 253). Here factional will-to-power has triumphed over
will-to-consensus and the common good. In truth, however, Maclntyre's understanding of
20th century politics exhibits striking parallels to his portrayal of ancient Athens. The
"dilemma" facing Plato and Aristotle was that "either the life of the reasoning human being
can be shown to have its arche ... or the sophistic and Thucydidean view of human reality
prevails" (WJ: 83). This Thucydidean view, subsequently expressed by Thrasymachus and
Alexander, is remarkably analogous to the views of Hobbes and modern political realists,
that justice reduces in the end to a question of superior strength. Indeed, Hobbes is
Thrasymachus' "heir," as are those thinkers, Weber, Lipset, and Bierstedt, who argue "it is
only important for [rulers] to be thought to be just" (WJ\ 98; ASIA: 278, my italics). Plato
and Aristotle's rejoinder, that justice demands the exercise of right reason, respect for arche,
and virtue, is also analogous to the rejoinder propounded by modern deontological and other
explicitly ethical schools on domestic and international politics. The tension between the
goods of excellence and the goods of efficiency is therefore not unique to the modern age but
originates in Greek politics, the supposed locus classicus of citizenly virtues. And as with
modern societies, where local communities now fight rearguard actions against the near
omnipotent nation-state and market, Aristotle's polis was challenged and eventually
overcome by Alexander's despotic empire.
This conspicuous structural symmetry between ancient Athens and modern politics also
informs Maclntyre (1996: 61-83) on medieval politics. From the 13th century jurisprudential
conflict between imperial law as defended by Frederick II, ecclesiastical authority as upheld
by Louis IX, and natural law as envisaged by Aquinas it is clear that the high Middle Ages
had not secured broad ethical-political consensus. The problem then as now "was how to
educate and civilize human nature in a culture ... torn apart by the conflict of too many
ideals," a conflict showing nascent signs of what would later become modern
"compartmentalization" (AV: 165; WJ: 206). There is sufficient reason, then, to discount the
20 This leads Giorgini (1989: 269), Porter (1993: 525), and Ferguson (1996: 118) to read Maclntyre as
a liberal, pragmatist, or even postmodern thinker. Although that conclusion needs careful
qualification, it is assuredly true that orthodox Thomists (Haldane, 1994: 99-105; Coleman, 1994:
80-88) unite in rejecting his thought.
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claim that modernity is especially conflictual. But insofar as Maclntyre both acknowledges
these historical facts and yet claims for pre-modernity a strong unity of purpose and outlook,
he stands guilty of perpetuating a myth of past homogeneity.21 This nostalgic myth-making
has two unfortunate effects. The first is that his genealogical unearthing of the origins and
unjust implications of modern modes of thought is unaccompanied by an equally rigorous
analysis of pre-modern social forms. Maclntyre repeatedly condemns Aristotle on labourers
and women and Aquinas on heretics and non-Christian religions, but he fails to accept that
modern thought, understood as heralding new or revising old ethical ideals, was itself
directed against these irrational and sectarian prejudices. And although he would dispute it,
the universal egalitarianism underpinning his thought springs in part at least from modern
struggles against the explicit exclusions of heroic and classical societies and the counterfeit
universalism of medieval Christianity. The result of poor genealogy is that Maclntyre's
(DRA: 102) warning that "even the best sets of social relationship are to some important
degree flawed ... [marred by] victimization and exploitation" appears to apply only to
modern contexts when it has equal, if not greater, application to earlier societies.
Maclntyre therefore fails to entertain the reasonable suspicion that pre-modernity,
because riven with status inequalities, may have been even less amenable to inclusive
engagement in meaningful practices than modernity (Bernstein, 1986a: 125; Miller, 1994:
258). Skewed historical analysis also permits his totalizing condemnation of modern
liberalism. That he refuses to be moved from thinking liberalism fallen, despite sharing
many convictions with it, is all the more peculiar when one reads that liberalism arose in
resistance to "outmoded forms of social organisation" and "what the modern world has
realised are the worst fears of the Scottish Enlightenment rather than its best hopes."22 A
fundamental error here is the classification of liberalism as a single tradition, when it, as with
conservatism or socialism, sub-divides into several perspectives. American neo-liberals are
said to be fundamentally at one, for instance, with the German social democratic tradition
(PP: 244), even though their principles stand poles apart. Here Maclntyre gives way to the
oversimplifying reductionism with which he (1970: 89; ASIA: 281) had reproached Marcuse
and Robert Paul Wolff years before. In a similarly reductive fashion, he denies every
liberalism the chance that it might substantively learn from other traditions and cast off its
"emotivist" shackles. What was possible for Aquinas, his exemplary bridging of
21 Thus disputing McMylor's (1994: 39) claim that Maclntyre does not presuppose a
Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft split. See Larmore (1987: 36-39) and Gutmann (1992: 135).
22 (AV: 60; 1991b: 271-272, my italics). One "best hope" was for the appearance of an educated
public, a hope which Maclntyre (1999d: 245-261; 2002: 16) has recently accepted as the "great
achievement of the Enlightenment."
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Augustinian and Aristotelian traditions, is deemed impossible under contemporary
circumstances.23
The above arguments suggest Maclntyre holds to a degenerative logic, the flip-side of
Habermas' progressive "developmental logic."24 He thus stands vulnerable to Arendt's (Ch
7.1.i) observation that to read history as a movement of inexorable rise or decline is to ignore
the contingency and sheer unpredictability of human affairs. The danger here is that the
evils of the present or, conversely, of the past are glossed over in deference to a theoretical
construct. Furthermore, Maclntyre's belief in the irredeemable fallenness of modernity sits
ill with his emphasis on fortuna, the former contention being wholly unjustified if the latter
pervades the human condition, since no one could then claim to know whether an age is truly
beyond redemption.
We will return to this point (Ch 10.III.ii). Before doing so the acute dilemma involved
in Maclntyre's disavowal ofmodernity must be admitted. Maclntyre commits himself to the
Aristotelian assertion that "the life of virtue within the community of the polis is available
only to those who already participate more or less fully in that life" (WJ: 110). That is, only
through inculcation within pre-existing authoritative standards do the young learn what it is
to be proficient reflective practitioners and thereafter take over these standards to maintain,
augment, or reject them. The good is already but imperfectly in the world, not hidden from
view in some speculative realm of Ideas (Schnadelbach, 1987: 226-233; Dunne, 1993: 380).
Yet modernity is also said to exclude practices and the common goods embodied within
them. Those born within the social structures of modernity, the vast majority now living
within Western cultures, lack the educative and institutional pre-requisites to advance or
even to identify their own and their common good. The unavoidable implication is that for
actors not belonging to marginalized pre-modern communities there exists little possibility of
practical learning and, by inference, of critiquing received standards. But if this is so, then
Maclntyre is caught in a dilemma, for contemporary actors, the "plain persons" of whom he
speaks, cannot be simultaneously capable and incapable of perceiving a temporally located
good. He must either hold to Aristotle's claim that the good exists and admit that modernity
is receptive, however inadequately, to practices and their educative structures or hold to his
totalizing critique and reject Aristotle in favour of some latter-day Platonism.
23
Aquinas' project is "incomplete," in need of revision, yet similar revision is denied liberal thought
(WJ: 143, 171-172). See O'Neill (1983: 395-398).
24 In this, however, Habermas is far less suspect than Maclntyre. As we saw, Habermas defends an
unacceptable developmental logic, but he remains significant for attempting to preserve modernity,
the present, as normatively meaningful, thus staving offWeber's totalizing pessimism (Ch 4.1.i).
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Yet Maclntyre does in fact believe modern actors engage in practical reasoning,
indirectly conceding that modernity is not irredeemably corrupt.25 This concession is
important. Without it his virtue ethics would be the "anachronism" Schneewind (1997: 200)
and Louden (1997: 215-216) think it to be, unable to identify the needs of modern actors or,
having rejected modernity as lost, to provide guidance in contemporary problem situations.
But in making this concession Maclntyre's argument undergoes significant, albeit
unacknowledged, transformation. It is no longer the case that modern society excludes
recognition of human capabilities or needs or has abolished excellences. Rather, it gives
insufficient recognition to capabilities and needs which it otherwise presumes in its daily
functioning. And instead of abolishing excellences and common goods, it has replaced these
with deficient stand-ins, even while still presupposing the continuing relevance of genuine
virtues and goods. The modern world is therefore marred by internal contradictions, at odds
with itself. But in this it is no more remarkable than pre-modernity.
10.II.ii.) Thomist Realism, Pluralism, and Ethical Uncertainty
Maclntyre's pessimism stems largely from his acceptance ofWeber's diagnosis ofmodernity
but has derived further support from his relatively late turn towards Thomist realism. This
realism makes two key claims, one metaphysical, the other ethical-political. The
metaphysical is that the universe is "teleologically ordered, and the only type of
teleologically ordered universe in which we have good reason to believe is a theistic
universe" (1992a: 152). Reality is thus informed by "certain determinate, fixed and
unalterable ... ends which provide a standard by reference to which our individual purposes,
desires, interests and decisions can be evaluated" (1990c: 173-174). The end-point of
enquiry is a deductive hierarchization of the different branches of knowledge, theology
occupying the highest position.26 The ethical-political concomitant of this perspective is that
"the best kind ofpolis will have an hierarchical order" reflecting the order embodied in the
kosmos (WJ: 105). Extremely difficult to achieve, yet increasing knowledge is increasing
awareness of the proper determinate ends of human activity, the summum bonum being
contemplation of God (TRV: 37). The various goods of the many modes of human life form
a unity whose overall purpose is spiritual perfection.
25 Notwithstanding "the changing portraits of the plain person which decorate the history of moral
philosophy ... the plain person is fundamentally a proto-Aristotelian" (1992a: 146).
26 "There is an ineliminable theological dimension ... to enquiry in an Aristotelian mode. For enquiry
aspires to and is intelligible only in terms of its aspiration to finality" (1990c: 184).
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Modernity's rejection of teleology in favour of a radically individualist and pluralist
metaphysics justifies pessimism, or so Maclntyre contends. Yet the heterogeneity and
conflict definitive of liberal politics is not a sign of how things really are but the result of
mistaken reasoning. Thomism moves Maclntyre to the view that there can be no objective
discord between the virtues and their goods, "the natural disposition exhibited in our most
basic apprehension of those precepts [of natural law]," the infallible faculty of synderesis,
implying a fundamental harmony between the virtuous traits of courage, justice, and charity
(WJ\ 184). If one reasons correctly, possesses requisite information, and does not suffer a
flawed character, all apparently dilemmatic situations reveal themselves as being amenable
to a right, true, course of action (1990b: 376, 380). Though we may be perplexed, in reality
the exceptionless precepts of natural reason and the virtue ofphronesis enable us to discover
how we should in fact act, proving that uncertainty is never perplexus simpliciter and that
ethical loss, the sense of having failed to abide by one's standards, is not a ineluctable
condition ofmoral life.
Maclntyre is assuredly right that an adequate ethical-political theory will rely on some
metaphysics, for even minimal specifications of what it means to reason tacitly presume one
conception of reality and the good in opposition to others.27 What is important is not
metaphysics but the defensibility of particular metaphysical schemes. And there are good
reasons to doubt the cogency of Thomist metaphysics, at least as articulated by Maclntyre.
The first concerns the tension between Maclntyre's idea of "dialectical construction," how
traditions prove themselves rationally superior to or learn from rivals, and the Thomist claim
that there are truths which human beings in striving for a completely perfected science can
apprehend beyond all doubt. Dialectical construction, we saw (Ch 9.IV.), entails the
fallibility of all claims to truth, the historicity of understanding, and the limitations of human
reasoning, ethical knowledge being a phronetic knowledge unsystematizable as an exact
science.28 Thomism, on the contrary, entails the self-evidentness of first principles, the
unchanging nature of the kosmos, and a conception of "final truth" or "a relationship of the
mind to its object which would be wholly adequate in respect to the capacities of that
mind."29 These two claims sit ill at ease, the one suggesting that the search for truth or the
good can never be concluded, the other that a cessation of enquiry is both possible and
27
Although Nussbaum (1990: 217), for instance, believes theories of human flourishing need no
metaphysics, it is certainly the case that in differentiating humans from animals and gods she is
already committed to metaphysical assertions as to mortality, omnipotence, and time.
28 Dialectic is "unfinished at any point in its development. If we do rest in a conclusion reached by
dialectical argument, it is only because no experiences have led us to revise our [beliefs]" (WJ: 100).
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desirable. Thus, although Maclntyre (JVJ: 361) disparages the Enlightenment dream of an
encyclopaedic viewpoint and thinks the "Absolute Knowledge of the Hegelian system" a
"chimera," he in fact assumes an end-point not very dissimilar from these.
Yet the core tenet of Maclntyre's (TRV: 125) theory of traditions-in-conflict is that
"there is and can be no finality" and insofar as he argues for the prospect of such finality his
theory threatens to collapse into incoherence. Apart from incoherence, there is also reason to
doubt his understanding of teleology and hierarchical ordering. Even if we could arrive at a
perfected science, it might very well be discovered that the universe is not hierarchically
ordered or the various goods directed towards a single summum bonum. Maclntyre (WJ:
107) is correct that many goods are valued "/or the sake" of higher goods, the good ofwealth
valued for the sake of the leisure it affords to pursue the excellences of family or artistic life.
But this does not mean these higher goods must likewise be understood as secondary to a
superordinate good. Were this the case, then the lives of agnostics or atheists would be
necessarily flawed, despite the exemplary lives of Engels, Eleanor Marx, and Trotsky (AV:
199). He is led to a hierarchical universe and polis because of a deep abhorrence of Weber's
understanding of the kosmos as a meaningless struggle between antagonistic value spheres.
But this understanding is the reverse image of the Thomist vision and negatively parasitic
upon its ideal of an eternal, monistic order. Maclntyre's mistake here is therefore to leave
unquestioned the assumption shared by these opposed yet mutually supportive views, that
either there exists an unchanging hierarchy of the good or the universe is a mad chaos.
Questioning this assumption, it becomes clear that Thomist realism also threatens
meaninglessness, for if a perfected science were achieved, then humanity as known until
now would disappear, replaced by some divine but as yet incomprehensible creature.30
There is thus a pressing need for an alternative to Thomism and Weberian chaos. One such
possibility is a teleological metaphysics positing the existence of objectively discernible
higher goods to which other goods are hierarchically subordinated, but without suggesting
that these higher goods are or should be subordinated to an overarching good or form of life.
We will consider this possibility later (Ch 11.II.). Here it is worth recognizing, however,
that this alternative returns us to Maclntyre's (AV: 157-163, 178-180; 1998b: 76-77, 206)
earlier non-Thomist position, where the virtues and the various goods were not thought of as
forming a seamless whole and where plurality was seen as an intrinsically valuable internal
29
(WJ: 360). Maclntyre denies that Thomism presumes the self-evidentness of first principles, but his
deployment of the concept of synderesis, an infallible conscience, suggests otherwise.
30 That Thomism implies such is proven by Coleman's (1994: 79) declaration that "we want
immortality and the cessation of desires ... the end of the search to know the cause of everything
absolutely and essentially," an aspiration with which Maclntyre (TRV: 137-138) agrees.
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dimension of any given community. Although his later work does respect the fact of
pluralism in highlighting incommensurable traditions and dissenters, it tends to regard
plurality as something to be overcome. Against this tendency, we will argue that plurality
cannot and ought not to be overcome since, practical endeavour taking myriad forms, the
general "common good" must accommodate a differentiation between ultimate common
goods.
Differentiation in this sense is compatible with much of what Maclntyre says, but it is
incompatible with his defence of "the finality of Scripture and dogmatic tradition" (TRV:
125). It is also incompatible with his dismissal of ethical dilemmas as corrigible errors due
either to flawed character or insufficient information. What the Thomist Maclntyre neglects
is that flawed character does not logically or empirically lessen the chance of there being
contradictory goods or principles. Indeed, his celebrated virtues of justice as desert and just
generosity are no less conflicting than those principles of entitlement and just redistribution
advocated respectively by Nozick and Rawls. Nor is it the case that a retrospectively
secured fuller grasp of relevant facts nullifies dilemmatic situations, for such situations are
always faced prospectively when actors, because spatially and temporally limited beings,
have no possibility of stepping outside of action contexts.31 Many dilemmas may be
amenable to a single right course of action, something Weber rules out by fiat, yet there are
others where genuine ways of life cannot be reconciled without remainder, where there
appear two or more equally right, yet contradictory, paths.32
Far from being illusory, then, ethical dilemmas cannot be explained away either by
reference to flawed character or insufficient information, but frequently derive their reality
from unfortunate circumstances beyond actors' control. Maclntyre (AV: 163, 224) once
accepted this, castigating Aristotle and Aquinas for ignoring the "centrality of opposition and
conflict in human life" and praising Cardinal Pole and the Marquis of Montrose for seeking
better as opposed to worse ways of living through the "tragic confrontation of good with
good." The strength of this earlier view, as Kerr (1995: 41) explains, was that it recognized
tragedy as understood by Aristotle, disastrous events stemming from flaws in characters such
as Lear, and by Sophocles, where events lead Antigone to ruin. In reducing the latter to the
former, Maclntyre's Thomist turn diminishes our understanding.
31 Here I am relying on an argument Maclntyre (AV: 99) uses against game theories, that these
theories, in supposing there to be a "determinate, enumerable set of factors, the totality of which
comprise [an action context],... confuse a retrospective standpoint with a prospective one."
32 The difference between this sort of conflict and Weber's battling value spheres is that Weber (SV:
147-148) sees the endorsement of aesthetics, let's say, as automatically devaluing religion, whereas
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The full significance of our arguments here will become clear in the following. Maclntyre's
concept of practice avoids dichotomizing political space and holds on to the economic as a
sphere of conscious achievement, yet his nostalgia for pre-modern local communities
terminates, as Barber (1988: 187) put it, with a "Manichaean" politics no less dichotomous
than Habermas or Arendt's. This Manichaean turn not only limits Maclntyre's relevance to
contemporary political realities, ensnaring him within conspicuous paradoxes, but also
threatens to nullify the gains secured by his mediating course between blunt instrumentality
and sheer performance. Furthermore, his later denial of fundamental conflict between goods
contributes to the fanciful belief that politics as the process of negotiating conflicts as to the
common good can be transcended or overcome. The essential vulnerability and fragility of
political existence is accordingly glossed over in preference for a pacific but deceptive myth.
for the earlier Maclntyre (AV: 224) beauty and spirituality both make authentic demands which
cannot, given difficult circumstances, be met together.
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10.111.) Political Manichaeism and the Problem of Compromise
lO.III.i.) Community, State, and Institutional Interdependence
Maclntyre imagines the nation-state a corrupt institutional form destructive of excellence.
Although never in fact neutral, nation-states must assume an ostensible neutrality and refrain
from espousing ethical values, for otherwise these values would be tainted by oligarchic
cliques seeking sectional ends. Local communities require the security and commodities
afforded by the nation-state and capitalist market, but the relation between them will
continue to be one of principled hostility.
Three distinct questions need to be asked of Maclntyre here: whether his dramatic
contrast between nation-state and community is tenable, whether local communities can be
the main loci of political aspiration, and whether, finally, his understanding of contemporary
politics escapes the difficulties marring Habermas' and Arendt's thought. On all three
counts, however, the answer has to be no. Maclntyre's contrast between state and
community is defensible only on the assumption that nation-states cannot be the bearers of
ethical value. Here, however, he is inconsistent. The state supposedly subverts all values
and yet he praises the "Americans with Disabilities Act" for removing structural obstacles to
"humane goals" and celebrates those "revolutionary struggles of the past that broke down the
barriers to achieving modern citizenship."33 If nation-states were inherently fallen these
state-secured or state-directed achievements would be inconceivable. Yet their realization
shows state corruption to be a matter of contingent fact, not theoretical generalization.
The truth that states have upheld worthy ideals suggests the stark opposition between
state and community derives less from state corruption and communal rectitude, since local
communities have also been "mean-spirited and oppressive" (PP: 237), than Maclntyre's
nostalgia for pre-modern orders. But if Maclntyre mischaracterizes the state as necessarily
debased, is he perhaps right to argue for local communities as the principal focus of political
endeavour, the state playing a secondary yet highly circumscribed role? That local
communities are not the sole or prime arenas of political concern is attested to by the
problems of civil liberty and economic redistribution, which together illustrate the
impossibility of communal self-sufficiency. Despite hostility to liberal rights discourse,
Maclntyre (AV: 255; 1999b: 144; Ferguson, 1998: 129) defends the institutionalization of
liberties as an essential check on tyranny. These are what prevent the sometimes necessary
33
(DRA: 133, 142, my italics). Maclntyre (2002: 19) also cites the United States Marine Corp, a
thoroughly statist body, as an "admirable example" to local communities of an institution having
successfully combated racial prejudice.
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temporary exclusion of unreasonable actors from mutating into permanent ostracism. What
Maclntyre does not recognize, though his theory implies it, is that because plain persons
depend on states for the maintenance of everyday freedoms, their lives are constructively
informed by national constitutions and legislatures. This dependency becomes all the more
important when we consider the sociological base of most local communities. Maclntyre
gives the impression that communities organized toward common goods are voluntary or
semi-voluntary organisations, universities, workshops or clubs, whose members pursue
vocations which they need not have taken up.34 Once it is accepted, however, that
communities are also geographic territories of living space to which people belong moreso
by birth than disposition, then it is misleading to consider them in a predominantly
vocational sense. As with the state, local communities are most often involuntary
associations in which membership is a contingent given. What protects the homosexual or
the homophobe, for example, from suffering unacceptable exclusions is a system of liberties
not intrinsic to many local communities but secured through struggle on communal,
intercommunal, and national levels. But insofar as Maclntyre offers no alternative to this
state-centred system of protection and actually relies on it, his politics is seriously
inadequate.
This inadequacy is especially apparent as regards economic redistribution. Warned to
guard against bureaucratic incursions, community members should nonetheless demand from
the state those resources which they lack, adopting a "double attitude" of suspicion and
pragmatism (DRA: 133). It is instrumentally "prudent to pay one's taxes and accept
obligations which one has incurred to the state and its agencies" since they possess
tremendous coercive power, yet one should remember that because the state never gives "its
clients value for money," collaboration must be minimal and distrust the rule (1994a: 303;
DRA: 132). The difficulty here, however, is that Maclntyre's hostility to the state forces him
into a position uncomfortably close to the "free-rider" figure he (PP: 242) associates with
liberalism. Like the free rider, his local communities seek the most they can with minimal
involvement in state structures. This not only problematizes their contribution to state-
maintained services such as the military and police, services which Maclntyre (2002: 14)
deems necessary and praiseworthy, but it also leaves untheorized the institutional
mechanisms needed to facilitate redistribution between wealthy communities and those
34
Maclntyre does not, of course, think local communities voluntary, since for him we are as much
what we inherit as what we choose. But his central idea of learning a craft (TRY: 61), be it
philosophy, chess, or farming, does suggest scenarios where actors voluntarily apprentice
themselves to tradition-bound activities.
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denied "access to the sources of both economic and political power" by free market
inequalities (PP: 249). In the absence of such mechanisms wealthy communities are likely
to regard their obligations to disadvantaged communities as a question of charity, not duty.
To prevent this there would have to be intercommunal bodies with considerable coercive
powers to uphold just social expectations. But this entails the maintenance of institutions
analogous to present-day states (Young, 1999: 159; Murphy, 2003: 172). Thus, in that
Maclntyre rejects and yet presumes the functioning of state-like institutions, there appears a
basic tension at the heart of his politics, the wish for a minimal state that will, through some
miracle, rectify the inequalities of existing welfare states.35
This tension is one symptom of Maclntyre's larger insensitivity to the structural
interpenetration of local and national institutions. Structural interpenetration means the
character of the nation-state determines to a real extent what can go on within its towns and
villages. Maclntyre and his liberal opponents are therefore similarly wrong to exclude ethos
from national and supranational bodies, it being an ethos of a highly specific sort that
sustains freedoms and ensures equity. Yet liberal neutralists are less guilty here inasmuch as
they at least believe states can be neutral, whereas Maclntyre denies this and yet demands
state functionaries act as if they were neutral, an impossibility by his own theory. A further
effect of downplaying structural interpenetration, however, is that his vision of self-sufficient
communities assumes a profoundly anachronistic air, one that is pre-Rousseauean, even pre-
Aristotelian. Although swiftly antiquated by the Macedonian empire, it was Aristotle's
(.Politics: I, 1252al-1253bl) understanding that the polis alone could be optimally self-
sufficient, not its constituent villages or tribes. By interlinking discrete families, villages,
and classes, all with their own perspectives, interests, and concerns, through shared laws and
the ecclesia, Athens achieved an independence sufficient to fulfil its material needs and
arrest the ambitions of rival city-states, an independence, of course, which never assumed the
form of perfect autarky. In retreating from the city, let alone the state, to a celebration of
schools, neighbourhoods, and villages as prime political institutions, Maclntyre defends not
just a pre-modern, but a pre-Athenian perspective. And because even more distant from the
realties of contemporary politics than Aristotle and Rousseau's small-scale yet squarely
urban ideals, his politics cannot possibly be a viable solution to modern crises.
It was Alan of Lille's great 12th century accomplishment, Maclntyre (AV: 170-171)
claims, to have articulated a new political philosophy "in a time when institutions [had] to be
35 Here Maclntyre confronts a quandary faced by libertarians, namely, how to reconcile a coercive
state with a theory inimical to its very existence. Unlike libertarians, however, he desires an
egalitarian social order, thus painting himself into the curious position of "libertarian welfarism."
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created," whereas the espousal of locality is not an inventive response to current crisis but a
return to the old. Underestimating pressing contemporary problems and neglecting structural
interpenetration, Maclntyre fails by his own standards of practical progress, that a superior
perspective is one which is able to explain why crises occurred and overcome them.
Compounding this is a troubling failure to fully appreciate the economic and strategic
challenges facing small-scale communities. Recognising the need to secure the external
goods ofwealth, power, and status, Maclntyre nonetheless thinks virtuous communities "can
never ... aspire to achieve the levels of economic and technological development of advanced
modernity" (PP: 250). Communities are not thereby condemned to a politics of "Utopian
ineffectiveness, he (PP: 252) contends, but are instead committed to placing necessary
checks upon the liberal ideology of limitless growth. He is clearly right to believe this
ideology dangerous if unchecked. However, in suggesting moral excellence demands a
sacrifice in efficiency, Maclntyre perpetuates a venerable, yet dangerous falsity, that justice
or the good is secured at the cost of material success.36 The difficulty here, as his account of
the interrelation between practices and institutions shows, is that without adequate material
foundations justice is already lost. For a politics of the common good to gain a firm
foothold within the modern world it must possess resources comparable to those already
possessed by governments and corporations. Hence, to countenance a sacrifice of efficiency
to excellence is in fact to advocate "Utopian ineffectiveness."
States are "to a remarkable degree united in an indissoluble partnership with the
national and international market" (1999b: 139), but so too are most non-state institutions,
willingly or otherwise. The fishing and farming communities prized by Maclntyre as the last
bastions of virtue endure in modern conditions only by entering, harnessing, and changing
state structures so as to counteract the interventions of more powerful communal and
corporate interests. Maclntyre (2002: 13) at times concedes this, urging "individuals and
local communities [to] deal constructively ... with the state as coercive law-maker and
regulator," but for the greater part his thought is an impediment to change. Returning to
Arendt's (Ch 7.1.ii) critique of civil society theory, the risks of Maclntyre's privileging of
locality become clear. Without intercommunal deliberative fora and constitutions, the
"separation" of different governmental functions and of different locations or sources of
power, villages, towns and cities, cannot be achieved, thus threatening the perpetuation of
unjust power monopolies. This possibility is increased when local communities, precisely
36 The "world being what it contingently is" the "cultivation of truthfulness, justice and courage will
often ... bar us from being rich or famous or powerful" (AV: 196). See also (WJ\ 113), where he
lauds the Spartans' "aristocratic carelessness about consequences."
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because local, are inappropriate sites for the "mediation" of opinions and policies. Without
undergoing processes of distillation through various grass-roots, regional, and national
deliberative fora, local opinions are more likely to reflect parochial rather than common
interests, promoting not engagement with rival traditions or groups but homogeneity and
introversion. Maclntyre is assuredly cognizant of these dangers, fearing isolationism and
calling for "formal constitutional procedures of decision-making," yet his political
commitments render him incapable of resolving them.37
If locality is not significant in itself but only important insofar as it enables political
deliberation, as Maclntyre (DRA\ 142) says, then our arguments suggest that he ought to
look beyond the small-scale. The fundamental problem, however, is that his thought
reinforces rather than contests Weber's understanding of modern politics, the large-scale.
Conceived as the prerogative of bureaucratic and party-political elites identified in terms of
their distance from plain persons or, in Weber's vocabulary, the mass, the state appears as an
institution which rules over and dominates, instead of being both responsible to and the
possession of its citizens. The thought that it might be more than a conglomeration of
quantitative resources, organizational technique, and coercive means, an arena of genuine
political aspiration and self-transformation, is suppressed. Thus, and in answer to our third
question, Maclntyre does in fact conclude by dichotomizing political reality. Earlier we (Ch
lO.I.ii) defended his view that the challenges of modernity issued less from the appearance
of "norm-free" realms than the distortion of "objective activities" occasioned by perverse
ethical understandings. From the above quandaries, however, it is evidently true that
although his theory of practice eschews ontological spatialization, nostalgia and pessimism
force him into a position structurally analogous to Habermas and Arendt's. Practitioners'
productive powers no longer fall under the sign of functional rationality or necessity, but
those citizen competencies or worker capacities connected to the state or capitalist market
unfortunately do, meaning that large areas of human endeavour are automatically distanced
from critique and transformation.
The paradox is that while Maclntyre goes beyond Habermas and Arendt in believing the
whole of human life the proper subject of ethical deliberation and rejecting all claims to
administrative neutrality, his partisanship for communal politics relinquishes these gains.
The dubious supposition that modern organization and government are irrecoverably
instrumental, machine-like, is consequently intensified. This need not have been the case.
We (Ch lO.I.ii) commended Maclntyrean "purposeful performance" for providing an
37
(PP: 248). For Maclntyre's admission that many civil-social organizations pursue sectional goods
240
Chapter 10 Engaging Maclntyre
alternative to crude instrumentalism and sheer performance, one shunning the instrumental-
versus-communicative, praxis-versus-poiesis, framework underpinning Habermas and
Arendt's lifeworld-system, social-political, diremptions. This alternative incorporates techne
within a broadly conceived praxis and defends a modest expertise in contrast to the
impossible technocratic "expertise" fantasized about in managerial textbooks (SS\ 64; AV\
106). Yet Maclntyre neglects to ask whether his alternative has application to state agencies
and functionaries, whether their expertise, insofar as it is real, is also only of a modest
phronetic kind. Slipping back into the familiar opposition of manipulative and non-
manipulative realms, he conceals the possibility that insofar as state functionaries cannot
claim to possess an expertise different in kind from ordinary practical wisdom, their
authority stands vulnerable to critique and revision from experienced plain persons. But if
this is so, then the state and its various institutions must be amenable to conscious change.
Refusing to pursue this thought, Maclntyre's project tends toward serious inconsistency.
His Manichaean opposition between community and state demands of plain persons a
"double attitude" of trust and respect, suspicion and pragmatism. In their communal
dealings these persons respect Kant's injunction to treat others as ends-in-themselves, but
when dealing with state functionaries they are the canniest of tacticians. What is remarkable
here is that this "double attitude" presumes a "compartmentalization" of institutional
structures and mentalities no less uncompromising than Weber's differentiation of value-
spheres. The very thing for which Maclntyre condemns liberalism is a notable feature of his
own theory.
10.III.ii.) Consensus, Compromise, and Struggle
We will further consider the temptation to partition political space and its consequences in
Chapter Eleven. Here we should recognize, however, that the predicaments of Maclntyre's
communal politics suggest his protest has become not unlike the Marcusian sort he rebuked
thirty years before. Then he criticized Marcuse for glorifying sub-cultural elites as the
torchbearers of a Utopian future. At that time he (1970: 92) believed "the majority of men in
advanced industrial societies are often confused ... [yet] they are often also hopeful, critical,
and able to grasp immediate possibilities of happiness and freedom." Ironically, Maclntyre's
subsequent concentration on the local gives rise to a new Puritan myth of reprobate and
elect, though one different from Weber's antinomy between the active few and the passive
at the cost of common goods, see his Pearson (1994: 36) interview.
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mass. In place of Marcusian cultural and artistic elites, hope is now borne by minorities, be
they farmers, fishing crews, or mining communities, who have by lucky happenstance
avoided the fate of the majority now subject to the state and capitalist market.
It is therefore unsurprising that he should be accused of urging a "politics of
withdrawal."38 This criticism is for the most part apposite. Maclntyre's (AV: 255) totalizing
insistence that "modern systematic politics, whether liberal, conservative, radical, or
socialist, simply has to be rejected" exalts the peripheral to such an extent that the possibility
of subjecting mainstream institutions to ethical demands is precluded. The danger here, of
course, is that this retreat to the margins of contemporary societies lends unwelcome
credence to Weber's (JPW\ 298; SV: 149) denunciation of emancipatory aspiration as a
"romanticism" incapable of measuring up "to workaday existence."
Yet Maclntyre thinks withdrawal appropriate given the dominant political mentality.
This mentality is marked by "adaptability" to "shifting coalitions of interest and power,"
where "compromise" and "bargaining" are the response to interminable conflict (PP: 245;
1999c: 326). Because there are no agreed principles to coherently organize clashing forms
of life, flexibility and sophistic rhetoric have become indispensable to modern politicians.
All this contrasts strongly with political orders where the various goods pursued are
consensually "integrated into the life of an overall community ... able to ... celebrate that life
by the things it does together, in a ceremonial and festive way."39 Here coherence, reason,
and integrity are applauded as virtues, not vices.
Maclntyre's opposition between state and community is therefore guided by a more
fundamental opposition between a strategic politics of factional conflict and a consensual
politics of the common good. Once we question the former we are forced to question the
latter, however. We have already discussed some convincing reasons why. Extrapolating
from the problems of nostalgia, poor genealogy, and those discussed in the previous section,
our first argument against this opposition concerns the impossibility of escaping interminable
conflict, the sine qua non of Maclntyre's consensual politics. The image of a community
celebrating its life in a "ceremonial and festive way" indicates Maclntyre's predominant,
though not exclusive, concern with political deliberation as conducted within specific
communities. This is not an unfair reading given his proposals regarding post-liberal
universities. Because modern society is torn between conflicting practical rationalities and
ideals, each university should organize itself according to the principles of its dominant
38 See, for instance, Barber (1982: 27-32), Barry (1989: 160-168), Pettit (1994: 183), Holmes (1996:
106), and Etzioni (1999: 165).
39
Maclntyre in Pearson (1994: 36). See, as well, Porter (1993: 526-527) and Ferguson (1998: 127).
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"tradition," be it Thomist along the lines of 13th century Paris or Genealogical as suggested
by Vincennes during 1968. "Wider society" would thus confront the claims of rival
universities, each advancing "in its own terms and each securing the type of agreement
necessary to ensure progress" (77?F: 234). The problem with this proposal is not that it is
patently wrong, but that analysis remains at the level of parts rather than wholes,
Maclntyre's focus being individual traditions, particular communities, not "wider society"
itself.40 Yet the reality of structural interpenetration shows the most pressing questions
concern politics understood as a community ofcommunities or a network ofnetworks. Once
this is accepted, as Maclntyre (DRA\ 122) sometimes does, then the chance of transcending
interminable conflict even within individual communities or universities, when these are
inescapably intertwined with others, becomes extremely unlikely at best, at worst fantasy.
Interminable conflict is basic to human existence per se, unlimited to specific arenas or
times. We are thus brought to our second argument, that Maclntyre's ideal community and
solution to factional conflict leads to a highly implausible and tension-ridden conclusion.
Maclntyre's realism is guided not only by a degenerative logic, looking towards the past for
inspiration, but also by a belief in an end-point to endeavour, the quasi-divine achievement
of complete comprehension (Ch 10.II.ii). He is compelled to this, we saw, by his assumption
that the goal of ethical enquiry is a deductive hierarchization of various goods under a
contemplative summum bonum. This end-point jars with his idea of dialectical construction
and tends towards a meaningless no less troubling than Weberian chaos, but it also has
severe consequences for the status of politics. Drawing once more from Arendt's (Ch 7.1.ii)
theory of citizenship, it becomes clear that the friendship Maclntyre envisages between plain
persons in his ideal community threatens to disturb the balance between distance and
commonality necessary for a robust institutional praxis. In contrast to Habermas, whose
"generalized other" errs on the side of distance and undermines the motivational impetus to
joint action, Maclntyre's ideal "integrated community" errs on the side of commonality.
Practitioners being basically one in their acceptance of identical arche, their community is
distinguished from wider society because of a strong consensus on the good. But if they
have already come to a strong consensus or awareness of first principles, then their reasons
for engaging with others politically, fundamental disagreements as to ethical presuppositions
and purposes, cease to apply. Their ideal community appears to resolve the quandaries of
contemporary politics only because politics itself no longer exists.
40 See Gutting's (1999: 100) related worry that Maclntyre's stress on locality, not just '"classical
Latin'" but "'Latin-as-written-and-spoken-in-the-Rome-of-Cicero'" (WJ: 373), problematizes the
transmission of traditions over centuries and through different forms of life.
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Were Maclntyre's ideal possible and desirable, then he could not endorse Aristotle's
definition of man as zoon politikon, since a quality capable of being transcended cannot
constitute part of a being's essential nature. Maclntyre's Aristotelianism stands therefore at
odds with itself, thinking politics an integral part of human life and yet positing its
disappearance.41 This does not yet invalidate his opposition between consensual and
strategic politics, but it does suggest his programme for avoiding the conflict generative of
the latter cannot be pursued without considerable internal tension. Reflection on that
tension, however, brings us to our third argument, the inevitability of compromise even
within a politics directed towards the common good. The earlier Maclntyre (AV: 164)
concurred with John Anderson's "insight" that it is "sometimes only through conflict that we
learn what our ends and purposes are." From this more Sophoclean perspective the best
achievable is a community marked by a creative dynamic of unity and disunity, acceptance
and critique, where difficulties are creatively engaged and overcome, a view which endures
in his theory of traditions-in-conflict. This creative dynamic excludes as wholly implausible
the thought that difficulty as a recurrent feature of human life could itself be overcome and
contradicts the Thomist belief in the unity of the virtues and the good.
But even the earlier Maclntyre, who sees in the "tragic confrontation of good with
good" a revelatory test of character, fails to register the implications of rejecting Aquinas'
unity thesis. For when we accept that goods conflict, that communities, not simply states,
are characterized by fundamental conflict, and that actors sometimes face dilemmas having
no clear resolution, then adaptability and compromise assume an ethical, rather than merely
instrumental, status. In both Maclntyre's earlier and later periods compromise is tainted by
association with emotivist preference maximization. Omitted throughout is the possibility
that compromise and adaptation might be more than accommodation to shifting interests, but
instead appropriate responses to situations where the achievement of two equally worthy
goods is impossible or, more seriously, where the overriding importance of a specific goal
necessitates partial yet grave infractions of the "natural law" (Johnson, 1994: 62). And this
for a reason Maclntyre himself concedes, that the "protagonist cannot do everything that he
or she ought to do."42
41 This is also a criticism of Aristotle. Like Maclntyre (AV: 158; WJ\ 108, 143), Aristotle
(Nicomachean Ethics: 1094a10-1094b12, 1177a10-l 179a30) alternates between the view that politics
constitutes an integral element of eudaimonia and the subordinating thesis that political goods are
inferior to contemplation.
42
(A V: 224). The inevitability of ethical loss is also suggested by his (PP: 252, my italics) injunction
that practitioners should secure state resources "at a price acceptable by [their] local community."
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Because actors inhabit a contingent world interwoven with complex interpersonal and
historical narratives, their avoidance of the problems of clashing goods and dirty hands is
often a matter of brute luck. The political vices Maclntyre attributes to liberalism and the
state are therefore not always vices, but unavoidable imperfections, as when, for example,
perpetrators of atrocities are freed so as to ensure future peace. For Maclntyre to deny this
conclusion and uphold his identification of compromise with emotivism, he would also have
to deny fortuna. But this he cannot do, since his arguments against bureaucratic technocracy
hinge on the inevitable role of unpredictability in human life. It is in the nature of human
beings, he (AV: 103) declares, to desire predictability so their projects can gain secure tenure,
yet this tenure is "permanently vulnerable and fragile." The fact that technocratic claims to
authority presuppose an entirely predictable world devoid of vulnerability indicates their
absurd unreality. But just as managerial predictions are often confounded "by an
unpredicted and unpredictable counter-example," so too are good intentions constrained to
adapt to unforeseen events (AV: 93).
Fortuna, then, obliges Maclntyre to accept compromise and adaptability as unavoidable
and sometimes laudable. Nevertheless, he could admit their role and yet argue this
admission does not jeopardise his identification of consensual deliberation with the politics
of the common good. His politics allows for moments of imperfection, but it still rejects the
strategic attitude prevalent in liberal cultures. This defence is unsuccessful for two important
reasons, however. The first, we saw, is that although Maclntyre denigrates the strategic
attitude, his stark dichotomization of state and community presumes the endurance of an
instrumental politics. Among themselves community members cherish cooperative
deliberation, but their relation to state functionaries is one of principled, not frequent or
occasional, hostility. Practitioners' will to consensus coexists and defines itself against their
equally strong commitment to manipulation when dealing with non-communal institutions.
Considering his politics as a whole, then, it is clear that far from countering the dominant
tendency to view politics strategically, Maclntyre explicitly perpetuates it, albeit in a limited
arena.
Of course, Maclntyre believes he is forced to perpetuate a Weberian understanding of
community-state relations on account of the Weberian realities underlying the state and
capitalist market. The instrumental nature of state politics compels plain persons to use
manipulative means to defend their communal ends, even if these same persons must also at
times collaborate in an "ad hoc" way with the state to battle the evils of imperialism or
fascism. A limited endorsement of strategy does not, he would assert, invalidate the
opposition between consensual and strategic politics but represents a justifiable response to a
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contingent state of affairs which does not apply to the internal functioning of Aristotelian
communities.
But this brings us to our final argument, that by his own theory Maclntyre cannot excise
strategy from the internal functioning of local communities. Basic to his theory is the idea of
educated publics vigorous enough to sustain deliberation as to the common good. These
publics are defined in contrast to the factionalism and manipulative mass media of existing
liberal publics. They are defined, as well, by the rationality or justness of their exclusions.
Unlike liberal publics, which because dominated by oligarchic elites exclude the poor and
vulnerable, Maclntyre's educated publics exclude those who break with the principles of
conversational justice or continue to uphold patently false or immoral views. Towards the
phrenologist and the racist, plain persons are justified in showing intolerance (1999b: 147-
148).
The problem here is not Maclntyre's insistence upon conversational constraints or his
presumption that there must be considerable agreement as to common goods, if never the
strong consensus presumed by his ideal. Once phrenology and racism are rejected as defunct
or unjust, for there to be any future progress in debate and for it to be fair phrenologists and
racists do have to be excluded. The difficulty, instead, is his insensitivity to what is involved
in excluding others from debate. The very fact that the phrenologist and racist have not been
convinced to revise their opinions means debate has ended in argumentative stalemate.43
Thus, the only option open is to temporarily ignore or eject these incorrigible characters.
But, and decisively, the phrenologist and racist will contest this turn, will refuse to be silent
or leave the chamber. Because they believe they are acting in the common good, they will
instead coalesce into factions and attempt, through agitation or appeal to freedom of speech,
to counter their exclusion. To defeat them, practitioners cannot use argument, since
argument has already failed, but will have to form factions of their own and resort to
electoral campaigning, majoritarian voting procedures or, in moments of extreme crisis,
coercion. But this resort entails a resurgence of the strategic politics Maclntyre would like to
confine to the state. Here the attempt to divorce a deliberative politics form strategy reaches
intractable limits.
Because exclusions are often necessary and yet by their very nature non-consensual, the
strategic cannot and, as the racism shows, ought not to be eliminated. The turn to strategy is
not always egoistic, but frequently arises from the painful realization that given stubborn
differences the well-being of one's society demands a willingness to impose authoritative
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settlements. In line with his Thomist commitment to the infallible faculty of synderesis and
fundamental coherence of our basic values, Maclntyre would attribute such moments to a
failing on the part of racists to see the incoherence of their opinions and uphold a
philosophically defensible position. The difficulty here, however, is that while every
political perspective relies on some philosophy, politics is not philosophy. There are, as we
saw in our critique of Habermas and Arendt (Ch 4.III.ii, 7.III.ii), temporally urgent moments
when actors are unsure as to the coherence of their views and have not achieved consensus
but nonetheless must act. Blind to these moments, Maclntyre's politics is motivated by a
belief in "perfect legitimacy" where actors' determination of the common good, as in
Habermas' "ideal-speech situation" or Arendt's moment of foundation, can occur without
remainder, without enduring dissent and hostility. Coupled with his belief in an end-point to
political struggle, this "perfect legitimacy" masks the vulnerability of political existence, the
challenges faced by citizens, and the uncertain paths they sometimes have to take to ensure
justice. The politics of local community transcends the cut and thrust of liberal politics at the
cost of generating a myth of ideal coherence.
43 As to argumentative stalemate, Maclntyre (AV: 277) admits "there are no successful a priori
arguments which will guarantee in advance that such a situation could not occur."
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Conclusion
Our study of Maclntyre has reached its conclusion. We have shown what is valuable in his
work, in particular his emphasis on flourishing and defence of a conception of ethics which
avoids Weberian decisionism. This emphasis is complemented by a non-dichotomous
theorization of political practice that recovers "system" and "the social" as ethical concerns
and provides an important alternative to the binary of crude instrumentalism and sheer
performance. Here Maclntyre represents a distinct advance upon Habermas and Arendt's
critique of Weber.
Yet we have also shown his errors, some unique to his thought. Maclntyre's contrast
between consensual pre-modernity and conflictual modernity contradicts the undeniable
modernism of his theory of traditions-in-conflict and undercuts his account of ethical
learning. His Thomist realism, in turn, excludes the possibility of a non-subjective
pluralism, is inconsistent with the idea of dialectical construction, and has as its guiding ideal
the surmounting or transcendence of politics. But these specific failings also exacerbate
false turns shared with Habermas and Arendt. Maclntyre's non-dichotomous theorization of
practice gives way to a dichotomous division of state and local community in many ways
reminiscent of Habermas and Arendt's bifurcations. With these two, as well, he yearns for a
moment of perfect legitimacy, an impossible end to strategy.
We are now finally in a position to interlink our various arguments with and against
these three thinkers to come to a broader view as to the possibilities and challenges of
politics in a post-Weberian era. The guiding assumption of our study has been that while
these three are in very important ways quite different, their thought is nonetheless marked by
a strong continuity in their response to Weber's diagnosis of modernity. Some continuities
are highly laudable, in particular their emphasis on intersubjectivity. Others, their
bifurcations and over eagerness to relegate the strategic to a fallen or anti-political status, are
seriously mistaken. The same, too, with their discontinuities. Although some hamper our
understanding, we saw there are others which, if conjoined in an appropriate way, show a
way beyond the Weberian antinomy of leader and machine, even if aspects of Weber's
thought cannot sensibly be left behind.
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Conclusion: Political Thought and Practice in a Post-Weberian Era
11.1.) A Brief Summary
Our study began by posing the problem of politics in terms of Max Weber's diagnosis of
modernity. For Weber modernity is paradoxical in that the processes of enlightenment and
rationalization promise individual maturity and yet threaten servitude (Ch I.I.). The "iron
cage" of formal bureaucratic organization and senseless hedonism is the fate of man under
capitalism. Weber's stoical response was to affirm the paradox of modernity, to concede
that all practical endeavour would now take the form of a specialism, but that this endeavour
could transcend hedonism and be rendered minimally meaningful by a fundamental act of
choice between the antagonistic realms of art, science, religion, and politics. This radical
decisionism informs his analysis of and prescriptions regarding politics, three features of
which are decisive (Ch 1 .II.). First, political life is a struggle over the means of violence and
domination utterly inimical to all "ethics of brotherliness." To enter politics is to contract
with diabolical powers, to place one's soul in jeopardy. Second, modern politics cannot but
be machine-like, dependent on a vast bureaucratic apparatus, but bureaucratic organization
can be held in check by exceptional charismatic leaders imbued with a vocation for politics
differentiating them from the passive mass. A monist antinomy of politicians and
bureaucrats, entrepreneurs and corporations, is the sole basis for a minimal endurance of
individual freedom in modernity. Third, political life cannot be assessed or justified by
reference to specific values, since politics as a means admits of a radical plurality of
conflicting ideals. Rather, the sole criterion for legitimacy is de facto belief in legitimacy
regardless of justifiability. Weber's solution to the gaping lacuna between mere belief in
authority and justified belief in authority is the figure of the responsible politician, the
Verantwortungsethiker. This solution, however, is entirely subjective, premised on an
inscrutable decision to act responsibly and not otherwise.
With Weber as both problem and foil, our study proposed a threefold argument. We
maintained, first, that Jurgen Habermas, Hannah Arendt, and Alasdair Maclntyre all begin
with and largely accept Weber's diagnosis of modernity. Thus Habermas' analysis of "one¬
sided rationalization" and "colonization," Arendt's narrative of the rise of the "Social" and
the processes of "world-alienation" or "subjectification," and Maclntyre's account of
"emotivist culture" and "bureaucratic individualism" are all inspired by the "iron cage,"
despite different nuances and emphases (Ch 1 .III., 3.1., 3.III., 6.I., 6.11., 9.1., 9.II.). Second,
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we claimed that they nonetheless reject his understanding of the grounds and possibilities of
politics, thinking him complicit in the very realities he sought to resist. Thus, Habermas
argues that Weber's adherence to the philosophy of consciousness paradigm blinded him to
the distinction between subjective ethical commitment and discursively validated moral
norms and conflated lifeworld rationalization with systemic rationalization, thereby ending
in decisionism and pessimism. Weber's Platonic substitution of work for action and
identification of freedom with an inner sovereignty or will abetted, in Arendt's view, the
equation of politics with violence and the processes of world alienation which would
culminate in totalitarianism. For Maclntyre, lastly, Weber's antinomy between the
charismatic leader and machine represents a radicalization of liberal individualism and
therefore augments rather than holds in check the compartmentalization, emphasis on
preference satisfaction, and endemic tendency to manipulation which currently prevent the
realization of a rational politics.
The third component of our argument was that these three thinkers simultaneously aid
and hinder in thinking beyond the "iron cage." Bound by a shared commitment to
intersubjectivity as both reality and ideal, and yet understanding this intersubjectivity
differently, each illuminates important but partial rejoinders to Weber's ordeal of
personality. For various reasons, however, their theories cannot be endorsed in full. Some
failings are unique, yet the more fundamental are shared, suggesting the difficulties
encountered are not confined to these thinkers but possess general significance.
The goal of the following is to further explicate this third component by recounting our
key claims, disputing challenges to these, and pointing to areas of especial concern. Thus we
begin by returning to the question of ethics and politics, that is, the manner in which they
interrelate and the principal ideals implied in their interrelation (Ch 11.11.). Habermas and
Arendt's contributions to this question are reiterated, as are our reasons for defending
Maclntyre's ideal of flourishing as a necessary correction to these contributions. Two
fundamental criticisms are also addressed. The first is that our understanding of the goal of
politics as flourishing illegitimately subordinates citizens' democratic prerogatives to a
philosophical vision. Moral-ethical questions, in other words, should only be answered by
actors themselves, not by theorists. The second concerns the suspicion that a politics
emphasizing flourishing relies on a cryptofascist metaphysic corrosive of the plurality of
modern life. In reply, we argue that the first criticism relies on a basic conceptual confusion
and that the second ignores the compatibility of a politics of flourishing with political
independence and the fact of value pluralism.
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Thereafter a key theme of our study is further considered, the question of the site of
political endeavour and the pernicious tendency to bifurcate political space (Ch 11.III.).
Here it is argued against the dualisms perpetuated by Habermas, Arendt, and Maclntyre that
only a monist understanding of political space is defensible, but that Weber's version of
monism has to be rejected, since it falsely condemns large-scale organization to a
depersonalizing and hierarchical instrumentalism. It is precisely this conception of large-
scale organization which led Habermas and Arendt to depoliticize political administration
and the economy and Habermas and Maclntyre to privilege civil society. With these false
trajectories in mind, we argue that the state and the economy are the prime sites of political
endeavour and that the contemporary turn to civil society is both theoretically mistaken and
politically timid, a symptom of rather than a response to the status quo.
The following section returns to the role of strategy and coercion in political life (Ch
11 .IV.). Building on our observations from "argumentative stalemate," "temporal urgency,"
and the inescapability of "remainder," the main argument is that communication, praxis, and
political reasoning are inevitably interwoven with strategy and contestation. There is no one
basic or fundamental "logic" which demarcates the political qua political. Although
opposed, Weber and our three thinkers are similarly guilty of fundamentalism, of seeking to
reduce politics to a single, predominant logic. This truth has significant implications for the
practice of politics. Bringing our study to a close, we argue that the strategic attitude finds




11.11.) Flourishing and Pluralism
A central contention of this study is that Habermas, Arendt and Maclntyre together show a
path beyond Weber's value-scepticism, thus obviating subjectivist and political-realist
dismissals of politics as a shared ethical activity. Regarding Habermas, his arguments
against Weber's formalist reduction of legitimacy and neglect of the intersubjective ground
of accountability recast politics as an endeavour intimately bound to normative expectations
(Ch 4.1.ii). This is complemented by his account of "lifeworld sociation" and
"socialization," which reconfigures Weber's "loss of freedom" and "loss of meaning" theses
in intersubjective terms and provides a non-subjective referent, socio-pathology, for critique
(Ch 4.1.i). Far more attuned to the plurality, contingency, and vulnerability of political
freedom, the truth that such freedom need not exist, Arendt shows the narrow philosophical
focus of Habermas and Maclntyre's theories in drawing attention to the moderation and care
required for a vibrant political culture (Ch 7.1.i, 10.11.i). In this her emphasis on promising is
especially important in suggesting that it is actual agreements between real actors which are
decisive in politics.
Significant false turns mar Habermas and Arendt's theories, however. We argued that
Habermas' proceduralism is untenable given his commitment to a substantive personality
ideal and that the solidly ethical grounds of this ideal are obscured by his diremption of
morality and ethics (Ch 4.11 .i). Indeed, his equation of ethics with the subjective and
conventional threatens to reinforce Weber's value-scepticism. These failings are
exacerbated by an abstract and reductive understanding of critique, which disregards the
historical specificity of moral-ethical reasoning and neglects the role of experience (Ch
4.II.ii). In like fashion, Arendt's theory of reflective judgement aspires to a "spectorial
disinterestedness" running counter to her emphasis on the "web of relationships" and
worldly tangibility (Ch 7.II.ii). Not only are the experiential criteria needed for
distinguishing good from bad judgement left unthematized, but in contending that spectators
possess an unconditioned autonomy her theory of judgement surreptitiously compounds the
"world alienation" or "subjectification" with which she accuses Weber. Struggling against
subjectivism, Habermas and Arendt nonetheless remain bound to it.
Maclntyre's thought is also problematic. An inordinate hostility to modernity undercuts
his account of practical learning and commitment to a universal egalitarianism explicitly
denied in heroic, classical and medieval societies (Ch lO.II.i). Deference to Thomist moral
realism, on the other hand, conflicts with the idea of "dialectical construction," prompts an
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ill-founded rejection of ethical dilemmas, and leads to the multiplicity of higher goods being
subordinated to a questionable summum bonum (Ch 10.11.ii). Habermas' awareness of the
moral-ethical dimensions of the transition to modernity and Arendt's stress on plurality are
important correctives here. In decisive ways, however, Maclntyre's is a superior response to
Weber. In direct contradiction to Habermasian proceduralism, he understands practical
reason as a teleological enquiry into the ends of human activity, an enquiry which renders
"socialization" concrete by reference to the practices men engage in. Ethics is properly
understood as the foundation of morality, but this foundation is neither subjective nor
conventional but premised on a dialectically secured comprehension of genuinely common
goods and needs that stand amenable to rational dispute across traditions (Ch lO.I.i). Hence
the universal-ethical standard of self-transformative activity, flourishing, which Maclntyre
defines as the reflective extension and augmentation of innate human powers. Yet unlike
Habermas or Arendt, he does not defer to an abstractly conceived system of rules or a
privileged "final arbiter" to ground critique (Ch 10.1 .ii). Instead, critique takes a multiplicity
of forms dependent on the activity in question and the phronetic experience of participants.
Although the end, the achievement of independence or maturity, remains constant, the paths
necessarily differ.
The ideal of independence points to flourishing as a prime political goal. Maclntyre
best thematizes that goal, yet in an elementary sense neither Weber, Habermas, nor Arendt
repudiates it. Each is concerned with the "quality" of human life, each is assured that quality
means more than mere functioning, and each, finally, is certain that political engagement
constitutes a key element of mature personhood. Weber's responsible politician, Habermas'
postconventional subject, and Arendt's public spirited citizen together reject the classical
liberal reduction of politics to security or the satisfaction of private preference.1 Indeed, this
reduction is itself deceptive in that all societies, whether liberal or illiberal, must give
recognition to human capabilities, common goods, and excellences, even if this recognition
be tacit, skewed, and patently insufficient.2 A polity failing to place teleological enquiry at
the heart of its deliberations cannot endure.
Although our analysis has been predominately metatheoretical, asking how best to
theorize ethics rather than offering specific suggestions as to the relation between politics
and education, for instance, or a full exploration of the conditions of the good life, it should
' Here we should recall Weber's repudiation of hedonism, Habermas' critique of neo-liberalism, and
Arendt's warnings regarding the "job-holding" society (Ch 1 .II., 4.II.i, 6.1.).
2 See (Ch lO.II.i) above, where we claimed Maclntyre's totalizing dismissal of modernity ignores that
modem societies do not exclude consideration of capabilities, needs, or excellences but instead
mischaracterize them. See, in confirmation, Nussbaum's (1990: 210-213) critique of Rawls.
253
Chapter 11 Conclusion
by now be clear that the political vision defended here is thoroughly perfectionist. A robust
politics nurtures the conditions of individual flourishing, facilitates those practices in which
flourishing is realized, and encourages the augmentation of shared ideals through
intersubjective reflection (Ch 9.IV.). A next step would be to theorize the substantive
implications of nurturance, facilitation, and encouragement in the arenas of education, work,
and citizenship. Such is obviously beyond the scope of this study, but here we can at least
counter two serious objections to its status as a permissible philosophical project.
The first is that a philosophical project directed towards ascertaining the conditions,
structures, or proper modes of the fulfilled life illegitimately usurps the citizen's right to
determine the shape and direction of his polity. This criticism issues from a number of
quarters. Deontological proceduralists such as Habermas argue that decisions as to
substantive principles and ethical goals ought to be left up to actors themselves, since these
principles and goals can only be deemed legitimate after having undergone the test of plural
discursive argumentation. Consequently, neo-Aristotelians, perfectionist liberals, and even
Rawlsians are accused of being Philosopher Kings, of failing to accept that all philosophy
can do is delineate the formal-pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation.3 In a similar
vein, but firmly rejecting philosophy's pre-eminence over procedural questions,
communitarians such as Walzer contend that our project threatens a "disconnected" sort of
critique whereby distinct cultures are judged according to alien and therefore distorting
standards.4 The only defensible critique is an "immanent" sort dependent upon and
explicating values actually shared by citizens of particular societies. From both sides, a
general philosophical analysis of the good life is deemed license for manipulation and
domination, for foisting upon ordinary subjects a vision which they have not agreed to or,
differently, which impairs the integrity of their culture.
These criticisms are mistaken. As regards the proceduralists, we have already shown
that procedures cannot be separated from substantive content and that much of this content is
ethical (Ch 4.II.i). Because the argumentative presuppositions of discourse ethics presume a
developmental theory of moral consciousness in turn dependent on a broad conception of
good human functioning strenuously contested by some mainstream ideologies, neo-
liberalism in particular, Habermas' demand that philosophy limit itself to bare procedures
appears decidedly incoherent. As regards the communitarian critique, on the other hand, it
has to be admitted that in refusing to separate justification and application we conceded there
3 Behind these projects "lurks the philosopher king who wants to put the world in order, not the citizen
of a democratic state" (JA: 86). See also (CES: 90, 199; MCCA: 66-67; JA: 176).
4 Walzer (1983: XV; 1987: 6, 64). My discussion of Walzer relies on Plant (1991: 327-330, 361-375).
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is no knowledge of values or goods independent from the experience of these within
determinate contexts (Ch 4.11.ii, 10.1.). But this does not limit theory to immanent critique.
The mistake of Walzer and other communitarians is to treat societies as self-referential
monads whose evaluations are internally directed, when in fact most are the result of an
interface between cultures and make evaluative claims of strong universal, as opposed to
conventional, reference.5 Thus, although critique is inevitably context bound, it can partially
transcend contexts by attending to mtercultural as well as m/racultural conflict. By a
process of dialectical conversation and comparison, where claims to universality and
superiority are tested intellectually in terms of coherence and cogency and practically in
terms of their problem-solving capacity, it is possible to come to better rather than worse
evaluative standpoints. Philosophical reflection simultaneously mirrors and critiques
received values in the hope of arriving at genuinely universal conceptions of the just and
good.6
The fundamental difficulty with these proceduralist and communitarian objections is not
their incoherence or foreclosure on intercultural criticism, however, but rather a residual
Platonism. Accusing perfectionist theories of hubristic ambition, it is nonetheless these
objections which remain paradoxically tied to the Philosopher King. Habermas and Walzer
wish to uphold a sphere of competence in which citizens have authority, yet like Plato they
express their ban on general teleological reflection in their role as philosophers, thus
accruing to themselves an especial authority to delineate the ways in which others may think.
This is exacerbated by their equally Platonic confusion of philosophy with governance. For
Plato, the thinker theorizes an ideal of the good or just and then compels reality to conform
to this ideal. The problem here, of course, is that Plato, as well as Habermas and Walzer,
elides the distinction between reflection and rule. Philosophy may defend particular
conceptions of the good, particular social arrangements, as best, but this defence does not
logically translate into the demand that these conceptions or arrangements be collectively
enforced against the will of citizens. It only so translates if one assumes that thinking about
the right course of action also means being permitted to pre-emptively determine the course
of action, a dubious inferential leap. A far more plausible understanding of the relation
between philosophy and rule is that philosophical theories and their practical conclusions
5 "The protagonists of those standpoints which generate large and systematic disagreements, like the
members of the moral communities of human kind in general, are never themselves relativists"
(Maclntyre, 1994c: 204; 1987b: 134).
6 As Plant (1991: 362) makes clear, Walzer (1983: 314) himself forwards many universalist claims,
not least the injunction that it is "unjust" to disregard the "distinct understandings ... that contribute
to a shared way of life."
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become opinions once expressed in public, opinions which it would be senseless to believe
automatically trump the opinions of ordinary citizens, who, for their part, also philosophize,
also render experience reflective. There is therefore an extreme hyperbolism at work in
Habermas and Walzer's arguments, the absurd supposition that Dionysius of Syracuse,
Alexander, and Nero really were in danger of becoming the puppet playthings of Plato,
Aristotle, or Seneca.
The philosopher, then, is neither a ruler in waiting nor a mere interpreter of cultures, but
a reflective critic voicing doubts and aspirations which frequently go beyond the bounds of
his own society. In this he differs from other social critics in degree, not kind.7 A related
but far more significant criticism of our project, however, concerns less a fear of
philosophical hubris than the suspicion that the ideal of flourishing itself threatens diversity
and plurality. The metaphor of health or well-being, the argument goes, contributes to a
cryptofascist politics where one way of life is imposed to the detriment of others, which are
deemed degenerate or harmful.8 Although the expression of philosophical visions may not
be identifiable with a will to manipulate, the substantive ideal we advocate would
nonetheless conclude, were citizens to freely endorse it, in tyranny and homogeneity.
This criticism would be devastating if true, for implicit in our attempt to transcend
Weber is a wish to prevent the move from charismatic Reichsprasidenten to autocratic
Fiihrerdemokratie, a move Weber's pupil, Carl Schmitt, actually carried out (McCormick,
1997: 40-41). However, it is not true and for reasons already intimated. As to the charge of
tyranny, we argued that deontology and teleology need not conflict, that the teleological
determination of the conditions of flourishing implies a deontological commitment to their
protection (Ch 4.II.i). The very fact that a capacity or potentiality is deemed of worth
warrants an attitude of jealous care. And because political engagement is a constitutive mark
of maturity, this engagement must be protected through the enshrinement of constitutional
liberties and powers (Ch 7.1.ii, lO.III.i). Rejecting a key supposition ofWeberian elitism, the
supposed passivity of the many, and committed to political independence and participation,
our project stands in starkest contrast to a politics autocratically enforcing one mode of life.
What matters is not the affirmation or transmission of values, but what values are
affirmed and how they are inculcated. Whether an ideal of flourishing is tyrannous depends
7 For a similar view, see Waldron (1993: 30-35). This does not warrant Rorty's (1989) reduction of
philosophy to literary criticism, for philosophy remains a rigorous exploration of the true, the right,
and the good. Decisively, however, one need not be a professional philosopher to perform this, nor,
when one has arrived at a conclusion, is the political enforcement of conclusions entailed.
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on its content, the specific values upheld. Yet if flourishing cannot be discounted as
cryptofascist, neither can it be construed as homogenizing or anti-pluralist. Earlier we
compared Weber's radically agonistic metaphysics with Maclntyre's Thomism (Ch 10.11.ii).
There it was maintained that these opposed perspectives are premised on the assumption that
the universe is either a mad chaos or forms an unchanging hierarchy guided by a single
summum bonum. Both threaten meaninglessness, Weber denying that plural goods can be
rationally interrelated and Maclntyre yearning for a moment of ideal unity where the pursuit
of knowledge and the urge to act would cease. The modest moral-realist metaphysic
underpinning our account of flourishing escapes this antinomy. It concurs with Maclntyre
that a subjective or excessively lax pluralism inhibits engagement between conflicting forms
of life, leaving each position isolated and tolerating all. This is one consequence of Weber's
decisionism, a consequence which carries forward in some branches of political science and
existentialist philosophy (Aron, 1967: 96; Taylor, 1991: 17-20). Yet it disagrees with
Maclntyre insofar as this laissez-faire, quietist pluralism is distinguishable from a pluralism
premised on the recognition that there are different ways of achieving diverse goods which
do not exclude the possibility of rational evaluation or prevent engagement with alternative
forms of life. As we described it, this latter pluralism is underpinned by a teleological
metaphysics positing the existence of higher goods to which lesser goods are subordinated,
but denying that these higher goods are bound in turn to an predominant good, whether it be
political achievement or spiritual perfection. In this weaker, non-Thomist moral realism the
relation between the higher goods of family, work, political engagement, and spirituality is
horizontal rather than vertical and the necessary attempt to integrate discrete roles and goods
proves a challenging and unending task.
This accords well with the reasonable insight that the general "common good" admits of
a differentiation between ultimate common goods. Differentiation does not equate with
diremption or compartmentalization, since ultimate goods cannot but impact on each other,
but instead gives expression to the unique and irreducible worth of distinct arenas and modes
of life. To appreciate that ultimate goods are pursued by different people in different forms
is therefore to acknowledge the desirability of diversity (Nussbaum, 1990: 234-235; O'Neill,
1998: 22). The advantage of our modest moral realism, however, is that diversity is
preserved without reverting to subjectivism. Subjectivist pluralism makes the three-fold
claim that there is a plurality of non-interchangeable goods, that there is a plurality of beliefs
8
Hence, for instance, Sullivan's (1983: 60-66, 95-96) critique of the turn from freedom understood as
civil liberty to freedom understood as self-realization, flourishing, or perfection. See O'Neill (1998:
17-21) for a discussion of related anti-perfectionist theories.
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about the good or goods, and that the criterion for deciding between conflicting goods is
arational individual preference. A non-subordinating metaphysics endorses the first two
claims whilst denying the third. Thus, a flourishing polity achieves an optimum of non-
interchangeable goods and these goods are pursued by actors possessing discrete talents and
dispositions who argue about the best understanding of each practice pursued. But because,
as was shown (Ch lO.I.i), these actors find themselves within intersubjective networks with
standards that stand over them, individual preference cannot be the sole or even prime
criterion in times of crisis.
It is evidently the case, then, that the perfectionism defended here is compatible with the
fact of pluralism and does not threaten tyranny, indeed quite the reverse. There are certainly
limits to what a society can allow, but these limits are set by reference to an ideal of personal
and intersubjective independence that openly acknowledges the condition of human
vulnerability. What independence and vulnerability signify can only be ascertained through
substantive analysis of real world contexts and problems, wherein the meaning of
independence and vulnerability changes through time. This analysis remains to be done, but
clearly it is both intelligible and permissible.
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11.III.) The Site of Political Endeavour
In Chapter One we saw that for Weber the "iron cage" overlays all political and economic
activity. Actors must accept the inevitability of instrumental, hierarchically configured
organizations and yet harness them as best they can. Hence the antinomy between
charismatic leaders and machines, the machine providing the organizational resources
needed to carry out projects, the exceptional leader bound to this apparatus and yet directing
it according to the evaluative dictates of an inner cause. Here democracy means the
dominance of an active few over passive masses, not the fantasy of citizen rule.
Our three thinkers are repelled and fascinated by this vision. Spurning Weber's elitism,
Habermas believes the modern constitutional state is not merely a means of violence but
rests on an idea of law presuming the co-originality of individual rights and popular
sovereignty (Ch 3.IV, 4.1.i). Thus, democracy does not degrade into plebiscitary rule;
instead, citizens find an outlet for their aspirations in the interplay between weak and strong
publics. However, Habermas' division between opinion-forming and decision-making
competencies engenders a paradoxical politics in which popular sovereignty is extolled and
yet where citizens' active capacities are distanced from government, limited to discourse in
the "subjectless," "anonymous" public spheres of civil society (Ch 4,III.i). More gravely
still, his "ontological spatialization" of communicative lifeworlds and blindly instrumental
sub-systems reduces political administration to "norm-free sociality" and denies labour's
role in identity formation.
Arendt's "Dual-State" is a far more robust reply to Weber. Refusing to separate
opinion-forming and decision-making competencies, she sees the state as the focus and site
of political aspiration (Ch 6.1V., 7.1.ii). A transformation of the state is demanded so as to
enable government to operate by and for citizens, not over and against them, this
transformation necessitating an institutional separation, mediation, and continuity lacking in
civil society. Yet this otherwise radical ideal of citizenship suffers dramatic truncation.
Analogous to the Habermasian division between communicative and instrumental action,
Arendt's opposition between performative action (praxis) and purposive work (poiesis) gives
rise to an untenable bifurcation of the political and the "Social" (Ch 7.II.i, 7.III.i). The
result, again, is that huge swathes of human activity fall under the sign of "necessity,"
administration and the economic being consigned to technocratic elites in manner confirming
Weber's politically realist diagnosis of social relations.
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Maclntyre's response to the "iron cage" is subtly different. His idea of "transformative
practice" disrupts the dichotomies between Zweckrationalitat and Wertrationalitdt,
instrumental and communicative action, poiesis and praxis, that provide the conceptual spur
to Habermas and Arendt's bifurcations (Ch 9.III., lO.I.ii). The significance of this non-
dualist perspective is that administration and the economic are no longer theoretically
abandoned to "necessity" or "norm-free sociality," thus allowing for a retrieval of key
human activities. Unfortunately, Maclntyre relinquishes these gains. His stark opposition
between the politics of local community and that of the modern state and market economy
neglects "structural interpenetration" and generates a dualist framework equivalent to
Habermas and Arendt's (Ch lO.III.i). The result is not only nostalgic adherence to a model
of citizenship already outmoded in pre-modernity, but a reinforcement of the belief that large
areas of modern life are necessarily fallen, inhuman.
All three thinkers are therefore guilty of bifurcating social reality in unacceptable and
simplistic ways. Our arguments against this shared tendency have varied in each case, but
they point to the impossibility of coherently upholding dualist spatializations, the fact that
they lead to large areas of life being arbitrarily excluded from critical reflection, and, finally,
the damaging effect they have on our understanding of identity formation and the self. On
first glance, however, these spatializations might appear appropriate. Our thinkers wish to
side step the "iron cage" and believe a division of reality into free and fallen realms aids in
this. By means of dualist myths, the forces of civility and barbarity can be identified and the
former defended, the agents of lifeworld, the political, or local community now the paladins
of a better future, in contrast to those of system, the Social, or the capitalist state (Barnes,
1995: 211). The fundamental difficulty with this tactic, however, is not just its patent
theoretical and empirical implausibility but the ironic truth that in designating certain realms
as irrevocably fallen it reinforces, rather than contests, Weber's vision. Condemning elitism,
political realism, or the compartmentalization of value spheres, Habermas, Arendt, and
Maclntyre nonetheless exacerbate these problematics by curtailing citizens' decision-making
competencies, advocating an extreme social-economic realism, or compartmentalizing
community and state.
IfWeber is to be contested and if large arenas of life are not to be excluded from critical
reflection, then a monist theory refusing to divide reality according to opposed rationalities
or ontological conditions is required. As suggested throughout, monism means here an
insistence on the spatial interwovenness of human activities, not a reduction of reality to one
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causal chain or value.9 Spatial monism is therefore eminently compatible with the value or
axiological pluralism defended in the previous section. Understood in this precise sense,
monism surpasses dualist theorizations in a number of ways. If, as Weber believed,
widespread political engagement is impossible under modern institutional forms and the
hope of humanising bureaucratic organizations forlorn, then they must at least be
consistently impossible and forlorn. The difficulty with the dualist frameworks criticized
here is that they accept Weber's bleak diagnosis as regards system, the Social, and the
capitalist state and yet maintain that there is still room for hope. But were this diagnosis
largely true, the only honest course would be to admit that there exists no ground for hope,
no chance for real improvement. When administrations, markets, and states, the
incontrovertibly dominant institutions of modern society, are impervious to internal change,
it is simply delusional to believe the public sphere, "elementary republics," or local
community could resist the tide of passification.
It is by narrating a Manichaean tale of fallen and free realms that dualist theories
reconcile the irreconcilable, transmute despair into hope, whereas the virtue of monist
theories, including Weber's, is their refusal to countenance these reconciliations. This
suggests a further strength of monist theorization, the fact that it precludes extolling
politically peripheral over politically pre-eminent spheres of life. With Habermas and
Maclntyre dualism leads to a privileging of civil society. This turn is of course not confined
to these two alone, but a recurrent feature of recent political thought. A sphere of voluntary
association lying between the economy and state, civil society promises a recovery of actors'
communicative and participatory capabilities in a manner which limits sectional power and
interests, publicly thematizes hidden injustices, and prevents ordinary subjects from
becoming the quiescent clients of administrations and corporations.10 No doubt these
expectations are not entirely without ground, for civil society does encompass pivotal forms
of intersubjective life. We have seen, however, that there are also very good reasons for not
privileging this realm (Ch 7.1.ii; lO.III.i). It is said to provide a bulwark against sectional
interests and yet its associations are permeated by these, are as much, if not more, the
preserve of classes and corporations motivated by status maintenance and profit as of groups
9 In this sense Adorno and Foucault are exemplary monists, as are Hegel, Marx, and those, Honneth
(1999) for example, who refuse to surrender labour to norm-free sociality. See Barnes (1995: 215)
10 See Havel (1986; 1988), Konrad (1987), Keane (1988b), Melucci (1988; 1989), Cohen & Arato
(1992), Putnam (1992), Hirst (1993a; 1993b), Gellner (1994), and Rodgers & Cohen (1995). For
important discussions of this turn, see Mansbridge (1983: 70-79), Walzer (1992: 89-107), Resnick
(1997: 97-108), Ehrenberg (1999: 173-250), Scheuerman (1999: 177), and Carter (2000: 228-249).
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motivated by justice or the common good (Ch 4.III.i).n The problematic fact that civil
society's associations have no intrinsic bond with equality or social justice is intensified, as
Arendt saw, by their fluid, shifting institutional structures. The separation of powers,
mediation of opinions, and appropriate distance, one neither anonymous nor crushingly
fraternal, needed to secure fair participation and moderation are absent, meaning in turn an
increased likelihood that only privileged or parochial interests will find voice. What appears
a voluntary realm of cooperation and mutual aid is in truth riven with involuntary power
inequalities generated by the wider economic and political structures of society.
There is nothing in civil society, then, that makes it especially suited to increasing
political participation, thematizing injustice, or countering the passification of citizens,
whereas the modern state's foundational commitment to citizen equality offers at least a
limited institutional guarantee that these concerns will not be silenced, will recur time and
again in moments of contestation. Some civil society theorists have conceded this. To
correct the deficiencies of intermediate associations, these moderates argue for the continued
existence of strong interventionist states so as to ensure social justice and limit sectional
power by holding economic agents in check (Held, 1987: 283-289; Young, 1999: 157-160).
Their arguments correctly point to the overarching role of the economy and state in
determining the shape of citizens' lives. In doing so, however, they also show that the
problems for which civil society was initially thought a solution are primarily problems
originating within and emanating from the economy and state. But if they originate in these
spheres, then solutions cannot be found in intermediate associations, not least because these
associations are rendered radically ambivalent by these selfsame problems, but must instead
be sought in the economy and state themselves (Resnick, 1997: 108; Ehrenberg, 1999: 246-
248).
It is not therefore unreasonable to think the privileging of civil society a sign of
timidity, of an age trusting only in indirect, largely foredoomed responses to social crisis.
Here it is worth recalling Arendt's central complaint against Weber, that his Platonic
separation of archein, "to begin" or "to rule," and prattein, "to finish" or "to follow
through," leads inevitably to a politics of elite domination (Ch 7.1.ii). Although civil society
theorists wish to advance citizens' active capacities, in understanding the state as necessarily
premised on a rule of the few over the many they inadvertently legitimate this venerable
separation and thus enfeeble calls for empowerment. Moderates who recognize the enduring
"
Thus, while civil society may be a vehicle of the Left, it is just as much, as Habermas (TCA, I: 394)
concedes, a vehicle of the Right, of thinkers such as Scruton (1988: 449-462) who defend a non-
egalitarian order, property, and free-market values.
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significance of the state face a similar dilemma, for while they desire increased participation
in government, the dualist categories of their thought conspire to prevent this. The reason
why they initially commended civil society was that it appeared a communicative, non-
manipulative counterbalance to the instrumental, depersonalizing logic of state and market
institutions. The difficulty, however, is that when the state and economy are defined as
essentially instrumental and dominative, there can be no democratization.12
Because the economy and state are the prime institutions of modern life they ought to
constitute the principal focus of emancipatory reflection, both in terms of the internal
functioning of these institutions and in terms of the chance for increased citizen or worker
participation. But if we are not to conclude in nullifying despair Weber's specific version of
monism has to be jettisoned. Weber's monism is superior to dualist theories in spurning
easy reconciliations and concentrating attention on politically pre-eminent realms. However,
his characterization of large-scale organization as stiflingly hierarchical, determined by rigid
regulations, and subdivided according to minutely specialized tasks impels the assumption
that actors are necessarily rendered atomized and mute, thereby tempting theorists towards
dualist myths. Yet this characterization is wrong, something our three thinkers acknowledge,
albeit infrequently. Consigning administration and labour to system, Habermas (TCA, II:
310) nonetheless sees the error ofWeber's "classical model of bureaucracy," the truth that if
communicative understanding "were banished from the interior of organizations, formally
regulated social relations could not be sustained." Likewise, in stressing flux,
impermanence, and unpredictability, Arendt's (OT: 431-435; EJ: 152) analysis of
totalitarianism undermines the equation of organization with minute regulation, inflexible
orders, and passivity, thus indirectly suggesting that if a pathological active bureaucracy is
possible so too are non-pathological, even emancipated, sorts. And in his critique of
technocratic expertise and the impossible dream of regulating society according to law-like
generalizations, Maclntyre (AV: 106) is forced to mitigate his otherwise extreme rejection of
modern institutional forms and admit that actually existing large-scale organizations
inevitably allow for "individual initiative, a flexible response to changes in knowledge, [and]
the multiplication of centres of problem-solving and decision-making."
These observations are significant for showing Weber's metaphors of the "iron cage"
and "mechanized petrification" to be misleading caricatures. As caricatures, their effect is to
rule out large-scale organization as an authentic site for deliberation, shared ideals, and
12
Young (1999: 143-145) takes a moderate stance, for instance, but in endorsing Habermas' claim
that the state, economy, and civil society presume "three distinct ways of coordinating action," she
effectively undercuts the grounds for participatory governmental structures.
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collective aspiration, to falsely suggest that human beings can become cogs. Once they are
rejected, however, the state and economy become amenable to constructive critique. False
turns aside, Habermas, Arendt, and Maclntyre have much to contribute to this rearticulation
of contemporary possibilities. It is impossible here to adequately explore these possibilities,
but, clearly, to gain initial credence they must be underpinned by a theory of modernity that
eschews Weber's totalizing pessimism. This Habermas provides in arguing that the core
meaning of modernity is not instrumental dominance over nature and humanity or an inner
turn towards an isolated self, but an ideal of socialization in which individuals attain maturity
in concert with others. Coupled with his view that individual rights and popular sovereignty
are embedded within modern political consciousness as constitutive and regulative norms,
this ideal yields a standard, albeit indeterminate and open to plural specification, by which to
judge existing institutions. Arendtian "substantive citizenship," in turn, lends force to this
standard by insisting that maturity demands actual participation within government and those
bodies where the power to change states of affairs is at stake. To retreat from this view is to
trivialize political freedom. The challenge in a post-Weberian era is therefore to arrive at
institutional structures that will combine citizens' opinion-forming and decision-making
competencies in an enduring manner.
The potentialities here are many, among them such experiments as the delegation of
powers, federalization, and citizen juries. None presumes a naive sort of direct democracy
where citizens are understood in Rousseauean terms as homogenous or undifferentiated.
Instead they point to a diffusion of decision-making competencies across a plurality of
institutions that together form the state, the binding assumption being that action within these
institutions is the prerogative of all. Nevertheless, without a similar diffusion of decision¬
making competencies within the economy and administrations, these experiments are likely
to come to nothing. Hence the importance of Maclntyre's critique of "norm-free sociality"
and our repeated claim against Habermas and Arendt that there exists no realm of human
activity devoid of ethical life, no arena immune to conscious intervention (Ch 4.III.i, 7.III.i,
lO.I.ii). The truth that every institutional complex is upheld by ethical teloi, that practices
and institutions are inseparable, means that modernity's pathologies are not due to systemic
"colonization," "de-linguistification," or ontological conditions run amok, the misleading
supposition of dualist accounts of modernity, but instead to a rudimentary misunderstanding
and even perversion of the proper ends and modes of collective organizational endeavour.
Acknowledging the embeddedness of ethical ideals within administration and the economy,
it therefore becomes possible to urge a revision of these ideals. Thus, in the realm of
production the idea of "transformative practice" entails an understanding of work not merely
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as a means to consumption, the current motivating ideal, but as an intimate part of the
workers' life and identity. The goal, consequently, is a mode of production wherein the
pursuit of quantitative external goods is checked by and bound to the pursuit of qualitative
internal goods determined by reference to the conditions of human flourishing. Similarly, in
the realm of administration the idea of "purposeful performance" shows that genuine
expertise is a "modest" expertise different in degree rather than kind to the phronetic wisdom
of ordinary subjects. Techne and praxis now recognized as intertwined, the fantasy of
neutral administration thereby gives way to a view of organization where it is people bound
by shared practices and justificatory understandings who rule, not abstract regulations. A
path is therefore cleared for subjecting these practices and understandings to critique in the
name of those they supposedly serve.
The task now is to think through the implications of the above for existing institutions.
This is an assuredly Utopian undertaking, but it remains the only course if we are to
consistently hold to independence and flourishing as serious political ideals. It may transpire
that the vast intricacy ofmodern societies will frustrate attempts at restructuring, that the best
achievable is a policy of tinkering in line with piecemeal and occasional micro-narratives.
Whether this is true or not is an empirical question unanswerable by theory alone. It is
salutary to recognize, however, that the current inclination towards micro-narratives relies on




11.IV.) Politics and Strategy
This study also sought to analyse the role risk, strategy, and coercion play in politics. For
Weber struggle is a fundamental condition of humankind, one magnified in the modern West
by the destruction of the unifying ethical core once bestowed by Christianity. Struggle
assumes many forms, but in politics it finds its purest expression in an unrelenting contest of
will between leaders, factions, and nation-states.
Here and elsewhere we argued this represents an excessively one-sided vision of
politics' potentialities. As Habermas and Maclntyre see it, Weber omits the intersubjective
constitution of political life, that action necessarily occurs within cooperative networks of
understanding and practice irreducible to coercive individual wills. Our defence of a non-
decisionist ethic presumes the truth of this critique. In responding to Weber, however,
Habermas and Maclntyre conclude with an equally one-sided account of politics. Both
neglect the recurrent problem of "argumentative stalemate" and downplay those "temporally
urgent" moments when, in judging as to justice of abortion or the acceptability of racism for
instance, actors vehemently disagree but must nonetheless act (Ch 4.IIl.ii, 10.111.ii). Thus,
politics cannot be equated with communicative understanding or dialectical conversation but
must also be seen as a sphere encompassing principled hostility and conflict. A shared
failure to recognize this truth is compounded by other elements of their thought. Habermas'
developmental-logical narrative of modernity, moral consciousness, and the modern
constitutional state suppresses the historically contingent, struggle bound origins of these
particularities, the decisive role of developmental dynamics. His regulative "ideal speech
situation," furthermore, enjoins consensus as the end point of deliberation and is thus
conceptually premised on an overcoming of difference and conflict. Similarly, Maclntyre's
denial of ethical dilemmas, supposition of an overarching summum bonum, and Thomist
vision of a perfectly integrated community together suggest the possibility of achieving
complete comprehension and harmony. In both cases what is sought is an unattainable
moment of "perfect legitimacy" where politics, understood as an incessant negotiation and
re-negotiation of crises, ceases to exist.
Arendt's strength, we saw, is to give the reality of contingency, frailty and uncertainty
its due (Ch 5, 6.III., 7.1.i). The condition of natality, that actors are free to begin the new,
invalidates developmental-logical readings of history and visions of perfect integration, since
these readings and visions cannot account for the unexpected, for the rise of totalitarianism
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or the advent of revolutions.13 Because action is both boundless and irreversible, the
political realm is inherently frail. What prevents freedom from succumbing to tyranny is not
philosophy, universal-historical logics, or the faculty of synderesis but a contingent act of
promising, of trusting in one's fellow citizens, premised on the equally contingent
recognition that the basis of freedom is not coercive sovereignty, as Weber assumed, but a
plurality which requires moderation and care to endure. In Arendt, then, the reality of
political risk is brought to the fore. The problem, however, is that she fails to fully explore
this risk (Ch 7.III.ii). Led astray by an inadequate phenomenology, she identifies the
political and the faculty of reflective judgement with "being-with" or friendship, with the
result that the intertwinement of power with coercion and the discriminating nature of
judgement fall from view. This also leads her to suppose that promising can occur without
"remainder" or contested exclusions, even though the fact that each promise is a specific
promise, one among a vast number, renders the avoidance of exclusion and of the frequent
need to coerce at times impossible. Thus, although admirably attuned to contingency,
Arendt attenuates the import of risk and, with Habermas and Maclntyre, yearns for a
moment of "perfect legitimacy" where conflict and hostility have disappeared.
The spur to these one-sided rejoinders to Weber's reductive account of the political is
once again a division of reality into free and fallen realms. The rationale underlying the
depoliticization of administration, the economy, and the state is that system, the Social, and
the state are intrinsically dominative, in contrast to the communicative, non-manipulative
foundations of lifeworld, the public realm, or local community. Our arguments against
"ontological spatialization" have conclusively discredited this line of reasoning. Just as
system is a cooperative realm underpinned by normative expectations, so too is lifeworld a
realm of conflict. The task, then, is to think through the interwovenness of the strategic and
communicative without succumbing to fundamentalism, defined in the sense of ascribing a
singular foundational logic to the "authentically" political. And this means breaking beyond
the confines of Weber's thought and that of his critics. Despite his non-dualist theory of
political space, Weber's inordinate emphasis on dominative struggle falsifies politics as both
reality and ideal, leaving actors with no non-coercive means by which to mediate
disagreements and conflict.14 Oppositely, our three critics' inordinate emphasis on mutual
understanding, "being-with," and conversational dialogue leaves actors bereft of the means
13 We saw, as well, that although Maclntyre stresses unpredictability, his "degenerative" historical
logic mirrors Habermas' developmental logic and thus diminishes the role offortuna (Ch lO.II.i).
14 As Aron (1971:84) put it, "a pessimistic distortion, inspired to show that power-politics are
inevitable and indispensable, is no less to be feared than an idealistic distortion."
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to act in moments of radical dissension. In both cases a disabling foreshortening of politics
occurs, either a denial that it can be more than a battle of wills or a reluctance to accept as
central its more troubling challenges.
Defenders of Habermas, Arendt, and Maclntyre will voice two objections to this
mediating course. First, it is simply untrue that these thinkers conceal the reality of coercion
or violence. The "ideal speech situation," the relation of "being-with," and the demands of
conversational dialogue are responses to violence and domination that, as regulative ideals,
provide aspirational standards by which to critique concrete interactions.15 It is by
approaching these standards that interaction can be presumed sufficiently rational or non-
dominative. Our critique has therefore confused counterfactuals with their empirical
actualizations and has misinterpreted the goal of excising exclusionary mechanisms as far as
is humanly possible. Second, and most problematically, this misinterpretation surrenders the
promise of politics and thereby threatens a reversion to Weber's political realism, his denial
that the common good can be separated from sectional interest.
As to the first objection, we have shown that while it would be absurd to think
Habermas, Arendt, and Maclntyre deny the reality of coercion, their failure to properly
address the problems of "argumentative stalemate, "temporal urgency," and "remainder"
means that the full ramifications of this reality are neglected. Furthermore, these problems
are not simply of empirical actualization or application, of regulative standards being
frustrated by chance circumstances. Rather, dissension, urgency, and exclusion are inherent
aspects of political life. We saw that discursive interaction often leads to the entrenchment
of disagreement and cannot in principle include all those affected, that founding moments
are simultaneously acts of constitution and exclusion and, finally, that dialectical
conversations as to the true or good have as their counterpart disputes as to the untrue or evil.
Our critique, therefore, does not confuse counterfactuals with their empirical actualization
but lays bare unthematized aspects of these counterfactuals themselves and, far from
misinterpreting the goal of excising exclusionary mechanisms, actually shows the formidable
complexity of this task.
It is the reality of unpredictability that renders this task complex and precarious.
Because actors inhabit relational networks and inherit histories over which they have little
control, the avoidance of conflict and strategy is more often than not a matter of brute luck.
Broad agreement certainly underpins stable polities, but stability does not imply consensus
15 See Cooke's (1999b: 177) defence of Habermas against Cornell (1995: 193) and Mansbridge (1996:
51) and Habermas' (MCCA: 92; JA: 163; 1992c: 479) own arguments against concretist readings of
the "ideal speech situation." For a similar defence of Arendt, see Knauer (1980: 721-733).
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on all issues. Nor is stability a possession guaranteed for all times and within all contexts.
"Crisis" means a weakening of foundational accord in which solidity gives way to fluidity.
Yet fluidity is at once both a threat and an opportunity. It increases the likelihood of social
violence and unrest, the costs of which are frequently borne by the weakest groups, and yet
promises the chance of changing political orders for the better (Mansbridge, 1996: 47). This,
in short, is the meaning of "risk." When "argumentative stalemate" accompanies instability,
the only resort actors have is to try to effect a new political order by the least destructive
means at hand.
This can take two forms. On the one hand, actors may opt to compromise. Here
compromise is not simply interest-directed bargaining, as Habermas (BFN: 166, 177) and
Maclntyre (PP: 245) suppose, but a principled response to situations of ineliminable moral-
ethical divergence in which actors hold to the good or flourishing as ideals, but accept
varying degrees of imperfection for the sake of the polity's future. On the other hand,
because of the elementary significance of particular ends or ideals, actors may reject
compromise and opt for all out success. Depending on the circumstances, the determination
to succeed can range from majority voting, through civil disobedience, to armed conflict, all
of which involve elements of coercion and the taking of irreversible decisions.16 Whatever
the case, because the polity would otherwise atrophy, action must be taken without the
perfectly legitimating "unforced force" of consensus or underlying accord. Indeed, there are
moments when to cease discussion and to act coercively is the proper course. We saw this in
relation to the American Civil War and Black slavery and in relation to racism and
phrenology, positions which undercut equality and prevent advancement in knowledge (Ch
7.III.ii, 10.III.ii). This moment of coercion, at least, performs a constructive, world-
enhancing role in pushing political orders beyond impasses and correcting injustice. But
acting without full agreement and in conditions of "remainder" entails a revaluation of
political legitimacy. In short, the legitimacy of an order, a procedure, or a substantive
outcome is always a "rough legitimacy" of more or less.17 It is patently false to think the
recourse to strategy necessarily tragic, but it remains fraught with the danger that what is
done in the name of justice and the good now may eventually turn out in hindsight to have
been unjust and evil. When finitude of forethought and power is a condition of being
16 Truths ignored by Habermas' (BFN: 179) claim that the majority vote represents only a temporary
stop in the ongoing discussion about what should be done.
17 "Actual democracies can produce at best a "rough" or "good enough" legitimacy, based on citizens'
generalizable interests in creating conditions of relatively willing cooperation" (Mansbridge, 1996:
54, my italics). See also Alexy (1989: 293), Dahl (1989: 161), and Moon (1993: 96).
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human, we cannot say what is incontrovertibly legitimate or best, only what is better or
worse, and even this knowledge must be tempered with a strong fallibilism.
Because pointing to a real danger faced by mediating theories, the second objection is
less easily dismissed. Without stipulating the scope and limits of strategy, mediating
positions can easily revert to singular logics, to a glorification of violence as quintessentially
political. What is needed, therefore, is a normative understanding of the strategic attitude. It
is essential to recognise, however, that within the conceptual framework underpinning
Habermas, Arendt, and Maclntyre's thought this understanding cannot be coherently
developed. The effect of their opposition between communicative and instrumental reason,
praxis and poiesis, practical reasoning and compromise, is to divorce ethics from strategy, to
automatically condemn the strategic attitude as amoral. The chance that the strategic attitude
might be justified on ethical grounds, that strategy is an appropriate and sometimes virtuous
response to intractable difficulties, is consequently eliminated.
A first step in theorizing an ethical conception of strategy is to acknowledge that the
recourse to strategy and coercion, while intrinsic to political life, is not always inevitable.
There may be moments when widespread agreement is attainable, when genuine dialogue
and sense of "being-with" occurs. To deny this is again to neglect unpredictability, thus
diminishing politics' possibilities, and, more seriously, to weaken the injunction that actors
seek cooperative resolutions before committing to coercion. A second step, however, is to
acknowledge that when coercion and hostility are in truth inevitable this does not entail that
everything is permitted. Despite avowing an "ethics of responsibility," Weber is particularly
harmful in this regard. He (RRW\ 334; PV: 123) enjoins actors to "help right to triumph by
the use of force," warning that otherwise they may be responsible for greater evils, and yet
believes that politics is fundamentally a contract with "diabolical powers," that ethical and
political life follow incommensurable laws. But were politics truly a contract with diabolical
powers there could be little possibility of helping the right or good to triumph, since the right
and good would have no purchase on this realm. Instead, no action would be beyond the
pale, no deed too heinous, in the quest for power. Scathingly critical of the Machtpolitiker,
Weber's "ethics of responsibility" nonetheless concludes with a Machtpolitik of its own
where the claims of justice are recognised and yet denied.
Whatever the strategic attitude may be it cannot be "diabolical," for then all talk of
limits would be pointless. As a metaphor, Weber's contract is a distorting hyperbolism; as a
literal injunction, a license to cruelty and unbridled destruction (Shklar, 1984: 192). A
vigorously normative conception of strategy, in contrast, denies that ethics and politics abide
by different laws and instead views ethics as an immanent response to the challenges of
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politics. In contrast to Machtpolitik, which justifies strategy primarily in terms of attaining
and retaining power, the justification of strategy in our mediating course is the maintenance
and furtherance of the conditions of human flourishing. Moreover, in line with a respect for
limits, strategy remains ethical if it avoids succumbing to a dehumanizing enmity where
opponents are reduced to mere objects. The same moderation and care which informs
relations of friendship must also govern strategic interactions if they are not to degrade into
atrocity. Although voiced by thinkers, Nietzsche and Sorel among them, who otherwise
exhibit a dangerous tendency to glorify violence as an end-in-itself, "the spirit of fighting
without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge'" is a key political virtue.18 It is key
because strategy is most often enjoined when goods common to friends and opponents alike
are at stake. The assumption shared by Habermas, Arendt and Maclntyre that strategy is
egoistic or directed towards sectional interests ignores the real hazard of conflict, that it is
self-effacing contention over matters of principle or the common good and not private
interest which pushes actors towards fanaticism. The threat of fanaticism, however, is
lessened not by urging a liberal privatization of the good or communication in situations in
which communication has concluded in deadlock, but by investing the strategic attitude itself
with a sense of accountability.
This sense of accountability derives from the realization by actors that even as
adversaries they are dependent on others for their continued existence. As a sense it cannot
be demonstrated a priorily, since it remains open to the consistent sceptic to choose
unrestrained conflict, despite the terrible consequences of that choice.19 Nevertheless, the
sceptic's choice does not render accountability a subjective matter of inscrutable preference.
Rather, the motivation to accountability issues from the observation that to surrender the
intersubjective constitution of social life to a war of all against all is to court madness, an
observation grounded in turn on experience of cruelty and an historical awareness of the
horrors of political excess. It is the real harm done to social life by hubris and excess that
impels men and women to demand justifications from actors. Thus, the ultimate criterion for
strategic acts is not success, but success in a reflective, non-Pyrrhic sense, whether these
deeds truly advance the ends and ideals sought, whether they endanger these ends and ideals
by generating even greater enmity, and, whether, finally, they abide by the norms of
interaction as far as possible, if not by their letter then at least in their spirit.
18 Arendt (CR: 167) quoting Sorel (1999 [1906]: Ch 5, III). See Moon (1995: 157) for a view of non-
objectivating conflict that nonetheless rejects Nietzsche and Sorel's "life philosophy."
19 Indeed, Habermas' (MCCA: 100) idea of socialization, Arendt's (HC: 236-238) account of mutual
promising, and Maclntyre's (AV: 190-196) theory of practice are less proofs against value-
scepticism than reflective descriptions of the grounds of human sociability.
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In the moment of strategy communication and fellow feeling no longer suffice, but that
only increases the need for judgement and careful discrimination. Because the setting of
limits and attainment of worthy ends often comes about through contestation and stratagem,
it is judgement and discrimination in difficult circumstances that sustains the promise of
politics. What a mediating course stressing complexity loses in theoretical elegance it
therefore gains in truth. We should not aim at false reconciliations or assimilate diverse
phenomena under a singular logic. Instead, the necessary and creative tensions of political




In his judgement of post-war Europe Raymond Aron (1971: 83) was assuredly correct that
"Max Weber does not belong to a past which is over and done with." No metaphor has
captured the political imagination moreso than the "iron cage" and no prophecy has instilled
such apprehension as that of "mechanized petrification." Together they provided the
impetus to critical political thought throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-
first, as our exploration of Jiirgen Habermas, Hannah Arendt, and Alasdair Maclntyre has
conclusively shown. Yet while Weber and the latter three are not of the past but entirely
present in terms of how we now conceive politics' challenges and potentialities, the aim of
this study has been to discern those aspects of their work which ought to be carried forward
into the future.
The answer, as our preceding discussions revealed, is far from simple. Rather than
endorse one thinker exclusively, in thinking beyond Weber we travelled the complicated
path of conjoining diverse strengths and rejecting manifest weaknesses, both specific and
shared. From Habermas we took his ideal of socialization and account of legitimacy, whilst
questioning his morality-ethics divide and abstract understanding of critique. From Arendt
we took her notion of substantive citizenship and stress on contingency, yet carefully
distancing ourselves from her ideas of "performative action" and "disinterested judgement."
And from Maclntyre we took his emphasis on the good and theory of practice, all the while
wary of following him down the route of Thomist moral realism and rejecting his nostalgia
for pre-modern social orders. The result is a perspective emphasising the intersubjective
grounds of political life and alive to politics' central role in facilitating human flourishing.
Weber's elitism, decisionism, and normatively foreclosed account of legitimacy stifled
awareness of these realities and possibilities. In drawing attention to them, Habermas,
Arendt, and Maclntyre therefore deserve unstinting praise. Yet this praise must be tempered
with the realization that their thought also impedes an adequate theorization of politics. This
we showed in exploring the shared tendency towards "ontological spatialization" and
singular logics. Our conclusion that spatial dualisms are to be avoided if politics is not to be
pre-emptively foreclosed and that the strategic, as both brute fact and ethical category,
cannot and ought not to be overcome, is not just a correction of three individual theorists,
however, but also an important admonition to wider contemporary thought.
The question now is where to take this admonition, its paths of further development.
Here the possibilities are daunting in their scope. Our vision of a politics that nurtures the
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conditions of individual flourishing and robustly facilitates those practices wherein
flourishing is realized would seem to encompass the totality of social life, not simply the
debating chamber but also the workplace, school, and home. The paths, then, are many and
varied, ranging from an exploration of how best to instil ideals of excellence in the young
whilst respecting diversity, to the development of a conception and practice of work which
does not reduce to the accumulation of the means of consumption. To pursue them,
however, we would certainly have to consider the implications of a politics of flourishing for
social redistribution on national and international levels. Although this theme has not been
directly examined, it underlies most of our assumptions and claims. Indeed, because the
ethical referent of this study is human needs and capacities, not entitlement or private
interest, a strongly redistributive order would appear to be called for. Of course, the
challenge then is to determine which needs and capacities justify what sort of redistribution
and how to relate need and capacity to the concepts of desert and personal responsibility.
Our arguments against "ontological spatialization" also suggest lines of future enquiry.
The claim that the state ought to be the prime locus of political endeavour requires the study
of recent institutional experiments to be sufficiently credible. Hence the necessity, as was
said, to investigate what the delegation of powers, federalization, and citizen juries, among
other possibilities, can contribute to an appropriately restructured state. An essential
question here, moreover, is whether this restructured state must necessarily take the form of
a nation-state, as Weber would insist. For various reasons Habermas, Arendt, and Maclntyre
reject outright the idea of the nation-state, arguing instead either for post-national federal
frameworks or a turn towards the local. Our arguments have defended the political primacy
of the state but remain as yet uncommitted to a particular state form. However, when it is
currently the nation-state that upholds the liberties and freedoms definitive of citizenship,
there being no other significant political institution which citizens can call their "own," then
a rejection of this institutional form in favour of post-national frameworks or transnational
bodies might be deemed ill-judged in just the same way as the turn to civil society is ill-
judged.
There was another dimension to our concern with the state. We already pointed to the
need for extended consideration of large-scale organizations in terms not only of citizen
participation but also in terms of their internal functioning. The reason, we saw, is that a
restructured state and economy cannot be achieved without a viable alternative to Weber's
understanding of modern organization. A vast literature already exists on this subject, much
very critical of Weber, yet little of it perceives large-scale organization as a site for
transformative endeavour or a practice with its own internal goods. The principal reason for
274
Chapter 11 Conclusion
this omission is the widespread assumption that bureaucracy equates with tedium and
dehumanization. Nevertheless, if our goal is to ascertain how the work men and women
presently do can be rendered less tedious and dehumanizing, that assumption must be
rejected, at least at the inception of enquiry. We have already gone some way towards
developing this enquiry, but what it now requires is a sustained study of large-scale
organization as a present and ineliminable reality.
A final path of future attention is, of course, the problem of strategy. We have shown
that strategy cannot be overcome, that the recourse to strategy is unassimilable to egoism or
the pursuit of sectional interest, and that the strategic attitude is not one in which everything
is permitted but represents an ethical response to intractable circumstances. We have not,
however, explored the full scope or challenges of strategy. To do so would mean
investigating the manifold circumstances in which human beings conflict, up to and
including the phenomenon of war. What is permitted actors in times of extreme crisis is not
what is permitted them in moments of relative normality. The task, therefore, is to analyse
normal and extreme cases so as to determine what actors can and cannot do.
The above paths are simply intimations of further thought and practice, not blueprints or
prophecies. Whether the study of social justice, the state, large-scale organization, or
political violence, each is a major venture doomed to futility without sustained reflection and
scholarly commitment. Yet, in Weber's memorable words, "politics is a strong and slow
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